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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this research is to offer an analysis of the major conceptual and 
ethical problems facing penal substitution insofar as it is utilized as an explanatory 
feature of Christ's contribution to divine-human reconciliation.  I present fourteen 
problems and argue that penal substitution can overcome these problems by embracing a 
"divine-manifest offering" approach to atonement.  On this approach, God mercifully 
chooses to require satisfaction for sin through penal substitution in order to give God's 
Self the opportunity to meet this requirement by satisfaction through penal self-
substitution.  This divine self-substitution is intended by God to elicit a free human 
response of openness to a personal relationship of mutual love with God.  Its 
effectiveness in drawing humans to such a relationship with God is a result of its ability 
to create obstacles to human persistence in alienation (e.g. demonstrating the danger of 
sin and the value of God's offer of personal reconciliation), to remove obstacles to human 
appropriation of divine forgiveness (e.g. a subjective perception of shame, doubt of 
divine justice, doubt of divine love towards humans), and to motivate humans toward 
divine-human personal reconciliation with a display of the depth of God's love for 
humans.   
 
 
 
 
  
vii 
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INTRODUCTION 
Overview 
 The following is a dissertation in philosophy of religion which examines the logic 
of penal substitution as a key explanatory feature of the doctrine of the atonement.   
Thesis 
Several contemporary philosophers have renewed attacks upon penal substitution 
specifically (e.g. Eleonore Stump and Richard Swinburne) and theories of satisfaction 
generally (e.g. Philip L. Quinn and Richard Purtill).1  Such attacks have prompted several 
others to offer defenses of the view (e.g. John E. Hare and Steven L. Porter).  The 
purpose of this research is to offer an analysis of the major conceptual and ethical 
problems facing penal substitution insofar as it is utilized as an explanatory feature of 
Christ's contribution to divine-human reconciliation.  I argue that penal substitution can 
overcome these problems by embracing a "divine-manifest offering" approach to 
atonement.2  According to this view, God does not by God’s nature need satisfaction for 
sin.  Neither does God need satisfaction in order to offer personal reconciliation to fallen 
humans.  Instead, on a divine-manifest offering approach, God mercifully chooses to 
require satisfaction for sin through penal substitution in order to give God's Self the 
opportunity to meet this requirement by satisfaction through penal Self-substitution.  This 
                                                 
1 "Penal Substitution" and "Satisfaction" are defined below. 
 
2 "Divine-manifest offering" is a phrase employed by Paul K. Moser in The Elusive God. I will discuss this 
in more detail in chapter 3. 
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divine Self-substitution is intended by God to elicit a free human response of openness 
to a personal relationship of mutual love with God.  Its effectiveness in drawing humans 
to such a relationship with God is a result of its ability to create obstacles to human 
persistence in alienation (e.g. demonstrating the danger of sin and the value of God's 
offer of personal reconciliation), to remove obstacles to human appropriation of divine 
forgiveness (e.g. a subjective perception of shame, doubt of divine justice, and doubt of 
divine love towards humans), and to motivate humans toward divine-human personal 
reconciliation with a display of the depth of God's love for humans.   
Relevant Definitions 
"Atonement" 
 Many humans report experiencing, to some degree, existential perceptions of 
guilt, shame, moral self-dissatisfaction, estrangement, loneliness, restlessness, and 
hopelessness.  Many different courses of action are pursued in addressing these 
existential problems, including, for example, ignoring the problem or denying that the 
experienced shame has any corresponding basis in actual guilt; or the experienced 
estrangement corresponds to actual alienation from a real entity.  Christian theory has 
historically interpreted these existential perceptions as indicative of human "sin."  While 
the nature of sin is debated, it is generally agreed that sin includes human moral evil and 
that such evil is “sin” because it is offensive to or, in some sense, against, God.3  The 
"problem" with sin is that it has certain negative consequences4 which somehow separate 
humans relationally from God.5   
                                                 
3 We should note that human moral evil need not be conscious rebellion against God to be considered "sin."  
Such evil is still before, or against God, even if one does not believe that God exists. 
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The Christian doctrine of the atonement is concerned with the idea that Christ 
has overcome, or made it possible to overcome, the problem of sin.  Christ, in dealing 
with the problem of sin addresses these consequences in order to contribute to a sinner's 
reconciliation, or "at-one-ment"6, with God.  Thus, any fully developed theory of 
atonement will have to explain what it means to be separated relationally from God and 
how Christ contributes to the restoration of this relationship. 
"Satisfaction" 
 Satisfaction theories appeal to a divine requirement (by divine necessity or 
choice) for satisfaction in order to explain Christ's role in atonement.  "Satisfaction" 
refers to that which God accepts in place of a sinner's receipt of divine punishment (or, at 
least, the full divine punishment) for sin.7  To say that God "requires" satisfaction is just 
to say that God either cannot or will not forgo the punishment due to sinners without 
receiving satisfaction.   
                                                                                                                                                 
4 I discuss the nature of sin and its negative consequences in detail in chapter 1. 
 
5 Philip L. Quinn defines the doctrine of the atonement as “Christ’s incarnation, suffering, death and 
resurrection are supposed to have effected, or at least to have played an important part in effecting, the 
reconciliation of sinful humanity with God” (Philip L. Quinn, “Christian Atonement and Kantian 
Justification,” Faith and Philosophy. 3.4 (October, 1986), p. 440). 
 
6 Robert S. Paul notes that the term "atonement" is "wholly and indigenously English," and as such, the 
word was purposefully designed to indicate an "at-one-ment" between persons that were at one point 
alienated from one another (Robert S. Paul, The Atonement and the Sacraments. (Nashville: Abingdon, 
1960), p. 20).  This fact is also noted in Paul R. Eddy and James Beilby, "The Atonement: An Introduction" 
in The Nature of the Atonement: Four Views, edited by James Beilby and Paul R. Eddy. (Illinois: IVP 
Academic, 2006), p. 9. 
 
7 There is also a broad sense in which "satisfaction" can refer to both that which God accepts in place of a 
sinner's receipt of divine punishment or the punishment of the sinner itself.  According to the broad sense, 
God can also be satisfied by the punishment of the sinner.  In this sense, God's pursuing satisfaction would 
refer broadly to God's pursuing consequences for sin.  Throughout the remainder of this study, I will be 
employing "satisfaction" in the narrow sense described above. 
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 While elements of satisfaction theories can be found in earlier authors (e.g. 
Cyprian, Tertullian, Hilary, Ambrose)8 the first developed philosophical account appears 
in Anselm and is adapted and utilized by Aquinas.  In both authors, the concept is 
associated with a type of exchange, and as such, is affiliated with the ideas of payment 
and debt.9 As a result it is common among satisfaction theories to claim that Christ pays 
to God the debt that sinners owe.  Thus, a prominent historical take on satisfaction 
involves defining the relational gap between God and humans in terms of the debt that sin 
incurs; the reconciliation that must take place becomes a sort of legal reconciliation; and 
Christ's role in covering that debt is generally spoken of as a sort of legal transaction.10  
 Satisfaction theories differ, however, according to each theory's answers to at 
least two questions.   First, satisfaction theories vary according to their answer to the 
question, "Why does God require satisfaction?"  That is, "Why is God either unable or 
unwilling to forgo the punishment that sinners deserve without receiving satisfaction?" 11  
                                                 
 
8 For a brief history of the development of what he calls the "Latin" or "objective" theory of the atonement, 
see Gustav Aulen. Christus Victor (London: SPCK, 1970), ch. 5.  Also see Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-
Drama, Vol. 4: The Action, translated by Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994), 
p. 255. 
 
9 See Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, II.xviiia.  Also see Aquinas, Summa Theologica III, q. 22, a. 3.  Further, 
Quinn credits Anselm with describing satisfaction as, "the payment of the debt human sinners owe to God 
by the God-Man." (Philip L. Quinn "Aquinas on Atonement," Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement, edited 
by Ronald J. Feenstra and Cornelius Plantinga Jr. (University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame, 1989), p. 
153). And again, Quinn holds that according to Aquinas "satisfaction in the strict sense...pertains to the 
voluntary payment of the debt of punishment." (Quinn, "Aquinas on Atonment," p. 158)  Stump also 
understands Aquinas to be defining satisfaction as that which "removes the debt of punishment for sin." 
(Eleonore Stump, "Atonement According to Aquinas," In Philosophy and the Christian Faith, edited by 
Thomas V. Morris (University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame, 1988), p. 65).  
 
10 Gustav Aulen notes, "The relation of man to God is treated by Anselm as essentially a legal relation, for 
his whole effort is to prove that the atoning work is in accordance with justice" (Aulen, p. 90). 
 
11 Some theories suggest, for example, that God requires satisfaction in order to maintain His honor; some 
claim that in this He is preserving the moral order; and so on.  For further examples, see John Stott, The 
Cross of Christ (Leicester, England: Inter-Varsity Press, 1986), pp. 110-123). 
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Second, satisfaction theories vary according to their answer to the question, "What is the 
nature of Christ's payment to God?"  While in each case it is agreed that Christ's payment 
is substituted (at least in part) for the punishment of sinners, there is some debate over the 
nature of the payment substituted.12  This debate results in varying theories of 
satisfaction. 
"Penal Substitution"  
 Theories of penal substitution have been articulated in an attempt to answer that 
second question, "What is the nature of Christ's payment to God?"  Broadly speaking, 
there are two ways to understand the nature of Christ's payment in making satisfaction to 
God.  We will refer to them respectively as "non-penal substitution" and "penal 
substitution."  Satisfaction theorists that hold to a view of non-penal substitution claim 
that while Christ's suffering and death do (at least partially) substitute for the penalty due 
to sinners, the suffering and death of Christ is not of itself "penal."  Christ does not 
endure punishment by God.13  Instead Christ offers God reparation without Christ 
Himself undergoing any divine punishment.  Some claim that Christ offers God the type 
of obedience that is due, or a life of virtue, or penance, etc.  But all of these things are 
distinct from divine punishment.  Those theorists who hold to a view of penal substitution 
claim that the payment that Christ offers is (at least in part) some sort of punishment by 
God which Christ endures on behalf of sinners.   
                                                 
12 For example, penal substitution claims that Christ is paying a debt of punishment that sinners owe, while 
a non-penal theory claims that Christ is paying a debt of obedience, not punishment (some even claim that 
the Cross is not positively demanded by God, but rather an unavoidable result of Christ's paying the debt of 
obedience in a fallen world). 
 
13 Non-penal theories could, and often do, still hold that Christ was punished by Pilate who sentenced Him, 
the Pharisees who accused Him, the Romans who nailed Him to the cross, and the people who called for 
His execution. 
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 Not only are fleshed out theories of penal substitution found in the works of 
several contemporary theologians (e.g. John Stott, Leon Morris, and Wayne Grudem),  
penal substitution is often referenced as the popular account of the atonement held by 
contemporary Christian believers, particularly evangelicals.  John T. Carroll and Joel B. 
Green claim that penal substitution is the dominant view in America.14  David Hilborn 
notes that, 
  ...penal substitution has widely been regarded as the "controlling model"  
  within mainline evangelicalism—the sine qua non of evangelical   
  soteriology.15 
 
And Thomas R. Schreiner claims, 
 
  The theory of penal substitution is the heart and soul of an evangelical  
  view of the atonement.16 
 
Eleonore Stump nods to this fact when she outlines what she claims is "a popular 
version" of the atonement. 
A popular version of the doctrine: Human beings by their evil actions have 
offended God.  This sin or offense against God generates a kind of debt, a 
debt so enormous that human beings by themselves can never repay it.  
God has the power, of course, to cancel this debt, but God is perfectly just, 
and it would be a violation of perfect justice to cancel a debt without 
extracting the payment owed.  Therefore, God cannot simply forgive a 
                                                 
14 John T. Carroll and Joel B. Green, The Death of Jesus in Early Christianity (Hendrickson Publishers: 
Massachusetts, 1995), p. 259.  Green even expands this claim, saying, "For most Christians in North 
America and the United Kingdom, to speak of the atonement is almost invariably to speak of penal 
substitutionary atonement" (Joel B. Green, "Must We Imagine the Atonement in Penal Substitutionary 
Terms?" in The Atonement Debate, edited by Derek Tidball, David Hilborn, and Justin Thacker.  
(Michigan: Zondervan, 2008), p. 155). 
 
15 David Hilborn, "Atonement, Evangelicalism, and the Evangelical Alliance," in The Atonement Debate, 
edited by Derek Tidball, David Hilborn, and Justin Thacker (Michigan: Zondervan, 2008), p. 19. 
 
16 Thomas R. Schreiner, "Penal Substitution View," in The Nature of the Atonement: Four Views, edited by 
James Beilby and Paul R. Eddy (Illinois: IVP Academic, 2006), p. 67.  Steven L. Porter also says, "While 
no one theory of the atonement has received the stamp of orthodoxy within Christendom, amongst many 
conservative Christians various versions of the theory of penal substitution continue to rule the day" 
(Steven L. Porter, “Swinburnian Atonement and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution,” Faith and Philosophy. 
21.2 (April, 2004), p. 228).   
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person's sin; as a just judge he must sentence all people to everlasting 
torment as the just punishment for their sin.  God is also infinitely 
merciful, however; and so he brings it about that he himself pays their debt 
in full, by assuming human nature as the incarnate Christ and in that 
nature enduring the penalty which would otherwise have been imposed on 
human beings.  In consequence, the sins of ordinary human beings are 
forgiven; and, by God's mercy exercised through Christ's passion, human 
beings are saved from sin and hell and brought to heaven.17  
 
 A cursory glance at many Christian tracts seems to confirm that some take on 
penal substitution forms a popular account of the atonement.  A tract published by 
Evangelism Explosion International and distributed by The Moody Church reads, 
  God is merciful and therefore doesn't want to punish us...But the same  
  Bible which tells us that God loves us, also tells us that God is just and  
  therefore must punish sin...God solved this problem for us in the Person of 
  Jesus Christ...He died on the cross to pay the penalty for our sins and rose  
  from the grave to purchase a place for us in Heaven."18  
 
Another, published by Living Waters Publications, reads, 
 
  God's Law demands justice, and the penalty for sinning against Him is  
  death and Hell...God Himself made a way where His justice and His  
  goodness could meet.  We broke the Law, but He became a man to pay the 
  fine.  Jesus suffered and died on the cross to satisfy the Law.  Then He  
  rose from the dead, defeating death forever.  Therefore God can forgive us 
  and grant us the gift of everlasting life!19  
 
These and several other tracts all promulgate penal substitution. 20 
                                                 
17 Eleonore Stump, Aquinas (Routledge: New York, 2003), pp. 427-428. 
 
18 "Do You Know?" Evangelism Explosion International Inc, 2003. (P.O. Box 23820, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, 
33307,  info@eeinternational.org). 
 
19 "Are You A Good Person? Try the Ultimate Test..." Living Waters Publications. (P.O. Box 1172. 
Bellflower, CA, 90706, www.livingwaters.com).  
 
20 Here are three further examples.  1) "The judgments of God are sure, requiring the punishment of all who 
sin.  God sent His beloved son, Jesus, who was without sin, to die in our place. God's judgment was 
satisfied only through the shedding of Jesus' blood." And again, "Jesus, God's sinless and perfect Son then 
came and told men how to live. He took our sins upon Himself and died on the cross, paying the price that 
was demanded.  Jesus was a perfect man and therefore the only One who could pay the price" ("The 
Answer to Your Problems," published by the Church of God in Christ, Mennonite/Gospel Tract and Bible 
Society, P.O. Box 700, Moundridge, KA, 67107, gospeltract@cogicm.org).  2)"...you are guilty of breaking 
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Chapter Overview 
This work has been divided up into an introduction and four chapters.  In this 
introduction I present my thesis, list relevant definitions, identify my topic within the 
philosophical landscape, and detail fourteen problems facing penal substitution.  I divide 
these problems into three categories: problems facing penal substitution insofar as it is a 
satisfaction theory; problems facing penal substitution as a theory of vicarious 
satisfaction, or satisfaction by substitution; problems facing penal substitution insofar as 
it advocates the importance of the penal suffering of the vicar. 
Chapter one seeks to define “the problem of sin” in such a way that it may be 
possible to develop a theory of satisfaction that avoids the major problems outlined in (1).  
In so doing, I critically analyze four conceptions of the problem of sin including those 
developed by Friedrich Schleiermacher and Søren Kierkegaard.  The second chapter 
critically analyzes the soteriologies of well-known satisfaction theorists, Anselm of 
Canterbury and Thomas Aquinas.  In the third chapter I use the conclusions of chapters 
one and two to outline an approach to divine satisfaction through penal substitution 
according to which God pursues penal substitution as a means to elicit human 
appropriation of God's offer of personal reconciliation.  Borrowing a phrase from Paul K. 
Moser, I call this the “divine-manifest offering” approach to penal substitution.21  I then 
                                                                                                                                                 
God's law (sin) and the just punishment is eternity in Hell...Jesus died on the cross for your sins so that you 
could be forgiven" ("Where Will You be in a Billion Years?" published by www.abillionyears.com). 3) 
...he [Jesus] willingly bore our sins on the cross.  While Jesus was hanging on the cross, God laid the sin of 
the whole world upon him and cursed him...He was completely forsaken by God because of our sins that 
were laid upon him.  Complete separation from God is nothing but hell.  Thus on the cross Jesus 
experienced hell on our behalf; he paid the full penalty for our sins" ("The Gift of Love," Alan Lei, 2003 
(www.gospeloutlet.org)).   
 
21 See Paul K. Moser, The Elusive God, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
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compare this theory with the contemporary satisfaction theories of Richard Swinburne 
and Eleonore Stump.  In chapter four I argue that a divine-manifest offering approach to 
penal substitution can avoid all of the fourteen problems outlined in this introduction.  
Setting Within the Philosophical Landscape 
 This project falls primarily within philosophy of religion or religious philosophy.  
While touching on various theological topics and doctrines, I will not be concerned with 
exegetical problems that arise where the doctrine of the atonement is related to Scripture.  
Neither will I be concerned with the historical development of the doctrine within the 
Church. Instead this dissertation will be an exercise in the logic of the atonement and 
moral philosophy.  I will be primarily concerned with conceptual and moral problems 
that arise insofar as the atonement is explained as an act of divine satisfaction by penal 
substitution carried out by God (where "God" is a title for a being who is worthy of 
worship.  Such a being would be all-powerful and perfectly moral (i.e. just and all-
loving)).  These problems are outlined below. 
Fourteen Problems for Penal Substitution 
 Elizabeth Stump goes so far as to call the popular view of the atonement, which 
promulgates penal substitution, an "unreflective account."22  At one point, she even 
claimed that the popular account of the atonement  
  ...is really hopeless, so full of philosophical and theological problems as to 
  be irremediable.23 
 
                                                 
22 Stump calls this account "unreflective" (Stump, "Atonement according to Aquinas," p. 61).  In a later 
version of the essay, she calls the account "popular" and says that it "tends to be promulgated by 
unreflective believers" (Stump, Aquinas, p. 427). 
 
23 Stump, "Atonement According to Aquinas," p. 63.  In a later version of the same essay, Stump pulls back 
on this language somewhat.  Instead she says, "It seems to me, then, that the version of the doctrine of 
atonement in (P) is subject to serious philosophical and theological objections" (Stump, Aquinas, p. 429). 
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And she is not the only one. Keith Ward claims that, 
  One must therefore reject those crude accounts of Christian doctrine  
 which...say that Christ has been justly punished in our place so that he has  
 taken away our guilt and enabled God to forgive us.  Almost everything is  
 ethically wrong about these accounts.24 
 
Here I outline the main problems facing penal substitution.  I divide these 
problems into three headings.  The first concerns problems that penal substitution must 
address insofar as it is a satisfaction theory.  The second heading concerns problems for 
penal substitution as a theory of vicarious satisfaction, or satisfaction by substitution.  
The third heading relates to problems that penal substitution must face insofar as it 
advocates the importance of the penal suffering of the vicar.  In total, I outline fourteen 
problems that confront penal substitution. 
(1–6) Problems for Penal Substitution as Satisfaction 
The following are problems that penal substitution must address insofar as it is a 
theory of satisfaction.  Attacks on satisfaction tend to take one of three approaches.  The 
first is to use an ontological argument which claims that divine freedom is lost if we hold 
that divine satisfaction is necessary.  The second approach is to offer a moral argument 
against satisfaction.  The third claims that satisfaction leads to conceptual inconsistency 
within Christian orthodoxy. 
(1) The Ontological Argument against Satisfaction 
  This objection accuses satisfaction theories of dethroning the all-powerful God in 
that such theories subjugate God to an authority above God’s Self.25  According to this 
                                                 
 
24 Keith Ward, Ethics and Christianity (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1970), p. 240.  This is also 
cited by Porter, "Swinburnian Atonement and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution," p.228. 
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objection, an all-powerful God should have the freedom to demand satisfaction, 
enforce punishment, or forgive without either.  Yet theories of satisfaction create an 
image of a God whose hands are tied; a God who wants to forgive but is prevented, by 
something to which God is subjected, from doing that which God longs to do.  It suggests 
that a repentant sinner could stand before a God who desires a restored relationship with 
the sinner and yet God could say, “I’m sorry.  I really want to forgive you, but My hands 
are tied.  I cannot do so until satisfaction is made.”26   
(2 & 3) Moral Arguments against Satisfaction 
 Moral arguments against satisfaction typically take one of two forms. The first 
argument, "the problem of superfluous suffering," claims that divine satisfaction involves 
morally unjustifiable suffering.  The second criticism involves the claim that a divine 
demand for satisfaction is at odds with a divine character of robust love. 
(2) The Problem of Superfluous Suffering 
Any theory of satisfaction faces the problem of superfluous suffering when it does 
not offer sufficient moral justification for the suffering endured by Christ.  If suffering is 
prima facie bad, a demand for something that will result in unjustifiable suffering can be 
considered evil.  In such a case, a satisfaction theorist is confronted with the possibility 
that her27 soteriology ascribes an evil demand to God. 
                                                                                                                                                 
25 See, for example, Stott, pp. 122-123. 
 
26 Green and Baker criticize penal substitution theorist, Charles Hodge, saying "Within a penal substitution 
model, God's ability to love and relate to humans is circumscribed by something outside of God—that is, 
an abstract concept of justice instructs God as to how God must behave.  It could be said that Hodge 
presents a God who wants to be in relationship with us but is forced to deal with a problem of legal 
bookkeeping that blocks that relationship" (Joel B. Green and Mark D. Baker, Recovering the Scandal of 
the Cross. (Illinois: InterVarsity, 2000), p. 147). 
 
27 Throughout, I will vary my use of the third person pronouns “he” & “she.” 
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We can lay out this argument in the following way. Suppose it is possible to 
derive all of the benefits of an action, x, from a different action, y.  Suppose further that x 
involves more suffering than y.  Where both of these conditions are present, then x 
involves superfluous suffering. 28 
If we hold to the claim that suffering is prima facie bad then a burden of proof for 
the moral justification of a suffering-causing or suffering-allowing action, x, lies with 
those who wish to perform x.29  If suffering is superfluous then, by definition, there is no 
benefit which could justify allowing that suffering.  The proponent of such suffering 
would not be able to meet the burden of proof and that suffering could be considered bad.  
The action which inflicts or allows that suffering would be considered evil.  Likewise, 
any demand for actions which inflict or allow superfluous suffering can be considered 
evil.  Such a demand cannot be ascribed to a morally perfect God with consistency.30   
 Based on the above, we can claim the following.  If a theory of satisfaction is to 
hold that Christ’s death is not a case of superfluous suffering, that theory must show that 
Christ's death involves some sort of benefit that could not be had in any other way or at 
                                                 
 
28 I should note that I do not define suffering here merely as physical pain.  If x fulfills a particular duty 
whereas y does not fulfill that duty, then performing y might be considered to involve a sort of suffering (let 
us call it a “moral suffering”) that x does not involve.  Avoiding this suffering could be considered a benefit 
associated with x.  If this is the case, then there is at least some sense in which x could be considered 
necessary in comparison to y.  On the basis of this conditional someone might offer the following simple 
argument against the death penalty.  We can derive all of the benefits of capital punishment (x) from life-
long prison sentences (y).  Capital punishment involves more suffering than life-long prison sentences (by 
taking life, occasionally killing innocents, etc.).  Therefore, the suffering associated with capital 
punishment is superfluous.  In order to defend the death penalty a proponent would have to argue that 
capital punishment involves some benefit that life in prison does not; or at least that capital punishment 
does not involve more suffering than life in prison. 
 
29 Thanks to Heidi Malm for this way of articulating this claim. 
 
30 We could also argue that love is incompatible with willed superfluous suffering.  In this case, a 
soteriology which attributes an action to God that entails superfluous suffering would be in conflict with 
God’s all-loving nature. 
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least that it does not involve more suffering than any other means to that benefit.  If 
that theory cannot show this, then that theory is in jeopardy of holding that the suffering 
of the Cross is bad without justification.  Thus, the theory will be confronted with the 
problem of superfluous suffering.  
 If I have read Richard Swinburne correctly, he uses the problem of superfluous 
suffering against penal substitution when he objects to penal substitution by questioning 
why God would choose to be satisfied through self-punishment (or the Son's placation of 
the Father), when God could just "let us off."31  The problem of superfluous suffering 
also appears to be in Vincent Brümmer when he responds to Calvin saying,  
  If the 'mere mercy of God' is sufficient, it is hard to see why the   
  'intervention of the merit of Christ' is necessary for the 'purchase of  
  salvation for us'.32 
 
(3) Appeal to Robust Love 
 Another attack on the necessity of divine satisfaction appeals to God's character 
as a being who is perfectly moral.  One could argue that a being who is worthy of the title 
"God" is a being who is worthy of worship.  Worthiness of worship requires perfect 
morality.33  A being who is perfectly moral is a being who is "robustly loving."  That is to 
say, such a being would be ever in pursuit of the benefit of others and is self-giving34 in 
                                                 
31 Richard Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 151. 
 
32 Vincent Brümmer, "Atonment and Reconciliation," Religious Studies 28 (1992), p. 444. 
 
33 On "God" as "a title of a being who is worthy of worship" see Paul K. Moser, The Elusive God. 
 
34 Michael J. Gorman distinguishes between "sacrificial love," "self-giving love," and "status-renouncing 
love."  "Sacrificial love" is "love as a costly act to benefit others."  "Self-giving love" is "a fully self-
involving act to benefit others." And "status-renouncing love" is "a deliberate abandoning of status and 
self-interest and a freely chosen act of concern for others" (Michael J. Gorman, Cruciformity: Paul's 
Narrative Spirituality of the Cross (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), p. 173) By "abandoning self-interest" 
Gorman is referring to a self-denial of status and rights (Gorman, p. 178).  Gorman takes all of these to be 
patterned in the Cross.  Where I say "robust love" I include willingness to give sacrificial love and self-
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such a way that it would be willing to relinquish any personal benefit inasmuch as the 
pursuit of that benefit conflicts with the benefit of the other. 35  We might anticipate, then, 
that God, being a being who is worthy of worship (and thus perfectly moral) is a being 
who is robustly loving.36   A demand for satisfaction, some argue, conflicts with a 
character of robust love.37 
 There is also a theological approach to this same objection.  Those who take this 
approach argue that the picture of God as revealed in Christ’s parables (i.e. the prodigal 
son, the merciless creditor) and in Christ’s Own commands (He demands unlimited 
forgiveness) is at odds with the theory of satisfaction.38  Furthermore, someone taking 
                                                                                                                                                 
giving love.  (However, God is not a masochist, so where there is a less "sacrificial" way to attain the same 
benefit of others God would pursue such a means.)  I hesitate to apply status-renouncing love to God 
because such love is arguably not in the genuine interest of others.  God's denying God's Own status and 
rights could have disastrous consequences for humans. (Thanks to Paul K. Moser for this point).  There can 
be cases in which denying one's status and self-interest (even where self-interest is defined as "maintaining 
rights") is not a manifestation of robust love.  It may sometimes be harmful to the beloved for the lover to 
relinquish her rights, for example, because it may allow the beloved to fail to understand the value of the 
lover.  However, if there is a way for God to deny God's status or rights in the genuine interest of others, 
then we could associate this type of love with divine "robust love." For example, if God has the right to not 
forgive, God could manifest a character of robust love by denying this right and forgiving fallen humans.   
 
35 This is not to say that God, as a being of robust love, would ever neglect God's Own genuine self-interest 
because God may equate the attainment of human benefit with God's Own interest.  Further, God's pursuing 
God's benefit may also be in the benefit of humans.  Also, by "benefit" I am referring to things which are in 
one's overall self-interest.  On this understanding of "benefit," things like short-term pleasures which lead 
to long-term harms are not benefits.  Also, on this view, "benefit" is distinct from "that which a person 
desires."  A person may or may not desire her own benefit.   
 
36 Someone might claim that robust love, as I have defined it, goes beyond moral perfection to the 
supererogatory.  If this is the case, then this argument can be modified such that "God" is a title of a being 
who is most worthy of worship.  A being who loves supererogatorily is more worthy of worship than a 
being who merely loves without moral defect.   We might anticipate, then, that God, being the most worthy 
of worship is a being who is robustly loving.36   
 
37 John Hare outlines a similar objection where he says "...forgiveness without requiring reparation would 
be the mark of a good person.  And if so, it would be a defect in God to require penal substitution..." (John 
Hare, "Moral Faith and Atonement," Presented at the 1996 Annual Wheaton Philosophy Conference. 
http://www.calvin.edu/academic/philosophy/writings/moralato.htm.).  Vincent Brümmer suggests that 
satisfaction can imply that "To put it crudely: God values his own honour more than he values me" 
(Brümmer, p. 446). 
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this approach could point to actions performed by Christ in which He appears to 
forgive without demanding satisfaction. 
 This objection is relevant here because it creates boundaries within which a 
satisfaction theorist must answer the ontological argument and the problem of 
superfluous suffering.  For example, one might attempt to escape both of these problems 
by claiming that God chooses to seek satisfaction in the Cross because God values God’s 
reputation and that receiving satisfaction is the best way to preserve that reputation.  
Against this, one might present the appeal to robust love, arguing that such a being would 
not be worthy of worship and so not qualify for the title God.  The more theological 
approach notes that Christ appeared to be robustly loving even to the point of enduring 
shame.  Thus, if Christ's character is indicative of God's character we would not expect 
God to seek to preserve God’s reputation at so great a cost (even though it might be 
morally permissible for God to preserve God’s reputation in this way).  
(4–6) Conceptual Arguments against Satisfaction  
 Even if one can escape all three attacks on the necessity of divine satisfaction, one 
must still face at least three conceptual problems that threaten theories of satisfaction 
with inconsistency.  The first accuses satisfaction of incompatibility with the claim that 
God forgives sin.  The second accuses satisfaction of incompatibility with the claim that 
some sinners are damned.  The third accuses satisfaction of a sort of soteriological 
impotence.  That is, it accuses it of failure to contribute to its intended purpose; the 
reconciliation between God and humans. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
38 See, for example, Raymond Schwager, Must There Be Scapegoats? (New York: Crossroad Publishing, 
2000), pp. 206-207. 
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(4)  The Forgiveness Problem 
 Some claim that, by definition, one cannot both forgive and accept satisfaction.  
Thus, if God receives satisfaction through penal substitution, God cannot be said to give 
forgiveness.  For example, Stump argues, 
  To forgive a debtor is to fail to exact all that is in justice due.  But,   
  according to (P), God does exact every bit of the debt owed him by human 
  beings.39 
 
Similarly, Vincent Brümmer claims,  
 
  Through bearing punishment or making satisfaction I can earn   
  reinstatement into a relationship of rights and duties, and what I have  
  earned you are obligated to give...punishment and satisfaction would make 
  forgiveness unnecessary.  If full satisfaction or appropriate punishment has 
  been borne, there is nothing left to forgive.40 
 
(5)  The Damnation Problem 
 The conflict with damnation appeals to the theological claim that some sinners 
will likely still face damnation by God.41  This criticism notes that after receiving 
satisfaction, one no longer has any claim on the penalty previously owed.  Thus, divine 
satisfaction is inconsistent with damnation.  If God condemns sinners to damnation after 
receiving satisfaction, either God does so unjustly42 or God cannot be said to be fully 
satisfied in the Cross.43 
                                                 
39 Stump, Aquinas, p. 428. 
 
40 Brümmer, p. 441. 
 
41 This claim is controversial and is not held by all Christians.  I address it here because it is a claim that is 
commonly held by those ascribing to some version of penal substitution. 
 
42 For example, see Stump, "Atonement According to Aquinas," p. 63.  See also, Quinn, "Aquinas on 
Atonement," p. 164 and Quinn, "Christian Atonement and Kantian Justification," p. 446. 
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(6) The Impotence Problem 
 A third conceptual attack on theories of satisfaction claims that satisfaction cannot 
accomplish what the atonement is said to accomplish.  If the purpose of atonement is to 
facilitate reconciliation with God and humans, then satisfaction fails to do so because it is 
"too mechanical" to accomplish something so personal.44  That is to say, satisfaction may 
effectively free sinners from punishment by God, but it does not appear to restore God 
and sinners into a relationship of mutual love.  A sinner could be relieved that he does not 
have to be punished while despising the One who freed the sinner from punishment.45  
(7 & 8) Problems for Penal Substitution as Vicarious Satisfaction 
 Insofar as penal substitution is a type of vicarious satisfaction it is vulnerable to at 
least two attacks.  First, vicarious satisfaction can be criticized as impossible.  Second, 
vicarious satisfaction can be criticized as immoral. 
(7) Attack on the Possibility of Vicarious Satisfaction 
 Insofar as penal substitution is a theory of vicarious satisfaction it must face the 
challenge that vicarious satisfaction is impossible.  The source of the problem lies in the 
claim that guilt and innocence are non-transferable.46   
                                                                                                                                                 
43 This criticism would not confront theories that claim that God is only partially satisfied by Christ's 
suffering and death.  Neither would it confront theories that claim that Christ's suffering and death only 
provide divine satisfaction for a select group rather than for all people. 
 
44 Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement, p. 152. 
 
45 See Stump, "Atonement According to Aquinas," p. 63.  See also, Aulen, pp. 92, 147.  See also, Green 
and Baker, p. 149.  
 
46 See Richard Purtill, "Justice, Mercy, Supererogation, and Atonement," in Christian Philosophy, edited by 
Thomas P. Flint (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), p. 38. This is also printed in Richard L. 
Purtill, Reason to Believe:Why Faith Makes Sense (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2009), pp. 187-203.  See 
also, Oliver D. Crisp, "The Logic of Penal Substitution Revisited," in The Atonement Debate, edited by 
Derek Tidball, David Hilborn, and Justin Thacker (Michigan: Zondervan, 2008), pp. 214-219, 222-223. 
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 Philip Quinn offers an excellent articulation of this objection.  Following 
Kant,47 he claims that the notion of satisfaction through substitution is conceptually 
problematic because of the non-transferability of moral credit and debt.  He claims that 
there is 
  ...a salient disanalogy between pecuniary and moral debts.  It seems that  
  moral debts are not transferable in the way that pecuniary debts are.48 
 
Similarly we cannot be the recipients of someone else's moral credit. 
 
  If I owe it to God to love my neighbor, it does not seem that this debt is  
  paid if another loves my neighbor a little extra but I do not love my  
  neighbor at all.49 
 
But if 
 
  ...neither moral merit nor moral demerit is transferable or    
  transmissible...then the very possibility of vicarious atonement is   
  precluded, as far as human reason can tell.  Even if there were a surplus of  
  goodness in the universe, it could never be reckoned to us as our own  
  moral goodness because it would not be imputable to us.50 
 
The non-transferability of moral credit and debt is problematic, Quinn claims, for all 
cases of penal substitution, both in the examples above and in the atonement.  What is 
more, it is problematic for any theory of vicarious satisfaction. 51 
 
                                                 
 
47 See Immanuel Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, translated by Theodore M. Greene and 
Hoyt H. Hudson (Harper & Row: New York, 1960). 
 
48 Quinn, "Christian Atonement and Kantian Justification," p. 445. 
 
49 Ibid. 
 
50 Ibid., p. 456. 
 
51 Eleonore Stump similarly argues against vicarious satisfaction through penal substitution saying, "When 
a person commits a sin, a debt of guilt is registered in one column which must be balanced on the same line 
in the other column by the payment of a punishment which compensates for the guilt.  This view raises a 
problem about how the books could ever balance if the debt is to be paid by someone other than the sinner, 
because the debt stems from guilt, and guilt is not a transferable commodity" (Stump, Aquinas, p. 436.) 
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(8) Attack on the Morality of Vicarious Satisfaction 
 Quinn raises this complaint when he claims that there is a  
  ...problem of making sense of the notion of vicarious satisfaction in such a 
  way as to render it morally palatable.52 
 
He points out that a medieval thinker (like Aquinas who made use of the notion of 
satisfaction) lived in a time in which "the debt of punishment for even such serious 
crimes as killing was literally pecuniary."53  Thus,  
  It would be natural enough for a medieval thinker to extend this legal  
  model to debts of punishment generally and to think of suffering as a kind  
  of currency that can be used to pay them.54 
 
As a result, we can understand how someone like Aquinas might think that one person 
could satisfy for another person's sins.  Yet, because our notions of crime and punishment 
are "tutored by a very different legal picture" (one in which punishment for serious 
crimes is something like a prison term) we should anticipate that, to us, the idea of 
vicarious satisfaction for serious crimes will seem "alien and morally problematic."  
 While our intuitions in this regard should be recognized as fallible, he says that 
we should trust them "if they remain stable under reflection."55  Quinn claims that this 
objection 
  ...strikes to the heart of any theory of Christ's atoning work that   
  incorporates the element of vicarious satisfaction for the debt of   
  punishment owed on account of serious sin.56 
                                                 
 
52 Quinn, "Aquinas on Atonement," p. 171. 
 
53 Ibid., pp. 171-172. 
 
54 Ibid., p. 172. 
 
55 Ibid., pp. 172-173. 
 
56 Ibid., p. 173. 
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(9–14) Problems for Penal Substitution as Penal 
 
 Penal Substitution is also confronted with criticisms that arise due to its claim that 
an innocent vicar, Christ, endures a penalty by God.  Critics usually take one of three 
approaches when criticizing penal substitution on this claim.  The first is to attack the 
possibility that Christ endures the punishment due to sinners.  The second is to challenge 
the claim that Christ actually endures the punishment due to sinners. The third is to 
morally critique the notion of vicarious punishment.    
(9 & 10)  Attacks on the Possibility of Christ's Enduring Sinners' Punishment 
 
 Here I present two attacks on the notion that it is possible for Christ to endure 
sinners' punishment.  Both claim that it is not possible for Christ to endure such 
punishment.     
(9) An Innocent Person Cannot be Punished 
 
 In "On Punishment" A.M. Quinton presents a logical argument against the 
possibility of penal substitution.  He argues that it is logically impossible to punish an 
innocent person.  This is because punishment, by definition, can only correlate with guilt.  
An innocent person may receive suffering that he does not deserve, but he cannot, strictly 
speaking, "be punished."57   
(10) One Person Cannot Endure the Punishment of Many 
 
 Even if one escapes Quinton's argument, one must address the fact that Christ is 
only one person.  Penal substitution claims, however, that Christ suffered and died for all 
                                                 
57 A.M. Quinton, "On Punishment," Analysis 14 (1954), pp. 133-142.  Also cited in David Lewis, "Do We 
Believe in Penal Substitution?" Philosophical Papers 26.3 (1997), p. 209.  Also cited in Porter, 
“Swinburnian Atonement and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution,” p. 236. 
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sinners.58  It seems that it is not possible for one person to endure the punishment of 
many people when that punishment is something like death or a life sentence.  Suppose 
three persons, A, B, and C, are convicted of certain crimes and all sentenced to life in 
prison.  Suppose further that their friend, D, wishes to serve a life sentence on their 
behalves.  It seems that, as D can only serve one life sentence, he can only be vicariously 
punished for one person.  If D is punished for A, then B and C will have to serve their 
own sentences or hope that someone else will offer to serve it for them. 
(11) Attack on the Claim that Christ Actually Endured Such Punishment 
 Some argue that even if one can show that it is possible for Christ to endure 
punishment on behalf of all sinners, it can be shown that Christ does not do this in fact.  
As evidence, they argue that the claim that Christ does so is at odds with the claim that 
Christ is resurrected.  These objectors then point to the claim that the penalty that sinners 
deserve is everlasting damnation.  Yet, Christ is said to be risen and exalted.  Thus, it 
appears that Christ is not everlastingly damned and as a result, does not endure the 
punishment that sinners deserve.  How can Christ pay an eternal punishment, when His 
punishment came to an end?59   
(12–14)  Moral Attacks on Vicarious Punishment 
 I present three moral attacks against penal substitution.  The first attacks the 
concept of retributive punishment in penal substitution.  The second criticizes the 
punishment of an innocent person.  The third claims that such a model valorizes 
victimization as a virtue.  
                                                 
 
58 Or minimally for an "elect," which presumably is made up of more than one person. 
 
59 See Stump, "Atonement According to Aquinas," p. 63.  See also David Lewis, p. 206. 
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(12) Retributive Punishment 
 This argument follows the structure of the appeal to God's character in problem 
(3), the appeal to robust love.  It could be argued that even if one could show that some 
forms of satisfaction are compatible with robust love, satisfaction through retributive 
punishment is not so compatible.  And, so the argument goes, theories of penal 
substitution rely upon a divine demand for retributive punishment.  As a result, penal 
substitution is incompatible with a divine character or robust love.  As with the appeal to 
robust love, a theological corollary of this argument claims that retributive punishment is 
incompatible with the revelation of God in Christ.60 
(13) Punishing an Innocent 
 Some claim that even if one can show that vicarious satisfaction is possible and 
morally permissible, it is simply immoral to punish an innocent substitute in place of a 
guilty wrongdoer.  To support this claim, an appeal is made to our moral intuitions.  Our 
moral intuitions, as manifested in our current practice of punishment, reject such a notion 
as deplorable (even if they can be shown to be compatible with some forms of vicarious 
satisfaction). These intuitions manifest themselves in the claim that the suffering of the 
innocent Christ is simply "unjust" or "unfair."61 And so, Stump reminds us that according 
to penal substitution, God punishes "not the sinner, but a perfectly innocent person 
                                                 
 
60 See C.F.D. Moule, "The Christian Understanding of Forgiveness," Theology 71 (1968), p.437.  Also see 
Garry Williams, "Penal Substitution: A Response to Recent Criticisms," in The Atonement Debate, edited 
by Derek Tidball, David Hilborn, and Justin Thacker (Michigan: Zondervan, 2008), pp.172-178.  Also see 
Steve Chalke, "Cross Purposes," Christianity (September, 2004), pp. 44-48. 
 
61 See Purtill, "Justice, Mercy, Supererogation, and Atonement," pp. 38-39. 
 23 
instead."  Then she asks, "And how is justice served by punishing a completely 
innocent person?"62   
 Peter Abelard simply calls it "cruel" and "wicked," saying, 
Indeed, how cruel and wicked it seems that anyone should demand the 
blood of an innocent person as the price for anything, or that it should in 
any way please him that an innocent man should be slain—still less that 
God should consider the death of his Son so agreeable that by it he should 
be reconciled to the whole world!63 
 
It is this objection that offers support to the feminist claims that the atonement involves 
divine "child abuse"64 and the characterization of God as "a sadist who willfully inflicts 
punishment...65     
(14) The Valorization of Victimization  
 Finally, a feminist criticism of Christ's penal substitution claims that this model of 
atonement encourages the passive endurance of violence and so endorses victimization as 
a virtue.  Green and Baker note, 
Unfortunately, then, in calling people to imitate Christ the model [penal 
substitution] too easily has been misused to glorify suffering and 
encourage passive tolerance of abuse.66 
 
 
                                                 
 
62 Stump, Aquinas, p. 428. 
 
63 Peter Abelard, “Exposition of the Epistle to the Romans (Excerpt from the Second Book)—Translation 
by Gerald E Moffat,” in A Scholastic Miscellany, edited by Eugene R. Fairweather (Philadelphia: The 
Westminster Press, 1956), p. 283. 
 
64 See Hilborn, p. 19. Also see Steve Chalke and Alan Mann, The Lost Message of Jesus (Grand Rapids: 
Zondervan, 2003), p. 182. Also see Rita Nakishima Brock, "And a Little Child Will Lead Us: Christology 
and Child Abuse," in Christianity, Patriarchy, and Child Abuse: A Feminist Critique, edited by Joanne 
Carlson Brown and Carole R. Bohn (New York: Pilgrim, 1989), pp. 42-61.  Also see Rita Nakishima 
Brock, Journeys by Heart: A Christology of Erotic Power (New York: Crossroad, 1998), p. 56. 
 
65 Carroll and Green, p. 260. 
 
66 Green and Baker, p. 149. 
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Also Carroll and Green claim, 
 
Feminist theologians have been quick to observe that atonement theology 
construed along these lines legitimates and perpetuates abuse in human 
relationships, not least in the home.  What is more, locating Jesus, 
characterized as the willing victim of unjust suffering, at the heart of 
Christian faith is tantamount to idealizing the values of the victim and 
inviting the abused to participate in their own victimization.67  
  
                                                 
 
67 Carroll and Green, p. 260.  See also Darby Ray, Deceiving the Devil: Atonement, Abuse, and Ransom 
(Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 1998).  
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CHAPTER ONE 
ON THE PROBLEM OF SIN 
Introduction 
 We will better understand the atonement by further elucidating the problem that it 
is meant to overcome.  We noted earlier that the Christian doctrine of the atonement is 
concerned with the idea that Christ has overcome, or made it possible to overcome, the 
problem of sin.  We will better understand the atonement, therefore, if we can develop a 
clearer picture of the problem of sin.  In this chapter I will pursue an understanding of the 
problem of sin.  That is, I will seek to define the nature of sin and the problematic 
consequences of sin.  I will be particularly concerned to pursue an understanding of the 
problem of sin which allows for the development of a staurocentric (or Cross-centered) 
theory of satisfaction that can avoid problems 1–6.  For now, I will limit my 
consideration of sin to its relation to the individual; and the consequences of sin to the 
consequences experienced by the individual sinner.1   
 This chapter is divided into three sections.  In the first section I critically analyze 
four conceptions of the problem of sin and evaluate whether each allows for the 
possibility of a staurocentric theory of satisfaction that can avoid problems 1–6.  In the 
second section I present a reading and critical analysis of Schleiermacher’s view of the 
                                                 
1 This is not to deny the reality of corporate sin.  Neither do I intend to make light of the serious 
consequences that sin can have on other individuals who are not the sinner under consideration.  My focus 
is narrowed here because the theory of penal substitution appears to be built upon a concern for the 
problem of sin as it relates to each individual.  
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problem of sin and its solution.  I then ask whether this view can be used as a 
springboard from which to develop a staurocentric theory of satisfaction that can avoid 
the objections against satisfaction.  In the third section I do the same with Kierkegaard’s 
view of sin and its solution. 
 I will argue that a theory of satisfaction which shows the necessity of the Cross 
while avoiding problems 1–6 must be developed using a personalist conception of the 
problem of sin.  Schleiermacher's conception of the problem of sin does not allow for 
such a theory of satisfaction.  A conception of the problem of sin inspired by a 
Kierkegaardian understanding does allow for the possibility of such a theory. 
Four Conceptions of the Problem of Sin 
In this section I critically analyze four conceptions of the problem of sin and 
broadly examine the potential role of the Cross of Christ in the solution to each 
conception of the problem of sin.2  I argue that two prominent historical conceptions of 
the problem of sin ((A) sin as a type of action followed by external consequences and (B) 
sin as a type of action followed by internal consequences) prevent the development of a 
staurocentric theory of satisfaction which can escape problems 1–6 outlined above.3  I 
will further argue that while a third prominent historical conception ((C) sin as a 
defective/broken/disordered human state)4 allows for a satisfaction theory that can 
overcome some of the problems by which the first two conceptions are confronted, such a 
theory is still threatened by some of the problems listed above.   Specifically, a 
                                                 
2 Another presentation of various conceptions of the problem of sin can be found in H.H. Farmer, The 
World and God (London: Collins, 1935), pp. 170-175. 
 
3 As we will see, the problem of superfluous suffering becomes particularly potent when certain definitions 
of the problem of sin are presumed. 
 
4 I will argue that an example of this can be found in the work of Friedrich Schleiermacher. 
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satisfaction theory utilizing this conception is vulnerable to problem (3), the appeal to 
robust love and problem (6), the impotence problem.  I will conclude that any 
staurocentric satisfaction theory which hopes to hold up against problems 1–6 must 
assume a personalist definition of the problem of sin such that sin is understood to be (D) 
a willfully perpetuated state of alienation from the Person of God.5   
First Conception:  Acts of Sin Followed by External Consequences 
 
 A common view of the problem of sin interprets sin as a category of actions that 
are followed by external consequences.  An external consequence involves one agent’s 
response to another agent’s action, like God's punishing a sinner for a transgression of 
divine law.  One might view the problematic consequences associated with sin as external 
consequences imposed by God.  Much as a parent might punish a child for transgressing 
a home law, so God will punish humans for transgressing a divine law.6  If this is the 
case, then for God to offer salvation with regard to sin, God will need to rescue humans 
from God’s Own external punishments.   
 A theory of satisfaction that requires the Cross as a means to rescue sinners from 
God’s external punishment will find itself confronted with several of problems.  For 
example, it will be confronted with problem (1), the ontological argument against 
satisfaction.  One could ask, "If the only negative consequence of sin is that God will 
punish the sinner, why does God not simply withhold punishment, and so deliver humans 
from the negative consequence of sin?"  What, if anything, compels God to punish in 
                                                 
5 I will argue that an example of such a view can be found in the authorship of Kierkegaard. 
 
6 H.H. Farmer identifies such a conception in The World and God where he presents the conception of sin 
as "something which man does against an eternal law, or laws, inherent in things." The consequences of 
transgressing such law come in the form of divinely-sanctioned penalty (Farmer, p. 171).   
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response to sin?  If nothing outside of God compels God to punish in response to sin, 
then a proponent of this view will have to address (2), the problem of superfluous 
suffering, to show that God’s delivering us from punishment by means of the Cross is 
more beneficial/effective than God’s delivering us by some less painful means.  Further, 
the benefit to which a proponent appeals to escape problem (2) must not be subject to 
criticism under problem (3), the appeal to robust love. 
 To argue for a staurocentric theory of satisfaction which employs this conception 
of the problem of sin and can escape these problems, a proponent would have to argue for 
the necessity of a divine response to sin beyond God’s simply waiving the punishment.   
Broadly speaking, there are two ways in which one might do so.  I will refer to the first 
method as a "deontological defense."  I will refer to the second method as a "teleological 
defense." 
According to the deontological defense, God must punish acts of sin.  In order to 
avoid (1), the ontological argument, one would have to show that this response is not due 
to God’s submission to some power outside of God’s Self.  Rather, this response is a 
necessary manifestation of a particular divine attribute.  On account of this attribute God, 
by God’s Own nature, will not simply waive the punishment for sin.   
There are at least two candidates for a divine attribute to which someone 
employing the deontological defense could appeal.  First, someone might argue that God 
is a Promise-Keeper who binds God’s Own Self to do what God says.  If God says that 
sin will be followed by punishment, then it must be so followed.  Of course, the question 
then arises, “Why even threaten the external consequences in the first place?”  If God is 
omniscient then God would know before making the threat that God will be forced to 
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make good on God’s threat if God makes it.  But if God’s making good on God’s 
threat is the only negative consequence of sin, then when God chooses to remove the 
threat we are "saved" from all of the negative consequences of such actions.  If this is the 
case, then in making the threat, God is committing God’s self to punishment simply for 
punishment’s sake.  As a result, this defense would fall to (3), the appeal to robust love. 
The second divine attribute to which one might appeal is divine justness.  Perhaps 
divine punishment of sin is an unavoidable expression of God’s Justice.  Yet it is not 
immediately clear why this would be the case.  While it may be just for an offended party 
to demand punishment for sin, it seems to be consistent with justice for an offended party 
to forgive an offender without imposing any sort of punishment upon the offender.  In 
fact, does not God sometimes command us to do this?  If God can remain just while 
forgiving sinners without punishment, then this defense will fall to (2), the problem of 
superfluous suffering.7 
Unless one can find another divine attribute to which one can appeal through the 
deontological defense, a proponent of a staurocentric theory of satisfaction which 
employs this view of the problem of sin will have to use a teleological defense.  That is, 
one could appeal to a particular benefit that God is pursuing through the punishment of 
sinners or through satisfaction in the Cross; a benefit which could not be had by God’s 
waiving the punishment for sin.  The benefits to which one might appeal can be divided 
into two general categories: benefits for God’s sake and benefits for our sake. 
First, someone could claim that God must punish sin-acts for God’s Own sake. 
                                                 
7 This critique of the appeal to God’s justice may here seem too brief and oversimplified.  I will address this 
at greater length in chapter 2.  See this diss., pp. 118-125, 132-137, 139-142.  
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A danger in pursuing this defense is that one will be constantly threatened by (3), the 
appeal to robust love.  Robust love would be willing to relinquish any personal benefit 
inasmuch as such a pursuit conflicts with the benefit of the other.8   
 Yet even if this defense can escape (3), it will find itself confronted with 
conceptual problems.  For example, someone could claim that God must punish sin acts 
in order to preserve God’s honor.9   Let us suppose that God can preserve God’s honor in 
this way.  If we can prove that there is no less painful way for God to preserve God’s 
honor than through the suffering and death of Christ, then we would be able to escape the 
problem of superfluous suffering.  However, if the consequences of sin are merely 
external consequences, then once God has restored God’s honor through the suffering 
and death of Christ we will be confronted with (5), the damnation problem.  That is, if 
God must punish sin acts to preserve God’s honor, and if God’s honor is preserved in the 
death of Jesus as a satisfaction for punishment of sin acts, then why are some humans still 
damned?  What continuing concern should we have for sin?  If the external consequences 
have been endured then the penalty has been paid.  So, why not keep sinning without fear 
of damnation?  If, after God’s honor has been preserved, sin still poses some sort of threat 
then we will need a fuller understanding of the problem of sin.  Salvation from sin still 
must involve more than mere preservation from God’s (even necessary) external 
punishment.  
                                                 
8 Of course, these benefits could be connected such that God in pursuing a divine benefit also preserves our 
benefit. 
 
9 The word “honor” may recall Anselm’s theory of atonement.  Anselm’s theory will be addressed in more 
detail in chapter 2.  
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Second, someone could claim that God must punish sin-acts or pursue 
satisfaction in the Cross for our sake.  For example, in the spirit of Hugo Grotius, 
someone could suggest that the punishment of sin is necessary for the preservation of 
public justice.10  We could then ask, “For whose sake must justice be seen?”  If the 
answer is that public justice must be preserved for God’s sake, then we can appeal to the 
same critique just offered above.  But perhaps God preserves public justice for our own 
good.  For our own good we must see sin acts condemned.  Yet why is this the case?  So 
that we avoid sin acts?  Why should we avoid them?  Because God punishes them?  This 
response is self-defeating.  It claims that God must punish sin so that we can avoid God’s 
punishment for sin.  But couldn’t the same avoidance of God’s punishment be had with 
less suffering if God simply chose to not meet out punishment?  This is not enough to 
justify Christ's suffering and death and will fall to (2), the problem of superfluous 
suffering.  It will have to be argued that it is good for us to avoid sin acts for some other 
reason.  As a result we will, again, require a more robust understanding of the problem of 
sin.  While sin-acts followed by external consequences may be part of the problem of sin, 
they cannot make up the problem of sin in its entirety.   
Again, someone could suggest that God has set up external consequences for sin 
in order to create the opportunity for God to save us. Perhaps God’s point in doing 
something like this is to show us how much God loves us, or to teach us to respect God, 
or some other beneficial thing.  But if this is the case, then the ultimate problem from 
which we need to be saved is not the external consequences of sinful acts.  It will be 
                                                 
10 See Hugo Grotius, Defensio Fidei Catholicae de Satisfactione Christi, Adversus Faustum Socinum 
Senensem, edited by Edwin Rabbie, translated by Hotze Mulder (Assen/Maastricht, The Netherlands: Van 
Gorcum, 1990). 
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something rather deeper, like our inability to see God’s love, or our lack of respect for 
God.  Again, we will need a fuller understanding of the problem of sin; one that goes 
beyond this view of sin merely as a type of action subject to God’s punishment.11    
Second Conception: Acts of Sin Followed by Internal Consequences 
 
 If my argument in the preceding section succeeds, then if we are to recognize a 
need for salvation beyond a mere waving of God’s hand we must develop a picture of sin 
and its consequences that goes beyond a type of action subject to external consequences.  
Perhaps the consequences from which we need to be rescued are internal.  HH Farmer 
mentions such a conception when he notes that some have conceived of sin as a sort of 
"self-abuse."   
[Sin] is an action, or way of life, which goes against the true norm of 
man's own being.12   
 
The consequences involved in this understanding of sin are that insofar as one sins, one 
"turns aside from the path of his true development" or "injures his own being."13   
 It does seem that sin-acts have some very negative natural consequences for the 
one who performs them.  Just as over-indulging on sweets has negative physical 
consequences, so acts of sin can negatively affect the sinner’s soul.  Someone could argue 
this point in the following way.  Insofar as a person is a living body there are certain 
                                                 
11 Though, actions subject to divine punishment may still make up part of the definition of sin.  The point 
here, is that this definition is not sufficient to define the problem of sin.  
 
12 Farmer, p.172 
 
13 Ibid.  Dorothy L. Sayers also distinguishes between external and internal consequences, saying, "There is 
a difference between saying: 'If you hold your finger in the fire you will get burned' and saying, 'if you 
whistle at your work I shall beat you, because the noise gets on my nerves.' The God of the Christians is too 
often looked upon as an old gentleman of irritable nerves who beats people for whistling. This is the result 
of a confusion between arbitrary 'law' and the 'laws' which are statements of fact. Breach of the first is 
'punished' by edict; but breach of the second, by judgment" (Dorothy L. Sayers, The Mind of the Maker 
(New York: HarperCollins, 1941), p. 12).  Sayers is also cited in Leon Morris, The Cross in the New 
Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1965), p. 148, footnote 13. 
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actions that are conducive to the flourishing of that body.  In order to function at a peak 
level the body needs properly balanced meals, exercise, etc.  There are also certain 
actions that prevent the body’s flourishing.  Acts of gluttony and sloth are two examples.  
When a body participates in gluttony or sloth, it gives up a certain amount of freedom.  
Though over-eating or over-resting may be presently enjoyable, they impede a body’s 
ability to enjoy future goods. 
 Similarly a human soul can be harmed by certain actions performed by that 
human agent.  Envying and lusting are two examples.  If we allow our souls to participate 
in envy or lust we may soon find that we have lost hold of the reigns of our mind.  Envy 
can quickly consume us, such that we can hardly think about anything else.  And insofar 
as we are envious we sacrifice peace; we are dissatisfied and restless.  In the same way 
we can give ourselves up to lust.  To the degree to which we do this we may find that we 
cannot harness our minds to focus on other tasks or thoughts.  Again we are restless and 
dissatisfied.  When we participate in these things, we sacrifice our own flourishing and 
ultimately our happiness.  Thus such actions are truly "deadly."14  
                                                 
14 It should be noted that a view of sin as a type of action subject to external consequences is compatible 
with the view of sin as a type of action subject to internal consequences.  In fact, the external consequences 
of sin could be intended as a deterrent against the internal consequences.  This can be explained using the 
following example.  When I was a boy there was a rule in my house, set down and promulgated by my 
parents, which limited the amount of candy that I could consume when I came home from school.  One 
day, I chose to break that rule, and after school, I consumed more than the allowed amount of candy.  After 
my mother discovered the missing candy and tell-tale wrappers, I faced the two different types of negative 
consequences.  First, my mother punished me by restricting me to my room for the afternoon.  This was an 
external consequence.  Then, while I suffered this external consequence in my bedroom, I also noticed 
another negative consequence—a stomach ache.  This was an internal consequence of my action. 
Someone preserving a notion of sin as a type of action followed by external consequences might point out 
that in my mother’s case the external consequences are imposed in order to train me to avoid internal 
consequences.  In this case, my mother punishes me because she recognizes that my pattern of behavior can 
lead to stomach aches, cavities, and poor health.  One might argue that God, too, threatens us with external 
consequences in order to help us avoid certain internal consequences.       
 34 
 One can argue that a staurocentric theory of satisfaction is not necessary in 
order to escape this problem of sin.  There are at least two ways in which one might do 
so.  First, someone might argue that this view of sin allows for the possibility of sinning 
without serious consequence.  While over-indulging on candy can hurt my body a little 
bit for the afternoon, my body will certainly recover assuming that I do not participate in 
regular candy binges.  Why couldn’t I dabble in lust or envy just a little bit as long as I 
saw to it that I did not go too far?  On this view, we might be able to escape the negative 
consequences of sin through a sort of disciplined sin-management.  Thus, an attempt to 
overcome these consequences by means of the Cross would be confronted with (2), the 
problem of superfluous suffering.15 
 Second, it can be argued that such internal consequences are really external 
consequences in disguise.16  The fact that a stomach-ache follows overeating is a causal 
connection ordained by God.  Similarly, one could claim that the harmful consequences 
of envy and lust are consequences that God chose to associate with those actions.17  If 
this is the case, then such internal consequences will be subject to the same critique 
offered in the preceding section.  In that case, we will still lack a picture of the problem 
of sin such that we require a salvation effort that exceeds a simple divine waiver.   
                                                 
15 Thanks to Paul K. Moser for this point. 
 
16 Farmer indicates this when he points out that this conception of sin is a form of the first view of sin as 
lawlessness.  The difference is that, "the law which is infringed is regarded as primarily written within the 
constitution of human nature" (Farmer, p. 172).   
 
17 Leon Morris notes "Many today find no difficulty in the thought of an impersonal process of cause and 
effect operating quite apart from God. For Paul this would have been an intolerable thought. For him 
nothing operates apart from God. If men sin, and evil consequences follow, then that is because God has 
willed it so. God punishes men by those consequences" (Morris, p. 204).  And again, "This is a moral 
universe and God has so made it that sin cannot but reap its reward" (Morris, pp. 182-183).  
 35 
Here again we will require a more robust understanding of the problem of sin.  
While sin-acts followed by internal consequences may be part of the problem of sin, they 
cannot make up the problem of sin in its entirety if we are to find a justification for the 
pursuit of divine satisfaction through the Cross. 18   
Third Conception: Sin as a Defective/Disordered/Broken Human State 
   
Another approach to the problem of sin claims that sin is not simply an issue of 
right/wrong or healthy/unhealthy actions followed by particular consequences.  Instead, a 
sinner can be viewed as one who is in a particular state.  Here, sin is not simply 
something that a sinner does or has done.  Sin is also something that a person is "in" 
insofar as that person is in a state of sin.  Or sin is something that is "in" a person insofar 
as sin can be conceived as a disposition, attitude, etc. 
 One such conception holds that sin is a sort of defective human state.  That is to 
say that there is a certain human state that we might call moral perfection, or perfection 
                                                 
 
18 In his overview of the problem of sin H.H. Farmer describes another conception that I have not included 
here.  Farmer describes the view that sin "is an attempt to isolate and enclose the self and its ends, a refusal 
to merge the life in a larger whole" (Farmer, p.172).  I have not included this conception in my analysis of 
the problem of sin because it appears to be fall into either of the first two conceptions of sin presented 
above.  Farmer briefly describes several versions of the "sin-as-selfishness" view.  It seems that each view 
defines the problem of sin as a type of action followed by an external consequence or an internal 
consequence.  For example, Farmer describes one version of this view in the following way.  “At the lowest 
extreme there is that thin and secular morality which identifies wrong-doing merely with anti-social 
conduct, and conceives that no one can be condemned for doing what he likes, provided only that he does 
not disregard unduly the requirements of community” (Farmer, p.173).  In this case, sin (or "wrong-doing") 
is identified as a category of conduct which leads to an agent's condemnation by the community.  This is to 
define the problem of sin as a category of actions that have external consequences.  Farmer describes 
another version of the "sin-as-selfishness" view.  “Then there is the view which on psychological grounds 
maintains that men's minds are made for fellowship, and cannot be healthy and happy unless they learn to 
lose themselves creatively in the larger life of mankind” (Farmer, p.173).  This is to describe the 
consequences of selfishness in terms of the internal consequences that result from it.  Insofar as we are 
"made for fellowship," one might say that a lack of healthiness and happiness are a contingent internal 
consequence of selfishness, since we might have been made otherwise.  All of the other versions of the 
"sin-as-selfishness" view presented by Farmer can be similarly analyzed.  One might argue that the 
conception offered by Farmer does not merely concern selfish actions but also the state of selfishness.  If 
so, its analysis can be subsumed under the third category offered here. 
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of soul, and that any state that falls short of perfection is, to the degree to which it falls 
short, a state of sin.  Sin is not defined primarily by sin-acts but by the defective state that 
manifests itself in sin-acts.   
 The question then follows, "What are the problematic consequences of such a 
state?"  One could answer this question by appealing to external consequences.  As long 
as someone is in the state of sin that person could experience divine punishment or be 
threatened with divine punishment.  In response to this, we could refer to the analysis of 
the problem of sin as action followed by external consequences.  The same analysis of 
external consequences there applies here as well.  If the problematic consequences of a 
state of sin are only external, the need for satisfaction (especially a satisfaction which 
involves Christ’s suffering in the Cross) is not clear. 
 Another answer to this question claims that the state of sin is followed by internal 
consequences.  Perhaps someone with a disordered soul experiences a certain pain or 
discomfort; a mental anguish, restlessness, sense of guilt, etc.  As above, however, one 
could appeal to the claim that these causal connections are ordained by God.  If there is 
no necessary connection between a disordered soul and the discomfort that it manifests, 
then it is unclear why God would require the Cross in order to deliver sinners from the 
consequences of the state of sin.  This conception of the problem of sin is thus subject to 
the same analysis offered above with regard to the conception of sin as a type of action 
subject to divine external punishment. 
 There is yet another answer, however, to the type of consequences manifested by 
a defective/disordered/broken human state.  One might argue that whether any sort of 
pain is experienced by the sinner, the defective/disordered/broken human state is its own 
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consequence.  Living in a lower state, or lacking a higher state of being (when such a 
state is possible), is the negative consequence of being in such a state.  Let us call this an 
analytic internal consequence of the state of sin.  In such a case it is impossible to 
separate the state of sin from the consequence of sin, without removing the state of sin 
altogether.19   
 Still, someone might suggest that the suffering of the Cross isn’t necessary to 
overcome this problem of sin.  Couldn’t God simply fix us as a mechanic might fix a 
broken machine?  The answer to this question, it seems, depends on the extent to which 
God values human freedom.  God could destroy the sinful state by making the higher 
(sinless) state the only possible mode of existence, but in such a case God would be 
removing human moral freedom.  God would be removing the possibility of choosing 
anything but a sinless state.  Of course, someone might respond, “Good!  What’s the 
value in human freedom if it only opens the possibility to existence in a lower state?”  
Perhaps now we will need to justify the existence of human freedom.  We might be able 
to do so by distinguishing between three states of existence.  One in which we exist in a 
sinless state by our own consent, another in which we exist in a sinless state without our 
consent (not necessarily against our consent), and a third in which we exist in a sinful 
state.  It seems that the first state is the highest and most noble state.  Thus, in creating 
freedom, God creates the possibility of a higher human state than simply sinlessness 
                                                 
19 It seems that God could allow us to be comfortable with our low state, but to do so appears to amount to 
a sort of abandonment (whether justified or not) on God’s part; a sort of letting us “wallow in the muck.”  
On this point see also, C.S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain (New York: HarperCollins, 1996), pp. 32ff.  And 
what is more, leaving us in a low state seems unable to free us from evil.  For if we exist in this lowly state 
in a community of humans, there is sure to be wars, theft, envies and all sorts of misery.  To avoid this, God 
could separate each of us from all other humans, but this alone would not transform us from our low state.   
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without consent (though God may simultaneously create the possibility of a lower state 
than sinlessness without consent; e.g. the sinful state). 
 Now, if our state of sin is a result of or comprised of, at least in part, a willfulness 
on our part then we may have found a conception of the problem of sin that requires a 
solution beyond a mere waiving of God’s hand.  In order to overcome this willfulness, 
God could either force our transformation into a sinless state or invite it; even draw it.  
Through the first method, God destroys human freedom.  Through the second, God works 
with the human will to achieve God’s ends.  If we suppose that God values human 
freedom, God will pursue human transformation by the second means.  This goal cannot 
be achieved simply by divine decree.  The Cross of Christ may be an essential part of 
God's opening the sinner’s will to transformation into a state of sinlessness.  If this is the 
case, we will have uncovered a route by which a staurocentric soteriology can escape (2), 
the problem of superfluous suffering.20   
 Still, this view of the problem of sin can be attacked in at least two ways.  First, 
someone might utilize (3), the appeal to robust love, and argue against the value of 
human freedom on this view.  Perhaps the value of being able to consent to existing in a 
sinless state does not outweigh the harm allowed for by simultaneously opening up the 
possibility of existing in a sinful state (not to mention the pains involved in delivering us 
from such a state through the Cross of Christ).  God’s creating the possibility of 
damnation could be considered a violation of God’s robustly loving character if the value 
of human freedom cannot be defended. 
                                                 
20 I will also discuss this possibility in a following section in this chapter where I offer a critical analysis of 
Schliermacher's soteriology. See this diss., pp. 43-72.  
 39 
 Further, this conception of sin fails to include an obvious case of sin.  That is, it 
seems that a sinner could be willing to exist in a higher state of being while hating the 
One who makes the transformation possible.  Just as a patient might despise her 
physician, so the sinner might despise God while consenting to her transformation from a 
defective/disordered/broken state.  She yields to God’s work in her life only because she 
finds it necessary.  Perhaps all the while she wishes she could be free of the relationship 
and would be willing to do so if she could be “healed” without God.  Yet, this despising 
of God is a clear case of sin.  Thus, this conception of the problem of sin fails to fully 
capture our common intuition about the nature of sin.  As a result a theory of satisfaction 
using this conception of the problem of sin will be vulnerable to problem (6), the 
impotence problem. 
Fourth Conception: Sin as a State of Alienation from the Person of God 
 A fourth view of the problem of sin holds that sin amounts to a breach in 
relationship from the Person of God.  Like the third conception, this holds that sin is a 
state.  However, this state is not primarily defined as an internal defectiveness but as a 
dysfunction in personal relationship.21  Sin is an alienation from God; an isolation in a 
way analogous to the way in which we might be alienated or isolated from another 
human being.  F.W. Dillistone puts it in the following way. 
[T]here is a universal creature man whose essential being is determined by 
what we may call the ‘pull’ towards God and that his being can only find 
its satisfaction and fulfillment when all his instincts find a harmonious co-
ordination in relation with God Himself and with His purpose for man’s 
good…[T]his ‘pull’ has been thwarted and resisted and even in a measure 
negated by all that is involved in what is comprehensively designated the 
sin of mankind.22 
                                                 
21 Though a dysfunction in personal relationship with God could lead to a sort of internal defectiveness. 
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And again, H.H. Farmer describes this conception in the following way. 
[Sin amounts to]...a dislocation or rupture or alienation...in the most 
fundamental of all personal relationships in which man stands, namely his 
relation as will to the Eternal as will.23 
 
One might then ask, as we did above, "What are the problematic consequences of 
such a state of alienation?"24  Again, an appeal merely to external consequences will be 
subject to the same criticisms already offered.  Perhaps, then, one could claim that the 
state of alienation from the Person of God is followed by internal consequences.  One 
might suggest that such a state of alienation prevents the 
flourishing/healthiness/happiness of the person in that state.  Unlike the second 
conception of sin (sin-acts followed by internal consequences), an appeal to the claim that 
this involves causal connections ordained by God will fail.  It is not clear that someone 
could argue for the logical possibility of human flourishing apart from God.  If God is a 
Person who does not merely possess the attributes of goodness, love, beauty, and so on, 
but is supposed to be a unique sort of Person who actually is Goodness, Love, and Beauty 
then human flourishing in isolation from the Person of God is impossible.  One would be 
expected to flourish in the absence of Goodness, Love, Beauty, etc.  Thus, this 
conception of sin as a state of alienation from the Person of God is not vulnerable to (2), 
                                                                                                                                                 
22 F.W. Dillistone, The Christian Understanding of Atonement (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1968), 
p. 15. 
 
23 Farmer, p.174.  Farmer notes that this understanding of sin, includes within it the other three conceptions 
of sin that he presents. 
 
24 I refer to Kierkegaard to develop a personalist conception of alienation from God.  I claim that alienation 
from God can be understood as a failure to trust God as the source and end of one's fulfillment (see this 
diss., pp. 82-95).  I also utilize Aquinas to explain that alienation can be understood as an absence of 
mutual love between God and a human (see this diss., pp. 149-151). 
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the problem of superfluous suffering, in the same way that the conceptions of sin-as-
action are. 
This argument appeals to analytically connected internal consequences.  
However, even if this argument does not hold, this conception of sin could still be 
directly associated with an analytic internal consequence.  If existing in a personal 
relationship with God is a higher state of being than existing apart from God, then to exist 
apart from God analytically results in the negative consequence of not existing in the 
higher state of personal relationship with God.  Thus, God could not simply waive the 
consequences of sin without first abolishing the sin itself.25 
Not only does this view hold up over the first two conceptions of sin, it seems to 
preserve the benefits of the third conception while avoiding the two main criticisms that 
confront it.  Like the third conception, this view opens the door to a staurocentric 
soteriology that can escape (2), the problem of superfluous suffering.  One could argue 
that the state of alienation from the Person of God is at least in part an issue of the human 
will.  If God values freedom, God will seek to invite and even draw human beings into a 
personal relationship with God rather than simply override human freedom by force.  The 
suffering and death of Jesus could be an essential part of this divine project.   
Unlike the third conception, however, this understanding of sin is not vulnerable 
to (3), the appeal to robust love.  This is because this view is not vulnerable to the same 
potential criticism of the value of human freedom.  In the third conception there is such a 
thing as sinlessness without consent, which one might argue is as valuable as sinlessness 
with consent.  It is not clear that the same holds with sin as a state of alienation from God 
                                                 
25 "First" here indicates logical priority, not temporal. 
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as Person.  If freedom is an essential component of personal relationship, then on this 
conception of sin there will be no such thing as sinlessness without consent.  We could 
not be in a personal relationship with God without freely engaging such a relationship.  A 
relationship without freedom would de-personalize human beings and turn them into 
objects in relationship to God.  So, God would not be able to override human freedom 
without simultaneously overriding the possibility of personal relationship with God (the 
very state which we’d presume God to be overriding human freedom to achieve).  Thus, 
in order to bring the human being out of a sinful state on this view, God must work with 
human freedom to achieve God’s ends.  Whereas in the third conception, by overriding 
human freedom God can destroy the possibility of sin but preserve sinlessness, in this 
conception, by overriding human freedom God destroys even the possibility of 
sinlessness. 
Second, this conception of sin fully captures our common intuitions about the 
nature of sin.  It would not be possible to hate God without somehow being isolated from 
God’s Person by one's hatred.  Thus, this view can also avoid (6), the impotence problem.  
And, if someone were to claim that this view fails to capture our common intuitions about 
sin in that our common intuitions include sin-as-action or sin as a 
defective/disordered/broken state we need only note that this fourth description of sin and 
its consequences allows for each of the other three views within it.26  By being alienated 
                                                 
26 Farmer makes the same claim with regard to this last view of sin and the three conceptions of sin he 
presents before it.  “...in a way that is not unimportant to note, the three conceptions of sin first mentioned 
above are all included in the specifically religious category.  Thus, sin, being against God, is felt as being 
against a law and an order which must somehow run throughout all creation...And, being against God, it is 
felt as being against the self; for God is apprehended as having created the self precisely that He might thus 
address it and claim its whole obedience...Finally, sin, being against an Eternal will which includes the 
whole of creation in its scope, is felt as being the most radical form of self-isolation...the more so as the 
divine demand is...mediated through, and draws its content from, man's social world and its requirements”  
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from God, one could be in and allow for a defective human state which will manifest 
itself in sinful actions.  These sinful actions could be followed by both internal and 
external consequences (or the threat of external consequences).  Thus, what has been 
presented here as four conceptions of the problem of sin could be viewed rather as four 
aspects of the problem of sin, the core aspect being the current conception under 
consideration: sin as alienation from the Person of God. 
 As a result, it appears that we must not neglect the role of alienation from the 
Person of God in a definition of sin.27  Such a personalist conception has an advantage 
over the first two conceptions of sin in that it does not preempt the possibility of escaping 
the problem of superfluous suffering.28  Further, unlike the third conception, a personalist 
conception of the problem of sin allows for a satisfaction theory that can more 
convincingly overcome (3), the appeal to robust love and (6), the impotence problem.  
Schleiermacher’s Conception of the Problem of Sin and Its Solution 
 In what follows I will offer a reading and critical analysis of Schleiermacher’s 
conception of the problem of sin and its solution.  I will then ask whether such a view can 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Farmer, pp.174-175). This can address Darby Ray's concern that definitions of sin as alienation from God 
"focus so exclusively on divine-human relations that they establish human morality solely or even primarily 
in relation to a transcendent Other, with the result that the interhuman sphere is practically ignored" (Darby 
Ray, Deceiving the Devil (Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 1998), p. 33).  An individual's failure in the 
interhuman sphere can be seen as a manifestation of that person's alienation from God.  Likewise, the more 
a person comes to love God with all of her heart, the more she will love her neighbor as herself. 
 
27 “[In] a faith which regards a living and personal God as the original creator and final goal of human 
existence…the essential problem of the atonement is the restoration of a torn fabric of personal 
relationships” (Dillistone, p. 16). 
 
28 We will explore a personalist conception in more detail later in this chapter when we critically analyze 
Kierkegaard's understanding of sin and sin’s opposite, faith.  See this diss., pp. 73-99. 
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offer hope for the development of a theory of satisfaction which can avoid problems 1-
6.29   
I will argue that according to Schleiermacher sin is a type of defective human 
state.  When we yield to the independent impulses of the flesh, we exist (like beasts) in a 
lower state of being.  This lower state is sin inasmuch as we are disposed to follow its 
impulses in the face of the impulses of the God-consciousness.  This lower state of being 
is an analytic internal consequence of existing in a state of sin.  We are implicated in the 
problem of sin in that we allow for and perpetuate this sinful state by the movements of 
our own will.  
 I will then offer a reading of Schleiermacher’s soteriology.  I will argue that 
according to Schleiermacher, God seeks to transform the human being such that the God-
consciousness rules over the impulses of the flesh.  This is a goal that the sinner cannot 
achieve alone.  Yet, the sinner’s will is still the gateway to this transformation.  God 
seeks to initiate the process of transformation by inviting and drawing the human being to 
a place of openness through an attraction presented in the teaching and action of Christ.  
In the Cross, Christ displays God’s love in such a way that invites and attracts the sinner 
to a fellowship with God in which God can, with the sinner’s consent, begin the work of 
transformation in the sinner’s self-consciousness. 
 Finally, I will ask whether this reading can inspire a staurocentric theory of 
satisfaction that can escape problems of 1–6.  I will argue that while such a theory could 
plausibly escape problem (2), the problem of superfluous suffering (a problem which 
                                                 
 
29 While Schleiermacher himself is not a satisfaction theorist, I will be concerned with the possibility that 
his soteriology could inspire a viable satisfaction theory. 
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plagued the first two conceptions of sin above), it seems that such a satisfaction theory 
would still be confronted by (3), the appeal to robust love, and (6), the impotence 
problem.   
The Problem of Sin 
Sin as a Defective Human State 
 While Schleiermacher’s analysis of sin contains an understanding of sin as a 
certain category of action, it would be wrong to conclude that Schleiermacher holds 
exclusively to such an understanding of sin.30  While sin-as-action makes up part of 
Schleiermacher’s analysis, it is clear that Schleiermacher’s view of sin extends beyond 
this to the state of the human being.  This is plain to see when we note that in The 
Christian Faith, the “Second Part of the System of Doctrine” Schliermacher introduces a 
section titled “Sin as a State of Man.”31   
 If I have read Schleiermacher correctly, then he holds that sin is characterized by 
a defective state of the soul. Schleiermacher claims that within human beings the flesh 
and the spirit are in conflict.  When the flesh, or “the totality of the so-called lower 
powers of the soul,” is asserted as "an independent motive principle" over against the 
influence of the God-consciousness, sin is present.32  On the other hand, the person 
                                                 
30 There are various places in Schleiermacher’s analysis of sin where one might be tempted to conclude that 
Schleiermacher holds to a sin-as-act conception of the nature of sin.  For example, in The Christian Faith, 
he claims that “…as the swift movement of a sensuous excitation towards its object without ranging itself 
with the higher self-consciousness is unquestionably the act of the individual, every single sin of the 
individual must necessarily have its source in himself” (Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith 
(CF), 69.1).  And again, “…what gives a moment the character of sin is the self-centered activity of the 
flesh…for all activities of the flesh are good when subservient to the spirit, and all are evil when severed 
from it” (CF, 74.1).  And again, “…the distinctive feature of Christian piety lies in the fact that whatever 
alienation from God there is in the phases of our experience, we are conscious of it as an action originating 
in ourselves, which we call Sin…” (CF, 63). 
 
31 CF, 66-74.  
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whose flesh is susceptible only to impulses from the God-consciousness is in a sinless 
(non-defective) state.  Thus, he claims that sin is “an incapacity of the spirit.”33  That is, 
sin is an arrestment of the “determinative power of the spirit, due to the independence of 
the sensuous functions.”34  Because of this sin is a “derangement of our nature”35 and a 
“hindrance of life.”36  Robert Merrihew Adams describes this in the following way. 
Sin in this view, as in much ancient and modern thought, is rooted in a 
conflict between lower and higher faculties or aspects of the self.  It is 
constituted by a failure of the lower or sensuous consciousness to be 
properly subservient to the higher or religious consciousness.37 
 
Now that we’ve determined that Schleiermacherian sin involves a defective 
human state, let us attempt to more fully elucidate the nature of the defect.  
                                                                                                                                                 
32 CF, 66.2.  
 
33 Ibid. (emphasis mine). One might note that “spirit” and “God-consciousness” are not identical in 
Schleiermacher and yet I am using them interchangeably here.  I argue that while the two are distinct in 
parts of The Christian Faith, for the purposes of our discussion of Schleiermacher’s view of sin, the 
concepts can and should be used interchangeably.  Additionally, “higher self-consciousness” can be read as 
“God-consciousness” or “spirit” in Schleiermacher’s discussion of sin.  Schleiermacher describes spirit as 
“[a human’s] inner side, as a self-active being in whom God-consciousness is possible.” (CF, 59.1).  
Wyman takes this to mean that “Spirit would refer, then, to the higher self-consciousness (or the capacity 
for it)” (Walter E. Wyman Jr., “Sin and Redemption,” in The Cambridge Companion to Friedrich 
Schleiermacher, edited by Jacqueline Mariña (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2005), pp. 129-
150).  Schleiermacher claims that without the God-consciousness there is no sin.  While there may be an 
independent function of the flesh, the flesh cannot be in conflict with the spirit until the God-consciousness 
is awakened (CF, 67.1).  And it is the God-consciousness that resists the independent motion of the flesh 
(CF, 67.2).  Thus it seems, that to speak of the spirit in tension with the flesh is to say that the God-
consciousness through the spirit, is in tension with the flesh.  In this way, Schleiermacher and we, may 
speak of the tension between the flesh and the God-consciousness and mean the same thing as the tension 
between the flesh and the spirit.  Since it is ultimately this tension that we are concerned to define, “God-
consciousness” and “spirit” seem to be interchangeable insofar as they seem to relate to this tension in the 
same way.  Similarly, “higher self-consciousness” seems to be akin to “spirit” and “God-consciousness” in 
as much as the tension between the “higher self-consciousness” and the “lower self-consciousness” seems 
to correlate with the tension between spirit and flesh.   
 
34 CF, 66.2. 
 
35 CF, 68 (emphasis mine). 
 
36 CF, 83.1. 
 
37 Robert Merrihew Adams, “Schleiermacher on Evil,” Faith and Philosophy 13.4 (Oct, 1996), p. 568.  And 
later he notes that in Schleiermacher, “Specifically, sin is limitation of the God-conciousness imparted by 
God” (Adams, p. 569). 
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Schleiermacher holds that the God-consciousness is essential to sin.  While there may 
be an independent function of the flesh, there is no sin unless the God-consciousness is in 
tension with it.38  Thus, to understand Schleiermacher’s view of sin, we must define the 
God-consciousness and determine how it can be in tension with the flesh.   
 If I have read Schleiermacher correctly then the activity of the God-consciousness 
which makes sin possible is the activity whereby we become aware of and encouraged to 
follow legitimate moral demands.39  This view finds support throughout The Christian 
Faith.  Schleiermacher claims,  
...the modes of action emanating from our God-consciousness are identical 
with those developed from the idea of the good.40  
  
That is,  
...all modes of activity issuing from our God-consciousness and subject to 
its prompting confront us as moral demands.41   
 
This reading finds further support when we see that Schleiermacher describes sin as the 
state in which we desire what Christ condemns.42  Further he says,  
…sin is committed only where there exists a commanding divine will to 
which some active impulse is the opposition.43   
                                                 
 
38 CF, 67.1 
 
39 By “legitimate” here, I refer to demands which come from a source with the authority to dictate morality.  
In this case, that is God.  The question concerning the source of God’s moral authority is out of the scope of 
this paper.  Here it is presumed that God does have such authority. 
 
40 CF 83.1.  One might note that Schleiermacher here attributes this view to the Evangelical (Protestant) 
Church and thus be tempted to suggest that he is here presenting a view held by some, but not necessarily 
himself.  However, Schleiermacher joins himself to the Evangelical view by using the pronoun “we” when 
speaking of the Evangelical view (CF, 83.1); as well as “us Evangelical (Protestant) Christians” elsewhere 
(CF 3.1). 
 
41 CF, 83.1. 
 
42 CF, 66.2. 
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And again, he claims that defect, or living by the independent impulse of our sensuous 
self-consciousness, becomes sin when we are made to recognize the divine will.44  If the 
independent impulse of our sensuous self-consciousness is not sin until the God-
consciousness is in tension with it, and the same impulse is said to become sin when we 
recognize the divine will, then we can read Schleiermacher as including the illumination 
of the divine will as an activity of the God-consciousness. 
Thus, it seems that when this aspect of the God-consciousness (the God-
consciousness as revealing divine demands) is present and the sensuous self-
consciousness still motivates the self independently, that self is in sin.  We can now begin 
to understand how the God-consciousness can be in tension with the sensuous self-
consciousness.  The God-consciousness reveals divine demands and encourages us to 
follow them, while our sensuous self-consciousness moves us to follow its own 
promptings (which may be contrary to the promptings of the God-consciousness). 
 We can clarify this point by appealing to a distinction between human beings and 
animals.  C.W. Christian interprets Schleiermacher as saying 
Without God-consciousness there can be no awareness of sin, only animal 
sensuality.  The awakening of our sense of God arouses in us a sense of 
the higher life we do not possess.45  
 
We might say that while a beast is moved by the flesh, it cannot be considered a sinner 
because it has no awareness of any moral demand to the contrary.  The flesh dominates 
by default in that there is nothing for it to struggle against.  The human on the other hand 
                                                                                                                                                 
43 CF, 81.1. 
 
44 CF, 81.3. 
 
45 C.W. Christian, Friedrich Schleiermacher (Waco, Texas: Word Books, 1979), p. 115. 
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is accountable to her moral illumination and is thus a “sinner” inasmuch as the flesh 
wins out over the God-consciousness.  Thus, Schleiermacher can say that a person is in a 
state of sin inasmuch as she is disposed to follow her sensuous impulses over against the 
direction of her God-consciousness. 
Three Potential Objections to This Reading and My Responses 
 There are at least three ways in which someone might object to my reading of the 
God-consciousness and its role in Schleiermacher’s conception of sin.  First, someone 
might argue that this understanding of God-consciousness is misguided in that it appears 
to interpret sin as a transgression of divine law (a view which Schleiermacher appears to 
reject).  Second, someone might argue that this reading is wrong to relegate moral 
insights and feelings to the God-consciousness.  Third, someone might argue that I have 
misinterpreted sin as a moral concept instead of a religious concept.  Here I outline these 
three criticisms and offer responses to each.  In so doing, I aim to develop an even clearer 
picture of the role of the God-consciousness in Schleiermacher’s view of sin. 
 Someone could claim that I have attributed to Schleiermacher a view that he 
clearly rejects.  That is, I have suggested that he defines sin as a transgression of divine 
law.  An objector could point to CF 66.2 where Schleiermacher claims that his definition 
of sin (as “an arrestment of the determinative power of the spirit, due to an independence 
of the sensuous functions”) is less in harmony with an understanding of sin as a 
“violation of the divine law.”46   Again, one might read Schleiermacher as Richard 
Niebuhr does when he says, 
While Schleiermacher does call sin a ‘turning away from God,’ the 
metaphor of rebellion or disobedience is not significantly present, and its 
                                                 
46 CF, 66.2. Though, Schleiermacher notes that such a harmony may be possible. 
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absence is undoubtedly coupled with the unimportance of the role that 
divine law plays in his theology (CF 68.3) and with the omission, from his 
view of the divine economy of creation and redemption, of any serious 
consideration of Israel and its Scriptures.47  
 
An objector would be correct to note that my understanding of God-consciousness 
adheres to the idea that God reveals God’s will and encourages the following of God’s 
will through the human spirit.  God’s will as revealed in the human spirit is not merely 
suggestive, but morally imperative.  Therefore God’s will as revealed in the human spirit 
can be understood to be a revelation of divine law.  Insofar as a sinner is defined as one 
who does not act with the God-consciousness as his motive principle, a sinner (according 
to my reading) could also be defined as one who transgresses divine law.    
However, we must make a distinction between what I will call, externally and 
internally promulgated divine law.   Externally promulgated divine law concerns divine 
demands that are made known through some sort of announcement outside of the God-
consciousness.  This would refer primarily to the Old Testament law or commands issued 
through Christ’s teaching.  Internally promulgated divine law concerns divine demands 
issued through the God-consciousness. 
 My understanding of God-consciousness employs “divine law” in the internal 
sense.  It appears that when Schleiermacher refers to “divine law” in the passages above, 
he is using “divine law” in the external sense.  For example, to support his position, 
Niebuhr cites CF 68.3.  Presumably he is here alluding to the passage where 
Schleiermacher says, 
                                                 
 
47 Richard R Niebuhr, Schleiermacher on Christ and Religion (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1964), 
p. 200, footnote 34.   
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It is of course true that the consciousness of sin comes from the law, but 
as the law in the very multitude of its precepts is but an imperfect 
representation of the good, and even in the unity of an all-embracing 
maxim does not show how it can be obeyed, the knowledge of sin that 
arises out of it is ever in some respects incomplete and in some 
uncertain…48 
 
When referring to the law in this passage, Schleiermacher cites Romans 7:7 where Paul 
says 
What shall we say then?  Is the Law sin?  May it never be!  On the 
contrary, I would not have come to know sin except through the Law; for I 
would not have known about coveting if the Law had not said, ‘You shall 
not covet’.49 
 
Paul is here referring to the Mosaic Law and makes explicit reference to the command 
against coveting in Exodus 20:17.  Thus, it appears that in citing Romans 7:7, 
Schleiermacher is indicating that by “law” he means the externally promulgated divine 
law of the Old Testament.  This is not in conflict with my reading which claims that sin is 
a state in which the impulses of the flesh struggle against the God-consciousness through 
which we perceive and are encouraged to follow internally-promulgated divine law.50  
 Second, someone might argue that I am wrong to relegate moral insights and 
feelings to the God-consciousness.  Moral insights and feelings, one might say, are not 
part of the God-consciousness but rather are activities specifically associated with the 
flesh, which is the sensible self-consciousness.  Walter E. Wyman, Jr. notes that  
                                                 
48 CF, 68.3. 
 
49 Rom. 7:7 (New American Standard Bible). 
 
50 According to my reading, however, the internally-promulgated divine law may call for adherence to the 
externally-promulgated divine law.  The fact that my reading may have a place for an understanding of sin 
as a transgression of externally-promulgated divine law is not a problem when we recognize that 
Schleiermacher held that his view of sin could possibly be compatible with an understanding of sin as a 
“violation of divine law” (CF, 66.2). 
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[Schleiermacher] is explicit that flesh means ‘the totality of the so-
called lower powers of the soul’ (CF 66.2); we may take it to mean, in 
Schleiermacher’s philosophical vocabulary, the sensible self-
consciousness.51 
 
 And, according to Wyman’s reading, moral feelings are a part of the sensible self-
consciousness. 
It is the realm of feeling (or immediate self-consciousness) which arises 
from the self’s relation to the world (including ‘social’ and ‘moral’ 
feelings) that Schleiermacher designates the ‘lower’ or ‘sensible self-
consciousness’.52 
 
This claim is supported in The Christian Faith where Schleiermacher says,   
…by the word ‘sensible’ we understand the social and moral feelings no 
less than the self-regarding…53 
 
Thus, it would seem that moral insights and feelings should be read as belonging to the 
sensible self-consciousness.  If the sensible self-consciousness can be equated with the 
flesh, then moral insights and feelings cannot be understood to belong to the God-
consciousness for Schleiermacher strongly distinguishes between the activities of the 
flesh and those of the God-consciousness. 
 Against this criticism, I will first argue that we should not, as Wyman does, 
equate Schleiermacher’s use of “flesh” with his use of “sensible self-consciousness.”  I 
will argue that Schleiermacher’s use of “flesh” does not include moral insights and 
feelings.  As we noted above, Wyman cites CF 66.2 when explaining Schleiermacher’s 
use of “flesh.”  There Schleiermacher speaks of the tension between the flesh and the 
                                                 
 
51 Wyman, p. 134. 
 
52 Ibid., p. 131. 
 
53 CF, 5.1. 
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spirit and in so doing cites Galatians 5:17 where Paul also speaks of the tension 
between flesh and spirit saying, 
For the flesh sets its desire against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the 
flesh; for these are in opposition to one another, so that you may not do the 
things that you please.54 
 
For “flesh” Paul uses the word σαρξ.  In every use, this word refers to the physical as 
opposed to the spiritual.  It refers to the body generally and in this reference indicates 
“the seat of the affections and lusts.”55  It does not seem that Paul is intending to include 
moral feeling as a part of σαρξ, since he seems to be saying that we know what we 
should do and yet on account of the pull of σαρξ find ourselves unable to do it.   
 Schleiermacher also cites Romans 7:18-23.  There, Paul also discusses σαρξ. 
For I know that nothing good dwells in me, that is, in my flesh; for the 
willing is present in me, but the doing of the good is not.  For the good 
that I want, I do not do, but I practice the very evil that I do not want…I 
see a different law in the members of my body, waging war against the 
law of my mind and making me a prisoner of the law of sin which is in my 
members.56 
 
This also clearly separates the “flesh” from the moral.  Unless we think that 
Schleiermacher was unaware of this Pauline distinction when he cited these passages, we 
should hold that Schleiermacher does not consider the flesh to include moral feelings as 
is indicated by Wyman’s reading.57  
                                                 
54 Gal. 5:17 (NASB). 
 
55 H.G. Liddell and Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon: A New Edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1953), p.1585. 
 
56 Rom. 7:18-19, 23 (NASB). 
 
57 For further support see also CF, 59.1. 
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Still, one might note that while it may be true that moral feelings and insights 
are not part of the flesh, Schleiermacher relegates them to the sensible self-consciousness.  
This claim, however, does not clearly contradict my view that moral insights and feelings 
belong to the God-consciousness.  There is some evidence to suggest that these two 
claims are not mutually exclusive in Schleiermacher.  We should take note that in the 
quote above, Schleiermacher claims to be analyzing “sensible” in “the widest sense of the 
term.”58  This leaves open the possibility that there is a more narrow sense of “sensible” 
which excludes moral feelings and insights and allows them to be associated instead with 
the God-consciousness.  It may be that in the second part of The Christian Faith 
Schleiermacher begins to utilize this more narrow sense.59  In any case, the evidence 
offered above (such as Schleiermacher’s claim that “all modes of activity issuing from 
our God-consciousness and subject to its prompting confront us as moral demands.”60) 
indicates that moral insights and feelings are clearly an activity of the God-consciousness 
in Schleiermacher.  Any interpretation of the sensible self-consciousness as distinguished 
from the God-consciousness must take this evidence into account.    
 Third, someone might argue that I have read sin in Schleiermacher as a moral 
issue, when it is essentially a religious issue.  Walter E. Wyman cites Schleiermacher’s 
                                                 
 
58 CF, 5.1. 
 
59 Perhaps this explains why, in the Mackintosh/Stewart edition of The Christian Faith, there is a shift from 
the use of "sensible self-consciousness" to "sensuous self-consciousness."  D.M. Baillie, who translated the 
relevant passage in CF, 5.1 employed the term "sensible self-consciousness."  In the second part of The 
Christian Faith, translator, D.D. Macaulay employs the term "sensuous self-consciousness" (see, for 
example, CF, 66.1 and 66.2).  Perhaps Macaulay intends to distinguish a more narrow sense of sensible 
self-consciousness.  "Sensuous" certainly seems more "fleshly" and bodily in reference than the broader, 
"sensible."  
 
60 CF, 83.1. 
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sermon “The Power of Prayer in Relation to Outward Circumstances” in order to make 
just such a point.  There Schleiermacher says, 
To be a religious man and to pray are really one and the same thing.  To 
join the thought of God with every thought of any importance that occurs 
to us; in all our admiration of external nature, to regard it as the work of 
his wisdom; to take council with God about all our plans, that we may be 
able to carry them out in His name; and even in our most mirthful hours to 
remember His all-seeing eye: this is the prayer without ceasing to which 
we are called, and which is really the essence of true religion.61 
 
Wyman suggests that through this quote we can better understand sinfulness as “God-
forgetfulness” and thus a religious, rather than moral problem.62 
 This claim, however, is not incompatible with my reading inasmuch as “God-
remembering” can be considered part of the revealed divine will.  In this sense, the moral 
and the religious are united in the God-consciousness.  Again, this view is in harmony 
with and supported by Schleiermacher’s claim that  
...the modes of action emanating from our God-consciousness are identical 
with those developed from the idea of the good.63   
 
The Problematic Consequences of Such a State 
In Schleiermacher there appears to be three ways to interpret the nature of the 
negative consequences of sin.  One view involves an understanding of those 
consequences as external; another sees the consequences as internal.  I will argue that in 
Schleiermacher, the ultimate problem of sin involves a third understanding.  Specifically, 
                                                 
 
61 Friedrich Schleiermacher, Selected Sermons of Schliermacher, translated by Mary F. Wilson, edited by 
W. Robertson Nicoll (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1890), p. 38.  This is also cited by Wyman, p. 133. 
 
62 Wyman takes the term “God-forgetfulness” from CF, 11.2.  In an endnote, Wyman concedes that the 
given textual support for his claim may be weak on account of the early date of the sermon compared to 
Schleiermacher’s more mature work (Wyman, pp. 147-148, endnote 7).  
 
63 CF, 83.1.   
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sin is followed by the analytic internal consequence of living in a lower state of being.  
This reading allows Schleiermacher to escape the pitfalls (outlined earlier) of 
understanding the problem of sin merely in terms of external or contingently internal 
consequences. 
 There are places where Schleiermacher characterizes the evil that results from sin 
in such a way that the “evil” under consideration can be understood as external 
consequences that result on account of sin.  For example, Schleiermacher at one point 
notes that we do not see a correspondence between sin and “evil” in the individual.  
When someone lies, he is not always afflicted with disease; and honest people often get 
sick.  Thus, he argues, we must see the connection between sin and evil on a corporate 
scale.64  And again,  
...each individual does not wholly and exclusively suffer precisely the evil 
which is connected with his personal sin.65   
 
This take appears to associate external consequences with sin.  If this is the end of 
Schleiermacher’s analysis of the consequences of sin, he will be susceptible to all of the 
criticisms of such a view offered above.66 
 There is, however, another consequence to sin that Schleiermacher discusses; one 
which sees internal consequences for sin.  According to Schleiermacher, sin can lead to a 
                                                 
 
64 CF, 84.2   
 
65 CF, 104.4   
 
66 See this diss., pp. 27-32.  Not only is this view subject to the above criticisms, also the corporate element 
emphasized by Schleiermacher allows for at least one additional criticism. If the self from which we are 
being rescued is “a self-enclosed life of feeling within a sensuous vital unity, to which all sympathetic 
feeling for others and for the whole was subordinated” (CF, 101.2), it would be strange that an awareness 
of the suffering of humanity in general would produce in us an essentially altruistic desire for a higher life 
(especially if we were experiencing no personal suffering).  If the consequences of sin are supposed to spur 
the sinner towards repentance in some way, a more complete account of the consequences of sin is 
necessary; one which takes into account some element of personal suffering by the sinner. 
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certain experience of pain.  When we sin, the lower consciousness feels pleasure, but 
the higher consciousness (which is aware of legitimate moral demands) feels pain.67  
C.W. Christian describes this Schleiermacherian view of pain in the following way.  
…what we call sin is the experience of God accompanied by a sense of 
alienation or guilt.  Sin is the state in which we find ourselves when we 
think of God, and it “hurts.”68  
 
Further Wyman claims, 
By the experience of Unlust Schleiermacher apparently means a sense of 
incompleteness, mental discomfort, of things somehow out of joint, of the 
world lacking in religious meaning.69 
 
This take appears to analyze the consequences of sin in terms of internal consequences.70 
Of course, as we noted above, internal consequences for sin can often be seen as external 
consequences relative to God.71  Thus, it would seem that God could rescue us from these 
consequences of sin by breaking the connection between sin and the internal pain 
experienced by the sinner.   
                                                 
 
67 CF 66.1 
 
68 Christian, p. 114. 
 
69 Wyman, p. 133. 
 
70 It is important to maintain a distinction between external and internal suffering when analyzing 
Schleiermacher’s view of the consequences of sin.  External suffering can be understood as the suffering 
that results from living in a community of selfish beings.  External suffering is the sort of thing that exists 
in the world without direct correlation to personal sin.  Internal suffering, on the other hand, is the sort of 
thing that is experienced, for example, in the pangs of conscience.  We could say that internal suffering is 
experienced when we become conscious of penal desert (CF, 84.2).  Likewise, we could say that external 
sufferings are internalized when they are received as hindrances to life or as deserved penalties.  Indeed, 
Schleiermacher must make such a distinction if we are to make sense of his claim that evil diminishes as 
actual sin diminishes, even though a person’s material condition may remain the same (CF, 84.2).  Only in 
this way can Christ’s assuming us into fellowship with Himself dissolve the connection between sin and 
evil such that for the believer pain no longer means “simple misery” (CF, 101.2).  Schleiermacher himself 
points out that the believer will continue to suffer (CF, 104.4).  Thus, if evil truly diminishes as sin 
diminishes, then we must see a connection between sin and internal suffering in distinction from the 
connection between sin and external suffering. 
 
71 See this diss., p. 34. 
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However, if I have read Schleiermacher correctly, then the internal 
consequence of pain experienced by the sinner is supposed to correlate with an awareness 
of the analytic internal consequence72 of existing in a lower state of being.  
Schleiermacher claims that legitimate moral demands assert themselves in our self-
consciousness in such a way that we perceive any deviation from them as a “hindrance of 
life, and therefore as sin.”73  Elsewhere he claims that  
...we have the consciousness of sin whenever the God-
consciousness…determines our self-consciousness as pain.74  
  
Thus, the internal consequence of pain relates to our awareness of sin as a hindrance of 
life.   If I understand Schleiermacher correctly, it is this hindrance of life which is the 
ultimate problem of sin, and that which Christ suffered to overcome.  As we saw above, 
such an understanding of the problem of sin will allow Schleiermacher to escape the 
typical pitfalls of analyzing the problem of sin in terms of external or contingently 
internal consequences.  That is, the hindrance of life cannot be removed without also 
removing the sinful state which is the hindrance of life. 
 The Role of the Human Will 
If the ultimate problem of sin is that in sin we exist in a lower state of being, why 
doesn’t God simply raise us to the higher state of being, much in the way that a mechanic 
might raise a machine into a higher-functioning state?   The answer, it seems, involves an 
appeal to the human will.  If our defective state is a result of and/or comprised of, at least 
                                                 
 
72 See this diss., p. 37. 
 
73 CF, 83.1. 
 
74 CF, 66. 
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in part, a willfulness on the part of the human being, God may avoid simply forcing a 
change in us out of a concern to preserve human freedom. 
Sin, according to Schleiermacher goes beyond a mere state of defect (the 
impotence of the God-consciousness against the flesh).75  Schleiermacher claims that the 
fact that the defect becomes sin is a result of human willfulness.  Thus, he claims, that sin 
is “rooted” in human freedom76 though God created the elements that make up the defect 
(the natural impulse and the God-consciousness).77  
The relationship between our defective state and our will is represented in the 
difference between “original” and “actual” sin.  The defective disposition that logically 
precedes our will (that is, the strength of the flesh against the spirit) is the original sin, in 
which our guilt is latent.  This is the state of sin.  Actual sins are our sinful actions.  They 
are movements of the will which reveal the presence of a defective state78 and further 
perpetuate that state.79  We remain in a lower state because our will does not respond as it 
should to the insight and exhortation offered through the God-consciousness.80  Thus, 
wrong action relates to the problem of sin insofar as it reveals and perpetuates this low 
and sinful state. 
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77 CF 83.3. 
 
78 CF, 69.3. 
 
79 CF, 69.1. 
 
80 CF, 68. 
 60 
The Nature of the Solution to the Problem of Sin: Moral Perfection 
 In view of this problem we already have a general idea of what salvation would 
look like in Schleiermacher’s soteriology.  A sinless state, as noted above, is a state in 
which the God-consciousness rules over the impulses of the flesh.81  The goal of salvation 
is to produce this state in the believer.  Somehow our impulses and motive principle must 
be changed.  The God-consciousness must increase in us, and the sensuous consciousness 
must decrease.  Just such a transformation is what Schleiermacher claims the Redeemer 
intends.  According to Schleiermacher, the fruit of Christ’s saving activity is the 
transformation of the internal composition of the person.  The person’s impressions are 
differently received.  The personal self-consciousness becomes altogether different.82  If I 
have interpreted Schleiermacher correctly above, the sinless state which would result 
could be accurately characterized as a state of moral perfection.   
Parameters in Pursuit of a State of Moral Perfection 
 On my reading of Schleiermacher, the pursuit of this goal will be confined by at 
least three parameters.  First, transformation cannot be achieved by the sinner’s strength 
alone.  Second, the sinner’s will is the gateway through which God will pursue this goal 
of transformation.  And finally, God will not force the human will in God’s pursuit of the 
goal of transformation. 
Parameter 1: The Sinner Cannot Transform on Her Own Strength 
 It does not appear that we can accomplish such a transformation by our own 
efforts.  Evidence from Schleiermacher’s “Second Speech” indicates that the God-
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consciousness is something to be received rather than something to be achieved.  In the 
“Second Speech” Schleiermacher describes the essence of religion as the "intuition of the 
universe."83  Schleiermacher then points out that the intuition of the universe, or 
"Infinite,"84 proceeds from that which is intuited to the one who intuits.85  Further, the 
goal of religion is to be passively filled with the influences of the universe.86  Now, if I 
am correct in claiming that the goal of religion in The Christian Faith is to be filled with 
the God-consciousness, then we have reason to read “God-consciousness” in place of 
“the intuition of the universe.”  In this case, God-consciousness is something to be 
received passively by human beings.  It will take the form of influence received from 
God’s initiation.  This move receives further support from the second edition of the 
“Second Speech” in which Schleiermacher shies away from using the term “universe” 
and instead claims that the object of religion is God and the world.87  This gives us an 
indication that it is acceptable to read “the universe” or “the Infinite,” as “God.” 
 This reading of the passivity of human transformation is consistent with 
Schleiermacher’s language in The Christian Faith.  There he makes reference to the 
                                                 
83 Friedrich Schleiermacher, "Second Speech: On the Essence of Religion," in On Religion: Speeches to Its 
Cultured Despisers, 1st ed., translated by Richard Crouter.  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988). (SS, 1st ed.), p. 104. 
 
84 See Friedrich Schleiermacher, "Second Speech: The Nature of Religion," in On Religion: Speeches to Its 
Cultured Despisers, 2nd ed., translated by John Oman.  (New York: Harper and Row, 1958). (SS, 2nd ed.). 
The first edition of the "Second Speech" was published in 1799.  The second edition was published in 1821. 
Concerning the differences between the two editions I hold that the changes in the second edition do not 
represent a new or modified theory of religion.  Rather, the changes appear to respond to possible concerns 
that could have arisen after the publication of the first edition by making more explicit certain points that 
were already allowed for or implied by the first edition.  So, by refering to "God" instead of the "universe" 
in the second edition, Schleiermacher seems to be steering away from the “materialistic pantheism” that 
can be easily read into the first edition but which he did not intend (SS, 2nd ed., p. 115).    
 
85 SS, 1st ed., p. 104 
 
86 SS, 1st ed., p. 102 
 
87 SS, 2nd ed., p. 30.  
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divine impartation of the God-consciousness.88  Further, he says that God gives us 
consciousness of God's will.89  In fact, Schleiermacher indicates that since sin, properly 
speaking, cannot be present without the God-consciousness, God (the giver of the God-
consciousness) is in a sense responsible for sin.90  Also, he claims that we cannot be 
expected to begin this transformation by ourselves.91 
Parameter 2: The Sinner’s Will is the Gateway to Transformation 
 While the transformation of self-consciousness is fundamentally passive in 
character, we can see that the human will can be a hindrance to this transformation.  
There is evidence of this in the “Second Speech.”  In the “Second Speech” 
Schleiermacher links intuition with feeling.92  In fact, feeling is so attached to intuition 
that Schleiermacher includes it as part of the essence of religion.93  In the first edition of 
the “Second Speech” he even says that "intuition without feeling is nothing."94  He claims 
that the intuition of the universe produces a change in the "inner consciousness" of the 
intuiting subject.95  This change can come in the form of, for example, "heartfelt 
reverence," a feeling of kinship with humanity, and "the humblest desire to be reconciled 
                                                 
 
88 CF, 81.1. 
 
89 CF, 81.3. 
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with a view to redemption (CF, 81.3). 
 
91 CF, 104.4. See also Christian, p.115. 
 
92 SS, 1st ed., p. 109. 
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94 SS, 1st ed., p. 112. 
 
95 SS, 1st ed., p. 109. 
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to the deity."96  Now, we noted above that the reception of this “intuition of the 
universe” is initiated by God.  If this is the case, then why doesn’t everyone experience 
religious feelings?  Either God must show a kind of favoritism or persons must vary in 
their degree of receptivity.  Schleiermacher appears to favor the second explanation. 
 While the connection between intuition and feeling is intimate, it is mediated by a 
certain attitude of openness or desire.  Notice that Schleiermacher tells his religious 
despisers that something like religious intuition has likely entered their minds before, but 
before this intuition could achieve its effect upon their minds it was dispensed with or 
simply misunderstood.97  Thus, the genuine reception of intuition depends "entirely on 
the mood and attitude of the mind."98  
 Thus, inasmuch as intuition is hindered by a lack of openness and cannot beget 
feeling, what was potentially an intuition is not properly actualized as intuition.  If, on the 
other hand, an attitude of openness is present in the intuiting subject, intuition will 
necessarily beget feeling and so will truly be actualized as intuition.99  As a result, the 
willing attitude of the intuiting subject acts as a sort of gateway to transformation.  If we 
are to passively receive redemption, we must be willing for it to be imparted to us.   
 
 
                                                 
 
96 SS, 1st ed., pp. 129-130. 
 
97 SS, 1st ed., p. 127. 
 
98 SS, 2nd ed., p. 106. 
 
99 It appears, then, that if any one of these three components is missing (intuition/feeling/an attitude of 
openness) they all are missing, and where one is properly present, they all are present.  Thus, 
Schleiermacher can refer to each as being the essence of religion.  Furthermore, even in the first edition, 
Schleiermacher centralizes the role of feeling in his theory of religion (SS, 1st ed., p. 130). 
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Parameter 3: God Respects Human Freedom 
 To enter through a gateway, one often has the option of breaking the lock and 
forcing his way inside.  Likewise, God could simply override our unwillingness by divine 
fiat.  If God wished, God could simply ignore our attitude and force upon us the change 
necessary for redemption.  Of course, if God did this, God would seemingly have to 
retract the gift of freedom.  Unless God is to retract the gift of freedom, God must 
somehow make us willing to receive the God-consciousness.   
 Schleiermacher claims that God does not redeem us by overriding our own 
choices.  He points out that "the commanding will of God does not of itself secure 
obedience."100  And again, he claims that “submission to [Christ’s] lordship must always 
be voluntary.”101  As, in the beginning, God created freedom in the human soul (a 
mystery "which we cannot expect to understand"), so Christ’s creation concerns 
freedom.102  Christ's activity of salvation is creative, "yet what it produces is altogether 
free."103  Thus, he claims that Christ saves us by means of “a creative production in us of 
the will to assume Him into ourselves.”104  Christ seeks to evoke our "assent to the 
influence of His activity."105  Schleiermacher proceeds to say that, 
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  …the original activity of the Redeemer is best conceived as a pervasive 
  influence which is received by its object in virtue of the free movement  
  with which [the object] turns himself to its attraction…106 
 
In other words Christ creates willingness through Christ's attractiveness.  In this way the 
power by which Christ opens the gate of our wills is like the attractive power of 
someone’s "educative intellectual influence" to which we freely submit ourselves.107 
One Problem for this Reading and My Response 
 Someone might object to my reading in the following way.  Above we noted that 
by "intuition of the universe" we can understand "God-consciousness."  We also noted 
that if a potential intuition of the universe meets an unwilling attitude on the part of the 
intuiting subject it cannot manifest itself as intuition properly speaking.  This is to say 
that the God-consciousness is not received if we are unwilling to receive it.  We also 
noted, however that the presence of the God-consciousness is necessary in order for sin to 
exist.   Is it not a contradiction to claim that the problem of sin is that we are not willing 
to receive that which must be present in order for sin to exist?  
 To preserve my reading against this criticism we will have to make a distinction 
within the God-consciousness.  Some part of the God-consciousness will be present in us 
despite our attitude.  Another part can be imparted to us only with the consent of our will.  
In The Christian Faith we have a candidate for the former in "conscience."  
Schleiermacher defines conscience as  
...the fact that all modes of activity issuing from our God-consciousness 
and subject to its prompting confront us as moral demands.108   
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Recall that it is the awareness of moral demands that must be present for sin to exist.109  
Thus, it is not surprising that Schleiermacher also claims that it is because of conscience 
that a given state becomes sin.110  Yet, Schleiermacher notes that "conscience is not 
identical with the fact of the God-consciousness in man."111  Now, since Schleiermacher 
also claims that it is only the presence of the God-consciousness that makes our state a 
sinful one,112 we must hold that conscience is part of (though, not the whole of) the God-
consciousness.  In fact, we see Schleiermacher doing just this when he distinguishes 
between the God-consciousness as understanding and the God-consciousness as will and 
implies that conscience falls into the former category.113  Thus, we can say that the God-
consciousness as understanding is present in us (at least in some degree) despite the 
openness of our will, while our reception of the God-consciousness in its fullness can 
only be had if we are open to it.114     
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114 This does not mean that the God-consciousness as understanding in its entirety must be present in us for 
sin to be present.  Really we would only need one moral command to which we were unwilling to submit 
our sensuous self-consciousness.  This allows for the possibility that the God-consciousness as 
understanding grows in us as we open ourselves to transformation.  This also addresses the concern that 
Schleiermacher's account of sin entails that a person must have awareness of God in order to be a sinner.  
We can see here that an atheist or agnostic could become a sinner by allowing the impulses of the flesh to 
motivate despite impulses from conscience (or the God-consciousness as understanding) to the contrary.  
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The Role of the Cross in the Solution 
 We might now inquire, “How, in Schleiermacher, does the Cross of Christ 
function in God’s project of transforming our self-consciousness?”  As noted above, 
Schleiermacher describes Christ’s activity as a sort of attraction.115  Christ attracts us to 
God’s project of transformation.  In what follows I will attempt to articulate 
Schleiermacher’s view as to how Christ accomplishes this. 
 The longing for a better state of being is too general for us to claim that it is all 
that is needed to induce openness to the work of Christ.  One can want something better 
but not know where to go to acquire it.  This is where the suffering of Christ plays an 
important role in Schliermacher’s soteriology.  He claims that, 
  …in order to effect assumption into the fellowship of His blessedness, the  
  longing of those who were conscious of their misery must first be drawn  
  to Christ through the impression they had received of His blessedness.116 
 
And Christ’s blessedness is seen in its fullness in that “it was not overcome even by the 
full tide of suffering.”117  Again, he claims that in Christ’s suffering we can perceive 
Christ’s "imperturbable" blessedness.118  And again, Schleiermacher claims that if Christ, 
forseeing His death, perceived a means to avoid this death without shirking His duty, it 
was His responsibility to fulfill the duty of self-preservation.  It behooved Christ to die, 
however, so that in doing so "He might proclaim the full dominion of the spirit over the 
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flesh."119  A death such as the one Christ endured was more effective toward this end 
than an accidental death would have been.120   
 Yet, why should this vision of Christ draw us to Christ rather than provoke us to 
simple envy?  We will envy, or merely admire, Christ if Christ represents a state of 
blessedness in which we can never partake.  However, if Christ invites us to join in His 
blessedness, then we may open ourselves to Him that He might begin this project in us.  
If I have read Schleiermacher correctly, He argues that Christ makes just such an 
invitation through His teaching and His action in the Cross. 
 First, Christ calls us to "eternal life in the Kingdom of God."  This is a very 
straightforward invitation to the sort of fellowship that we need in order to exist in a state 
of blessedness.121  But how do we know that such an invitation is legitimate?  Anyone 
can make a promise of blessedness, but only God can execute that promise.  Perhaps this 
is why Schleiermacher claims that the invitation to fellowship with Christ is most truly 
extended "by the proclamation of His peculiar dignity.”122  That is, Christ also teaches us 
that He has a special relationship to the Father; one in which the Father reveals to Christ 
and is revealed through Christ.123   
 As I read Schleiermacher, this invitation reaches its climax on the Cross.  
Schleiermacher claims that, 
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…in [Christ’s] suffering unto death, occasioned by His steadfastness, 
there is manifested to us an absolutely self-denying love; and in this there 
is represented to us with perfect vividness the way in which God was in 
Him to reconcile the world to Himself…124 
   
It will be helpful to note that Schleiermacher claims that Christ’s willing self-surrender is 
"identical with His persistence in redemptive activity."125  If we can understand this 
redemptive activity to begin with His attempt to attract us to Him, then we have reason to 
claim that Christ endures the Cross in order to reveal His blessedness to us and to draw us 
into a participation in that blessedness.  Once this is realized, then we can see in Christ on 
the Cross "an absolutely self-denying love."126  If we remember that the Father is 
revealed in Christ then we see God in Christ showing forth God’s love for us; a love 
which is intended to invite us and attract us to fellowship with God.  Once we have been 
opened to the work of Christ, God can begin the work of transforming our self-
consciousness.  That is, God can animate us such that "we ourselves are led to an ever 
more perfect fulfillment of the divine will."127 
Final Evaluation of Schleiermacher’s Conception of Sin and Its Solution 
 Let us now ask whether Schleiermacher’s understanding of the problem of sin and 
salvation can inspire a staurocentric theory of satisfaction that can plausibly avoid 
problems 1–6.  While such a theory could plausibly escape problem (2), the problem of 
superfluous suffering (a problem which plagued the first two conceptions of sin above), it 
seems that such a satisfaction theory would still be confronted by at least two of 
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problems: (3), the appeal to robust love and (6), the impotence problem.  I will address 
each in turn. 
 Now, it seems that Schleiermacher has allowed for a theory that can escape (2), 
the problem of superfluous suffering.  Since God has chosen to respect human freedom in 
God’s attempt to deliver humans from sin, God cannot merely deliver humans by divine 
decree.  We have seen that God, given this Self-imposed limitation, must somehow seek 
to draw open the human will.  It is arguably the case that Christ’s suffering is the most 
effective way of opening human wills to God’s project of transformation.128  Perhaps, 
God’s seeking satisfaction in Christ’s suffering is the most effective means to achieve 
this goal.  As a result the satisfaction theorist could plausibly claim that Christ's suffering 
involves some sort a benefit that could not be had in any other way (the benefit of being 
the most effective means to non-forcefully open human wills to God’s project of 
transformation).129 
 Still, as we saw earlier in the analysis of the third conception of the problem of 
sin, this defense against the problem of superfluous suffering is on tenuous ground.  
                                                 
 
128 Though, it would be difficult to prove that it is certainly the most effective way, it is at least plausibly 
the most effective way, and as such would offer hope for escaping the problem of superfluous suffering. 
 
129 Such a view even offers a plausible justification for the internal and external consequences that result 
from sin.  The pains associated with this lowly state can be seen as divine penalties that exist to spur us 
toward deliverance.  In fact, Schleiermacher defines divine punishment as, "…that which must of necessity 
be interposed wherever and in so far as the power of the God-consciousness is as yet inactive in the sinner, 
its object being to prevent his dominant sensuous tendencies from meanwhile attaining complete mastery 
through mere unchecked habit" (CF, 101.3). When we do not need to be deterred from choosing a lowly 
state, then, punishment is not necessary.  One might ask, “Why must God associate any pain at all with our 
lowly state?”  The goal is to keep us from becoming complacent in our lowly state.  If we do not 
experience, at least dissatisfaction, how will we avoid complacency?  God could allow us to be comfortable 
with our low state, but it would be a rather unloving thing to abandon us out of "kindness."  And what is 
more, it could not free us from evil.  For if we exist in this lowly state in a community of humans, there is 
sure to be wars, theft, envies and all sorts of misery (On this point, see also C.S. Lewis, The Problem of 
Pain, pp. 32ff.).   
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Specifically, an objector might question the benefit of non-forcefully opening human 
wills as opposed to forceful transformation.  First of all, in pursuing a non-forceful 
opening of the will, it is highly likely that not every will will respond to the attraction of 
Christ in the Cross.  A forceful transformation by an omnipotent God, however, would 
certainly result in the transformation of every human being and thus complete human 
sinlessness.   
 This leaves a staurocentric satisfaction theory built on a Schleiermacherian 
conception of sin and salvation vulnerable to problem (3), the appeal to robust love.  An 
objector could claim that ensuring the forced transformation of all humans is more loving 
than winning the non-forceful transformation of only some humans.  Suppose that in 
allowing human freedom, God allows for the possibility of three states.  The highest state 
is sinlessness with consent.  Second, is sinlessness without consent.  The third and lowest 
state is the state of sin.  An objector could argue that it is more loving to guarantee that 
everyone exists in the second state (if possible) than to have some people existing in the 
first and some existing in the third.  If a parent had two sick children, the loving parent 
would not respect human freedom when administering the medicine that would cure the 
child’s illness.  Rather, each child would receive her medicine whether she wished it or 
not.  This objector could argue that God, in respecting human freedom and thus allowing 
some humans to persist in a low state, is actually failing to manifest a character of robust 
love (as would the parent who respected his child’s wish not to receive medicine).  Thus, 
even though a theory of satisfaction could plausibly escape problem (2), the problem of 
superfluous suffering, an objector could maintain that it fails to escape problem (3), the 
appeal to robust love.   
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 Even if such a theory could escape this problem, it would still be confronted by 
problem (6), the impotence problem.  That is, according to Schleiermacher’s view of sin, 
it appears that one could exist in a sinless state while still hating God.  One could 
acknowledge that one is in a lowly state and cannot, on one’s own strength, attain to the 
higher state wherein the God-consciousness rules over the impulses of the flesh.  Further, 
it is possible that one could see Christ’s blessedness and invitation through Christ’s 
suffering.  One might then submit to God’s transformative influence through Christ much 
in the same way that one could submit to someone’s educative influence or a doctor’s 
healing influence.  Yet, despite all of this, it seems that the sinner could still resent or 
even hate God, just as a student might despise her teacher or a patient might despise his 
doctor while recognizing the need for the teacher or doctor.  If this is the case, then 
Schleiermacher has failed to capture the complete nature of sin.  A theory of satisfaction 
based on this conception of sin would then be vulnerable to the impotence problem.130 
  Schleiermacher’s conception of the problem of sin and its solution has clear 
advantages over the first two conceptions of sin.  However, if we are to develop a 
staurocentric theory of satisfaction that can avoid all of problems 1–6, we must seek 
another conception of the problem of sin.  In the next section, I argue that just such a 
conception can be found in the problem of sin as articulated by Kierkegaard. 
 
 
                                                 
130 One might argue that I have misread Schleiermacher and that part of the influence of the God-
consciousness is to restore a love of God in the heart of the sinner.  Anyone who thus despises God is still 
in a state of sin in which the impulses of the flesh have too much strength over the God-consciousness.  
This would be to argue that Schleiermacher can escape these problems by employing a personalist aspect to 
his conception of sin.  That a personalist understanding of the problem of sin is necessary to escape all of 
problems 1-6 is the main thesis of this chapter. 
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Kierkegaard’s Conception of the Problem of Sin and Its Solution 
 In this section I will offer a reading and critical analysis of the problem of sin as it 
is presented in Kierkegaard's The Sickness Unto Death.  I will also offer a reading and 
critical analysis of the solution to sin, faith, as it is presented in Kierkegaard's Fear and 
Trembling.  I will then ask whether such a view of sin and its solution can offer hope for 
the development of a theory of satisfaction which can avoid problems 1–6.   
I will argue that in The Sickness Unto Death sin is conceived of as a state of 
alienation from God.  This state is realized when we freely refuse to rest dependently on 
God.  That is, we pursue our terms for our own flourishing rather than God's terms.  In 
doing so, we exist in a lower state of being which is an analytic internal consequence of 
existing in a state of sin.  I will then offer an answer to the question, "What are God's 
terms for our flourishing?" by developing an understanding of faith as it is presented in 
Fear and Trembling.  I will argue that faith can be understood as a state in which we 
place our trust in the Person of God not simply instrumentally, for our fulfillment, but 
intrinsically, as our fulfillment. 
 Finally, I will ask whether this reading can inspire a staurocentric theory of 
satisfaction that can escape problems 1–6.  I will argue that this Kierkegaardian 
understanding of the problem of sin, as an example of the fourth conception analyzed 
above (a personalist conception), can justify the necessity of the Cross in a way that 
preserves the benefits of the third conception (as in Schleiermacher) while avoiding the 
problems to which such a conception is susceptible. 
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The Problem of Sin 
Sin as a State of Alienation from God 
 Kierkegaard, using the pseudonym "Anti-Climacus," warns against falling into 
the mistaken assumption that sin is merely a problem of wrong actions. 131  This is as 
superficial, he says, “as supposing that a train moves only when the locomotive puffs.”132  
Instead, 
…this puff and the subsequent propulsion are not what should be 
considered but rather the steady impetus with which the locomotive 
proceeds and which produces that puffing.  And so it is with sin. In the 
deepest sense, the state of sin is the sin; the particular sins are not the 
continuance of sin but the expression for the continuance of sin; in the 
specific new sin the impetus of sin merely becomes more perceptible to 
the eye.133  
 
As in Schleiermacher, while acts of sin are a problem, the full problem of sin must 
include an account of the state of the sinner.  This state will likely manifest itself in 
various acts of sin, but the core problem will not be located in the acts.134   
 Anti-Climacus claims that sin is more like a sickness.  He begins to describe the 
human sickness which leads to death.  He claims that “Christianly understood” no earthly 
                                                 
131 In The Sickness unto Death (SUD) Kierkegaard is writing under the pseudonym, Anti-Climacus.  He 
uses his own name as editor.  For a brief comment on this pseudonym’s role in Kierkegaard’s authorship, 
see Sylvia Walsh, Living Christianly: Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of Christian Existence (Pennsylvania: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005), pp. 20-21.  Also see, Murray Rae, Kierkegaard and Theology 
(London: T & T Clark, 2010), pp. 56-57. Also see, Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Introduction to 
The Sickness Unto Death, edited and translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (New Jersey: 
Princeton, 1980), pp. xix-xxiii. For my purpose here, it will not be necessary to determine the relationship 
between the beliefs espoused by Anti-Climacus and Kierkegaard’s actual beliefs.  I am only concerned with 
explicating the conception of sin as it is presented in SUD and determining whether such a view can 
contribute to a satisfaction theory that avoids the problems outlined above. 
 
132 SUD, XI 216. 
 
133 Ibid. 
 
134 “Certainly Anti-Climacus views sin as being fundamentally an inward ontological condition of 
humanity rather than consisting in particular external immoral acts.  Particular sins are merely an 
expression of a more fundamental state of being in sin” (Walsh, p. 25). 
 75 
suffering is the sickness unto death.  That is, neither need, nor illness, nor grief is the 
sickness unto death.  In fact, from a Christian worldview, not even death is the sickness 
unto death.  That is because, from this perspective, our death in this life is only a minor 
event in an eternal life.135  When the human is considered as a soul, with an existence that 
extends beyond this body then the deadly sickness is what Anti-Climacus refers to as 
"despair"136 or "sin."137 
The Conditions under Which the State of Sin is Possible 
 Anti-Climacus describes despair "in the strict sense" as taking one of two forms.  
One can either in despair not will to be oneself, or in despair will to be oneself.138  In one 
place Anti-Climacus claims that all despair proper139 can be traced back to this second 
form of despair: in despair to will to be oneself.140  He describes this second form of 
despair as 
…the expression for the complete dependence of the relation (of the self), 
the expression for the inability of the self to arrive at or to be in 
equilibrium and rest by itself, but only, in relating itself to itself, by 
relating itself to that which has established the entire relation.141   
 
If I have read Anti-Climacus correctly, then when he says that the second form of despair 
is “the expression for…,” he means to indicate that the fact that such a type of despair 
                                                 
 
135 SUD, XI 122. 
 
136 SUD, XI 127. 
 
137 SUD, XI 189. 
 
138 SUD, XI 127. 
 
139 For a brief comment on the distinction between the lower forms of despair and the intensification of 
despair which makes up sin, see Walsh, p. 22. 
 
140 SUD, XI 128. 
 
141 Ibid. 
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exists is only possible because of what follows (namely, because the relation is 
completely dependent, etc.).  This reading gathers support from what immediately 
precedes the quote above. 
If a human self had itself established itself [as opposed to being 
established by another], then there could be only one form: not to will to 
be oneself, to will to do away with oneself, but there could not be the 
form: in despair to will to be oneself.142 
 
Thus, we can read Anti-Climacus as saying that part of what makes this despair possible 
is the fact that the relation is completely dependent, that is, unable to find rest by itself.  If 
this is the case, then we are justified in supposing that Anti-Climacus is offering us a 
metaphysical backdrop against which this type of despair is possible.   
   Anti-Climacus gives us two criteria for the possibility of despair:  human 
dependence and human freedom.  Since by "relation" Anti-Climacus means to indicate 
the human spirit or self,143 we can read him as saying that the human being is completely 
dependent.  Upon what is the human being dependent?  It is dependent upon that which 
established the self, that is, God.144  Thus the self will not find rest until it rests 
dependently upon God.  It must do this "in relating itself to itself."  This is to say that the 
human being must do so freely (since elsewhere Anti-Climacus has referred to the 
                                                 
 
142 Ibid. 
 
143 SUD, XI 130.  For an analysis of Anti-Climacus’ conception of “spirit” and “self” in The Sickness Unto 
Death, see Alastair Hannay, “Spirit and the Idea of the Self as a Reflexive Relation,” in International 
Kierkegaard Commentary: The Sickness Unto Death, edited by Robert L. Perkins (Georgia: Mercer 
University Press, 1987), pp. 23-38.  Also see John D. Glenn, “The Definition of the Self and the Structure 
of Kierkegaard’s Work,” in International Kierkegaard Commentary: The Sickness Unto Death, edited by 
Robert L. Perkins. (Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1987), pp. 5-22.  Also see Walsh, pp. 91-92.  Also 
see Rae, pp. 91ff. 
 
144 SUD, XI 130. 
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relation’s relating itself to itself as “human freedom”).145  Thus, this fact of human 
freedom is the second factor that makes sin possible.146   
Finally, we should note that after setting this metaphysical backdrop as a defining 
feature of the second form of despair, Anti-Climacus says that 
…this second form of despair (in despair to will to be oneself) is so far 
from designating merely a distinctive kind of despair that, on the contrary, 
all despair ultimately can be traced back to and be resolved in it.147 
 
As a result, we can conclude that Anti-Climacus is claiming that any sin is possible 
because humans are dependent upon God and have the freedom to choose to embrace or 
to defy this relationship of dependence.148 
The Manner in Which the State of Sin is Realized 
 Sin is realized when a person chooses not to embrace this relationship of 
dependence upon God.  Anti-Climacus elaborates upon this point in another section in 
which he claims that all despair can be traced back to the first kind of despair: in despair 
not to will to be oneself.149  He describes this form of despair using two examples.  In one 
case a person desires to be Caesar.  But when the person cannot attain to this level of 
                                                 
 
145 Ibid.  Or rather, we might say, the human being truly acts freely when it acts in dependence upon God.   
 
146 Rae makes a similar point in the following way, “We exist in relation to God and are endowed with 
freedom to respond to God in love—or in defiance.  Both things are true of each human subject; we are at 
once both finite, limited, material beings and yet endowed with freedom and called to life in communion 
with God” (Rae, p.92).   However, Rae goes on to interpret the self’s “relating itself to itself” as self-
consciousness.  I have given evidence above to show that this aspect of the self should be read as human 
freedom. 
 
147 SUD, XI 128. 
 
148 Murray Rae appears to make a similar point in Kierkegaard and Theology where he says, "We exist in 
relation to God and are endowed with freedom to respond to God in love—or in defiance.  Both things are 
true of each human subject; we are at once both finite, limited, material beings and yet endowed with 
freedom and called to life in communion with God" (Rae, p. 92). 
 
149 SUD, XI 134. 
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power, wealth, and prestige the person despairs over himself.150  He cannot bear to be 
himself and now wants to be rid of himself.  He despairs over himself because he cannot 
be the self that he wants to be.151  In another case a girl despairs because her beloved has 
died.  She despairs over having to be a self without her beloved, and despairingly wishes 
to be rid of this self.  She despairs over herself because she cannot be the self that she 
wants to be.152 
What is common to both despairing persons is that they both have set their own 
terms for their own flourishing.  When they cannot achieve this, they are distraught and 
no longer wish to be.  But Anti-Climacus points out, that even if they had reached their 
own goals, they would still be in despair.  Even the person who despairingly wills to be 
himself is desiring to be something that he is not.  Even if he becomes Caesar he has 
made it clear that “he wants to tear his self away from the power that established it.”153  
Again, this person has set the terms for his own flourishing.  And even if he attains to 
these terms, he is still in despair. 
If I have read Anti-Climacus correctly, then when Anti-Climacus claims that the 
formula for all despair is willing to be rid of oneself154 we can read him as saying that all 
sin involves one’s own setting of the terms for one’s own flourishing.  We can understand 
                                                 
 
150 Recall the distinction between despairing "over" and despairing "of."  We despair over that which binds 
us in despair.  We despair of that which releases us.  We both despair over and of the self (SUD, XI 64, 
footnote, p. 60). 
 
151 SUD, XI 133. 
 
152 SUD, XI 133-134. 
 
153 SUD, XI 134. 
 
154 Ibid. 
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sin as a bid for independence.  Because we are by nature dependent upon God for our 
flourishing, we will not be at rest until we abide in God.  But we want to set our own 
terms, and since we have freedom we can choose to refuse God’s terms.  Yet God's terms 
are the only terms by which we will find rest.  By setting our own terms, we attempt to 
become the master of ourselves—we attempt to become God.  But since we are by nature 
dependent upon God and the terms that God sets, a person who sets his own terms is 
merely “a king without a country.”155  Sin is realized when we use our freedom to assert 
our terms for our flourishing over God’s terms for our flourishing. 156  Khan and 
McKinnon make a similar point where they say, 
...despair is essentially the self's reluctance to accept the fact that of itself 
it does not have the power to become a true self.157   
                                                 
 
155 SUD, XI 180. 
 
156 "Christianly conceived…[sin is] supposing that we can invest our own lives with meaning and purpose 
in defiance of the truly human life established and revealed in Jesus Christ" (Rae, p. 95).  Rae is 
specifically referring here to the second form of despair "in despair to will to be oneself."  Yet as I have 
argued, Anti-Climacus claims that this characteristic is common to both this form of despair and the form 
"in despair not to will to be oneself."  Thus, I’ve applied Rae’s quote to the common nature of sin in SUD 
argued for above.  (Though, one could argue that the one who despairs in weakness just wishes she could 
invest her life with meaning on her own instead of "supposing" that she can.  In either case, there is an 
assertion of the despairing person's terms over God's terms.) Further, my reading of the conception of sin in 
SUD differs slightly from Rae’s where he claims, "Sin may be conceived, then, as a mis-relation between 
the finite and the infinite, the temporal and the eternal, freedom and necessity.  To over emphasize the 
infinite and the eternal is to suppose oneself to be a god; it is to be puffed up, to claim inordinate power and 
to imagine oneself superior to others.  To over-emphasize the finite and the temporal…is to conceive of 
oneself…entirely in material terms" (Rae, p.93).  I claim that the common essence of the mis-relation in 
any form is to suppose oneself a god not in the sense of considering oneself superior to others, but in the 
sense of setting the terms for one’s own flourishing as described above.  Rae’s reading would leave Anti-
Climacus vulnerable to the claim that one could still be in sin while avoiding both of the types of mis-
relation described by Rae.  I am instead emphasizing a point made by Walsh who says, "…the misrelation 
in the self to whatever degree and in whatever respect is recognized as being grounded in a prior 
misrelation to God" (Walsh, p.22). 
 
157 Abrahim H. Khan and Alastair McKinnon, "Kierkegaard's Two Forms of Conscious Despair," Studies in 
Religion 14.4 (1985), p. 453.  Khan and McKinnon have rigorously analyzed the two forms of conscious 
despair for their similarities and differences.  While they do note that the two concepts are distinct, they 
appear to agree that they are relevantly similar in the way that I have argued so far.  They note, "Both 
[types of despair] involve a self which misses its true mark and thus never reaches its human plentitude.  In 
Svaghed the self is either so busy relating itself to its own imaginary construct of the self, or so absorbed in 
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The question then arises, “How do we rest dependently on the power that 
established us?”  That is, what exactly are God’s terms for human flourishing?  We will 
address this question below in a section discussing the nature of the solution to the 
problem of sin.158 
The Problematic Consequences of Such a State 
We’ve seen that an appeal to external consequences for sin will offer us no hope 
in developing a staurocentric theory of satisfaction that can escape problems 1–6.  In 
Kierkegaard’s authorship there are clear references to internal consequences of sin, such 
as subjective anxiety.159  Yet, as we’ve seen, if this is the end of the problem of sin, we 
will still be unlikely to develop a successful satisfaction theory.  
It seems, however, that Kierkegaard also has a place for analytic internal 
consequences in his authorship’s explication of the problem of sin.  Anti-Climacus claims 
that insofar as we are a self we have the task of becoming ourselves.  This, he says, can 
only be done in relationship to God.160  In this relationship to God, we gain ourselves 
only by giving ourselves.161  The result, then, of not giving ourselves is simply that we 
lose ourselves.  We become sick unto death.  If we were to become ourselves, however, 
we would find rest.  For, “the self in being itself and in willing to be itself rests 
                                                                                                                                                 
despairing over its own despair that it ignores its mark...In Trods the self misses its mark because...It 
refuses to rest itself in any power outside itself and instead wills to become itself independently of any 
external power or assistance...Each is still estranged from its true self" (Khan and McKinnon, p.448). 
 
158 See this diss., pp. 82-90. 
 
159 See Kierkegaard's The Concept of Anxiety.  This point also referenced in Rae, p. 91. 
 
160 SUD, XI 143.  
 
161 SUD, XI 163. 
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transparently in God.”162  According to Anti-Climacus, in choosing to relate properly 
to God we choose to have real life.  Insofar as we do not do so, we choose death.  As 
dependent creatures it is our nature to be dependent.  We can never find rest in a bid for 
independence for it is a bid to become who we can never be.  We can never succeed 
because when we try to become independent of the power that established us, we try to 
escape becoming who we are "in truth."163   
 If what I have said above is correct, then it appears some consequences of the 
state of sin necessarily follow from being in that state.  Sin is the rejection of a certain 
personal relationship with God.  It will not be possible for God to allow us to 
simultaneously reject such a relationship and enjoy any analytically connected benefits of 
having such a relationship.  If this is the case, then God cannot merely wave God’s hand 
at the consequences and allow sin to continue.  We must be changed into the kind of 
people that relate appropriately to God.  
The Role of the Human Will 
 
As indicated above, the role of human freedom is part of what makes sin possible 
and is that through which sin is realized.  As a result, we can understand Anti-Climacus’ 
claim that the state of sin is a "position."164   Sylvia Walsh states that this claim that sin is 
a position refers,  
                                                 
 
162 SUD, XI 194. 
 
163 SUD, XI 134.  Rae notes, “Climacus has also told us that sin is ‘to exist in untruth’ (Philosophical 
Fragments, 15), to exist, that is, in alienation from the one who is himself the Truth” (Rae, p. 90). 
 
164 SUD, XI 207. 
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...to the fact that sin is not a given condition or state in human 
beings…Rather, sin is a condition that is posited by humans 
themselves.”165  
 
Thus, we can see the centrality of the human will in this concept of sin. 166 
The Nature of the Solution to the Problem of Sin: Faith 
 I have argued that to rest transparently in the power that established us we must 
freely embrace God’s terms for human flourishing.  According to Kierkegaard the state in 
which this is accomplished is called, "faith."  Anti-Climacus claims that the opposite of 
sin is faith.   
...the formula...which describes a state in which there is no despair at 
all...is also the formula for faith:  in relating itself to itself and in willing to 
be itself, the self rests transparently in the power that established it.167 
 
We can gain insight on how to rest in the power that established us by elucidating a 
Kierkegaardian concept of faith.  With this in mind, let us look at some of the 
characteristics of the "knight of faith" as presented by Kierkegaard through the 
pseudonym, Johannes de Silentio, in Fear and Trembling.168  I will argue that the knight 
                                                 
 
165 Walsh, p. 25. See also Robert C. Roberts, "The Grammar of Sin and the Conceptual Unity of The 
Sickness unto Death," in International Kierkegaard Commentary, edited by Robert L. Perkins (Georgia: 
Mercer University Press, 1987), pp.153-160. 
 
166 There is some question as to whether the role that freedom plays in this definition of sin implies that sin 
is inherently conscious.  For discussion of this question see Walsh, pp. 24ff. See also Roberts, pp. 141-146, 
153-156.  Furthermore, Louis P. Pojman notes that even where Kierkegaard could be read as defining sin as 
an “ontological category” (e.g. in The Concept of Anxiety and the Postscript), which could be seen as a 
downplaying of the role of human freedom in sin, Kierkegaard still maintains that “we are infinitely 
responsible for our condition” (Louis P. Pojman, Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Religion (San Francisco: 
International Scholars Publications, 1999), p.55). 
 
167 SUD, XI 161. 
 
168 Someone could argue that “faith” in Fear and Trembling (F&T) differs from “faith” in the works 
attributed to Anti-Climacus.  For our purposes here, it is enough to show how Anti-Climacus and Johannes 
de Silentio can be used together to develop a picture of the problem of sin and its solution that allows for a 
staurocentric theory of satisfaction that can escape problems 1-6. 
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of faith radically trusts the Person of God. 169  The trust which characterizes faith is not 
simply a trust in God for the knight’s fulfillment.  That is to say, the trust which is unique 
to the knight of faith is not simply trust that God will give the knight some other thing 
which will fulfill him.  Rather, the knight of faith trusts God as his fulfillment.  That is to 
say, the knight of faith intimately loves God for God’s Self and not for what God gives 
the knight of faith.  
On "Fear and Trembling" as a Meditation on the Question of Trust 
Fear and Trembling involves a lengthy meditation on Abraham's willingness to 
sacrifice Isaac (whom Abraham loved) at God's command.  We can presume, therefore, 
that De Silentio would have been familiar with the Biblical account of Abraham.  I argue 
that this account portrays Abraham as a person of faith inasmuch as Abraham trusts God.    
 It appears that if trust in God is not the very essence of what it means to have faith 
in the Biblical story of Abraham, then it is at least an essential (and likely dominant) part 
of that conception of faith.  When we first meet Abraham in the Genesis account we hear 
God speaking to Abraham,  
  Now the LORD said to Abram, 
Go forth from your country, 
  And from your relatives 
  And from your father's house, 
  To the land which I will show you;170 
 
And God gives Abraham a promise. 
  And I will make you a great nation,  
And I will bless you,  
                                                 
 
169 It seems that Rae would agree with this interpretation insofar as he claims that despair is “misplaced 
trust” (Rae, p. 94). 
 
170 Gen. 12:1. 
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And make your name great;  
And so you shall be a blessing;171 
 
In response, we do not hear Abraham speak.  We immediately see him act. 
  So Abram went forth as the LORD had spoken to him;...172 
We are not shown what happened before this.  We are not told whether this is the 
beginning of Abraham's relationship with God, or whether we are being introduced to a 
relationship with a rich history.  What we are given, is an image of trust.  Perhaps 
Abraham doubted.  These details are not given to us.  It could be that they are kept from 
us because they are unknown.  Or it could be that they are simply unimportant in the 
shadow of the truth that in the end, Abraham trusted God.  In the end, Abraham left 
everything else that he had known before and set out toward he knew not where.  He put 
his future, his benefit, himself in God's hands. 
 Soon the trust of Abraham was tested.  Though he and his wife were well beyond 
child-bearing age, God promised them a son.  And while it seemed impossible, God 
fulfilled his promise and Isaac was born.  And Abraham loved Isaac. 
 God then came to Abraham saying, 
Take now your son, your only son, whom you love, Isaac, and go to the 
land of Moriah, and offer him there as a burnt offering on one of the 
mountains of which I will tell you.173 
 
In response, we do not hear Abraham speak.  Instead, we see him act. 
So Abraham rose early in the morning and saddled his donkey, and took 
two of his young men with him and Isaac his son; and he split wood for 
                                                 
 
171 Gen. 12:2. 
 
172 Gen. 12:4. 
 
173 Gen. 22:2 (NASB). 
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the burnt offering, and arose and went to the place of which God had 
told him.174 
 
We are presented with an image of trust.  Perhaps Abraham doubted.  We are not told.  
We are only shown that when the morning came, Abraham trusted God.  
The author of Hebrews recounts a long list of men and women of faith.  The 
author dedicates the central and longest portion of this list to the faith of Abraham. 
By faith Abraham, when called to go to a place he would later receive as 
his inheritance, obeyed and went, even though he did not know where he 
was going...By faith Abraham, even though he was past age—and Sarah 
herself was barren—was enabled to become a father because he 
considered him faithful who had made the promise...By faith Abraham, 
when God tested him, offered Isaac as a sacrifice.  He who had received 
the promises was about to sacrifice his one and only son, even though God 
had said to him, 'It is through Isaac that your offspring will be reckoned.'  
Abraham reasoned that God could raise the dead, and figuratively 
speaking, he did receive Isaac back from death.175  
 
As God had promised, Abraham's name became great.176  And the author of Hebrews 
greatly praises Abraham's name because of Abraham's faith.  While, in the Genesis 
account I suggested that Abraham's actions were characterized by an attitude of trust in 
God, the author of Hebrews commends the same actions on account of Abraham's 
attitude of faith.  Thus, it appears that the Biblical account of faith holds that faith is, or is 
essentially comprised of, trust in God. 
It is not an unreasonable hypothesis to suppose that De Silentio also noticed this 
connection and as a result understands the knight of faith to be a sort of knight of trust in 
God.  In the light of this we can read Fear and Trembling as a meditation on the question, 
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“Where should we place our trust?”  Or to put it another way, “In what should we 
place our hope as our fulfillment and flourishing?”  Johannes De Silentio seems to 
suggest that there are three possible objects of human trust: finitude, the ethical, and the 
Person of God.  The knight of faith places his trust in the Person of God. 
On Trust and Infinite Resignation 
 In the "Preliminary Expectoration" of Fear and Trembling, Johannes de Silentio 
insists that the movement of infinite resignation is the last stage before faith.177  This 
movement involves the relinquishing of everything that belongs to finitude.178  By 
resigning himself with regard to everything that belongs to finitude, the knight of infinite 
resignation surrenders all of his earthly wishes; everything that belongs to earthly 
happiness.179  This release may be painful, for one is surrendering things for which one 
truly wishes.  However, even in the pain of this surrender, the knight of infinite 
resignation experiences peace, rest, and comfort.180 
 The knight of infinite resignation has developed a sort of Stoic indifference to the 
circumstances of his life.  He trusts neither health, nor wealth, nor fame for his 
fulfillment.  He is resigned concerning all of the pleasures of finitude.  As a result, he 
"has grasped the deep secret that even in loving another person one ought to be sufficient 
to oneself."181  In his resignation, he has become a man defined by a resolute act of will 
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rather than a man who is passively tossed about by the unpredictable happenings of 
circumstance.  He is content with himself without regard to exterior circumstances.  The 
knight of infinite resignation gives up his trust in exterior circumstance as that which will 
bring him fulfillment.   
 The knight of faith is like the knight of infinite resignation in that both must make 
a movement of infinite resignation, but the knight of faith makes one movement more.182 
On Trust and the Teleological Suspension of the Ethical 
How does the knight of faith differ from the knight of infinite resignation?   
According to De Silentio, the knight of faith is distinct in that he "teleologically suspends 
the ethical" in order to relate "absolutely to the Absolute."  Even the ethical can be an idol 
which claims the place that belongs to God alone.  According to Anti-Climacus, the 
person who does this only manages a sort of pharisaical righteousness, but is still failing 
to be dependent upon God.183     
 Yet what is the "ethical" that must be suspended?  Perhaps it is a sort of culture-
specific morality.  Someone arguing for this claim could point out that De Silentio does, 
in fact, equate the ethical with "social morality."184  Yet, by "social morality," De Silentio 
cannot be referring to a set of moral standards that is culture-specific.  If so, he would 
contradict his own claim that the ethical is the universal, which means that it applies to 
everyone at all times.185 
                                                 
182 F&T, pp. 37ff. 
 
183 SUD, XI 193-194. 
 
184 F&T, p. 55. 
 
185 F&T, p. 54. 
 
 88 
 Instead, it appears that De Silentio is concerned with goodness itself (at least as 
it relates to how we should, without qualification, behave toward others).  If this is what 
De Silentio means by the “ethical” then he is indeed making a very radical claim when he 
says that to be a knight of faith one must surrender one’s commitment to the ethical.  One 
must not simply be willing to act against the accepted morality of his time.  One must go 
further, and be willing to relinquish even the Good itself. 
 De Silentio employs a contrast between the knight of faith and the tragic hero in 
order to draw out this point.  The tragic hero is the person that remains within the 
ethical,186 while the knight of faith teleologically suspends the ethical.  The tragic hero is 
a knight of infinite resignation.  He has made the infinite movement in relinquishing 
finitude.  But in the contrast in Problemas I and II we see that the tragic hero finds his 
security in the ethical.187  The tragic hero puts his trust in the duty that he has 
relinquished all of his wishes to obey.  The knight of faith, by contrast, must surrender  
both his wishes, and his duty as that which he trusts for his flourishing.188 
 De Silentio may be suggesting that the tragic hero trusts God’s commands in such 
a way that he does not directly trust the God who gives the commands.  While he does 
trust God’s goodness, it is the goodness that he trusts and not the God who is good.  In 
Problema II, De Silentio makes this point in the following way. 
The ethical is the universal, and as such it is also the divine.  Thus it is 
proper to say that every duty is essentially duty to God, but if no more can 
be said than this, then it is also said that I actually have no duty to God.  
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The duty becomes duty by being traced back to God, but in the duty 
itself I do not enter into relation to God.189 
 
That is, one can trust in goodness, which may be part of God’s very essence, without 
trusting God himself.  The tragic hero may be in love with a sort of abstraction.  God is 
the Good, but the tragic hero trusts the essence without trusting the Person.  De Silentio 
speaks out against this, claiming that this sort of trust makes the Person, God, impotent.  
For the tragic hero, God’s power is only in the ethical.190  The tragic hero’s trust in God 
is impeded by God’s own essence, which stands between him and God.  By contrast, the 
knight of faith as the single individual determines his trust in the ethical through his trust 
in the absolute.191  He trusts God’s commands only because he trusts the Person, God, 
who commands.  The knight of faith is such a radical that he is willing even to suspend a 
commitment to God’s essence to trust in the Person of God. 
On Trust and the Absolute Relation to the Absolute 
 The knight of faith, as a “single individual stands in an absolute relation to the 
absolute.”192  The knight of faith relates directly to God.  If I have understood De Silentio 
correctly, his emphasis here is on personal relationship with God.  The knight of faith 
uses “You” with reference to God, whereas others can only speak of God in the third 
person.193  De Silentio contrasts the knight of faith with the tragic hero who finds his 
                                                 
 
189 F&T, p. 68. 
 
190 Ibid. 
 
191 F&T, p. 70. 
 
192 F&T, pp. 56, 120. 
 
193 F&T, p. 78. 
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security in the ethical.  While the ethical is the divine, the tragic hero does not, as the 
knight of faith does, enter into a private relationship with the divine.194   
 As I have argued, this personal relationship is one wherein the knight of faith puts 
his trust in the Person of God.195  Yet a distinction is necessary.  As I have read Fear and 
Trembling, the knight of faith does not merely put his trust in God for his fulfillment.  He 
puts his trust in God as his fulfillment.  Someone could put his trust in earthly wishes as 
his fulfillment while trusting God for his earthly wishes.  In such a case, that person’s 
ultimate trust is in his earthly wishes and not in the Person of God.196  He is simply 
relying on God to give him what he really wants.197  The knight of faith trusts the Person 
of God as his fulfillment.198  Indeed, if I have read De Silentio correctly, then we can say 
that the absolute relation involves perfect love of God.199   
                                                 
 
194 F&T, p. 60. 
 
195 It seems that I differ here from Khan and McKinnon who say, "...the self does not become properly 
structured until it humbly accepts the forgiveness of sins.  Further, its constitutive force is not God but, 
more specifically, the healing power of God's forgiveness.  It is only this forgiveness that makes it possible 
for the self to acquire its full human plentitude." (Khan and McKinnon, p.452).  My reading agrees with the 
first sentence and even the third.  But, the healing power of God's forgiveness is that it opens the door to 
relationship with the Person of God, Who is the constitutive force of the self. 
 
196 Just as in Schleiermacher, the Christian ultimately trusts a state of perfect morality as his fulfillment and 
trusts God to bring the believer into that state. 
 
197 This is not to say that the knight of faith should not also put his trust in God for his fulfillment.  He 
might need to rely on God as the source of strength which enables him to put his trust in God as his 
fulfillment. It appears that the knight of infinite resignation must trust his own will for his fulfillment.  It is 
by his will that he takes on a resolute attitude of resignation.  He makes this movement of infinite 
resignation all by himself  (F&T, p. 48) and he must continually use all of his strength to do so (F&T, p. 49)  
If his resolution is to continue, he must trust his own strength.  This strength comes from no other source 
but himself.  And as a result, he becomes sufficient to himself (F&T, p. 44).  He places his trust in his own 
will (and not in God) for the salvation of his soul (F&T, p. 49).  Yet if he is using all of his strength to do 
this, what strength is left to enter into faith?  Perhaps, he must rely on God. 
 
198 Though, in so doing, he may be given the strength to be perfectly ethical and given the pleasures of 
finitude through a sort of second immediacy. 
 
199 F&T, pp. 37, 73. 
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One Problem for This Reading and My Response 
 At least one objection can be brought against this reading of Fear and Trembling.  
First, someone might attack my reading, protesting that if my reading is true, then I have 
put De Silentio in the unpalatable position of being a divine command theorist.  By 
separating the person of God from the Good, I run the risk of allowing De Silentio’s God 
to give evil commands that must be obeyed. 
 I, however, have separated God’s person and God’s goodness only by 
abstraction.200  In my reading, De Silentio’s purpose is to emphasize the relational virtue 
that characterizes the knight of faith.201  While goodness is part of God’s essence, it is 
important that the knight of faith relate directly to the Person of God.  This may mean 
that my reading puts De Silentio in the position of claiming that the knight of faith must 
relate to God as though he were a divine command theorist.  Yet, it escapes the 
unpalatable result that the knight of faith may have to obey an evil command. 
 One could make the same point by stating that while God is Truth, one must relate 
to the Person of God such that one would believe a false proposition if God uttered it.  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
200 Another objection could arise here.  Someone could object to my reading of the ethical as making up 
part of the essence of God.  This person could claim that the essence of a person is separable from a person 
only by an abstraction (if even that), but De Silentio separates God from the ethical in fact.  De Silentio 
writes, “For I certainly would like to know how Abraham’s act can be related to the universal, whether any 
point of contact between what Abraham did and the universal can be found other than that Abraham 
transgressed it” (F&T, p. 59).  If one can trust God, but transgress the ethical then God’s person and 
essence are not in harmony.  This objection does put my reading in a tight spot.  But it is a tight spot in 
which it appears that Kierkegaard has De Silentio standing as well.  For De Silentio claims that the ethical 
is the divine (F&T, pp. 60, 68).  And what is the divine but the essence of Divinity?  Further, De Silentio 
binds the ethical with the notion of duty (F&T, pp. 68, 78) and he claims that duty is simply the expression 
of God’s will (F&T, p. 60).  This puts De Silentio in the awkward position of claiming that Abraham’s trust 
in God led him to transgress God’s will.  If someone can rescue De Silentio, then my reading is rescued as 
well.  But if my reading falls from this attack, then it appears that it would fall in good company.  Yet for 
the purpose of developing a view of sin that allows for a staurocentric theory of satisfaction which can 
escape problems 1-6, we are free to deviate from De Silentio here.  We can maintain his views on the 
personalist nature of faith while holding that Goodness is part of God's essence. 
 
201 F&T, p. 59. 
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While it may be impossible for God, being Truth, to utter a false proposition one could 
make the above claim with the purpose of emphasizing the importance of personal 
relationship with God.  Such a claim could warn against the danger of trusting in truth 
while never relating to the Person who is Truth.202 
We can explain this point in another way.  De Silentio claims that in infinite 
resignation, one gains love of God. 
The act of resignation does not require faith, for what I gain in resignation 
is my eternal consciousness.  This is a purely philosophical movement that 
I venture to make when it is demanded and can discipline myself to make, 
because every time some finitude will take power over me, I starve myself 
into submission until I make the movement, for my eternal consciousness 
is my love for God, and that for me is the highest of all.203  
 
However, the love of God gained here may not be the sort of love of God had by the 
knight of faith.  According to De Silentio it is possible to love God without faith. 
...he who loves God without faith reflects upon himself; he who loves God 
in faith reflects upon God.204 
 
                                                 
 
202 This reading of faith in Fear and Trembling differs in an important way from another, more typical, 
reading represented by Louis P. Pojman.  Pojman notes,“In Fear and Trembling the faith of the believer is 
against all the evidence.  It is at odds with the universal requirement which proceeds from the moral law” 
(Pojman, p. 37).  According to Pojman, “Kierkegaard’s point is that the God relationship is unique, 
qualitatively unlike any other relationship.  It involves its own standards, which must be judged irrational—
even immoral—by human standards” (Pojman, p. 155).   Pojman then claims that this point is “fraught with 
problems” (Pojman, p. 157).  He goes on to show how Abraham’s faith could be rationally justifiable and 
even not immoral (Pojman, pp. 157-160).  On my reading, however, it is not a problem if a knight of faith 
has rationally justifiable evidence for trusting God as his fulfillment.  On my reading, Kierkegaard’s point 
is simply that we should have a faith relationship with the Person of God.  The knight of faith may have 
quite a bit of evidence including his own history of relationship with God and witnessing the fulfillment of 
others in a faith relationship with God.  Further, it may never be possible for God to give an immoral 
command.  Kierkegaard’s point is just that the knight of faith should relate to God’s person such that we 
would follow an immoral command if God gave one.  This is because the knight of faith finds his 
fulfillment directly in God’s Person and not in God’s commands.   
 
203 F&T, p. 48. 
 
204 F&T, p. 37. 
 
 93 
Perhaps the difference is that the person who loves God without faith, ultimately loves 
his own love of God and not God’s Self.  He trusts his own love of God as his fulfillment 
rather than trusting God’s Person as his fulfillment.  Perhaps De Silentio is warning 
against being in love with being in love without being in love with the Beloved. 
Paramaters in Pursuit of a State of Faith 
 It seems that a Kierkegaardian solution to the problem of sin will, as in 
Schleiermacher, be confined to at least three parameters. 
Parameter 1:  Sin Cannot be Overcome on the Sinner's Strength Alone 
 De Silentio claims that the knight of infinite resignation must continually use all 
of his strength to resign everything.205  If this is the case, then what strength can he use to 
make the final movement of faith?  How is such a movement to be made?  Perhaps it 
cannot be made.206  Instead, it must be given.  If the sinner cannot make the necessary 
movement himself, then the only hope for the movement will be from a source outside of 
himself.  In that case, the most that the sinner can do is to be open to the transforming 
movement when it comes.207 
Parameter 2: The Sinner’s Will is the Gateway to Transformation 
 As we saw above, human freedom is a key element in the state of sin.  While we 
may not be able, by a simple movement of the will, to enter immediately into a state of 
                                                 
205 F&T, p. 49. 
 
206 F&T, pp. 50, 66. 
 
207 This reading is consistent with Walsh’s conclusion that according to Kierkegaard’s authorship “The 
admission of impotence is the only positive act that one can make toward one’s own salvation.” (Walsh, p. 
40).  Further, Louis P. Pojman argues that if Anti-Climacus' conclusions with regard to becoming authentic 
selves only by resting in the power that established us are true, then “it follows that if we are to be healed of 
our despair in our failed attempts to become authentic selves, we must have assistance from a higher power 
which constituted our being in the first place” (Pojman, p. 35).  Also see Pojman, p. 55. 
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faith, it is clear that the will is the gateway to faith inasmuch as a state of faith can be 
impeded by our unwillingness to enter into a state of faith.  To escape the problem of sin, 
the sinner must choose to embrace, rather than reject, the relationship of dependence that 
she has with God, the power that established her.  
Parameter 3: God Respects Human Freedom 
 God could initiate this change in us by force or in a manner which works with 
human freedom.  If God were to make us sinless by force, then God would remove the 
possibility of sin for God would remove freedom.  According to Anti-Climacus, however, 
our freedom to sin is our "superiority over the animal."208  The possibility of sin is an 
"infinite advantage."  (Yet, the actuality of sin is "ruination").209  Thus, God cannot 
remove freedom without making us into lesser beings.  It certainly seems that we would 
become beings who are incapable of having a “personal relationship” with God in a deep 
sense.  God’s relationship with us would become like our relationships with inanimate 
objects.  But we correctly hesitate to call a relationship with a machine a personal 
relationship.  Recall that according to Anti-Climacus we become truly ourselves only in 
relationship with God.  If God saves us from sin by removing the possibility of our 
having a personal relationship with God, then (in a way) God saves us from sin by 
destroying us.  If forcing change in us is an unacceptable option, then God must 
somehow elicit a free movement of human will towards change. 
 God could utilize fear toward this end.  However, fear is an option that only 
seems to work as a behavior-modifier, but fails as a will-modifier.  Suppose that God 
                                                 
208 SUD, XI 129. 
 
209 Ibid. 
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were to send an excruciating pain through a person’s body any time that person sinned.  
God might succeed in frightening us into submission.  We would very likely stop 
performing sin acts for fear of feeling pain.  But this strategy would fail to reach the 
human heart.  At our deepest part, we might still want our own way.  Fear will not be 
enough to change us, only enough to control us. 
 Another option is for God to invite us into transformation.  God must call us into 
a relationship with God.  This does not mean that God cannot use any form of fear.210  
God might frighten us by warning us of and exposing us to the necessary consequences 
of rejecting a relationship with God, but we must ultimately be willing to be transformed 
into the kind of people that will relate to God as a person and not simply to God’s 
commands as a good means for avoiding pain.   
The Role of the Cross in a Solution 
 We might now ask, “What role might the Cross take in brining us to a state of 
faith?”  On this conception of sin and its solution God would, as in Schleiermacher, need 
to invite and draw us into a state wherein there is no sin.  As opposed to Schleiermacher, 
God would not simply be inviting us to accept God’s help towards something God could 
give us or create in us apart from God’s Self.  Rather, God would be inviting us to a 
personal relationship of trust with God’s Self.  The Cross could be an essential part of 
this invitation and attraction.   
                                                 
 
210 In fact, God could use any number of indicators to encourage us to open our wills to our ultimate telos.  
“Despair, anxiety over the self, and guilt at our failures to realize our telos, are indicators which remind us 
of our origins and cause in us a holy homesickness, until we finally journey back to our Father’s home” 
(Pojman, p. 35).  And again, “Guilt, then, drives him like a good school master to seek an education in a 
higher class, the school of grace where forgiveness may be forthcoming” (Pojman, p. 53).   
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 While we do not have room for a thorough analysis of a Kierkegaardian 
soteriology,211 let us note that this role for the Cross could be consistent with 
Kierkegaard’s authorship.  For example, the Cross could invite us to relationship with 
God inasmuch as it reveals our state of alienation from God and displays God’s desire for 
reconciliation.  The fact that God has to go to such lengths as the Cross to reconcile us, 
could be a wake up call to how far we are from God.  Thus begins an “inverse 
dialectic”212 wherein by becoming aware of our distance from God, we are enabled to 
draw near to God.213  Further, the fact that God is willing to go to such lengths could be a 
display of God’s love for us.  And this could function as God’s invitation and attraction 
to personal relationship with God.   
 Kierkegaard claims, 
…all by himself no man can ever come to think that God loves him.  This 
must be proclaimed to men.   This is the gospel, this is revelation.  But 
precisely because no human being can by himself come to the idea that 
God loves him, in like manner no human being can come to know how 
great a sinner he is.  Consequently the Augsburg Confession teaches that it 
must be revealed to a man how great a sinner he is.  For without the divine 
yard-stick, no human being is the great sinner (this he is—only before 
God).214 
 
                                                 
211 Kierkegaard clearly has a role for satisfaction and even penal substitution.  "Thus when the punitive 
justice here in the world or in judgment in the next seeks the place where I, a sinner, stand with all my guilt, 
with my many sins—it does not find me.  I no longer stand in that place; I have left it and someone else 
stands in my place, someone who puts himself completely in my place.  I stand beside this other one, 
beside him, my Redeemer, who put himself completely in my place—for this accept my gratitude, Lord 
Jesus Christ!" (Without Authority, p. 123).  Also cited in Rae, p. 103.  Also see Walsh, p. 44 and Rae, 
pp.102-103. 
 
212 See Walsh, pp. 47-48. 
 
213 See Walsh, pp. 39-40.  And, Without Authority, 131, 133 (as cited by Walsh). 
 
214 Søren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers, Vol. 2, F-K., edited and translated by Howard V. Hong and 
Edna H. Hong (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1970), p. 49, 1216, VIII A 675, n.d., 1848.  Also 
cited by Rae, p. 100.  See also, Rae, pp. 99-100. 
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Perhaps the Cross functions as an essential component in this revelation whereby God 
communicates these truths to us and invites us to reconciliation. 
 This potential role for the Cross is compatible with Murray Rae's interpretation of 
"how Kierkegaard conceives the atonement doctrinally."215  Rae claims that Kierkegaard 
focuses on the substitution of Christ.  This substitution has a "threefold aspect."  First, 
Christ sympathetically "puts himself in the place of the one who suffers" in order to offer 
comfort to the sufferer.  "Second, Christ puts himself in the place of those who are 
tempted" so that he can stand with you in your own temptation.  "Third, Christ stands in 
the place of sinners."216  Rae then cites Without Authority where Kierkegaard says, 
If he, if the Redeemer's suffering and death is the satisfaction for your sin 
and guilt—if it is the satisfaction, then he does indeed step into your place 
for you, or he, the one who makes satisfaction, steps into your place 
suffering in your place the punishment of sin so that you might be saved, 
suffering in your place death so that you might live.217 
 
While this third aspect of the substitution of Christ embraces penal substitution, Rae 
notes that,  
...the emphasis here, and in Kierkegaard's further elucidation of the matter, 
is placed not at all upon the punitive aspect of the satisfaction but entirely 
upon the compassion of the Saviour who bears for us the cost of sin.218 
 
The point, then, according to Rae, is Christ's compassion for the sinner.  This is 
compatible with my suggestion that the Cross could have an invitational role insofar as it 
displays God's love and the need for us to be reconciled to God.  Even the first two 
                                                 
 
215 Rae, p.102 
 
216 Ibid. 
 
217 Søren Kierkegaard, Without Authority, edited and translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. 
(New Jersey: Princeton, 1997), p. 123.  Also cited by Rae, p. 102. 
 
218 Rae, p. 103 
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aspects of Rae's Kierkegaardian substitution theory can be seen as Christ's encouraging 
and exhorting the believer to be reconciled to the Person of God.  This helps us to 
understand the claim that 
Kierkegaard is concerned above all with how one responds to the 
declaration of forgiveness and grace rather than with the mechanics of 
how atonement is accomplished.219 
 
Final Evaluation of This Kierkegaardian Conception of Sin and Its Solution 
 Let us now ask whether this understanding of the problem of sin and its solution 
can inspire a staurocentric theory of satisfaction that can avoid problems 1–6.  I will 
argue that, as with Schleiermacher, such a theory could escape problem (2), the problem 
of superfluous suffering.  Further, it seems that such a satisfaction theory would have an 
advantage in that it could also overcome (3), the appeal to robust love and (6), the 
impotence problem.   
 Since, as we have seen, God cannot remove human freedom without destroying 
what it is to be a “self,” God must work with human freedom to bring us into a state of 
faith.  It is plausible that God’s finding satisfaction in the Cross is the most effective 
means towards accomplishing this end inasmuch as this draws humans into personal 
relationship with God.220  As a result the satisfaction theorist could claim that Christ's 
suffering involves some sort a benefit that could not be had in any other way (the benefit 
of being the most effective means toward drawing humans into personal relationship with 
God).  If this is the case then such a satisfaction theory could escape (2), the problem of 
superfluous suffering.   
                                                 
 
219 Rae, p. 101 
 
220 This possibility will be explored with more detail in chapter 3. See this diss., pp. 154-182. 
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 Further, such a satisfaction theory will not be confronted with (3), the appeal to 
robust love.  God cannot force this transformation.  If God overrides human freedom, 
then, as we have seen, God destroys the possibility of bringing humans into a state of 
faith.  It appears that the only other possible way of eliminating sin, on this view, is to 
destroy the human self and so also eliminate faith.  It does not seem that destroying the 
human self is more loving than allowing the possibility of a state of sin. 
 Finally, on this view, it is not possible to be in a state of faith and yet hate God.  
As we saw above, the relationship of faith is an absolute relation wherein the person of 
God is perceived as the end in which a human places her ultimate trust.  In this absolute 
relation is "absolute love" of God.221  If a person hates God, but enters into a reluctant 
relationship with God because that person needs some end which only God can offer (e.g. 
out of hope for the attainment of some earthly wish, or as a source of strength from which 
to meet the demands of the ethical), then that person’s ultimate trust is in the end which 
she relies on God to help her to attain.  But, if the Person of God is the ultimate object of 
one’s trust, there is no room for hate.  One equates one’s flourishing with relationship 
with God.   
                                                 
 
221 F&T, p. 73. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
SATISFACTION AND GOD'S EXTENSION OF FORGIVENESS 
Introduction 
In this chapter I examine the potential role of satisfaction in personal 
reconciliation by analyzing satisfaction's possible contribution to God's extension of 
forgiveness.  This chapter is divided into three sections.  In the first section I explain the 
role of forgiveness in personal reconciliation and show how satisfaction can relate to 
forgiveness.  I claim that there are two necessary conditions for personal reconciliation.  
The first condition is that forgiveness must be extended by the offended party.1  Second, 
the offender must appropriate the extended forgiveness.  A common way to understand 
satisfaction's contribution to personal reconciliation is in terms of its contribution towards 
God's extension of forgiveness.  I argue that satisfaction is neither logically necessary for, 
nor the most effective means to, God's extension of forgiveness.  One could claim, 
however, that God refuses to extend forgiveness until God has received satisfaction.  For 
a satisfaction theory to make such a claim while avoiding problems 1–6, it will have to 
argue that God insists on satisfaction as a condition for God's extension of forgiveness 
because of its ability to achieve some benefit other than the mere eliciting of God's 
forgiveness.   
                                                 
1 One might ask whether God can extend forgiveness to an offender who has wronged persons other than 
God.  I address this question in chapter 4.  See this diss., pp. 245-247. 
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In the second and third sections I critically analyze two historical theories of 
satisfaction, paying specific attention to each view's claims concerning the benefits of 
satisfaction.  In the second section I critically analyze Anselm's satisfaction theory.  I will 
show that while Anselm can avoid (1), the ontological problem, Anselm fails to offer a 
benefit of satisfaction that enables his theory to simultaneously avoid both of the moral 
problems listed against satisfaction(e.g. (2) and (3)).  In the third section, I critically 
analyze Aquinas's theory.  I claim that Aquinas opens the door to a successful satisfaction 
theory by arguing that God's pursuing satisfaction contributes to the second condition for 
personal reconciliation; namely, human appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration.  
Thomas's theory succeeds over Anselm's in its ability to overcome (2), the problem of 
superfluous suffering, and (3), the appeal to robust love, simultaneously.2   
Personal Reconciliation, Forgiveness, and Satisfaction 
In chapter one I used a reading of Kierkegaard to argue that the core problem of 
sin is that sinners exist in a state of alienation from the Person of God wherein they fail to 
trust God as the source and end of their fulfillment.3  Therefore, the solution to the 
problem of sin will require personal reconciliation between God and a human being 
wherein the human turns from her lack of trust in God and embraces God as the source 
and end of her fulfillment.  Since the problem with sin is that humans exist in an un-
reconciled, or alienated, state, we must ask what conditions are necessary for a change 
from such a state into a state of personal reconciliation with God.  I posit that for personal 
                                                 
2 I will use Thomas's theory to inspire an approach to penal substitution that can avoid problems 1–14.  I 
develop this approach in chapter 3.  I show how this approach can enable penal substitution to avoid 
problems 1–14 in chapter 4. 
 
3 See this diss., pp. 74-90. 
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reconciliation to take place there are two necessary conditions.  First, the offended 
party must extend forgiveness to the offender (the party culpable for the alienation).   
Second, the offender must appropriate the extended forgiveness.  In order for satisfaction 
to contribute to personal reconciliation (and thus avoid (6), the impotence problem), it 
must contribute to one, or both, of these conditions.  In this chapter I will analyze the 
approach which claims that satisfaction contributes to God's extension of forgiveness.  To 
do this we must first define "extension of forgiveness" and its relationship to personal 
reconciliation.4 
Personal Reconciliation and Forgiveness  
Three Conceptions of Forgiveness 
There are at least three ways in which we understand the term "forgiveness."  I 
will refer to them respectively as "forgiveness-as-pardon," "forgiveness-as-letting go," 
and "forgiveness-as-restoration."  I will define each and argue that forgiveness-as-
restoration and forgiveness-as-letting go are necessary for personal reconciliation.  
Forgiveness-as-pardon is not necessary for personal reconciliation.   
Forgiveness-as-Pardon 
Let us begin with forgiveness-as-pardon.  This type of forgiveness can be 
understood as an offended party's choice to release a claim to certain external 
consequences.  In this way an offended party might forgive a financial debt or choose not 
to punish his offender.  It is forgiveness-as-pardon to which we refer when we talk of the 
type of forgiveness that contributes to legal reconciliation.   
                                                 
4 What it means for an offender to appropriate forgiveness is defined in this diss., pp. 155-158.  
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Forgiveness-as-pardon is not necessary for personal reconciliation. An 
offended party might become personally reconciled to an offender after the offender has 
received his due punishment.  In such a case, personal reconciliation can be achieved 
even though forgiveness-as-pardon has not been given.  Thus, forgiveness-as-pardon is 
not necessary for personal reconciliation. 
Also, this type of forgiveness can be given regardless of the offender's current 
attitude or actions.  In fact, this type of forgiveness could be given even if the offender 
did not want the forgiveness.   
Forgiveness-as-Letting Go 
A second type of forgiveness, forgiveness-as-letting go, is described by Eleanor 
Stump when she notes,  
Sometimes...we mean by 'forgiveness' the wronged person's putting away 
all resentment or wrath with respect to the wrongdoer.5 
 
 In this type of forgiveness, the forgiver releases any anger or resentment that he 
feels toward the offender.  This is the sort of forgiveness to which we refer when we say 
we are "letting it go."  We are letting go of the resentment we feel towards our offender.  
Forgiveness-as-letting go is necessary for personal reconciliation.  If any 
harboring of resentment creates a sort of alienation between persons, then personal 
reconciliation cannot be had inasmuch as forgiveness-as-letting go is not also present.  
An offended party might desire personal reconciliation with his offender while also 
                                                 
5 Eleanore, Stump, "Book Review: Responsibility and Atonement by Richard Swinburne," Faith and 
Philosophy 11 (1994), p. 325.  It might be possible to read "wrath" in Stump's quote in such a way that it 
includes the first understanding of forgiveness.  If that is her intent, then both the first and second 
understanding of forgiveness are present in her quote. 
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harboring resentment toward his offender.  But in order to attain personal 
reconciliation he will have to overcome his resentment. 
This type of forgiveness is similar to forgiveness-as-pardon in that it can be given 
without any change in (or expectation of) the offender.  In fact, the offender does not 
even have to be aware of having been forgiven for these types of forgiveness to be 
complete.   
Forgiveness-as-letting go can be done in conjunction with forgiveness-as-pardon 
but neither implies the other.  One can give forgiveness-as-pardon while refusing 
forgiveness-as-letting go.  For example, I could waive my claim to a debt owed to me but 
still despise my offender for having incurred the debt in the first place.  Conversely, one 
can give forgiveness-as-letting go while refusing forgiveness-as-pardon.  I could release 
my resentment toward my offender but still insist that the offender repay his debt or 
receive his punishment.  In fact, I could even feel love towards my offender and still 
insist on punishment or repayment.  For example, a parent, without resentment and in 
love could discipline her child because she values the instruction that such discipline will 
afford her child. 
Forgiveness-as-Restoration 
There is yet a third conception of forgiveness.  Sometimes by "forgiveness" we 
are referring to a type of forgiveness that cannot be given without regard to the offender's 
response.  This type of forgiveness, "forgiveness-as-restoration," is given when an 
offended party enters into personal reconciliation with her offender.  Stump briefly 
describes this type of forgiveness in the following way. 
 105 
...sometimes...we mean by 'forgiveness' the restoration and healing of a 
broken relationship.  When a husband asks his wife for forgiveness, he 
wants the marital relationship whole again.6 
 
Similarly Vincent Brümmer speaks of this type of forgiveness when he says, 
 
...if you, by forgiving me, show your willingness to identify with me 
again, then our fellowship will not only be restored, but might also be 
deepened and strengthened.7 
 
Someone could object to the use of "restoration" in connection with this type of 
forgiveness.  One could point out that someone could give this type of forgiveness even 
where there was no previous relationship to be restored.  For example, a husband could 
abandon his wife not knowing at the time that she is pregnant.  For years, the husband 
may not know that a daughter exists whom he has wronged.  The daughter could then 
find her father and offer him forgiveness-as-restoration even though they are meeting for 
the first time.  Yet here, we can identify forgiveness-as-restoration as restoring, as much 
as possible, the relationship to what it would have been had there been no wrongdoing.  
This applies as much to the man and the wife (who had a relationship prior to the 
wrongdoing) in the example as much as to the man and the daughter (who had no 
relationship prior to the wrongdoing).8 
As I mentioned, this type of forgiveness is distinct from the first two in that it 
cannot be given to an offender without regard to the offender's response.  An offended 
party can offer forgiveness-as-restoration but this type of forgiveness will remain merely 
                                                 
6 Stump, "Book Review: Responsibility and Atonement by Richard Swinburne," pp.325-326. 
 
7 Vincent Brümmer, "Atonment and Reconciliation," Religious Studies 28 (1992), p. 442. 
 
8 Someone might then ask, "In what sense can we forgive a stranger who wrongs us?"  It may be that 
forgiveness-as-pardon and forgiveness-as-letting go are the only types of forgiveness appropriate to 
strangers.  If forgiveness-as-restoration applies at all to forgiveness of strangers, it applies in a weak sense.  
Restoring the relationship, as much as possible, to what it would have been had there been no wrongdoing 
will only mean going back to being co-existing human beings who do not harm one another. 
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an offered possibility until it is received, or appropriated, by the offender.9  
Forgiveness-as-restoration cannot be given unless it is also received.  An offended party 
cannot enter into personal reconciliation merely by an offer of forgiveness-as-restoration.  
For personal reconciliation to be complete, both the offender and the offended must be 
willing to be reconciled.  This is why C.F.D. Moule says, "reconciliation is not complete 
until there is a two-way traffic."10 
 Forgiveness-as-restoration can be extended (offered and/or given) even if 
forgiveness-as-pardon is withheld.11  For example, an offended party might offer 
forgiveness-as-restoration after punishment has been given or satisfaction received.12  
                                                 
 
9 It is worth noting that there is a subtle difference between this understanding of forgiveness and a fourth 
way in which the term is sometimes used.  Sometimes the term "forgiveness" is used to indicate the offer of 
forgiveness-as-restoration.  To say, "I forgive you" can sometimes mean "I offer you personal 
reconciliation."  C.F.D. Moule makes such a claim when he says, "...forgiveness is not a commodity, an 
impersonal something that can be bestowed without the recipient's response.  Forgiveness is free, but it is 
essentially a free invitation" (C.F.D. Moule, "The Christian Understanding of Forgiveness," Theology 71 
(1968), p. 441).  Moule, however, has employed both the third and fourth understandings of forgiveness in 
this quote.  It would be strange if, in his first use of "forgiveness" he meant "forgiveness-as-offer-of-
forgiveness-as-restoration," since one could, in fact, give forgiveness in this way without a recipient's 
response.  Here, Moule appears to employ forgiveness in the "forgiveness-as-restoration" sense.  His 
second use of "forgiveness" clearly employs the fourth understanding, since he specifically refers to it as an 
"invitation."  For our purposes, I will not use the term "forgiveness" to indicate this fourth sense but merely 
refer to an "offer of forgiveness-as-restoration" where I intend to use this concept. 
 
10 Moule, "The Christian Understanding of Forgiveness," p. 442.  John Wilson also makes a similar point in 
"Why Forgiveness Requires Repentance," Philosophy. 63 (1988), pp. 534-535.  Richard L. Purtill also 
makes a similar point in "Justice, Mercy, Supererogation, and Atonement," in Christian Philosophy, edited 
by Thomas P. Flint (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), p. 42.  Also see Brümmer, p. 441. 
 
11 Garrard and McNaughton allow for this where they say, "To forgive is not necessarily to waive 
punishment...Holding that it is right to punish someone can be quite consistent with having an attitude of 
good will towards them" (Eve Garrard and David McNaughton, "In Defence of Unconditional 
Forgiveness," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103.1 (2003), p. 48).  Richard Purtill also notes that 
"forgiveness is quite consistent with punishing exactly as much as deserved" (Purtill, “Justice, Mercy, 
Supererogation, and Atonement,” p.43).  Purtill is here referring to forgiveness-as-restoration for he says 
"genuine forgiveness is 'at-one-ment' and it requires action on both sides" (Purtill, “Justice, Mercy, 
Supererogation, and Atonement,” p.42).  Also, Steven L. Porter claims that in some cases one could even 
rightfully withhold forgiveness until the wrongdoer has not only repaid his debt but also endured 
appropriate punishment (Steven L. Porter, “Swinburnian Atonement and the Doctrine of Penal 
Substitution,” Faith and Philosophy 21.2. (April, 2004), 234-235).   
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Also, forgiveness-as-restoration can be withheld even if forgiveness-as-pardon is 
given.  For example, an offended party could waive her claim to punishment or debt-
repayment while despising her offender and refusing to have any further interaction with 
her.13   
Further, it seems that forgiveness-as-restoration can be withheld even if 
forgiveness-as-letting go is given.  As Stump points out,  
We can forgive people who still aren't speaking to us; we can forgive our 
parents long after they are dead; and we can be commanded to forgive our 
enemies...14 
 
Thus, there are times when one can forgive-as-letting go even where forgiveness-as-
restoration is not possible.  It seems, however, that forgiveness-as-letting go is entailed by 
forgiveness-as-restoration.  As noted above, if any harboring of resentment creates a sort 
of alienation between persons, then forgiveness-as-restoration cannot be had inasmuch as 
forgiveness-as-letting go is not also present.15   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
12 There could, however, be some debate as to whether forgiveness-as-restoration can be extended without 
any form of legal reconciliation, or at least the promise of legal reconciliation. 
 
13 C.F.D Moule also distinguishes between what I have called "forgiveness-as-pardon" and "forgiveness-as-
restoration."  He says, "...it is a wholly inadequate...notion of forgiveness that sees it as the settling of a 
credit and debit account, as though the offender paid and the injured party was then satisfied.  That may be 
what happens when an offence is dealt with on the level of legal proceedings, but it is certainly remote 
from what happens on the level of personal relations when an estrangement is healed" (C.F.D. Moule, "The 
Theology of Forgiveness," p. 253).  
 
14 Stump, "Book Review: Responsibility and Atonement by Richard Swinburne," p.325. 
 
15 Someone could point out that the type of forgiveness that applies to human-human relationships is often 
"incomplete and involves the harboring of some residual feelings of resentment"  (Thomas Carson, written 
note to author).  On my analysis, "incomplete forgiveness," or the type of forgiveness that harbors any 
resentment, is either only forgiveness-as-pardon or an attempt to work towards forgiveness-as-letting go 
and forgiveness-as-restoration. 
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Summary 
 Thus, God's extension of forgiveness-as-restoration and human appropriation of 
such forgiveness are necessary conditions for personal reconciliation; together they are 
sufficient.  God's giving forgiveness-as-letting go will be a necessary, though not 
sufficient, condition of God's extending forgiveness-as-restoration.  And finally, God's 
giving forgiveness-as-pardon is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for either of 
the other forms of forgiveness.  
Three Objections to this Analysis and My Responses 
 There are at least three ways that someone might object to this analysis of 
forgiveness.  The first two objections involve the claim that my analysis of forgiveness is 
incomplete insofar as it neglects another type of forgiveness.  The first is exemplified by 
Eve Garrard and David McNaughton who also identify three understandings of 
forgiveness.  Two of their conceptions correspond to forgiveness-as-letting go and 
forgiveness-as-restoration respectively. 16  They identify a third conception, however, 
which one might argue that I neglect.  According to this third conception, 
...forgiveness involves, in some sense, the removal or bracketing off of the 
wrong, or of the guilt created by the wrong—the wiping clean of the 
slate.17 
 
I argue, however, that this conception of forgiveness is not separate from my three 
conceptions, but rather a common definition that applies to all three.  Each type of 
forgiveness involves a "wiping clean of the slate" in a different way.  When one gives 
forgiveness-as-pardon she "brackets off the wrong" from the debt or claim to punishment 
                                                 
16 Garrard and McNaughton, p. 41. 
 
17 Ibid. 
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that it has incurred.  When one gives forgiveness-as-letting go she "brackets off the 
wrong" from the resulting hostility or resentment toward her offender.  When one offers 
forgiveness-as-restoration, one is offering to "bracket off the wrong" inasmuch as it has 
caused a relational distance between the offended party and the offender. 
 Second, Anne C. Minas indentifies another form of forgiveness when she 
suggests that in one sense 
...forgiveness may simply be retraction or modification of a previous 
adverse moral judgment about the act in question.18 
 
I argue, however, such a conception is mistakenly called "forgiveness."  If I retract my 
adverse moral judgment, then I am declaring my original judgment to be false.  Yet, one 
can only be forgiven in relation to wrongdoing.  If my original judgment was false and I 
have mistakenly treated you as a wrongdoer, I cannot be said to forgive you when I later 
come to realize my mistake.  As a matter of fact, I may need your forgiveness for my 
mistaken judgment.  Even if my mistaken judgment results in a sort of resentment 
towards you, my release of resentment cannot be called forgiveness.  A release of 
resentment cannot be called forgiveness if it does not correspond to any actual 
wrongdoing on the part of a perceived offender.  For example, I might resent you for 
being better-looking than me or for being hired for a job that I wanted.  If later I come to 
release my resentment, I cannot be said to have forgiven you.  Rather, I dealt with my 
jealousy or my own anger problem.  You need not be "forgiven" for being better-looking 
or more qualified.  If, on the other hand, my original judgment was true, then in retracting 
                                                 
 
18 Anne C. Minas, "God and Forgiveness," The Philosophical Quarterly 25.99 (April, 1975), p. 138. 
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my original judgment I am committing myself to a false moral judgment.19  It is still 
unclear, in this case, how I can be said to forgive my offender since only offenders can be 
forgiven and I am refusing to believe that my offender is/was such. 
 Third, one might object to my distinction between forgiveness-as-pardon and 
forgiveness-as-restoration by pointing out that it is common for a punishment to be 
relational.  That is, the offended party's refusal to enter into personal relationship is 
punishment.  As a result, it will not be possible to give forgiveness-as-restoration without 
also giving forgiveness-as-pardon.  My claim that one can give forgiveness-as-pardon 
while withholding forgiveness-as-restoration will, in such cases, be false.  Also, my claim 
that forgiveness-as-restoration can be given even if forgiveness-as-pardon is not given 
will, in such cases, be false.  This is particularly relevant in the divine-human situation 
since many claim that divine punishment is relational.20 
Even when the punishment due to an offender is the offended party's refusal to be 
personally reconciled, the distinction between forgiveness-as-pardon and forgiveness-as-
restoration will hold.  This is because there will be two different grounds upon which the 
offended party can refuse personal reconciliation.  The offended party can refuse personal 
reconciliation on the grounds of punishment or the offended party can refuse personal 
reconciliation on the grounds of that person's free personal prerogative.  In these cases 
one could give forgiveness-as-pardon by waiving one's claim to refusal of personal 
reconciliation on the ground of punishment, and yet exercise one's free personal 
                                                 
19 Thanks to Thomas Carson for this last point. 
 
20 See, for example, Garry Williams, "Penal Substitution: A Response to Recent Criticisms" in The 
Atonement Debate, edited by Derek Tidball, David Hilborn, and Justin Thacker (Michigan: Zondervan, 
2008), pp. 177-178. 
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prerogative not to enter into personal reconciliation.21  Further, one might extend 
forgiveness-as-restoration only after satisfaction has been given22 or after the offender 
has endured one's refusal of personal reconciliation for a time.23   
Similarly, a wife might refuse personal reconciliation with her unfaithful husband 
for a period time, as a punishment for his unfaithfulness.  When the period of time is 
over, the wife could still refuse personal reconciliation with her husband.  The husband 
might protest, "Why are you still punishing me?"  To which the wife could reply, "You 
are no longer being punished.  I simply do not wish to be in a relationship with you."  
Thus, the distinction between forgiveness-as-pardon and forgiveness-as-restoration still 
holds even where punishment is relational. 
God's Extension of Forgiveness-as-Restoration and Satisfaction 
 Now that we have identified the conditions for personal reconciliation as an 
extension of forgiveness-as-restoration from God and the appropriation of forgiveness-as-
restoration by humans, we can ask whether a theory of satisfaction can contribute to the 
attainment of either or both of these conditions in a way that avoids the problems for 
satisfaction.  One common way to understand satisfaction's contribution to personal 
reconciliation is in terms of its contribution towards God's extension of forgiveness-as-
                                                 
 
21 If the offended party chooses not to exercise this prerogative not to enter into personal reconciliation, that 
person extends the gift of forgiveness-as-restoration. No offender has a right to forgiveness-as-restoration, 
even if punishment as a ground for refusal of personal reconciliation is removed.  So C.F.D. Moule says, 
"Forgiveness...is, by definition, free...The offender may make material reparation for any material damage 
he may have caused; but, if he is to be forgiven by the person he has offended against, he must be humble 
enough to accept the forgiveness gratis and not try to pretend he can earn it" (C.F.D. Moule, "The 
Theology of Forgiveness," in Essays in New Testament Interpretation (London: Cambridge, 1982), p. 251). 
 
22 Or after the promise of satisfaction has been made. 
 
23 One might then ask "If the due punishment for sin is God's permanent refusal of relationship and yet God 
offers humans personal reconciliation, how can God be said to exact the full penalty for sin?"  For my 
response see this diss., pp. 252-254.  
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restoration.   There are three ways to argue for such a contribution.  The first is to 
claim that satisfaction is logically necessary for an extension of forgiveness-as-
restoration.  The second is to claim that satisfaction is the most effective or efficient 
means towards an extension of forgiveness-as-restoration.  The third is to claim that 
while God can offer forgiveness-as-restoration without satisfaction, God requires 
satisfaction as a prerequisite to God's extension of forgiveness-as-restoration because of 
satisfaction's contribution to attaining some other benefit.   
Any theory of satisfaction built using the first approach seems likely to fail.  Just 
as forgiveness-as-pardon is not necessary for forgiveness-as-restoration, neither is 
satisfaction a necessary condition for an extension of forgiveness-as-restoration.  One 
might argue that legal reconciliation of some sort (through forgiveness-as-pardon, 
satisfaction, or punishment) is a necessary condition for an extension of forgiveness-as-
pardon.24  Yet even if this is the case, there are still two options aside from satisfaction 
that can be used to meet this condition.  One of these options, forgiveness-as-pardon, 
involves less suffering than satisfaction.  Thus, if an atonement theory advocates for 
satisfaction over forgiveness-as-pardon as the means to meet the condition of legal 
reconciliation, satisfaction will be vulnerable to the problem of superfluous suffering.    
 Let us now examine the second approach.  Perhaps receiving satisfaction assists 
more effectively or efficiently than any other means to the attainment of one of the 
necessary conditions for an extension of forgiveness-as-restoration.  For example, I have 
argued that forgiveness-as-letting go is a necessary condition for an offer of forgiveness-
as-restoration.  We can imagine a scenario in which receiving satisfaction could make it 
                                                 
24 Though, even this isn't clear.  It seems possible to extend an offer of forgiveness-as-restoration to 
someone who has yet to be punished, offer satisfaction, or receive forgiveness-as-pardon. 
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easier for an offended party to give forgiveness-as-letting go to an offender.  The 
offered satisfaction could soften the offended party's heart toward the offender making it 
easier to let go of the resentment one has toward the offender.  Now, while this may be 
the case when we consider human offers of forgiveness-as-letting go, the same difficulty 
with regard to releasing resentment does not apply to God.  Given that God is 
omnipotent, God could presumably remove God's resentment by the power of God's own 
will (if God felt any resentment in the first place).25  Further, inasmuch as God is 
characterized by robust love, God does not need anything to appease God's anger or to 
help God release resentment.  A pursuit of satisfaction (especially insofar as it includes 
the Cross) as a means to forgiveness-as-letting go would fall to the problem of 
superfluous suffering.26 
 Forgiveness-as-letting go is not the only necessary condition for an extension of 
forgiveness, however.  There are two additional necessary conditions for an extension of 
forgiveness-as-restoration.  First, God must be willing to be personally reconciled to 
                                                 
 
25 Here we might feel the inadequacy of identifying this type of forgiveness with the phrase "letting go."  It 
would be possible for God to give this type of forgiveness even if God had never "grabbed hold" of 
resentment such that God needed to "let it go."  In fact, Anne C Minas takes advantage of this point to 
argue that God, as a perfect being, could not give forgiveness in this way (Minas, pp. 144-148.)  Garrard 
and McNaughton offer a concise response to such a criticism saying, "...it is not the case that hostile 
feelings have to be present, and then overcome, in order for forgiveness to be possible...[O]ne in whom the 
quality of forgiveness is deeply embedded may never feel resentment or hatred in the first place.  Effortless 
virtue is still virtue." (Garrard and McNaughton, p. 45).  Minas might object, saying, "...forgiveness has to 
be a giving up of something" (Minas, p. 148).  We could respond in two ways.  First, we might argue that 
forgiveness does not necessarily involve a "giving up."  Second, we could agree with Minas but argue that 
God could be said to "give up" something like a claim to resentment.   
 
26 Jean Hampton argues that there are cases in which it is immoral to release one's resentment.  (See Jeffrie 
G. Murphy and Jean Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy (New York: Cambridge, 1988)). Paul Moser 
responds directly to Hampton's view noting that it has failed to distinguish hatred of "a position, attitude, or 
action" with hatred of a person.  The former, he says is compatible with "love toward the person advancing 
that position, attitude, or action" (Paul Moser, The Elusive God, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), p. 178).  Garrard and McNaughton similarly argue against Hampton saying that her account 
"confuses love with moral approval" (Garrard and McNaughton, p. 51). 
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humans.  Second, God must communicate God's willingness to be so reconciled.  
Perhaps receiving satisfaction assists more effectively or efficiently than any other means 
to the attainment of one of these two conditions.   
 An appeal to the former seems unlikely to help a theory of satisfaction.  Since 
God can become willing to be personally reconciled with humans simply through the 
power of God's own will (and presumably God is perpetually so willing by virtue of 
God's all-loving character), holding satisfaction as a condition for such willingness would 
trap satisfaction between (1), the ontological problem, and (2), the problem of 
superfluous suffering.   
Likewise an appeal to the communication condition seems dubious.  Certainly 
there are a myriad of ways in which God could communicate God's willingness to be 
personally reconciled inasmuch as communication is understood to involve only 
announcement on the part of God.  And we can think of several ways that God could 
announce a willingness to be personally reconciled with fallen humans which would 
involve much less suffering than satisfaction.  For example, God could simply write each 
person a letter to announce God's willingness to be personally reconciled.  Thus, 
inasmuch as communication involves only announcement, the communication condition 
will not offer satisfaction any help in avoiding the ontological and moral problems.  If, 
however, the reception of such an announcement is part of what we mean by 
"communication," then we will be considering conditions for the appropriation of 
forgiveness-as-restoration.27   
                                                 
27 Such conditions will be considered in more depth in chapter 3. See this diss., pp. 155-158. 
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Let us now consider the third approach.  While satisfaction is not necessary 
for God's extension of forgiveness-as-restoration it is logically possible for God to make 
satisfaction a condition of such an extension.28  That is, God could refuse to offer 
forgiveness-as-restoration until God had received legal reconciliation through 
satisfaction.  For a satisfaction theory to claim this while avoiding both moral problems 
(2) and (3), that theory must show that there is some benefit achieved through satisfaction 
which cannot be achieved by any other means.  I argue that Anselm and Aquinas both 
defend satisfaction using this third approach.  I will show that where Anselm fails to offer 
a benefit of satisfaction that enables his theory to avoid these moral problems, Aquinas 
opens the door to a successful satisfaction theory by arguing that God's insisting on 
satisfaction as a condition of God's forgiveness-as-restoration contributes to the 
fulfillment of the second condition for personal reconciliation; namely, human 
appropriation of God's forgiveness-as-restoration. 
Anselm's Theory of Satisfaction 
 This section offers a critical analysis of Anselm's theory of satisfaction.  First, I 
present some contemporary readings of Anselm's soteriology and suggest that these 
readings leave Anselm vulnerable to the ontological and moral problems outlined above.  
I then offer a reading of Anselm's theory of satisfaction beginning with an explication of 
the divine requirement of satisfaction.  I show how Anselm's defense of the divine 
requirement of satisfaction has led some to hold the mistaken notion that Anselm's theory 
                                                 
 
28 One might argue that it is also possible for God to make the promise of satisfaction a condition for God's 
extension of forgiveness-as-restoration. 
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fails to overcome the ontological problem.  I then show how Anselm escapes the 
ontological problem. 
 I continue to offer a reading of Anselm's theory of satisfaction, answering the 
question "By what is God satisfied?"  I show that Anselm holds that Christ's death is a 
supererogatory act freely offered to God which replaces a deficit in God's 
honor/justice/fitness/orderly beauty; a deficit created by human disobedience of God.  I 
then analyze Anselm's theory of satisfaction against the moral problems offered above.  I 
argue that Anselm cannot appeal to divine justice, fitness, or beauty to avoid the problem 
of superfluous suffering.  While he could appeal to God's honor to avoid this problem, 
such a move will force his theory of satisfaction to confront the appeal to robust love.  It 
does not appear that an appeal to divine honor can sustain a theory of satisfaction in the 
face of this objection.  To avoid these moral problems, Anselm will need to find another 
way to justify the suffering of the Cross.   
Some Contemporary Readings of Anselm’s Soteriology 
 Jaroslav Pelikan claims that according to Anselm,  
[Christ’s] death on the cross made it, one may say, morally possible for 
God to forgive.29 
 
Similarly, Darby Kathleen Ray reads Anselm as saying that, 
 
[Jesus’] voluntary sacrifice of his innocent life is of infinite worth.  With 
this sacrifice, Jesus satisfies God’s justice so that God is free to love and 
forgive human beings.30 
                                                 
29 Jaroslav Pelikan, Jesus Through the Centuries: His Place in the History of Culture, (NewYork: Harper 
and Row, 1985), p. 107 
 
30 Darby Kathleen Ray, Deceiving the Devil, (Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 1998), p.8. Gustav Aulen also 
claims that in Anselm, "It is an indispensable necessity that God shall receive the satisfaction which alone 
can save forgiveness from becoming laxity; and this need is met by Christ's death" (Gustav Aulen, Christus 
Victor, (London: SPCK, 1970), p. 90).  Aulen further uses language similar to Ray when describing the 
"Latin type" of atonement theory (of which he considers Anselm's theory an instance).  According to this 
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These readings illustrate a common contemporary reading of Anselm in response 
to the two questions that we noted satisfaction theories must address.31  Both readings 
answer the question of God's requiring satisfaction by appealing to the claim that God is 
bound in some way before Christ’s death, and is freed from this binding after Christ’s 
death.  That is, God requires satisfaction so that God can forgive sinners.  Without 
satisfaction it is not "morally possible" for God to forgive; God is not "free" to forgive.  
Such a reading leaves Anselm vulnerable to the ontological problem outlined above.   
In response to the question "What was the nature of Christ's payment to God" we 
can see that both readings centralize the role of Christ’s death in Anselm’s soteriology.  
Why God finds satisfaction in the death of Christ is yet to be determined.  However, it is 
clear that if Anselm really does hold to the importance of Christ's death for reconciliation 
between God and humans, he will be vulnerable to the two moral problems outlined 
above ((2) and (3)).   
In what follows I will examine Anelm's theory of satisfaction against phrases like 
“the cross made it morally possible” and “Jesus satisfies God’s justice so that God is 
free” to determine whether such phrases are compatible with Anselm's actual views.  
Further, I will present a reading of Anselm's theory of satisfaction that affirms the central 
role that Pelikan and Ray assign to Christ’s death and explicates Anselm's position with 
regard to the role that Christ's death plays in divine satisfaction.    
 
                                                                                                                                                 
type, "...the Justice of God receives a compensation for man's default, so that His Mercy may now be free 
to act" (Aulen, p.154). 
 
31 See this diss., pp. 4-5. 
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Anselm on the Divine Requirement of Satisfaction 
 When explaining the importance of satisfaction, Anselm claims that 
  Man cannot be restored to that end for which he was made unless he  
  attains to the likeness of those angels in whom there is no sin.  This state  
  can only be attained if remission is received for all sins.  And this   
  remission is possible only if complete satisfaction has been made.32 
 
With regard to the end for which humanity was made Anselm says, 
 
  It ought not to be disputed that rational nature was made holy by God, in  
  order to be happy in enjoying Him.33 
 
We can thus read Anselm as holding to the necessity of satisfaction for the personal 
reconciliation of God and humans.  So, we can now ask, "How, on Anselm's view, does 
satisfaction contribute to the personal reconciliation of God and humans?"   
 Anselm claims that satisfaction must be made so that human sins can be remitted 
and humans can be returned to the enjoyment of God.  John McIntyre takes this to mean 
that,  
  ...the whole process of satisfaction...is regarded by St. Anselm as that  
  which forms the ground of God's forgiveness and through which it takes  
  place.34 
 
 This raises the question, "Why is satisfaction necessary for the remission of (or 
forgiveness of) sins?"  Anselm utilizes a handful of interrelated concepts in order to 
explain why God requires satisfaction for the remission of sins (there being only one 
alternative to satisfaction on his view, and that being punishment).  At various places 
                                                 
32 Anselm, Meditation on Human Redemption (MHR), in Anselm of Canterbury, Vol. 1, translated by 
Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson, (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1974), p. 139 
 
33 Anselm, Cur Deus Homo (CDH), in St. Anselm: Basic Writings, translated by S.N. Deane, 191-302. 
(Chicago: Open Court, 1962), II.i. 
 
34 John McIntyre, St Anselm and His Critics: A Reinterpretation of The Cur Deus Homo (Edinburgh: Oliver 
and Boyd, 1954), p. 200. 
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Anselm argues for God's requirement of satisfaction through appeals to "God's 
honor," "justice," "fittingness," and "orderly beauty."35 
 Anselm explains that to sin is to "not render to God his due."  That which we owe 
to God is our complete subjection to God's will.  To be subject to the will of God is to be 
upright in heart/will (that is, holy36).  Insofar as we fail to do this, we fail to give God the 
honor which is due to God.37  Therefore, through disobedience, we are said to "rob" God 
of the honor that we owe him as God's creatures.  Anselm explains that God requires 
sinners to pay back the "honor" of which we have robbed God through disobedience.38  
God maintains his honor by insisting upon satisfaction for sin freely given, or 
punishment.  Any other alternative would mean God's not maintaining God's honor.39   
 God's upholding God's honor is connected to the concept of justice when Anselm 
says that, 
  ...God maintains nothing with more justice than the honor of His own  
  dignity.40 
  
Such claims lead Paul Helm to state that for Anselm, it is a, 
  
  ...necessary truth...that God's justice requires his honour to be satisfied.41 
                                                 
35 One could also note that Anselm appeals to God's holiness (a concept that appears to be very much 
related to, if not identical with God's justice).  See, CDH, II.xx. 
 
36 CDH, II.i. 
 
37 See also Meditation on Human Redemption where he explains that "to sin is to dishonor God" (MHR, p. 
139). 
 
38 In fact, Anselm sometimes insists on a superabundant satisfaction as when he says "...without doubt, 
unchanging truth and clear reason demand that the sinner give to God, in place of the honor stolen, 
something greater than that for which he ought to have refused to dishonor God" (MHR, pp. 139-140). 
 
39 CDH, I.xi.   
 
40 CDH, I.xiii. 
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In fact, the link between God's honor and justice is so strong in Anselm that it has led to 
some readings like the following from Gustav Aulen. 
  [Anselm] clearly taught an 'objective' Atonement, according to which God 
  is the object of Christ's atoning work, and is reconciled through the  
  satisfaction made to His justice.42 
 
And again Aulen says, 
 
  The vindication of the justice of God and His judgment on sin necessarily  
  involves a making-good, a compensation, which satisfies the demands of  
  justice.  Hence the payment of satisfaction is emphasized as a safeguard of 
  moral earnestness...43 
  
Aulen's reading appears to be confirmed where Anselm says, 
 
  ...without the required satisfaction human nature could not be reconciled,  
  lest Divine Justice leave a sin unreckoned within His kingdom.44 
 
 Anselm connects the concept of justice to the concept of fittingness when he 
claims that it is not fitting for God to do anything "unjustly or out of course" including 
allowing a sinner to go unpunished without repaying the debt owed to God.45  He 
involves the concept of beauty when he claims that if injustice is passed over without 
punishment, then injustice would have more liberty than justice.  This, says Anselm, 
would be "unbecoming" to God.46  And again, by pursuing "the satisfaction for sin freely 
                                                                                                                                                 
41 Paul Helm, “Anselm’s Understanding of the Atonement,” in Faith and Understanding (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1997), p.145. 
 
42 Aulen, p.2. 
 
43 Ibid., p.89. 
 
44 MHR, pp.139-140. 
 
45 CDH, I.xii. 
 
46 Ibid. 
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given, or if this be not given, the exaction of punishment" God is preserving the 
"orderly beauty" of the universe.47  If God were not to do this 
  ...there would be, in the very universe which God ought to control, an  
  unseemliness springing from the violation of the beauty of arrangement,  
  and God would appear to be deficient in his management.48 
 
This would be both "unfitting" and "impossible."49   Thus, as David Brown says, 
 
  ...Anselm appeals not only to requirements of logical consistency but also  
  to what might now be more naturally termed aesthetic considerations:  
  what is fitting or appropriate (conveniens/decens).  Here we need to think  
  ourselves back into a world in which God was identified not only with  
  Justice, Truth, and Goodness but also with Beauty.50 
 
On account of Anselm's appeal to these four concepts, critics of Anselm have claimed 
that he is vulnerable to (1), the ontological problem outlined above.  That is, Anselm is in 
danger of subjecting God to a concept of honor, justice, fittingness, or beauty which 
exists outside of God.  Let us now see whether, given his position on the divine 
requirement of satisfaction, Anselm can escape the ontological argument against 
satisfaction.  
Anselm and the Ontological Argument against Satisfaction 
 Recall that Ray and Pelikan interpret Anselm as saying that Christ’s death, in 
some sense, allows God to forgive us.  Ray claims that after Christ’s death God is "free to 
love and forgive us."  Pelikan notes that Christ’s death "made it morally possible…for 
                                                 
 
47 CDH, I.xv. 
 
48 Ibid. 
 
49 Ibid. 
 
50 David Brown, "Anselm on Atonement," in The Cambridge Companion to Anselm, edited by Brian 
Davies and Brian Leftow, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 285. 
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[God] to forgive."  Such claims have led to what I will argue is the mistaken notion 
that Anselm subordinates God to a justice or law which exists apart from God's Self. 
In reference to Anselm’s soteriology John Stott says the following. 
We must certainly remain dissatisfied whenever the atonement is 
presented as a necessary satisfaction either of God’s ‘law’ or of God’s 
‘honour’ in so far as these are objectified as existing in some way apart 
from him.51 
 
If I have read Stott correctly, then he is suggesting that Anselm's theory of atonement 
portrays God as a Being Who must yield to the demands of something outside of God's 
Self.  Such a position would “demote” God’s place in the universe.  Instead of having a 
God Who rules over all things, it would appear that there could be a time in which God's 
hands were tied by something outside of God's Self.  Yet while Stott is right to point out 
that this view is distasteful, I argue that attributing this view to Anselm conflicts with 
Anselm’s own views in at least three ways.  (1) It is in conflict with Anselm’s claim that 
God is “that, than which nothing greater can be conceived.”52 (2) It is in conflict with 
Anselm’s claim that God does not possess God's nature by participation in something 
apart from God's Self.  (3) It is in conflict with Anselm’s explanation of God’s 
relationship to necessity. 
 First, as a premise in his ontological argument Anselm establishes the claim that 
God is "that, than which nothing greater can be conceived."53  If we portray God as a 
Being Who must yield to the demands of something which exists apart from God, then it 
                                                 
51 John R. W. Stott, The Cross of Christ, (Leicester, England: Inter-Varsity Press, 1986), p. 120. 
 
52 Anselm, Proslogium (P) in St. Anselm: Basic Writings, translated by S.N. Deane, 47-80 (Chicago: Open 
Court, 1962), ch. iii.   
 
53 Ibid.  
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seems that we can think of something that is greater than God.  We could do this 
insofar as we could imagine that that which gives God demands is omnipotent, active, 
etc.  That is, a God who is Goodness is greater than a God who answers to Goodness.  
Thus, it seems that Anselm’s argument in the Proslogium entails that God does not yield 
to a law or code of honor that is objectifiable apart from God.  Such a view would likely 
give Anselm the same dissatisfaction that it gives Stott. 
 Second, in chapter xvi of the Monologium Anselm appears to reject Stott’s 
interpretation.  There he explicitly argues against the idea that God is just because God 
participates in the quality of justice.  If this were so, he claims, then God, or "the 
supremely good Substance," would be "just through another, and not through itself."54  
Yet God is whatever God is through God's Self and not through another.  Thus, we must 
conclude that God as God's Self is Justness.55  Anselm identifies God with certain 
attributes by which God will “necessarily” behave in a particular way.  This is why he 
says, 
...the supreme Nature...is, therefore, supreme Being, supreme Justness, 
supreme Wisdom, supreme Truth, supreme Goodness, supreme Greatness, 
supreme Beauty, supreme Immortality, supreme Incorruptibility, supreme 
Blessedness, supreme Eternity, supreme Power, supreme Unity…56 
 
Thus, we can concur with Hans Urs von Balthasar when he reads Anselm as saying that  
 
in God, freedom is identical with rightness.57 
                                                 
54 Anselm Monologium (M), in St. Anselm: Basic Writings, translated by S.N. Deane, 81-190 (Chicago: 
Open Court, 1962), ch. xvi. 
 
55 Ibid. 
 
56 Ibid. 
 
57 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama, Vol. 4: The Action, translated by Graham Harrison (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994), p. 257.   
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 Finally, Anselm’s view of God’s relationship to necessity indicates that Stott 
has misread Anselm.  According to Anselm, when we say that God acts necessarily what 
we should mean is that God’s desire "freely maintains itself in his own 
unchangeableness."  No desire of God’s is constrained.  That is to say that "the will of 
God does nothing by any necessity, but of his own power."58  
Anselm explains this position even further in chapter xviiia of the Cur Deus 
Homo.  There he claims that "no necessity or impossibility exists before [God’s] choice 
or refusal."59  Once God has made a choice, the type of necessity that comes to exist is a 
necessity that restrains not God but everything else.  That is, when God makes an 
immutable choice, by necessity nothing else can cause God to change it.  For example,  
...when we affirm that it is necessary for God to utter truth, and never to 
lie, we only mean that such is his unwavering disposition to maintain the 
truth that of necessity nothing can avail to make him deviate from the 
truth, or utter a lie.60 
   
Thus Anselm would say that the phrase, “It is necessary for God to maintain God's 
honor” can be read as “Of necessity, nothing can make God deviate from God's choice to 
maintain God's honor.”61   
This evidence indicates that we should not hold Anselm to the view that John 
Stott attributes to him.62  Anselm does not paint an image of God according to which God 
                                                 
58 CDH, II.xvii. 
 
59 CDH, II.xviiia. 
 
60 Ibid.   
 
61 On account of this Paul Helm says that in Anselm, "The necessity by which God does what he does is, if 
the language of necessity is to be used at all, is, so to speak, 'internal necessity', the necessity which arises 
from God's own character and his own choice, a choice unconstrained by any factors external to him, and 
wholly in accordance with his character" (Helm, p. 133). 
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wants to forgive but must answer to something outside of God's Self first.  Instead 
God wants to forgive but God is prevented by God's own will.  God refuses to forgive 
without satisfaction because of God's own commitment to 
honor/justice/fittingness/beauty.  This recalls Anselm's words, 
...the Father was not willing to rescue the human race, unless man were to 
do even as great a thing as was signified in the death of Christ.63  
 
Thus, when we claim (as Ray and Pelikan do) that Christ’s death “frees” God to 
act in a certain manner, we must view the binding from which God is “freed” as a binding 
which God freely established.  In doing so, we will free Anselm's atonement theory from 
the ontological argument against satisfaction.64   
Anselm on the Object of Divine Satisfaction 
 Like Ray and Pelikan, Gustav Aulen claims that Anselm holds that God is 
satisfied by Christ's death.  Aulen says, 
  [Anselm's] whole emphasis is on the death as an isolated fact, and as in  
  itself constituting the satisfaction...65 
 
One might argue against such a claim by pointing to where Anselm says, 
For, as death came upon the human race by the disobedience of man, it 
was fitting that by man’s obedience life should be restored.66  
                                                                                                                                                 
62 This evidence also enables us to avoid a pitfall of Anselmian interpretation mentioned by Gustav Aulen. 
"It is certainly true that Anselm's teaching has often been misinterpreted, and that many, or most, of the 
criticisms which have been levelled against it are valid only against a misrepresentation of it which 
amounts to a caricature.  Thus it has constantly been said, especially in popular expositions, that Anselm 
taught that a direct change in God's attitude was effected by Christ's satisfaction; but this is not what 
Anselm said." (Aulen, p.85). 
 
63 CDH, I.ix (emphasis mine). 
 
64 For more defenses of Anselm with relation to the ontological argument against satisfaction see Helm, 
pp.132-135; McIntyre, pp.192-193, 203; Brown, p. 285. 
 
65 Aulen, p. 89. 
 
66 CDH, I.iii (emphasis mine). 
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At first glance this passage seems to conflict with a reading that emphasizes the salvific 
centrality of Christ's death.  This passage seems to indicate that Anselm's focus is, 
instead, on Christ’s obedience.  Christ, being without sin, was presumably obedient to 
God his entire life.  It is possible that Christ's death was merely a side-effect of his 
lifelong obedience to God and not the event which satisfies God.   
 This possibility seems to find confirmation when we notice that Anselm makes a 
distinction between what Christ does "at the demand of obedience" and what Christ 
endured "because he kept his obedience perfect."67  Anselm claims that the suffering 
inflicted upon Christ in the Passion falls within the latter category.68  This seems to 
indicate that Christ’s suffering was an outcome of His holy existence in our fallen world, 
rather than His pursuit of a divine death-command.  We might be led by this to conclude 
that God is satisfied by the life of Christ, while Christ’s death is a side-effect of His living 
this life.  If this is the case, then Ray and Pelikan are wrong to centralize the death of 
Christ in Anselm’s atonement theory.  
However, to understand Anselm’s position correctly we must make a distinction 
between what God demands of Christ and what Christ does that satisfies God.  Anselm 
makes it clear that God does not demand that Christ suffer death.  He claims that, 
God did not…compel Christ to die; but he suffered death of his own will, 
not yielding up his life as an act of obedience, but on account of his 
obedience in maintaining holiness.69  
 
                                                 
67 CDH, I.ix. 
 
68 Ibid.   
 
69 Ibid.   
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We might be tempted by this to think that Anselm is playing fast and loose with his 
words.  Sure, God didn’t tell Christ to die, but there is no way He could have avoided 
death without being disobedient.  And, of course, if He is disobedient, then He will 
deserve death.  Thus it appears that there is no way at all that He could avoid death.  
From this it seems that there is no strong sense in which death is not demanded of Him.  
Yet when, in the Cur Deus Homo, Anselm’s interlocutor asks whether Christ could have 
remained holy if He had not died Anselm makes it clear that Christ was free from any 
obligation to die.70  
Anselm explains Christ’s freedom with regard to the Cross in at least two ways.  
First, he explains it in terms of human liberty.  He notes that sometimes God gives a 
creature the choice to do one thing which is acceptable or another thing which is better.  
In a case like this, 
...he [God] leaves the alternative with him [the creature], so that, though 
one is better than the other, yet neither is positively demanded.71  
 
Recalling the apostle Paul’s opinion in the first epistle to the Corinthians, Anselm 
elucidates this idea using the example of celibacy. 
…though celibacy be better than marriage, yet neither is absolutely 
enjoined upon man; so that both he who chooses marriage and he who 
prefers celibacy, may be said to do as they ought.72  
 
Thus, while Christ’s choice with regard to the Cross was the better choice, He had the 
freedom to choose another acceptable, though not as good, option.  The latter, it seems, 
He could have done without fear of punishment. 
                                                 
70 CDH, II.xviiib   
 
71 Ibid.   
 
72 Ibid. 
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 Second, Anselm explains Christ’s freedom in terms of divine liberty.  By 
virtue of His divine nature, Christ was free “from all obligation, except to do as he 
chose.”73  From this evidence it is clear that God does not demand that Christ suffer 
death. 
 Yet, while God does not insist that Christ suffer death, Anselm argues that God 
cannot be satisfied unless Christ dies.  Now, when we sin we steal from God the 
obedience which we owe Him.74  When presented with sin, God must respond with either 
"the exaction of punishment" or "the satisfaction for sin freely given."75  So, unless we 
are to be punished we must make satisfaction.  According to Anselm, for God to be 
satisfied something must be given to Him that is not owed to him.76  Unfortunately, we 
owe even our repentance to God.  Thus our contrition cannot satisfy God because when 
we give what we owe we cannot make reparation.77   As a result, there is nothing that we 
can give Him that we do not already owe Him.78  Only Christ is in a position to give such 
a gift.  While Christ does owe His obedience to God, since He is sinless, He does not owe 
death.79  Thus, Christ "reconcile[s] sinners to God by his own death."80  And again, 
                                                 
 
73 CDH, II.xviiib. 
  
74 CDH, I.xi.   
 
75 CDH, I.xv. 
 
76 CDH, II.xi. 
 
77 CDH, I.xx. 
 
78 Ibid.   
 
79 CDH, II.xi.   
 
80 CDH, II.xv.   
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...there [is] no other salvation…but by his death.81  
 
And again, 
 
...the Father was not willing to rescue the human race, unless man were to 
do even as great a thing as was signified in the death of Christ.82  
 
Thus, we can see that while God does not positively demand that Christ die, God will not 
be satisfied unless Christ suffers death.83  In other words, God does not categorically 
demand satisfaction.  But hypothetically, if God is to be satisfied Christ must die.   
 If this reading is correct, then Ray and Pelikan are justified in emphasizing the 
role of the Cross in Anselm’s atonement theory.  Christ's death satisfies God on account 
of its being a supererogatory act84 freely offered to God which replaces the deficit in 
human obedience.85  In replacing this deficit Christ maintains God's 
honor/justice/fittingness/orderly beauty through satisfaction so that God will not have to 
maintain God's honor/justice/fittingness/orderly beauty through punishment.86  So, 
Anselm says, 
  To honor the Father, that man [Jesus] – who was not obliged to die,  
  because not a sinner – freely gave something of His own when He   
  permitted His life to be taken from Him for the sake of justice.87 
                                                 
 
81 CDH, I.x.   
 
82 CDH, I.ix. 
 
83 In fact, as we have seen, it is an essential part of satisfaction that Christ do something that God does not 
positively demand (CDH, II.xi). 
 
84 This reading is also confirmed by Hans Urs von Balthasar.  See Balthasar, pp. 258-259. 
 
85 In CDH, I.xiv Anselm argues that Christ's life, being "more lovely than sins are odious," is of a value so 
great that in laying it down, this gift outweighs all of the sins of humans.   
 
86 See also F.W. Dillistone, The Christian Understanding of Atonement (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 
1968), p. 193. 
 
87 MHR, p. 140. 
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Two Potential Problems for this Reading 
 This reading seems to pose at least two problems for Anselm.  First, one might 
ask, "How can we reconcile the passages which claim that Christ’s death was necessary 
for salvation with the passage in Cur Deus Homo Book I, chapter iii in which Anselm 
claims that man was restored by obedience?"  If Anselm is to escape unscathed, we must 
claim that he employs two senses of the term "obedience."  The first sense (used in CDH, 
I.iii) is broad enough to include things not "positively demanded"88 by God (namely, 
Christ’s death).  We can see from Anselm’s treatment of celibacy and marriage that it is 
plausible that he would sometimes employ a broader sense of "obedience."  As noted 
above, he claims that while celibacy is not positively demanded by God one who remains 
celibate can still be said to do what he "ought."89  Here he uses a broad sense of "ought" 
that includes things not positively demanded of God.90   
We should contrast this with a second sense of "obedience" in Anselm’s writing.  
This sense only refers to that which is positively demanded by God.  It is likely that this 
is the sense that Anselm employs when he claims that Christ’s obedience was not enough 
to satisfy God because, 
...this will not be giving a thing not demanded of him by God as his due.91  
 
The distinction between two senses of obedience can serve double duty.  Not only 
does it smooth over this prima vista inconsistency within the Cur Deus Homo, it also 
                                                 
88 CDH, II.xviiib. 
 
89 Ibid.   
 
90 For another study on Anselm's use of "ought" see Desmond Paul Henry, The Logic of Saint Anselm 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), pp. 191-201. 
 
91 CDH, II.xi. 
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resolves the seeming inconsistency between Ray and Pelikan’s readings and the 
passage in which Anselm claims that humanity is restored by obedience.  When Anselm 
claims that humanity’s restoration comes through obedience we should read "obedience" 
in the first sense; understanding it to include Christ’s Passion.  When Anselm claims that 
obedience is not enough to rescue us we should read "obedience" in the second sense; 
understanding it to exclude Christ’s Passion.  Thus, Ray and Pelikan are further 
confirmed in their centralization of Christ’s death in Anselm’s soteriology. 
 The second problem arises with regard to the necessity of salvation.  At the end of 
Book I of the Cur Deus Homo, Anselm argues that it is necessary for some people to be 
saved.  Otherwise,  
...it should seem that God had repented of his good intent, or was unable to 
accomplish his designs.92  
 
If, as we have seen above, humans can only avoid punishment by offering satisfaction 
and satisfaction can only be offered through Christ’s death, then Christ’s death is 
necessary because salvation is necessary.  One might then ask, “How can we reconcile 
the necessity of Christ’s death with the claim that God did not demand Christ’s death?” 
 In response, we should recall Anselm’s description of Christ’s divine freedom.  
Because Christ is also God, He has no obligations except those which He chooses.93  
Thus, we should view the necessity of Christ’s death as the result of His free choice.  
Anselm likens the necessity of Christ’s death to a person who freely makes a vow.  The 
person who makes the vow freely enters into an obligation, while being under no prior 
obligation to so enter.  Similarly, Christ as God could foresee when He created humanity 
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that humanity would fall.  He also knew what would be needed to rescue humanity 
once it fell.  Yet, Christ as God still chose to make humans.  And, 
...by freely creating man, God as it were bound himself to complete the 
good which he had begun.94  
 
Therefore, while salvation (and by implication, Christ's death) is necessary, it is 
necessary only because Christ freely chose it, not because God demanded it. 
Anselm and the Moral Arguments against Satisfaction 
 
 Anselm holds that the notion that God must respond to sin either by punishing the 
sinner or by receiving satisfaction is a necessary principle of God's maintaining God's 
honor.  If this is true, and Anselm is right in saying that the only means to divine 
satisfaction is by Christ's death, then the benefit of Christ's death is that by it humans are 
allowed to avoid punishment while God maintains God's honor.  With this, Anselm can 
avoid the problem of superfluous suffering. 
 However, Anselm will still have to face the appeal to robust love.  In the face of 
such an appeal we must remember that 
  The necessity for God to uphold his own honour is...a conceptual truth for  
  Anselm, another aspect of what Anselm means by the nature of things.   
  Other conceptions of God are possible, of course, but Anselm would reject 
  these as not being in accord with the faith of the Church, and more   
  pertinently as not being in accord with the idea of God as the most perfect  
  being.95  
 
Someone attacking Anselm by means of the appeal to robust love would claim that the 
idea of God as having a character of robust love is no less in accord with the idea of God 
as a perfect being.  God, being robustly loving, would be willing to suffer injury to God's 
                                                 
 
94 CDH, II.v. 
 
95 Helm, p. 146. 
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honor in order to restore human beings to a right relationship with God's Self.  What 
is more, God, being robustly loving, would not insist on the great suffering endured by 
Christ in order to maintain God's honor.  Such a costly preservation of honor changes 
honor into vanity, one could argue.  And the idea of God being so vain is even in conflict 
with the faith of the Church.96  
 Yet, it is likely that such an argument misunderstands Anselm's notion of honor.  
Recall the inextricable link that Anselm makes between God's honor and justice.  It is 
more likely in Anselm that God is concerned with an honorable commitment to justice 
than with "how things look."  We should then look to justice as that in which God finds 
honor in Anselm.  Now, if I have read Anselm correctly he would claim that the fact that 
God must respond to sin either by punishing the sinner or by receiving satisfaction is a 
necessary principle of God's maintaining justice.  Again, if this is true, and Anselm is 
right in saying that the only means to divine satisfaction is by Christ's death, then the 
benefit of Christ's death is that by it humans are allowed to avoid punishment while God 
maintains justice.  With this, Anselm can avoid the problem of superfluous suffering. 
 Even if we accept the disjunction of divine satisfaction or punishment as a 
necessary principle of Divine Justice we can question whether something as extreme as 
Christ's death was necessary to effect such satisfaction.  Gustav Aulen presents a 
Nominalist criticism against the idea of God's requiring Christ's death in order to be 
satisfied. 
                                                 
 
96 John Baillie similarly applies the appeal to robust love against Anselm's use of divine honor as the 
justification for satisfaction.  He says, "...casting its sinister shadow over everything else, there is Anselm's 
view of God as being in His most ultimate nature, not a loving father, but a monarch and taskmaster, whose 
first concern is for His own dignity and prestige, though these are not presented as bearing any necessary 
relation to the proper good of His creatures" (John Baillie, The Place of Jesus Christ in Modern 
Christianity (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929), p. 156). 
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The Nominalist criticism is that in the last resort all depends on the 
arbitrary act of God in accepting the satisfaction.  The work of Christ has 
no value belonging to it, but only such value as God is pleased to 
recognize in it.  It could not be called necessary that mankind should make 
the satisfaction which Anselm had laid down, for the sin committed by 
finite men could not involve infinite guilt.  Nor, again, could the merit of 
Christ be infinite, since He only suffered in His human nature.  Finally, no 
such infinite merit could be necessary, since God can assess any 
meritorious act precisely as He pleases.97 
 
If this is the case, then we might suggest that each person could provide satisfaction for 
her own sin.  We have seen above that Anselm holds that every person can perform 
supererogatory actions, like voluntary celibacy.  If this is also a means to satisfaction, and 
so preservation of God's justice without punishment, then Anselm's theory of satisfaction 
is vulnerable to the problem of superfluous suffering.  For, presumably this other means 
of satisfaction would involve less suffering than that endured by Christ in the Cross. 
 Even if Anselm can overcome the Nominalist objection, what reason do we have 
to believe that Divine Justice requires satisfaction for sin in the absence of punishment?  
We might presume that Divine Justice requires satisfaction because our sense of justice 
requires it.  Yet, Anselm confesses that the human sense of justice clashes with the reality 
of Divine Justice. 
...when thou dost bestow goods on the evil, and it is known that the 
supremely Good hath willed to do this, we wonder why the supremely Just 
has been able to will this.98  
 
Again, Anselm asks how it is just for God to give everlasting life to those who merit 
eternal death.  To this question he replies, 
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Truly, in the deepest and most secret parts of thy goodness is hidden 
the fountain whence the stream of thy compassion flows.99  
 
If Divine Justice is so hidden and clashes with our own sense of justice, how can we 
come to know what Divine Justice requires?  Even Anselm confesses, we need God’s 
revelation.  We know that it is consistent with Justice for God to pity the wicked, he says,  
because God does so pity them and it would be impious to say that God does something 
unjust.100  It further seems that we are dependent upon revelation when Anselm says that, 
  ...God can certainly do what human reason cannot grasp.101   
So, how do we know that Divine Justice requires satisfaction in the absence of 
punishment?  Anselm does not appeal to revelation to prove this.  Instead, he claims that 
we must not interpret Justice in such a way as to conflict with God’s dignity.  That is, we 
must filter our understanding of justice through the concept of what is “best” or most 
"fitting."102  Now, we must ask ourselves, "Who is in a position to determine what is 
most fitting?"  Anselm’s own beliefs about the mystery and hidden depth of God’s justice 
indicate that God is the One who determines fitness and reveals it to us as God sees fit.  A 
similar argument would hold with regard to the "orderly beauty" maintained by justice.  It 
appears, then, that if we are to hold that Divine Justice requires satisfaction, we must find 
this to be consistent with God’s revelation.   
Yet some would argue that the revelation of Divine Justice shows that Divine 
Justice can forgive without satisfaction or punishment.  Raymund Schwager says, 
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...the image of God that stood behind the long-accepted satisfaction 
theory can hardly be brought into harmony with the father to whom Jesus 
repeatedly referred.103 
 
According to Schwager, the revelation that we receive through Christ’s teaching is in 
conflict with the theory of satisfaction.  He makes specific reference to the parable of the 
prodigal son and the parable of the merciless creditor.  From these parables, he says, we 
can conclude, 
  ...that God forgives without demanding satisfaction and payment in return.   
He demands only that we forgive others as unconditionally as we are 
granted unconditional mercy.104 
 
Again, he points out that in Matthew 18:22, Jesus commands his disciples to 
forgive without limit.  He then claims that if Christ demands limitless forgiveness of us, 
the Father whom Christ reveals "must be even more so willing" to forgive.105  Thus, 
Schwager argues that satisfaction is incompatible with the character of God as it is 
revealed in Christ’s teaching. 
To this I add that it appears that satisfaction (as necessary for the preservation of 
divine justice/fitness/orderly beauty) is also incompatible with the character of God as 
revealed in Christ’s life.  Even before his death, Christ freely offers forgiveness to those 
willing to receive it.  Furthermore, Christ seems to live a life of such robust love, that in 
Christ, God appears to be fundamentally other-focused; willing to relinquish what 
rightfully belongs to God (even God's Own life) in the best-interest of the other.  Also, if 
                                                 
 
103 Raymond Schwager, Must There Be Scapegoats? (New York: Crossroad Publishing, 2000), p. 206. 
 
104 Schwager, p. 206. 
 
105 Ibid., p. 207.  Schwager even goes so far as to attribute a heathen origin to the doctrine of satisfaction.  
He says that we learn from the Sermon on the Mount that “it is the tax collectors and the heathens who love 
and do good only to those from whom they expect the same” (Schwager, p. 207). 
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Christ is the image of the Father, then it seems that the Father does not seek to avoid 
shame brought upon Him by others.  In fact, it is part of Christ’s glory that He allowed 
Himself to be publicly humiliated upon the Cross.106     
It appears that the revelation of God in Christ’s teaching and life does not support 
(and is even in conflict with) a divine requirement for satisfaction as Anselm has 
defended it.  Thus, Anselm cannot appeal to divine justice, fitness, or beauty to avoid the 
problem of superfluous suffering.  While he could appeal to God's honor to avoid this 
problem, such a move will force his theory of satisfaction to confront the appeal to robust 
love.  It does not appear that an appeal to honor can sustain a theory of satisfaction in the 
face of this objection.  To avoid these moral problems, Anselm will need to find another 
way to justify the suffering of the Cross.   
Aquinas's Theory of Satisfaction 
 In this section I argue that Thomas Aquinas offers the satisfaction theorist a 
framework by which she can hope to overcome (2) and (3), the moral arguments against 
satisfaction.  I begin by showing that Aquinas must face these moral problems insofar as 
he maintains the centrality of Christ's Passion for divine satisfaction.  I then show how, 
despite an apparent similarity with Anselm's theory, Thomas deviates from Anselm with 
regard to the divine requirement of satisfaction.  Thomas claims that it is compatible with 
God's justice to waive the debt of punishment without satisfaction.  However, the 
requirement of satisfaction still arises from a "more copious mercy" on the part of God. 
                                                 
 
106 On the humiliation of the Cross see Michael J. Gorman, Cruciformity: Paul's Narrative Spirituality of 
the Cross (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), p. 5.  
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 I then attempt to determine in what way God's requiring satisfaction through 
Christ's Passion could be more merciful than waiving the debt of punishment without 
satisfaction.  I show that Thomas holds to a robust view of the problem of sin that goes 
beyond the debt of punishment.  For Thomas the problem of sin also lies in a corruption 
of the will whereby the sinner maintains an absence of love of God.  This problem creates 
a relational "distance" between God and the sinner that must be overcome through mutual 
charity if the sinner is to be reunited to God in such a way as to experience beatitude.  I 
claim that God's accepting satisfaction through Christ's Passion is more merciful insofar 
as this contributes to God's project of drawing sinners into a union of mutual love with 
God.  If this is the case, then Aquinas offers the satisfaction theorist hope for overcoming 
the moral problems against satisfaction. 
Aquinas on the Centrality of Christ's Passion for Divine Satisfaction 
 Like Anselm, Aquinas will have to confront the moral arguments against 
satisfaction on account of the role that he assigns to Christ's death in achieving 
satisfaction.  In fact, these arguments may confront Aquinas even more insofar as he 
includes Christ's Passion (wherein we include the suffering Christ endured leading up to 
His death) in divine satisfaction.  Aquinas says, 
  Christ’s Passion…acts by way of satisfaction, inasmuch as we are   
  liberated by it from the debt of punishment.107  
 
And, 
 
  Now it is a fitting way of satisfying for another to submit oneself to the  
  penalty deserved by that other.  And so Christ resolved to die, that by  
  dying He might atone for us…108 
                                                 
107 Aquinas, Summa Theologica (ST), translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: 
Benziger Brothers, 1914) III, q. 48, a. 6, ad. 3.   
 
 139 
   
 We can see then, that insofar as Thomas advocates such a painful means of divine 
satisfaction, his theory of atonement will be forced to confront the moral arguments 
outlined above.109 
Aquinas on the Divine Requirement of Satisfaction 
 At first glance, Aquinas's explanation of the divine requirement of satisfaction 
looks very much like Anselm's.  Like Anselm, Thomas explains that God does not 
categorically demand satisfaction; instead, satisfaction was hypothetically necessary to 
achieve the end proposed by God, namely humanity's deliverance from sin and unto 
salvation.110 
 Also, while Aquinas does not linger over the language of "honor" as Anselm 
does, he heavily emphasizes the link between satisfaction and justice as well as the 
concept of fittingness.111  For example, there are several passages in the Summa 
                                                                                                                                                 
108 ST III, q. 50, a. 1 
 
109 For more evidence that Thomas holds that Christ's Passion and death is that by which God is satisfied 
see also, ST III, q. 46, a. 3, ad. 3 where Thomas says, "…it was fitting that through justice man should be 
delivered from the devil’s bondage by Christ making satisfaction on his behalf in the Passion."  Also see 
ST III, q. 46, a. 1, ad. 3 where Thomas says,  "…because by His Passion Christ made satisfaction for the sin 
of the human race and so man was set free by Christ’s justice…" 
 
110 Thomas asks “Whether it was necessary for Christ to suffer for the deliverance of the human race?”  In 
his response Thomas employs the Aristotelian distinction between three types of necessity.  First, 
something is necessary which, by virtue of what it is, cannot be otherwise.  Second, something may be said 
to be necessary by compulsion.  Here Thomas employs the example of a person who is restrained by 
another by force.  Thomas claims that if either of these senses of necessity is employed, then it is false to 
say that it was “necessary” for Christ to suffer for our deliverance. Thus we can say that, according to 
Thomas, it would have been logically possible for Christ to avoid suffering.  Likewise neither the Father 
nor Christ was compelled to endure the Passion. Yet, there is a third way in which something may be said 
to be necessary.  Something may be necessary with regard to a proposed end.  Thomas claims that it is in 
this way that the Cross is necessary for our deliverance (ST III, q. 46, a.1). 
 
111 At least, the language of honor is less conspicuous in Aquinas's later works, though Aquinas does make 
occasional reference to the role of the Passion with regard to God's honor.  See ST III, q. 48, a.3.  Aquinas's 
early works make more reference to God's honor and justice.  On this see Romanus Cessario, Christian 
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Theologica that, at first glance, appear to endorse an Anselmian view of satisfaction.  
Thomas claims that man was under 
  …the debt of punishment, to the payment of which man was held fast by  
  God’s justice…112 
 
Again, Thomas claims, 
 
  …it was fitting that through justice man should be delivered from the  
  devil’s bondage by Christ making satisfaction on his behalf in the   
  Passion.113 
 
And again, he claims that man’s deliverance through Christ’s Passion was “in keeping” 
with God’s justice,  
  …because by His Passion Christ made satisfaction for the sin of the  
  human race and so man was set free by Christ’s justice…114 
 
And again,  
 
  Now it is a fitting way of satisfying for another to submit oneself to the  
  penalty deserved by that other.  And so Christ resolved to die, that by  
  dying He might atone for us…115 
 
These and other portions of Aquinas reveal an apparent similarity between Aquinas and 
Anselm in that Aquinas so links satisfaction and Divine Justice.116 
                                                                                                                                                 
Satisfaction in Aquinas: Towards a Personalist Understanding (University Press of America: Washington 
D.C., 1982), pp. 54-57.  Cessario makes specific reference to Aquinas' Scriptum super Sententias, Book IV.   
 
112 ST III, q. 48, a. 4. 
 
113 ST III, q. 46, a. 3, ad. 3. 
 
114 ST III, q. 46, a. 1, ad. 3. 
 
115  ST III, q. 50, a. 1. 
 
116 For more on Thomas's view of satisfaction and justice see Cessario, pp.53ff where Cessario discusses 
satisfaction's relationship to the virtue of justice according to Aquinas in Scriptum super Sententias, Book 
IV.  Cessario notes that Aquinas experiences considerable intellectual and spiritual development between 
the completion of this work and the Summa Theologica. Yet, it is clear from the evidence above that, for 
Aquinas, a connection between satisfaction and justice still holds even in his later works.  
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 Despite Thomas's apparent similarity with Anselm's view of satisfaction, it is 
clear that Thomas advocates a different understanding of the divine requirement of 
satisfaction.  While Thomas does insist that the Cross was just, he does not insist, as 
Anselm does, that the notion that God must respond to sin either by punishing the sinner 
or by receiving satisfaction is a necessary principle of Divine Justice.  Thomas asks  
...whether there was any other possible way of human deliverance beside 
the Passion of Christ.117 
   
Thomas then writes on behalf of an imaginary interlocutor who says that Christ’s Passion 
was the only way for humanity to be delivered because  
God’s justice required that Christ should satisfy by the Passion in order 
that man might be delivered from sin.118   
 
The interlocutor explains that if God were to otherwise deliver humankind, God would 
deny God's justice and so deny God's Self which is impossible. 
 Thomas opposes this claim saying,  
  Even this justice depends on the Divine will, requiring satisfaction for sin  
  from the human race.  But if He had willed to free man from sin without  
  any satisfaction, He would not have acted against justice.  For a judge,  
  while preserving justice, cannot pardon fault without penalty, if he must  
  visit fault committed against another…But God has no one higher than  
  Himself…Consequently, if He forgive sin, which has the formality of fault 
  in that it is committed against Himself, He wrongs no one: just as anyone  
  else, overlooking a personal trespass, without satisfaction, acts mercifully  
  and not unjustly.119 
 
 If I have understood Thomas correctly, divine satisfaction is not the only 
alternative to punishment in a course of Divine Justice.  It seems that God could have 
                                                 
 
117 ST III, q. 46, a. 2. 
 
118 ST III, q. 46, a. 2, obj. 3. 
 
119 ST III, q. 46, a. 2, ad. 3. 
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justly, “waved God's hand” at sin.  That is, God could have released human beings 
from the debt of punishment without any satisfaction.  If this is so, then God could have 
justly released us from the debt of punishment without the Cross.  Yet, this seems 
contrary to the quote above which claims that God, in God's justice, “held fast” to our 
debt of punishment.120  How are we to make sense of this? 
 According to Thomas, we must say that when carrying out a just response to the 
problem of human sin, God has at least three options.  It is just for God to demand 
satisfaction of us, it is just for God to accept satisfaction from another on our behalf, and 
it is just for God to pardon us without satisfaction.  It is up to the Divine will to choose 
how to carry out justice.121  We might now ask, “Why might God choose any one of 
these ways over the other?”  
 If I have read Thomas correctly, then he answers this question by appealing to 
God’s mercy.   
  That man should be delivered by Christ’s Passion was in keeping with  
  both His mercy and His justice.  With His justice, because by his Passion  
  Christ made satisfaction for the sin of the human race; and so man was set  
  free by Christ’s justice: and with His mercy, for since man of himself  
  could not satisfy for the sin of all human nature…God gave him His Son  
  to satisfy for him…And this came of more copious mercy than if He had  
  forgiven sins without satisfaction.122 
 
According to my reading, Thomas asks of the three just options “Which of these three 
just options is the most merciful?”  It seems that Thomas claims that God would be less 
merciful were God to choose to demand satisfaction from us over either of the other 
                                                 
 
120 ST III, q. 48, a. 4.    
 
121 With this strategy, Thomas avoids the ontological argument against satisfaction. 
 
122 ST III, q. 46, a. 1, ad. 3 (emphasis mine). 
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options.  Were God to insist that we satisfy for sin, we would surely go undelivered 
because it is not possible for humans to satisfy for sin.123 
 Thus, God’s mercy is left to decide between two just options:  God can accept 
satisfaction from another or God can pardon us without satisfaction.  At first glance, the 
choice seems obvious.  Why would God choose to send God's Son to suffer and die upon 
a Roman criminal’s cross when God could justly waive our punishment and avoid that 
suffering altogether?  Surely God’s mercy would be merciful toward Jesus as well and 
opt to avoid satisfaction altogether.  Thomas employs an imaginary interlocutor to 
express this opinion.  The interlocutor claims that it is not necessary for Christ to suffer 
for human deliverance, saying, 
  …it does not seem necessary that He should suffer on the part of the  
  Divine mercy, which, as it bestows gifts freely, so it appears to condone  
  debts without satisfaction:  nor, again, on the part of Divine justice,  
  according to which man had deserved everlasting condemnation.    
  Therefore it does not seem necessary that Christ should have suffered for  
  men’s deliverance.124 
 
In his reply, as quoted above, Thomas appears to concede that God's waiving the debt of 
punishment without satisfaction would be merciful.  However, God's delivering us 
through satisfaction is even more merciful.125  On this reading of Aquinas, then, where 
God could deliver humans from the debt of punishment by accepting satisfaction from 
another or pardoning humans without satisfaction, both alternatives are equally just.  And 
                                                 
 
123 Thomas makes this point in ST III, q. 46, a. 1, ad. 3 where he cites q. 1, a. 2. 
 
124 ST III, q. 46, a. 1, obj. 3. 
 
125 ST III, q. 46, a. 1, ad. 3. 
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while both alternatives are also merciful, God's delivering us through Christ's 
satisfaction is more merciful.   
Thus, Thomas does not ultimately appeal to God's justice to explain why God 
requires satisfaction in the absence of punishment.  While accepting satisfaction from 
another is in keeping with God's justice, the ultimate motivation for satisfaction comes 
out of God's mercy.  Somehow it is more merciful for God to require satisfaction for the 
debt of punishment than waive the debt of punishment without it.  If we can determine 
how this is so, Thomas might be able to avoid the moral arguments against satisfaction. 
Aquinas and the Moral Arguments against Satisfaction 
 Thomas can escape the moral arguments against satisfaction if he can offer a 
plausible explanation as to why God's receiving satisfaction through Christ's Passion 
"came of more copious mercy than if He had forgiven sins without satisfaction."  If 
Thomas can show that there is some merciful benefit obtained by satisfaction that is not 
obtained by the alternatives to satisfaction, then he can escape (2), the problem of 
superfluous suffering.  He can then escape both moral arguments against satisfaction if he 
can also show that that merciful benefit can stand in the face of (3), the appeal to robust 
love.  Let us now ask to what sort of benefit Thomas might appeal. 
 Above, we defined satisfaction as that which God accepts in place of a sinner's 
receipt of divine punishment (or, at least, the full divine punishment) for sin.  It is evident 
that Thomas maintains this minimal definition when he says, 
  …when sufficient satisfaction has been paid, then the debt of penalty is  
  abolished.126 
 
And again, 
                                                 
126 ST III, q. 49, a. 3. 
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  ...the debt of punishment is entirely removed by the satisfaction that 
  man offers to God.127  
 
Thus, one benefit of satisfaction is that by it sinners are freed from the debt of 
punishment.  This, however, is not sufficient for helping Aquinas escape the problem of 
superfluous suffering for, as we saw above, God could have removed the debt of 
punishment without satisfaction (and justly so). 
 We must then look for another explanation of the "copious mercy" that God 
pursues through satisfaction.  Since satisfaction is meant to address the problem of sin, let 
us now examine the problem of sin according to Aquinas.  In ST I.II. qq. 85-87, Thomas 
addresses three problems of sin:  (A) Sin corrupts the good of human nature.128  (B) Sin 
leaves a stain on the soul.129  (C) By sin we incur a debt of punishment.130  To these we 
can add a fourth, because elsewhere Thomas claims that (D) by sin we fall under bondage 
to the devil.131  We have seen above that claiming that satisfaction helps to overcome (C) 
the debt of punishment will not help Thomas escape the problem of superfluous 
suffering.  We might ask, however, whether satisfaction (more than the other just options) 
helps to overcome any of the other three problems.  Let us begin with (D) the bondage to 
the devil. 
                                                 
 
127 ST III, q. 22, a. 3. 
 
128 ST I.II, q. 85. 
 
129 ST I.II, q. 86. 
 
130 ST I.II, q. 87. 
 
131 ST III, q. 48, a. 4.  I add this here because it is another problem of sin listed by Aquinas that is not 
exactly equivalent to any of the problems of sin that he lists in ST I.II, qq. 85-87.  The closest similarity 
would be between bondage to the devil and the debt of punishment.  However, Thomas clearly 
distinguishes these as separate problems in ST III, q. 48, a. 4. 
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 Thomas distinguishes between bondage to the devil and the debt of 
punishment as types of bondage to sin.  He says, 
  Man was held captive on account of sin in two ways: first of all, by the  
  bondage of sin…Since, then, the devil had overcome man by inducing  
  him to sin, man was subject to the devil’s bondage.  Secondly, as to the  
  debt of punishment, to the payment of which man was held fast by God’s  
  justice.132  
 
Humans are freed from both types of bondage by Christ’s Passion. 
  Since, then, Christ’s Passion was a sufficient and a superabundant   
  atonement for the sin and debt of the human race, it was as a price at the  
  cost of which we were freed from both obligations.133 
 
 It appears, then, that the Passion overcomes the bondage to the devil much in the 
same way that it overcomes the debt of punishment.  Yet, an appeal to a role for 
satisfaction in dealing with bondage to the devil will not help Aquinas overcome the 
problem of superfluous suffering.  For when discussing humankind’s deliverance from 
bondage to the devil Thomas says, 
  …justice required man’s redemption with regard to God, but not with  
  regard to the devil.134 
 
And again, 
 
  Because, with regard to God, redemption was necessary for man’s   
  deliverance, but not with regard to the devil, the price had to be paid not to 
  the devil, but to God.  And therefore Christ is said to have paid the price of 
  our redemption—His own precious blood—not to the devil, but to God.135 
 
                                                 
 
132 ST III, q. 48, a. 4. 
 
133 Ibid. 
 
134 ST III, q. 48, a. 4, ad. 2. 
 
135 ST III, q. 48, a. 4, ad. 3. 
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Thus, humanity was delivered from the devil’s bondage by a price paid to God.  This 
was a price that God required in God's justice.  But, as we’ve seen, God can justly waive 
payment, so God could justly free humanity from its bondage to the devil without the 
payment found in Christ's Passion.  Since an appeal to satisfaction's role in humankind's 
deliverance from (C) the debt of punishment or (D) the bondage to the devil won't help 
Thomas escape the problem of superfluous suffering, let us now examine problems (A), 
the corruption of the good of human nature and (B), the stain on the soul.   
 Concerning (A), Aquinas says that three things comprise the good of human 
nature.   
First, there are the principles of which nature is constituted, and the 
properties that flow from them, such as powers of the soul, and so forth.136   
 
These, Thomas claims are neither diminished nor destroyed by sin.  Humans still have 
these powers (reason, will, the irascible, the concupiscible)137 despite the presence of sin.  
Second, the good of human nature is comprised of an inclination to virtue.  This, he says, 
is diminished by sin insofar as "human acts produce an inclination to like acts."138  Thus, 
insofar as we sin, we are more inclined to sin and less inclined toward sin's opposite, 
which is virtue.139 
 Third, the good of human nature is comprised of original justice.140  It was by 
original justice that  
                                                 
 
136 ST I.II, q. 85, a. 1. 
 
137 ST I.II, q. 85, a. 3. 
 
138 ST I.II, q. 85, a. 1. Thomas also cites ST I.II, q. 50, a. 1 
 
139 ST I.II, q. 85, a. 1 
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...the reason had perfect hold over the lower parts of the soul, while 
reason itself was perfected by God and was subject to Him.141 
   
Thomas claims that original justice was destroyed in Adam.142  As a result,  
...all the powers of the soul are left, as it were, destitute of their proper 
order, whereby they are naturally directed to virtue.143  
  
We can see by this that original justice is strongly related to the inclination to virtue.  By 
original justice, humans are perfectly inclined to virtue.  This perfect inclination is 
destroyed in Adam.  We are less and less inclined to virtue insofar as we commit acts of 
sin.  This is because,  
...through sin, the reason is obscured...the will is hardened to evil, good 
actions become more difficult, and concupiscence more impetuous.144 
 
 At first glance, it seems that God could restore the good of human nature without 
any need for a painful satisfaction.  Being omnipotent, couldn't God merely "re-wire" 
humans so that the powers of the soul are aligned as they were when humans had the gift 
of original justice?  If I have read Thomas correctly, God could do this if He were not 
concerned to preserve human freedom.145  Since the will is one of the four powers of the 
soul that is corrupted by sin, Thomas would be reluctant to suggest that God would 
simply re-wire us altogether.  If God did re-wire humans, then  
                                                                                                                                                 
140 ST I.II, q. 85, a. 1 
 
141 ST I.II, q. 85, a. 3 
 
142 ST I.II, q. 85, a.1; ST I.II, q. 85 a. 3 
 
143 ST I.II, q. 85, a. 3 
 
144 Ibid. 
 
145 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles (SCG), translated by the English Dominican Fathers (London: Burnes 
Oates & Washbourne Ltd., 1929) IV, ch.55. 
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...man's good would be compulsory, and would be rendered 
unmeritorious and undeserving of praise.146 
   
 Even if God were to intervene by ordering the human soul so that sinful actions 
could cease this would not be sufficient for overcoming the corruption of human nature.  
This is because, 
...man cannot return to one of two opposites unless he go away from the 
other;  in order by the aid of grace to return to the state of righteousness, 
he must withdraw from sin whereby he had abandoned the path of 
rectitude.  And since it is chiefly by his will that man is directed to his 
ultimate end and turned away from it, it is necessary that he not only 
withdraw from sin in his external actions, by ceasing to sin, but also 
withdraw by his will, in order to rise from sin by grace...[I]f he were 
willing to sin no more without repenting of his past sin, the sin itself that 
he committed would not be contrary to his will.147 
 
 This "distance" between a sinner and the state of righteousness to which the 
sinner must return, results in, what Aquinas calls, (D) the stain on the soul.  This problem 
is specifically a problem of the will. 
When the stain is removed, the wound of sin is healed as regards the 
will.148   
 
Thomas explains how the stain on the soul comes about. 
Now, when the soul cleaves to things by love, there is a kind of contact in 
the soul:  and when man sins, he cleaves to certain things, against the light 
of reason and of the Divine law...[T]he loss of comeliness occasioned by 
this contact, is metaphorically called a stain on the soul.149 
 
For the stain of sin to be removed from a sinner 
                                                 
 
146 SCG IV, ch. 55. 
 
147 SCG III, part II, ch. 158. 
 
148 ST I.II, q. 87, a. 6, ad. 3. 
 
149 ST I.II, q. 86, a. 1. 
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...it is necessary that his will should have a movement contrary to the 
previous movement.150   
 
It would appear that the contrary movement required is a movement towards God 
because Aquinas says that "the act of sin parts man from God."151  And again, 
  The stain of sin is, indeed, blotted out by grace, by which the sinner’s  
  heart is turned to God. 152  
 
If I have read Thomas correctly the sinner's heart being turned to God is the sinner being 
united to God in charity153 so as to find "perfect beatitude" in the "enjoyment of 
divinity."154  The relevant movement "towards God" will involve a movement of love in 
the sinner.  The stain of sin, then, is removed as humans are united to God in love.155   
 We might now understand more plainly why God would be unwilling to override 
human freedom if God's ultimate goal is to be united to humans in love.  Someone might 
                                                 
 
150 ST I.II, q. 86, a. 2. 
 
151 ST I.II, q. 86, a.2, ad. 3. 
 
152 ST III, q. 22, a. 3. 
 
153 ST III, q. 48, a. 4, ad. 1. 
 
154 SCG IV, ch. 54. 
 
155 While I do not have space to develop a complete view of Thomist love, a brief word here can show how, 
in Aquinas, love of God involves a union with God and the absence of love of God involves an alienation 
from God's Person.  Thomas holds that "mutual indwelling is an effect of love" (ST I.II, q. 28, a. 2).  
Among other things, this indwelling takes place inasmuch as the lover unites the good of the beloved with 
his own good.  "Consequently in so far as he reckons what affects his friend as affecting himself, the lover 
seems to be in the beloved, as though he were become one with him: but in so far as, on the other hand, he 
wills and acts for his friend's sake as for his own sake, looking on his friend as identified with himself, thus 
the beloved is in the lover" (ST I.II, q. 28, a. 2).  On this, David M. Gallagher remarks, "Aquinas's doctrine 
concerning the love of friendship shows how one can take the good of another person as one's own good; 
thus, it opens up the possibility that one's perfection can be found outside oneself in another person, 
especially in God...One loves one's own good precisely in loving the good of the other person for that 
person's sake (IaIIae, q.28, aa.2-3).  This happens especially in the case of loving God  If a person loves 
God with the love of friendship (caritas) then the good of God becomes his own good and his beatitude 
consists in possessing (by the visio beatifica) this good (IIaIIae, q.180, a.1)" (David M. Gallagher, "The 
Will and Its Acts (Ia IIae, qq.6-17)," in The Ethics of Aquinas, edited by Stephen J. Pope (Washington, 
D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), p. 85). 
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return to our suggestion of "re-wiring" sinners and suggest that God could simply 
program us to love God.  If this is possible, then the possibility that satisfaction could 
contribute to the solution to the stain of sin and the restoration of the good of human 
nature would not enable Thomas to escape the problem of superfluous suffering. 
There is some question, though, as to whether such a re-wiring would cause love 
to lose its value, or even whether a re-wired love can even be called love in the same way 
at all.  Consider Shakespeare's Titania.  After Puck, in Oberon's service, spreads a love 
potion on Titania's sleeping eyes, she wakes to fall in love with the next person she sees.  
Her eyes open to see Bottom, whose head has been transformed into that of an ass.  
Under the spell of the potion, she is immediately in love.  She coos to Bottom, 
  I pray thee, gentle mortal, sing again: 
  Mine ear is much enamour'd of thy note; 
  So is mine eye enthralled to thy shape; 
  And thy fair virtue's force, perforce, doth move me, 
  On the first view, to say, to swear, I love thee.156 
 
 But we would not say that she truly loves Bottom.  Since her freedom has been 
bewitched by Puck's flower potion, she merely acts like she loves Bottom.  Perhaps she 
even believes that she does, but the comedic potential in this scene comes through the 
dramatic irony.  We, the audience, know that she is deceived under the influence of the 
potion.  If she could somehow come to her senses, she would realize that, in fact, she 
does not love Bottom.  And when, eventually, she does come to her senses, she will even 
be embarrassed of the way she had behaved when she was under the influence of the 
potion. 
                                                 
156 A Midsummer Night's Dream. III.i. 145-148. 
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 Further, simply overlooking this relational distance will not be a solution to 
the stain of sin.  While God could free us from the debt of punishment by ignoring the 
debt, it is no help for God to simply ignore the stain of sin.  If God ignores the relational 
distance that separates humans and God, the distance is not overcome.  If the problem 
here is that God loves us but we do not love God, God's ignoring the problem of the 
absence of human love toward God will do nothing toward overcoming this problem.  If 
God cannot force the needed love and cannot overlook its absence, then it seems that 
there is only one remaining alternative for overcoming the stain of sin.  God must draw 
us into love of God. 157      
 If divine satisfaction through Christ's Passion contributes to God's project of 
drawing humans into love of God (such that the stain of sin is removed and the good of 
human nature is restored—particularly as regards the will) then Thomas may have 
provided the satisfaction theorist with a way to escape the problem of superfluous 
suffering.  If it can be shown that God's finding satisfaction in Christ's Passion more 
effectively removes the stain of sin than any less painful means to this end, Thomas will 
be free of this problem.158 
 Also, this method of escaping the problem of superfluous suffering will not force 
Thomas into the unpalatable position of facing of the appeal to robust love.  According to 
this Thomistic framework, God's pursuing satisfaction in this way is done because it is 
the most effective means of drawing sinners to God in love.  We can articulate this 
                                                 
157 This point recalls C.S. Lewis's claim that God “woos” us.  See C.S. Lewis, The Screwtape Letters (New 
York: Time Incorporated, 1961), pp. 24-25. 
 
158 It should be noted that such an attempt will be unlikely to offer definitive proof that the Passion is not 
more painful than any other means to the removal of the stain of sin.  It will be enough, however, to show 
how God's accepting satisfaction in this way is plausibly the most effective means to this end.  I address 
this in more detail in this diss., pp. 212-213. 
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approach in the following way.  While some theories of satisfaction claim that the 
efficacy of satisfaction is in its ability to free God to forgive, this Thomistic framework 
holds that the ultimate efficacy of satisfaction through the Passion is in its ability to draw 
sinners into the appropriation of God's forgiveness.  While this will be described in more 
detail later, the relevant point for now is that this answer with regard to the goal of 
satisfaction reveals an other-focused approach to satisfaction on the part of God, and as 
such is perfectly compatible with robust love.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
SATISFACTION AND HUMAN APPROPRIATION OF FORGIVENESS 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter I develop an approach to satisfaction through penal substitution, 
inspired by Aquinas.  According to this approach God chooses to require satisfaction 
through penal substitution because it affords God the opportunity to fulfill this 
requirement through divine penal Self-substitution.1  God creates and seizes upon this 
opportunity because of its effectiveness in eliciting human appropriation of God's 
forgiveness-as-restoration.2   
This chapter is divided into four sections.  In the first section I outline the 
necessary conditions for human appropriation of divine forgiveness-as-restoration and 
argue that while satisfaction is not logically necessary to meet these conditions, it may be 
the most effective means to human fulfillment of these conditions.   In the second section, 
I borrow a phrase from Paul K. Moser and present a "divine-manifest offering" approach 
to penal substitution.  According to this approach, penal substitution can be a tool through 
which God makes demonstrations meant to enable humans to meet the conditions for 
appropriation of divine forgiveness-as-restoration.  In the third section I compare this 
                                                 
1 "Require" here does not indicate a categorical demand on God's part.  Rather, God refuses to waive the 
debt of punishment, making satisfaction the only alternative to divine punishment of fallen humans.  Thus, 
in the absence of divine punishment of fallen humans, God "requires" satisfaction. 
 
2 "Effectiveness" here indicates causal influence as opposed to causal determination.  I say more on this in 
this diss., chapter 4, p. 212, footnote 5. 
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divine-manifest offering approach to penal substitution with the account of 
satisfaction developed by Richard Swinburne.  In the fourth section I compare this 
divine-manifest offering approach to penal substitution with the account of satisfaction 
developed by Eleonore Stump. 
Personal Reconciliation, Human Appropriation of Forgiveness, and Satisfaction 
 
 This section is divided into two parts.  In the first part, I outline three necessary 
conditions for human appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration.  I present two doxastic 
conditions and one volitional condition.  In the second part I argue that while satisfaction 
is not necessary for the fulfillment of any of the three conditions, it may be more 
effective than any other means at eliciting a person's fulfillment of the volitional 
condition. 
Personal Reconciliation and Human Appropriation of Forgiveness 
 As I argued in chapter two, God's extension of forgiveness-as-restoration is 
necessary, but not sufficient for personal reconciliation.  In order for personal 
reconciliation to be complete, an offending human must also appropriate God's 
forgiveness-as-restoration.  Here I outline three conditions for human appropriation of 
forgiveness-as-restoration and reply to an objection which accuses my account of 
neglecting a fourth necessary condition. 
Three Conditions for Human Appropriation of Forgiveness 
 
There are at least three necessary conditions that must be met for an offender to 
appropriate forgiveness-as-restoration, and so enter into personal reconciliation with the 
offended party.  The first two conditions are doxastic conditions.3  First, the offender 
                                                 
3 This is not intended to indicate a logical order. 
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must believe that she is in a state of alienation that requires forgiveness-as-restoration 
from the offended party. In order to meet the first doxastic condition for the appropriation 
of forgiveness-as-restoration, the offender must believe that she is alienated from the 
offended party.  This belief, however, must be accompanied by another belief in the form 
of a judgment.  That is, the offender must also see herself as the culpable agent who is 
responsible for the alienation.4  By believing that she is alienated and that she is 
responsible for the alienation, she will be able to perceive her role in personal 
reconciliation as an appropriator of forgiveness-as-reconciliation. 
Second, the offender must believe that the offer of forgiveness-as-restoration is 
genuine.  That is, she must trust the authenticity of the forgiver's offered forgiveness.  
This simply involves believing that the offended party's offer of forgiveness-as-
restoration indicates a real willingness on the part of the offended party to enter into a 
state of personal reconciliation with the offender.   
The third condition is a volitional condition.  The offender must be willing to be 
personally reconciled to the offended.  This involves a willingness to turn from the 
offensive behavior or state that caused (causes) the relational division and enter into a 
state of personal reconciliation.  The offender must reject her state of alienation and 
embrace a state of personal reconciliation.  As we determined in the first two chapters the 
                                                 
4 Richard Swinburne lists a similar condition as one of his two conditions of repentance.  "Repentance 
involves, first, acknowledgement by the guilty one that he did the act and that it was a wrong act to do.  
Thereby the guilty one distances the act from his present ideals" (Richard Swinburne, "The Christian 
Scheme of Salvation," in Philosophy and the Christian Faith, edited by Thomas V. Morris (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), p. 18).  I disagree with Swinburne that one distances the act by 
acknowledging it as wrong.  One might believe that the act was wrong but consider wrong acts to be a part 
of your "present ideals."  That is why I add a third, volitional, condition below.  It seems that Swinburne 
holds to some version of that condition as his second condition for repentance.  "Repentance also involves a 
resolve to amend—you cannot repent of a past act if you intend to do a similar act at the next available 
opportunity" (Swinburne, "The Christian Scheme of Salvation," p. 18).   
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relevant state of personal reconciliation which must be embraced can be described as 
a state of mutual love between God and the human being wherein the human trusts God 
as the source and end of her fulfillment.5 
An Objection to this Analysis and My Response 
Someone might argue that my analysis of personal reconciliation is still 
incomplete.  Earlier I identified a communication condition as part of an offended party's 
role in restoring a personal relationship with an offender.6  Namely, to extend 
forgiveness-as-restoration the offended party must communicate her willingness to be 
reconciled with the offender.  Similarly, one might argue that a communication condition 
must be met by the offender as well.  Personal reconciliation cannot be had until an 
offender has communicated her willingness to be reconciled to the offended party.  We 
can imagine a case in which an offended party has met all of the conditions for an 
extension of forgiveness-as-restoration (she is willing to be personally reconciled to the 
offender, she has released her resentment, and she has communicated her offer of 
forgiveness-as-restoration), the offender has met the above three conditions for 
appropriation, and still personal reconciliation is not complete because the offended party 
is unaware of the offender's willingness to be reconciled.  This, one could claim, is the 
importance of apology, which Richard Swinburne defines as an offender's "public 
expression to the wronged one" that the offender has disowned his wrongdoing.7  Thus, 
                                                 
 
5 See this diss., pp. 82-95, 149-151. 
 
6 See this diss., p. 114. 
 
7 Swinburne, "The Christian Scheme of Salvation," p. 18.  Also see also Swinburne, "The Christian Scheme 
of Salvation," p. 20. Also see, Richard Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1989), p. 87. 
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someone might claim, this analysis of personal reconciliation is incomplete because 
my analysis of the appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration does not appear to include 
a communication condition,.   
For our purposes, however, such a condition does not need to be distinguished 
from the above three conditions. Since God, as an omniscient being, is a reader of human 
hearts, genuine repentance (in the form of the second doxastic condition and the 
volitional conditional) can function as the successful attainment of any communication 
condition for the appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration.  Thus, for divine-human 
personal reconciliation the above three conditions suffice as a description of the 
necessary conditions for human appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration.  For human-
human personal reconciliation an additional communication condition in the form of 
apology might be necessary. 
Human Appropriation of Forgiveness and Satisfaction 
Let us ask whether God's pursuing satisfaction can contribute to human 
appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration.  There are three ways to argue that 
satisfaction contributes to human appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration.  The first is 
to claim that satisfaction is logically necessary for appropriation of forgiveness-as-
restoration.  The second is to claim that satisfaction is the most effective or efficient 
means towards human appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration.  The third is to claim 
that while humans can appropriate forgiveness-as-restoration without satisfaction, 
humans require satisfaction as a prerequisite to their appropriation of forgiveness-as-
restoration because of satisfaction's contribution to attaining some other benefit.   
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 As we have seen, satisfaction is not logically necessary for personal 
reconciliation.  While one might argue that legal reconciliation in some form is necessary 
for personal reconciliation, legal reconciliation need not take the form of satisfaction.  An 
offender could appropriate forgiveness-as-restoration after receiving due punishment or 
after being given forgiveness-as-pardon.  Thus, satisfaction is not logically necessary for 
the appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration. 
Let us now examine the second approach.  Perhaps God's receiving satisfaction is 
more effective or efficient than any other means toward the attainment of one of the 
necessary conditions for human appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration.  Let's begin 
with the volitional condition.  It seems that God cannot force the relevant movement of 
the human will without destroying the possibility of personal relationship; especially 
insofar as the relationship into which the human must enter is one that involves trust and 
love on the part of the human.8  Considering this, Paul K. Moser rejects the possibility 
that God makes reconciliation "humanly irresistible."  He claims that, 
Such a god would coerce human wills...in a way that robs humans of their 
moral agency and thus their personhood, at least in a definitive area of life.  
This would be to preclude genuinely personal interaction and thus 
genuinely loving interaction.9    
 
This does not mean that God is powerless to pursue human appropriation of God's 
forgiveness-as-restoration.  There are non-coercive ways in which God can help humans 
to fulfill the volitional condition.  For example, encouragement and discouragement are 
                                                 
8 See this diss., pp. 41-42, 94-95, 150-151. 
 
9 Paul K. Moser, The Elusive God (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 175.  Also James S. 
Stewart says, "...if the man does not wish to open, has no desire to be committed to discipleship, Christ will 
not break in. He stands and waits. This is the sacredness of personality. Even God will not violate it. This is 
the mystery of free will" (James S. Stewart, King For Ever (Nashville: Abingdon, 1975), p. 128). 
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consistent with a non-coercive attempt to elicit a particular movement of the will.  So, 
God could encourage humans to enter into personal relationship with God and discourage 
humans from persisting in alienation.  In this way, God could seek to draw humans into a 
relationship of mutual love while avoiding coercion.10  God's pursuing satisfaction (even 
through penal substitution) could be part of this project, and perhaps even the most 
effective means to this end.  
With regard to the doxastic conditions for the appropriation of forgiveness, it 
seems that God may be able to coerce human attainment of these conditions without 
destroying personal relationship.  However, the manner in which God makes available 
evidence that leads to the relevant beliefs can positively or negatively affect a human's 
fulfillment of the volitional condition.  That is, there could be many different ways to 
enable a human to meet the doxastic conditions and one of those ways could be more 
successful than the others at eliciting the necessary movement of the will from the human 
being.  For example, imagine that a man knows that a particular path in the woods is 
fraught with dangers; poisonous plants, wild animals, and brigands.  The man might aim 
to discourage his son from traveling down this particular dangerous path.  He could warn 
the son verbally by telling him that the path is dangerous and, because he is a trustworthy 
father, the son might develop the belief that the path is dangerous.  Still, the son has the 
freedom to travel down the path.  It is possible that the father could more effectively 
discourage his son from taking the path by showing the son the father's own scars from 
having traveled the same path when he was younger.  This second choice could also 
produce the belief that the path was dangerous but have more success in discouraging the 
                                                 
 
10 I will discuss this possibility in more detail in this diss., pp. 161-182. 
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son's choosing to take the path.  Also, the father might take care how he seeks to 
produce beliefs in his son depending upon the state of his son's heart.  If the son hates the 
father, the father might risk the son's intentionally taking the path when the father tells 
the son that the path is dangerous.  So, we can see that the manner in which a person 
seeks to produce belief in another person can affect the will of that other person.11  
Similarly, satisfaction may be part of God's project of enabling humans to meet the 
relevant doxastic conditions in a manner that has the most success at helping humans to 
meet the volitional condition. 
 Finally, let us examine the third approach to satisfaction's contribution to human 
appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration.  If personal reconciliation with God is the 
highest good for a human being it is unclear that there is any benefit for which a human 
being could hold out before he is willing to attain his highest good.  This is because 
anything for which the human would hold out is not beneficial to the human being insofar 
as it is an obstacle to the attainment of the highest good.  Thus, this approach is unlikely 
to provide a successful defense of satisfaction's contribution to human appropriation of 
forgiveness. 
A Divine-Manifest Offering Account of Penal Substitution 
This section is divided into three parts.  In the first part I briefly describe Paul K.  
Moser's "divine-manifest offering approach"12 to the atonement.  According to this 
approach God, in the Cross, pursues human appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration.  
In the second part I argue that the divine-manifest offering approach is compatible with 
                                                 
11 For more on what Paul K. Moser calls "purposively available evidence" see Paul K. Moser, The Elusive 
God.  
 
12 Moser, The Elusive God, p. 165. 
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penal substitution.  There I argue that penal substitution can be a tool through which 
God presents evidence meant to help humans to meet the doxastic conditions for 
appropriation of forgiveness.  This evidence can also be used by God to make various 
demonstrations intended for the effective encouragement of humans towards divine-
human personal reconciliation and discouragement against human persistence in 
alienation.13   In the third section I further clarify the nature of this divine-manifest 
offering approach to penal substitution. 
Paul K. Moser's Divine-Manifest Offering Approach to Atonement 
 What I have called "forgiveness-as-restoration," Moser calls "conciliatory 
forgiveness."14 According to Moser, this type of forgiveness 
...characteristically seeks perfect reconciliation with a person under the 
demands of morally perfect love, despite that person's having violated 
those demands.15 
 
As I have above, Moser also distinguishes between offering and receiving such 
forgiveness.16  Each of these is an "intentional action" rather than a "coerced 
happening."17  Because of this, 
The reconciliation typically sought by an offer of forgiveness isn't 
necessarily achieved by the offer of forgiveness.18 
 
                                                 
 
13 "Effective encouragement" refers to causal influence rather than causal determination.  See also this diss., 
p. 212, footnote 5. 
 
14 Moser, The Elusive God, p. 172. 
 
15 Ibid. 
 
16 Ibid., p. 176. 
 
17 Ibid. 
 
18 Ibid., p. 175. 
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Even so, an offer of conciliatory forgiveness "typically aims to lead a person to 
repentance."19  And repentance, which Moser identifies as "turning away from whatever 
violates perfect love,"20 is a condition for receiving conciliatory forgiveness.21 
God's offer of conciliatory forgiveness, which seeks to lead humans to the 
reception of such forgiveness, is manifested in the Cross of Christ.22  Thus, Moser calls 
his theory a "divine-manifest offering approach" to the atonement.23  Moser is thus 
claiming that in the Cross, God is pursuing human appropriation of forgiveness-as-
restoration.   
Penal Substitution and Divine-Manifest Offering 
 Paul K. Moser ultimately rejects penal substitution as an explanatory feature of 
the atonement.24  I will argue, however, that penal substitution is compatible with a 
divine-manifest offering approach to atonement such that God pursues satisfaction 
through penal self-substitution as a means to elicit human reception of conciliatory 
forgiveness.  In other words, through Christ's satisfaction by penal substitution God is 
helping humans to meet the conditions for the appropriation of God's forgiveness-as-
restoration.  
 
                                                 
 
19 Ibid., p. 172. 
 
20 Ibid. 
 
21 Ibid., pp. 173, 176.  
 
22 Ibid., p. 166. 
 
23 Ibid., p. 165. 
 
24 Ibid., pp. 167, 174.  Also see Paul K. Moser, "The Crisis of the Cross: God as Scandalous" in Mel 
Gibson's Passion and Philosophy, edited by Jorge J.E. Gracia (Chicago: Open Court, 2004), p. 209. 
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Penal Substitution and the Doxastic Conditions for Appropriation of Forgiveness 
 God's pursuing satisfaction through penal substitution can contribute to the first 
doxastic condition for appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration.  God's pursuing 
atonement in any form is evidence that humans are in a state of alienation for which 
atonement is appropriate.  This evidence as presented in God's pursuit of satisfaction 
through penal substitution is compatible with God's presenting other evidence for 
believing that humans are in a state of alienation for which they are culpable.  For 
example, God might also give evidence for this belief through feelings of guilt and the 
teaching of Jesus. 
 God's pursuing satisfaction through penal substitution can also contribute to the 
second doxastic condition for appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration.  God's pursuing 
atonement in any form is evidence that God is willing to be reconciled to human beings.  
If God refuses to offer forgiveness-as-restoration unless satisfaction is made on behalf of 
humans, then in providing the required satisfaction God could be seen as giving evidence 
for God's willingness to be reconciled with humans.  This evidence is also compatible 
with God's giving additional evidence for the belief that God extends forgiveness-as-
restoration to human beings.  For example, God might also offer such evidence through 
the teaching of Jesus and an existential feeling of peace.   
 Someone might object that God could enable us to meet the doxastic conditions 
without resorting to such extreme and painful measures.  Yet, while the Cross is not 
logically necessary for producing the relevant beleifs, there are at least two reasons why 
it might contribute to the most effective means to human fulfillment of the doxastic 
conditions.  First, humans have the ability to ignore available evidence.  The Cross is 
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attention-getting in a way that combats the human ability to ignore the claim that we 
are in an alienated state that requires forgiveness-as-restoration.  Second, humans have 
the ability to doubt God's message that God desires reconciliation.  The extreme lengths 
to which God will go to offer forgiveness-as-restoration is assuring in a way that combats 
human ability to doubt God's willingness to be personally reconciled with humans.  This 
is compatible with the claim of James S. Stewart where he says, 
It was not enough to send Jesus preaching the Sermon on the Mount, 
challenging and appealing to people in tones they had never heard before 
to trust God's love for everything; even that could not do it...The death of 
Christ gives me the very heart of the eternal, because it is not words at all, 
not even sublime prophetic utterance: it is an act, God's act, against which 
I can batter all my doubts to pieces.  We preach Christ crucified, God's 
truth revealed.25 
 
Penal Substitution and the Volitional Condition for Appropriation of Forgiveness 
The third condition for appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration is a volitional 
condition.  To fulfill this condition, the offender must be willing to turn from her state of 
alienation and embrace personal reconciliation with God.  It is possible for an offender to 
meet the doxastic conditions for appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration 
(acknowledge that she is alienated, trust the authenticity of God's offer of forgiveness-as-
restoration) and still refuse personal reconciliation.   
If freedom is an essential component of personal relationship, it will not be 
possible for an offender to be forced to meet this condition for the appropriation of 
forgiveness-as-restoration.  The moment force is applied in this respect to the will the 
possibility of personal relationship vanishes.26  Yet God could preserve personal 
                                                 
25 James S. Stewart, A Faith to Proclaim (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953), p. 82. 
 
26 See this diss., pp. 41-42, 94-95, 150-151, 159. 
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relationship while pursuing non-coercive means towards human fulfillment of the 
volitional condition.  God could seek to help an offender to meet this third condition 
(while preserving the possibility of personal relationship) through a sort of 
discouragement and encouragement.  In penal substitution God could be discouraging the 
offender from moving away from personal reconciliation.  That is, God is discouraging 
the offender from persisting in an alienated state.  Further, God could be encouraging the 
offender to move toward personal reconciliation.  God could be encouraging the offender 
to accept God's offer of forgiveness-as-restoration and enter into a relationship of mutual 
love with God wherein the offender trusts God as the source and end of her fulfillment.27 
I argue that satisfaction through penal substitution could be a means by which 
God provides such encouragement and discouragement.  I will present two ways that 
Christ's making satisfaction through penal substitution in the Cross can discourage human 
persistence in alienation and three ways that it can encourage human willingness to 
embrace personal reconciliation with God.  Each of the ways presented is inspired by a 
reading of Thomas Aquinas. 
Penal Substitution as Discouragement against Alienation 
 Through penal substitution, God could seek to discourage an alienated human 
being from persisting in her state of alienation.   God could do this by creating obstacles 
                                                 
 
27 This approach is reminiscent of P.T. Forsyth where he says, "To the question what the worth was which 
God saw in the work of Christ...the answer can here but be useless brevity.  First, the practical and adequate 
recognition of a broken law in a holy and universal life is an end in itself, and therefore a Divine 
satisfaction.  Second, the effect of that vicarious and loving sacrifice on men must bring them to a 
repentance and reconciliation which was the one thing that God's gracious love required for restored 
communion and complete forgiveness...Thirdly, that effect on men is due to the satisfaction of God's moral 
nature in the constitution of man.  God was in Christ reconciling the world by the sacrifice and satisfaction 
of Himself" (P.T. Forsyth, The Atonement in Modern Religious Thought (New York: Thomas Whittaker, 
1902), pp. 86-87). 
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to the human's continued resistance. There are at least two ways by which God can 
give such discouragement through penal substitution.  First, penal substitution could 
serve as a a demonstration of the danger of persistence in alienation.  Second, penal 
substitution could be a demonstration of the value of God's offer of forgiveness-as-
restoration.  Each of these could serve as obstacles against human persistence in 
alienation.28   
Penal Substitution as a Demonstration of Danger 
Thomas claims that in the Passion 
God's severity is thereby shown, for He would not remit sin without 
penalty...29 
 
God's demonstration of severity through penal substitution could serve as a warning 
which creates an obstacle against remaining in an alienated state.  To see how this could 
be so, let us distinguish between God's active wrath and God's passive wrath.  God's 
active wrath is that quality of God by which God pursues satisfaction or punishment for 
sin.  This is the sort of wrath to which Wayne Grudem refers when he claims that Christ's 
suffering and death is  
...a sacrifice that bears God's wrath to the end and in so doing changes 
God's wrath toward us into favor.30   
 
We might also, with Raymond Schwager, characterize God as having passive 
wrath in contrast to a holy anger which is carried out either upon us or upon Christ 
                                                 
28 These obstacles would be surmountable to allow for human freedom. 
 
29 Summa Theologica (ST) III, q. 47, a. 3, ad. 1. 
 
30 Wayne Grudem, Bible Doctrine: Essential Teachings of the Christian Faith (Zondervan: Michigan, 
1999), pp. 254-255. 
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(through active wrath).31  This passive wrath would be “the deliverance of humankind 
to themselves, their desires, their passions, and perverse thinking”32 through God’s 
respecting the freedom of "human activity right up to its ultimate and bitter 
consequences."33  God's passive wrath would manifest itself in the despair involved in 
God's allowing us to pursue our own deep desires apart from a mutual loving relationship 
of faith34 with the Person of God.35 
                                                 
 
31 We should note that Schwager argues that this interpretation of God's wrath is the only interpretation that 
we should hold.  He rejects the idea of active wrath. Joel B. Green also characterizes God's wrath as passive 
(though he does not use this word) saying, "...sinful activity is the result of God's letting us go our own 
way, and this letting us go our own way constitutes God's wrath" (Joel B. Green, "Must We Imagine the 
Atonement in Penal Substitutionary Terms?" in The Atonement Debate, edited by Derek Tidball, David 
Hilborn, and Justin Thacker (Michigan: Zondervan, 2008), p. 163).  Green contrasts this with, what I have 
called, God's active wrath.  Green also denies that God pursues external punishment of sin through such 
active wrath (Green, pp. 160-163).  See also Joel B. Green and Mark D. Baker. Recovering the Scandal of 
the Cross (Illinois: InterVarsity, 2000), pp. 54-55.  C.H. Dodd also employs a concept of passive wrath 
when he claims that divine wrath is intended "not to describe the attitude of God to man, but to describe an 
inevitable process of cause and effect in a moral universe" (C.H. Dodd, The Epistle of Paul to the Romans 
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1932), p. 23). Dodd is also cited in John R.W. Stott, The Cross of Christ.  
(Leicester, England: Inter-Varsity Press, 1986), p. 104.  I should also note that by "passive wrath" I am 
referring to analytic internal consequences as developed in this diss., pp. 36-37 and pp. 40-41. I am not 
simply referring to contingently internal consequences like those identified by Garry Williams where he 
says, "with God the Creator, it is quite possible for a punishment to be intrinsic, to follow from an act, and 
yet still to be retributive in character" (Garry Williams, "Penal Substitution: A Response to Recent 
Criticisms," in The Atonement Debate, edited by Derek Tidball, David Hilborn, and Justin Thacker 
(Michigan: Zondervan, 2008), p. 175).  I would characterize these consequences, ordered by God, as a type 
of active wrath.  Similarly, I argued that contingently internal consequences can be characterized as a type 
of external consequence enforced by God (See this diss., p. 34). 
 
32 Raymond Schwager, Must There Be Scapegoats? (New York: Crossroad Publishing, 2000), p. 215. 
 
33 Schwager. p. 216. 
 
34 In the sense discussed in this diss., chapter 1, pp. 82-90. 
 
35 Eileen Sweeney holds that Aquinas has a role for divine passive wrath.  She claims that Aquinas's view 
"makes mortal sin, which consists in the rejection of God, its own punishment, a punishment consisting in 
forgoing forever the enjoyment of that perfect good in order to 'fix one's end in sin,' thus willing 'to sin 
everlastingly' (IaIIae, q.87, a. 3, ad 1).  It is a punishment less inflicted by God than a wish on the part of 
the sinner (mistaken though it is) that is granted by God" (Eileen Sweeney, "Vice and Sin (Ia IIae, qq. 71-
89)," in The Ethics of Aquinas, edited by Stephen J. Pope (Washington, D.C. Georgetown University Press, 
2002), p. 156). 
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 If God can justly waive God's active wrath by granting forgiveness-as-pardon, 
then God's active wrath is a threat to sinners only inasmuch as God chooses to exercise 
this wrath.  If this were the end of the story we might anticipate that an omnibenovolent 
God would choose to do so, since in doing so God could remain just while also showing 
mercy.36  Yet, as we have seen, this is not the end of the story.  There is still the danger of 
God's passive wrath.  And this is a wrath which God cannot simply waive.  A human's 
refusal to enter into personal relationship with God is its own negative consequence 
which God cannot forcibly remove without simultaneously removing human freedom 
(and as a result removing personal relationship).  This is where the exercise of God's 
active wrath in seeking satisfaction through penal substitution becomes very useful; in it 
God displays a severity against alienation that serves as a warning to help sinners to 
avoid the dangers of God's non-waivable passive wrath.  God makes a demonstration of 
the danger of sin through God's active wrath in order to discourage us from a path which 
leads to a consequence that we may not perceive: God's passive wrath.37   
Thus, in publicly exposing and judging sin through penal substitution in the 
Cross, God demonstrates that sin is a real problem with which we should be concerned.  
It is possible that if God were to exercise God's freedom to waive God's active wrath, we 
                                                 
 
36 Also, as we have seen, if this were the end of the story any atonement theory that claimed that God is 
somehow satisfied in the suffering and death of Christ would be unable to escape at least the problem of 
superfluous suffering. 
 
37 Someone might ask how God's exercise of active wrath can be a warning if it is exhausted in the Cross.  
We can respond to this in two ways.  One response is to claim that God exhausts God's active wrath and 
then warns that such wrath is indicative of a non-waivable passive wrath that awaits for those who remain 
closed to divine-human personal reconciliation.  Another response is to claim that God's active wrath in the 
Cross manifests an offer of forgiveness-as-pardon which applies only to those who appropriate God's 
forgiveness-as-restoration.  Those who do not appropriate God's forgiveness-as-restoration are not given 
forgiveness-as-pardon and still face God's active wrath.  For more on this, see this diss., pp. 221-225.  
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would allow ourselves to be unconcerned with the danger of alienation and would 
become complacent in our alienated state.38  Instead, the severity of the Cross deters us 
from taking sin too lightly and the shocking nature of the Cross makes it more difficult to 
ignore the problem of sin.39  If we are to persist in our state of alienation we must ignore 
this warning, which is in itself an act of will. 
Penal Substitution as a Demonstration of the Value of Divine Forgiveness 
 This second form of discouragement against alienation is inspired by Aquinas 
where he says,  
...by [Christ's Passion] man is all the more bound to refrain from sin, 
according to I Cor. vi. 20: You are bought with a great price: glorify and 
bear God in your body.40 
  
By insisting that a price be paid as a condition of God's offer of forgiveness-as-
restoration, God is demonstrating that God's offer of forgiveness-as-restoration has value.  
God insists on a high cost; as high as penal substitution in the Cross.  And not just any 
penal substitution but, if Christ shares the Father's status and character as a being who is 
worthy of worship, and so is God, then the cost upon which God insists is divine penal 
Self-substitution.41  In this, God is demonstrating that God's offer of forgiveness-as-
                                                 
 
38 Richard L. Purtill makes a similar point, suggesting that "simple pardon" could give humans "a false idea 
of the seriousness of sin, and not give them motive for repentance" (Richard Purtill, “Justice, Mercy, 
Supererogation, and Atonement,” in Christian Philosophy, edited by Thomas Flint (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame, 1990), pp. 41-42).  
 
39 This recalls Hans Urs Von Balthasar who says the following regarding God's "anger." "...in no way does 
it exclude his mercy; in fact, it should be regarded as a function of mercy..." (Hans Urs von Balthasar, 
Theo-Drama, Vol. 4: The Action, translated by Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994), p. 
340).  
 
40 ST III, q. 46, a. 3.   
 
41 It is outside of the scope of this project to defend the divinity of Christ.  I argue that if Christ is divine, 
God's action in penal self-substitution can be seen as a significant manifestation of love.   
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restoration has tremendous value.  This consideration of the cost that was paid as a 
condition of God's offer could serve as a deterrent against persisting in alienation.  This 
consideration could discourage the offender from ignoring the value of the offer of 
forgiveness-as-restoration and persisting in an alienated state.42 
Penal Substitution and Encouragement towards Personal Reconciliation 
 Through penal substitution God could also encourage an alienated human to 
embrace personal reconciliation.  There are at least three ways by which God can give 
such encouragement through penal substitution.  First, penal substitution can be a 
demonstration of God's objective dealing with guilt in order to overcome an offender's 
shame.  Second, penal substitution can be a demonstration of divine justice which can 
encourage human victims of other humans' sin to be open to a relationship of mutual love 
with God.  Finally, penal substitution can be a demonstration of God's love toward the 
alienated human being which encourages a loving response in the sinner.     
 
 
                                                 
 
42 Similarly, Purtill claims "If God in his own nature had merely forgiven us without it costing anyone 
anything, we would not have the same motive for gratitude & repentance: we do not value what seems 
easy" (Purtill, “Justice, Mercy, Supererogation, and Atonement,” p. 44).  Purtill notes that Aquinas refers to 
this as "the major reason why God did not forgive us without satisfaction"(p. 49, footnote 6). Purtill, 
however, does not hold to penal substitution.  Instead, he claims that Christ's suffering and death was "an 
act of supererogation" (p. 41) that gave God "a good reason to punish us less and reward us more than we 
deserve on our own merits.  His suffering and death for our sake give us a claim on God's mercy and 
generosity" (p. 44).  He considers this a ransom theory wherein "A ransom is a payment which gives a 
captor good reason to release a captive" (p. 45).  On his account Christ's action gives God a good reason to 
free us from our self-captivity (p. 45).  There are at least two difficulties with Purtill's theory. First, it is 
unclear on his account how Christ's suffering and death constitute a good reason for God to forgive 
humans.  He claims that "All suffering undeserved by the sufferer and freely accepted out of love is an act 
of supererogation which gives God a good reason to punish members of Christ's body less than they 
deserve, and reward them far beyond their individual merits" (p. 47).  However, it is not clear how Christ's 
suffering is an act of love on his view, instead of merely an instance of undeserved suffering.  Second, 
Purtill seems to be involved in a contradiction where he claims that we can have "a claim on God's mercy 
and generosity" (p. 44) for earlier he claims that "God's forgiveness of us is purely supererogatory" (p. 42).  
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 Penal Substitution as a Demonstration of God's Dealing with Human Guilt 
 Whereas God can use penal substitution to create obstacles to a sinner's moving 
away from God, God can also use it to remove obstacles to a sinner's approach to God.  
One obstacle that threatens to prevent an offender from embracing personal reconciliation 
with his forgiver is a sense of shame.  In penal substitution God objectively addresses a 
sinner's guilt before God by dealing with the penal debt incurred through such guilt.  In 
so doing, God demonstrates that guilt is not an obstacle to God's love and ability to offer 
forgiveness-as-restoration.  As a result, the sinner who thinks, "I'm too guilty to be 
forgiven" meets rebuttal in the Cross.43    
 In offering an objective dealing with guilt, God helps the sinner to overcome a 
subjective sense of shame which could prevent the sinner from appropriating God's 
forgiveness-as-restoration.  This is a departure from Stump who rejects a concept of 
atonement which makes God "seem like an accountant" who balances sin and 
punishment44, and contrasts this with her claim that the purpose of Christ's satisfaction is 
                                                 
 
43 In his review of Herrmann of Marburg's Communion with God, H.R. Mackintosh writes the following.  
"...in Jesus' presence we become aware that God is forgiving us.  It is Jesus who has mediated to us the 
pardon of our sins, not however by His teaching but by being to sinners what He was...What the sinful saw 
in Jesus before the end was that this Man, who gave access to the Father, knowing that nothing else would 
avail, sacrificed Himself, and so took on Him their burden.  While dispensing forgiveness, He at the same 
time did everything to establish the inviolable justice of God's moral order.  The doctrine of vicarious 
atonement proves its value at just this point—it comforts the anxious and penitent believer. 'It helps to 
overcome the doubts which are always springing up as to the reality of the forgiveness which has been 
experienced' (p. 136).  Christ did not merely proclaim the forgiveness of sins, nor did He merely render it a 
possibility.  Rather He bestows it on us, as our mind, for the first time and ever anew, opens through Him to 
faith in the Father. 'His death, as He bore it and as He expounded it in words at the Last Supper, becomes to 
us the word of God that overcomes our feeling of guilt. The God who comes near to us in Christ reconciles 
us with Himself by that death' (p. 142)" (H.R. Mackintosh, "Books that have Influenced our Epoch: 
Herrmann's 'Communion with God'," The Expository Times 40 (1929), p. 314). 
 
44 Eleonore Stump, "Atonement According to Aquinas," in Philosophy and the Christian Faith, edited by 
Thomas V. Morris, (University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame, 1988), p. 68. 
 173 
to transform the will of the sinner. 45  On this divine-manifest offering approach to 
penal substitution God utilizes the image of a divine accountant who balances sin and 
punishment so that God can transform the will of the sinner.  If ever the sinner wonder, 
"Can God forgive me?" she needs only to look at the "divine ledger" which finds its 
balance in the Cross. 
 This is supported by Aquinas where he says, 
...man, being aware of this offense, loses by sin that confidence in 
approaching God which is necessary to achieve beatitude.  Therefore, the 
human race, which abounds in sins, needed to have some remedy against 
sin applied to it...But, if man is to be freed from awareness of past offense, 
he must know clearly that God has remitted his offense.  But man cannot 
be clear on this with certainty unless God gives him certainty of it.  
Therefore, it was suitable and helpful to the human race for achieving 
beatitude that God should become man; as a result, man not only receives 
the remission of sins through God, but also the certitude of this remission 
through the man-God.46 
 
 Penal Substitution as a Demonstration of Divine Justice 
 Thomas writes, 
That man should be delivered by Christ's Passion was in keeping with 
both His mercy and His justice.  With His justice, because by His Passion 
Christ made satisfaction for the sin of the human race; and so man was set 
free by Christ's justice...47 
 
and again, 
 
God's severity is thereby shown, for He would not remit sin without 
penalty...48 
 
                                                 
 
45 Ibid., p. 67. 
 
46 Summa Contra Gentiles (SCG) IV, ch 54 (8). 
 
47 ST III, q. 46, a. 1, ad. 3. 
 
48 ST III, q. 47, a. 3, ad. 1. 
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 Above I argued that God's display of active wrath through penal substitution 
can create an obstacle to human persistence in alienation.  In addition to this, God's 
demonstration of severity in response to sin can serve to remove an obstacle to human 
appropriation of divine forgiveness-as-restoration; namely, doubt that God is just.  In this 
display, human victims of other humans' sin can see that God is not flippant about the sin 
that has affected them.  While God could justly waive the debt of punishment, this would 
not be an act of justice that is visible to human victims of sin.  Instead, God chooses to 
justly exercise active wrath through penal substitution.  This is a visible display of divine 
justice that demonstrates God's seriousness about sin.  So, in penal substitution God 
addresses human doubt that God is concerned with human victimization.49  Thus this 
demonstration of divine justice is also a demonstration of divine love towards humans in 
a way which can encourage human victims of sin to be open to personal reconciliation 
with God.50 
 Penal Substitution as a Demonstration of Divine Love 
 Thomas claims that on account of the deliverance of humans through Christ's 
Passion, 
...man knows thereby how much God loves him, and is thereby stirred to 
love Him in return, and herein lies the perfection of human salvation...51 
 
                                                 
49 Penal substitution could also be seen as an expression of the value of human victims of sin.  This calls to 
mind John Hare who borrows Jean Hampton's term and calls this "the expressive theory of punishment."  
On this view, "[punishment] is good because it expresses the right relative value of [the offender] and his 
victim" (Hare, "Moral Faith and Atonement").    
 
50 I am also grateful to a sermon delivered by Russ Johnson at MissioDei Chicago titled "God is Just" 
(April 1, 2012) for insight with regard to this point (http://www.missiodeichicago.com/index.php/media/ul/ 
podcasts) 
 
51 ST III, q. 46, a. 3. See also SCG IV, ch 55. 
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In the Cross, not only does God demonstrate a willingness to be personally reconciled 
to humans, God could be seen as demonstrating abundant desire to be so reconciled.  
Since personal reconciliation is defined by a relationship of mutual love between God 
and humans, God's display of willingness to be personally reconciled could also be seen 
as a demonstration of love toward sinners.  Penal substitution is a means by which God 
can display the depth of God's love toward each sinner.  If Christ, as the substitute, is 
God (and as such shares the status and character of a being who is worthy of worship) 
then in the Cross we can see the depth of God's love for sinners, for we can see the extent 
to which God will go to win sinners back to God.  While God could justly forgive sinners 
without external penalty, God allows God's Self to demand satisfaction52 through penal 
substitution because this affords God the opportunity, through self-substitution, to 
convincingly display the depth of God's desire for fallen humanity to be personally 
reconciled to God.   
Thus, in the Cross, Christ and the Father conspire together to reveal God's love.  
Though God could simply waive God's active wrath, God chooses to make the pouring 
out of God's active wrath a condition of God's offering forgiveness-as-reconciliation. 53   
                                                 
 
52 Or perhaps God even creates in God's Self a need for satisfaction in the absence of punishment of fallen 
humans. 
 
53One might argue against this by claiming that unconditional forgiveness is a virtue. (For example, see Eve 
Garrard and David McNaughton, "In Defence of Unconditional Forgiveness," Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society 103.1 (2003), pp. 39-60).  The objector could say that by making God's offer of 
forgiveness-as-reconciliation conditional upon penal substitution the divine-manifest offering view of penal 
substitution creates a picture of God wherein God lacks moral perfection.  Since God cannot lack moral 
perfection, this divine-manifest offering approach to penal substitution must be false. It may be the case 
that where an unconditional offer of forgiveness-as-restoration and a conditional offer of forgiveness as 
restoration can both result in personal reconciliation, the choice to unconditionally extend forgiveness-as-
restoration is sometimes the more virtuous choice.  It is questionable, however, whether an unconditional 
offer of forgiveness-as-restoration is always morally superior to a conditional offer of forgiveness-as-
restoration.  In fact, where a conditional offer is more effective than an unconditional offer in eliciting 
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Thus God creates, through no other necessity than by God's choosing, an obstacle to 
God's offer of forgiveness-as-restoration.  In overcoming this tremendous obstacle God's 
Self through penal Self-substitution, God shows sinners the lengths to which God will go 
to be personally reconciled to them.  In doing this, God offers a shocking display of 
God's deep love for sinners and God's desire that they appropriate God's forgiveness-as-
restoration.  This display is so shocking that it can combat our ability to ignore or doubt 
it.  In this way God works to remove obstacles to a human's movement toward God in 
love.  Further, inasmuch as a loving display encourages a loving response, God could be 
seen as spurring the human towards personal reconciliation with God. 
 This is compatible with Moser where he says, 
Jesus's obedient death on the cross, commanded of him by God, aims to 
manifest how far he and his Father will go, even to gruesome death, to 
offer divine forgiveness and fellowship to wayward humans.54 
 
Further Explication of This Account 
 
 I will address four more points with regard to this divine-manifest offering 
account of penal substitution.  First, this view can accomodate the concern that the human 
will is weak.  Second, this view can address the moral problem of sin.  Third, this view 
does not claim to be a complete account of God's work in the Cross.  Fourth, on this view 
a human's fulfillment of the volitional condition is not dependent upon antecedent beliefs. 
First, this view can accommodate the concern that the human will is too weak to 
fulfill the volitional condition on its own.  If human appropriation of forgiveness-as-
                                                                                                                                                 
appropriation of the offer, it seems that choosing the unconditional offer (and thus foregoing, or risking 
foregoing, the appropriation of that forgiveness and, as a result, personal reconciliation) would conflict with 
God's character of robust love.  (In fairness to Garrard and McNaughton, I should note that they hold that 
"to forgive is not necessarily to waive punishment" (Garrard and McNaughton, p. 48)). 
 
54 Moser, The Elusive God, p. 166. 
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restoration depends upon a volitional condition, one might be tempted to think that 
human hope for actual appropriation is bleak on account of the weakness of the human 
will.  We can address this concern with help from Eleonore Stump.  Stump suggests that 
when a sinner reflects upon the Cross that person's mind and heart can be affected in such 
a way that the sinner experiences a second-order willing to avoid sin and draw near to 
God.  God can accept this second-order willing as permission from the sinner to 
strengthen the sinner's will so that she can make any necessary first-order movements of 
the will.55  Thus, 
What God infuses as grace is a disposition to righteous first-order willing; 
but God can do so only if a person is willing to have him do so, only if a 
person wills to will what he ought to will.56 
 
We can call this second-order volitional attitude "openness."  We can now say that on this 
divine-manifest offering account of penal substitution God pursues an openness on the 
part of the sinner to appropriating God's offered forgiveness-as-restoration. Once the 
sinner is open to appropriating God's forgiveness, God can help the sinner to meet the 
necessary volitional condition without destroying the possibility of personal relationship.  
What is more, God can help the sinner to acquire openness in the form of a second-order 
volition by providing encouragement and discouragement in the way described above.  
By reflecting on God's action through penal substitution, the sinner can find 
encouragement towards this openness and discouragement against resisting such 
openness.  This does allow for the possibility that some people will remain closed to 
God's project of personal reconciliation.  But, that is just what it means to have freedom.  
                                                 
55 Eleonore Stump, Aquinas (New York: Routledge, 2003), pp. 449-451. 
 
56 Stump, "Atonement According to Aquinas," p. 83. 
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 Second, this view can address the moral problem of sin.  According to this 
divine-manifest offering view of penal substitution, God delivers the human from the 
external consequences of sin (as presented in the first conception of sin in chapter one)57 
through penal substitution as a means to deliver the human from the divine-human 
relational problem of sin (as presented in the fourth conception of sin in chapter one).58  
At first glance, this appears to neglect the moral problem of sin.    
 I have argued, however, that divine-human personal reconciliation is 
characterized by loving trust of God on the part of the human.  Such a relationship entails 
willingness on the part of the human to submit to the will of God.  Insofar as a human is 
unwilling to submit to the will of God, that person cannot be said to be in a state of loving 
trust of God.  Insofar as a human is willing to submit to the will of God, that human can 
also be said to be willing to overcome the moral problem of sin.  Thus, willingness to be 
personally reconciled with God entails willingness to submit to God's will by which the 
moral problem of sin can be overcome.   
 An objector might then appeal back to the first concern and attack this answer 
based on the weakness of the human will.  We can reply that an openness to lovingly trust 
God entails an openness to submit to God's will.  God can then take this openness as 
permission to transform a person's first-order volitions, desires, emotions, and so on such 
that the human is empowered to obey.  In other words, the soteriology developed by a 
divine-manifest offering view of penal substitution is compatible with a pneumatology 
according to which humans are united with God in such a way that God pursues a project 
                                                 
 
57 See this diss., pp. 27-32.  
 
58 See this diss., pp. 39-43.  
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of moral transformation in those who are open to a relationship of loving trust with 
God.59  Such a project could be identified as an essential part of God's project of 
sanctification.60  
 Third, this account is not a complete account of God's work in the Cross.  One 
might point out that if a willingness to submit to God's will is entailed by loving trust of 
God, then there may be other obstacles to the appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration 
which a divine-manifest offering account of penal substitution does not appear to address.  
For example, willingness to submit to God's will would involve willingness to forgive 
one's enemies.  One's reluctance to do so could be an obstacle to one's willingness to 
enter into a relationship of loving trust with God.  This divine-manifest offering view of 
penal substitution does not seem to address this obstacle, thus someone might argue, this 
view cannot offer a complete account of the atonement. 
                                                 
 
59 H.R. Mackintosh claims that "Union to Christ is the fundamental idea in a theory of redemption."  By 
this, Mackintosh also is concerned with union to God for "the fellowship thus established with Christ is in 
express terms set forth as being intrinsically, and purely in itself, fellowship with God.  To have the Son is 
to have the Father also" (H.R. Mackintosh, Some Aspects of Christian Belief  (New York: George H. Doran 
Co., 1924), p.108).  Mackintosh describes this union as a "mystic union" wherein "the Christian's life is 
rooted in Christ and has in Him its encompassing vital element and medium...He Himself is present in His 
people as the living centre, the animating principle, of their inmost being (p.107).  Through such a union, 
the human could be empowered to overcome the moral problem of sin.  Yet, we must take care not to 
characterize the problem of sin merely as a moral problem lest this type of union be subject to the same 
criticism to which we subjected Schleiermacher and the third conception of sin.  Mackintosh says that God 
indwells like the person's own soul. But, it is possible to hate one's self.  Why wouldn't it also be possible to 
also hate God who dwells within you?  Yet such a union could address the problem of sin at its core if it 
also is concerned to transform the human into one who lovingly trusts God. 
 
60 John E. Hare notes, "We have a real possibility of living the kind of life God wants us to live, not merely 
because he can help us to live it, but because he offers to help us live it" (John E. Hare, "Atonement, 
Justification, and Sanctification," in A Companion to Philosophy of Religion, edited by Philip L. Quinn and 
Charles Taliaferro (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1997), p. 550).  This divine power unto moral transformation 
could be presented to us through another divine offering which is manifest in connection with the Cross.  
We could see Jesus as obedient to the Father even in the extreme circumstances of the Cross.  This 
obedience is divinely vindicated in the Resurrection.  And Jesus, through His teaching, declares that a 
divine source which can empower us to such obedience is available and offered to us.  
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 I am not concerned, however, to offer a complete account of Christ's work in 
the Cross.  (Neither do I think that such a task is possible in one lifetime.)  A divine-
manifest offering account of penal substitution may avoid all of the problems listed in the 
introduction of this work, while being only a small part of what God is accomplishing in 
the Cross.  One virtue of this account is its compatibility with other theories of atonement 
which might account for God's answer to other obstacles to human appropriation of God's 
forgiveness-as-restoration.  For example, in the Cross, Christ might be giving humans a 
demonstration of solidarity that can help a person to overcome her reluctance to submit to 
God's moral authority.  The person who thinks, "God wouldn't expect me to forgive my 
enemies if God understood how reprehensible my enemies have been towards me," meets 
rebuttal through the solidarity offered through Christ in the Cross.   
 A solidarity account of Christ's work on the Cross is compatible with a divine-
manifest offering account of penal substitution.  In fact, in the Cross, Christ could also be 
giving us an example of a perfect human life, meriting grace from God for humans, 
ransoming humans from the devil, and many, many, other things while also making penal 
substitution.  All of these things could work together as a sort of multi-lingual expression 
of God's love which aims to draw all humans into a personal relationship of loving trust 
with God.   
This claim helps to harmonize Thomas's use of what have sometimes been seen as 
competing theories.  Thomas can consistently maintain a satisfaction theory61 in 
conjunction with a redemption theory,62 a sacrifice theory,63 a merit theory,64 
                                                 
61 ST III, q. 48, a. 6, ad. 3.  ST III, q. 46, a. 1 ad. 3.  ST III, q. 49 a. 3. 
 
62 ST III, q. 48, a. 4. 
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exemplarism65, victory over the devil,66 and so on.  On the Cross, Christ could be said 
to actually, not just analogically, accomplish all of these things with the intent of eliciting 
appropriation of divine forgiveness-as-restoration from free human sinners.  On this 
view, penal substitution67 could be only one small part of the story and we can thus say 
with Thomas, 
...if one earnestly and devoutly weighs the mysteries of the Incarnation, he 
will find so great a depth of wisdom that it exceeds human 
knowledge...Hence it happens that to him who devoutly considers it, more 
and more wondrous aspects of this mystery are made manifest.68 
 
 Finally, a human's meeting the volitional condition for the appropriation of 
forgiveness-as-restoration is not dependent upon the development of certain antecedent 
beliefs on the part of the human.  At first glance it seems that such antecedent beliefs 
might be necessary.  Someone could argue that in order for a person's will to be moved 
by God's demonstration of love, that person must first assent to the claim, "God's work in 
the Cross is evidence of God's deep love for me."  Or again, for a person's will to be 
moved by a demonstration of the danger of sin, that demonstration must first convince 
the human to assent to the claim, "My state of alienation has dangerous consequences for 
me.  My fulfillment is not to be found in such a state." 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
63 ST III, q. 48, a. 3. 
 
64 ST III, q. 48, a. 1.  ST III, q. 46, a. 3. 
 
65 Aquinas, Compendium Theologiae (CT), ch. 227.  ST III, q. 46, a. 3.  ST III, q. 1, a. 2.  SCG IV, ch 55. 
 
66 ST III, q. 46, a. 3.  ST III, q. 1, a. 2. 
 
67 ST III, q. 47, a. 3, ad.1.  SCG IV, ch. 55. ST III, q. 49, a.5.  ST III, q. 50, a. 1.  CT, ch 227 & 228. 
 
68 SCG IV, ch. 54 (1).  While this quote references the incarnation and not the Passion we might apply it to 
Christ's Passion insofar as Thomas holds that "...the chief cause of the divine incarnation appears to be the 
expiation of sin..." (SCG IV, ch. 55 (7)). 
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   However, on this divine-manifest offering approach the demonstrations that 
God provides through penal substitution can be "purposive"69 in the sense that their 
primary purpose is to elicit a movement on the part of the human will.  Such a movement 
in the form of openness can occur without antecedent beliefs of the sort just described.  A 
person can be open to a possibility without the belief that such a possibility has been 
actualized.  For example, a person could be open to marriage without believing that a 
suitable spouse exists.  Similarly a person might be open to entering into a relationship of 
loving trust with God before they actually assent to the claim "God exists and desires 
personal reconciliation with me."  Such openness might be accompanied by certain 
beliefs like "If God exists and desires personal reconciliation with me (as would seem to 
be the case if the Cross is a real manifestation of God's love), then I am willing to be in a 
relationship of loving trust with God."  Such beliefs, however, are logically dependent 
upon the relevant human openness and not the other way around.70  
Richard Swinburne's Theory of Satisfaction 
 In this section I compare the divine-manifest offering view of penal substitution 
with the satisfaction theory of Richard Swinburne (which also finds inspiration from a 
Thomist understanding of atonement).  After explicating Swinburne's theory of 
satisfaction, I argue that Swinburne's theory can be read such that satisfaction's ultimate 
benefit is its ability to elicit human appropriation of God's forgiveness-as-restoration.  
This divine-manifest offering reading of Swinburne enables him to avoid some moral 
                                                 
 
69 For more on what Paul K. Moser calls "purposively available evidence" Moser, The Elusive God. 
 
70 Likewise, a person can be closed to a possibility without the belief that such a possibility has been 
actualized.  One's closedness is a volitional stance that does not depend upon antecedent beliefs.  In this 
way we could say that someone who has a closed volitional stance but does not opine as to whether God 
exists and desires personal reconciliation could still be said to "refuse" personal reconciliation with God. 
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criticisms typically launched against him.  I then argue that the divine-manifest 
offering view of penal substitution is compatible with a divine-manifest offering view of 
Swinburnian satisfaction.  This compatibility can help Swinburne to avoid problems with 
his reading of Thomas.   
Swinburne's Account of Satisfaction 
 Richard Swinburne develops a theory of atonement which he believes "to be in 
essence very similar to the theory expounded by St. Thomas Aquinas."71  At first glance 
Swinburne's view seems to reject satisfaction as an explanatory feature of the atonement 
inasmuch as he claims that "sacrifice" articulates the appropriate model.  A study of the 
nature of sacrifice in Swinburne, however, reveals that Swinburnian sacrifice meets our 
definition of satisfaction as "that which God accepts in place of a sinner's receipt of 
divine punishment (or, at least, the full divine punishment) for sin."72  In fact, he refers to 
Anselm's satisfaction theory as that which... 
"...brought back into Christian thought what is in essence the sacrifice 
model...73 
 
Swinburne continues, 
 
[Anselm] phrases it...in terms very close to my own terms.  The term he 
uses most frequently for what is rendered by Christ to God is 'satisfaction'. 
Anselm makes the point that something beyond reparation is owed, and he 
uses 'satisfaction' to denote reparation plus penance.74 
 
                                                 
71 Swinburne, "The Christian Scheme of Salvation," p. 15.  Also see Swinburne, Responsibility and 
Atonement, pp. 156-157. 
 
72 See this diss., p. 3.   
 
73 Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement, p. 155. 
 
74 Ibid. 
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For now, therefore, I will approach Swinburne's view as a satisfaction theory and 
interpret him in this light.75 
According to Swinburne, "God seeks our eternal well-being in friendship with 
himself"76, but there is an obstacle to this friendship in that we have failed in our duties to 
God (sinned) and so have acquired guilt.77  While guilt is a claim about the past it also 
"makes two further claims abut the present."78  First, one who is guilty presently "owes 
something to...his victim."  Second, one who is guilty "has acquired a negative 
status...which needs to be removed."79   
There are two conditions for the removal of guilt.  Atonement must be made by 
the wrongdoer and forgiveness must be given by the victim.80 Atonement consists in 
                                                 
 
75 Richard Cross critiques Swinburnian atonement as a theory of satisfaction (See Richard Cross, 
"Atonement without Satisfaction," Religious Studies 37 (2001), pp. 397-416).  Steven L. Porter calls 
Swinburne's theory a "satisfaction-type" theory, saying, "While Swinburne's theory is not a penal view of 
atonement, Swinburne does present Christ's person and work as a means to satisfy the moral debt sinners 
owe to God." (Steven L. Porter, "Swinburnian Atonement and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution,"  Faith 
and Philosophy 21.2. (April, 2004) p. 229).  Further, Swinburne appears to use "sacrifice" and 
"satisfaction" interchangeably as they relate to a Thomist account of atonement.  See Swinburne, 
Responsibility and Atonement, p. 156, footnotes 17 & 19.  I would argue, contrary to Swinburne, that 
satisfaction is distinct from sacrifice.  On my view (and I would attribute this to Aquinas also) satisfaction 
is that which God accepts in place of the debt of punishment.  Satisfaction eliminates forgiveness-as-
pardon.  Instead of giving forgiveness-as-pardon, God can be said to accept satisfaction which eliminates 
the debt.  Sacrifice, on the other hand, is an offering which encourages an extension of forgiveness-as-
restoration.  The same offering can be both satisfaction and sacrifice, but as they relate to forgiveness each 
has a different function.  Swinburne appears to conflate these functions in his theory of atonement.  
 
76 Swinburne, "The Christian Scheme of Salvation," p. 26. 
 
77 Ibid., pp. 26-27.  Regarding guilt Swinburne says that it "belongs to a person only in respect of his failure 
to perform his obligations, or his doing what it is obligatory not to do, i.e. something wrong" (Swinburne, 
"The Christian Scheme of Salvation," p. 16).  He distinguishes between objective guilt which is a result of 
objective wrong-doing, and subjective guilt which is a result of the intention to do wrong (Swinburne, "The 
Christian Scheme of Salvation," p.16. Also, Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement, pp. 73-75). 
 
78 Swinburne, "The Christian Scheme of Salvation," p. 16. 
 
79 Ibid..  Also, Swinburne. Responsibility and Atonement. p. 74. 
 
80 Ibid., p. 18. Also, Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement, p. 81. 
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repentance, apology, reparation, and penance.81  These are all aimed at the removal of 
the consequences of the failed obligation (the harm caused by the act and the "purposive 
attitude of the wrongdoer").82  While reconciliation can come about by repentance and 
apology alone, it is sometimes appropriate to demand reparation and penance.83  
According to Swinburne, God demands reparation, which involves removing the "former 
harm" caused by sin,84 and penance, which is a "performative act" by which a sinner 
distances himself from sin.85  On Swinburne's view, the sacrifice of Christ's life and death 
on the Cross is a valuable gift of reconciliation86 by which Christ offers reparation and 
penance on behalf of sinners.87    
The final act of this guilt-removal is forgiveness.88  In forgiving, the victim 
accepts the wrongdoer's reparation, penance, and apology by agreeing not to hold the act 
against the wrongdoer; by forwarding the wrongdoer's purpose in disowning the act.89  
                                                 
 
81 Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement, p. 81. 
 
82 Ibid.  Also, Swinburne, "The Christian Scheme of Salvation," p. 18. 
 
83 Ibid. p. 84. 
 
84 Swinburne, "The Christian Scheme of Salvation," p. 18.  Also, Swinburne, Responsibility and 
Atonement, p. 82.  Swinburne acknowledges that there are times when full compensation is not possible. 
 
85 Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement, p. 84.  Also, Swinburne, "The Christian Scheme of 
Salvation," p. 20. 
 
86 Ibid., p. 152. 
 
87 Ibid., pp. 149, 153. 
 
88 Swinburne, "The Christian Scheme of Salvation," p. 20.  Also, Swinburne, Responsibility and 
Atonement, p. 84. 
 
89 Ibid.  Also, Swinburene, Responsibility and Atonement, p. 85.  Repentance is not included here because 
repentance in Swinburne is an "expression to oneself" and so not an offering to another (Swinburne, "The 
Christian Scheme of Salvation," p. 18). 
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Forgiveness can only come in response to at least an apology.90  Beyond apology, the 
victim can  
...determine, within limits, just how much atonement is necessary before 
he is prepared to give the forgiveness which will eliminate guilt.91 
 
While a victim could "disown" a wrongdoer's act without receiving any atonement at all, 
such "disowning" would not be forgiveness properly speaking.92  In such a case, guilt 
would still remain.93  In addition, Swinburne claims, such a disowning would be wrong 
because it would trivialize human relationships by supposing "that good human relations 
can exist when we do not take each other seriously."94 
 Swinburne notes that one might ask,  
[W]hy would not God forgive us in return for repentance and apology 
without demanding reparation and penance?95 
 
 Swinburne cites Aquinas in answering that there would have been nothing wrong 
with God forgiving without a demand for reparation and penance.96  However, God does 
enforce such a demand because  
                                                 
 
90 In the case of subjective guilt repentance is also necessary.  Swinburne, "The Christian Scheme of 
Salvation," p. 20.  Also, Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement, p. 87. 
 
91 Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement, p. 86. 
 
92 Swinburne, "The Christian Scheme of Salvation," p. 20.  Also, Swinburne, Responsibility and 
Atonement, p. 87. 
 
93 Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement, p. 85. 
 
94 Swinburne, "The Christian Scheme of Salvation," p. 21.  Also, Swinburne. Responsibility and 
Atonement, pp. 86 & 148. 
 
95 Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement, p. 148. 
 
96 It is noteworthy that he cites ST III, q. 46, a. 2, ad. 3 where Aquinas claims that God could have forgiven 
without demanding "satisfaction" (Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement, p. 149. footnote 2).  This is 
further evidence that we are correct in treating Swinburnian sacrifice as a theory of satisfaction. 
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...it is good that if we do wrong, we should take proper steps to cancel 
our  actions...Our having the freedom subsequently to clear up...the mess 
we make...allows us to affirm our identities as agents continuing over 
time.  If we are in no position to make proper atonement for what we have 
done, it is good that someone else (even the victim) put us in that position 
and thereby allow us to make proper atonement.97 
 
God's providing reparation and penance in the life and death of Jesus Christ is 
part of God's putting us in a position to make proper atonement.98  While God's ability to 
set the amount of reparation and penance needed for forgiveness means that God could 
accept many different offerings as sufficient (even "one supererogatory act of an ordinary 
man")99 Christ's life and death was particularly suitable for the task.100  This is because 
The best reparation is that in which the reparation restores the damage 
done rather than gives something else in compensation; and the best 
penance is that which more than makes it up to the victim in the respect in 
which he was harmed...101 
 
Furthermore if reparation and penance are good, it is also good that the sacrifice 
providing them be "substantial" and not "trivial."102 
And it is good too that our creator should share our lot, and of his 
generosity make available to us his sacrificial life.103  
 
                                                 
 
97 Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement, p. 149. 
 
98 Ibid., p. 150. 
 
99 Ibid., p. 160. 
 
100 Swinburne, "The Christian Scheme of Salvation," p. 28. 
 
101 Ibid. 
 
102 Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement, pp. 160-161. 
 
103 Ibid., p. 161. 
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The sinner has the opportunity "to use Christ's death to get forgiveness" by 
associating himself with it.104  We may "join to it our feeble repentance and halting words 
of apology."105  And so,  
Any man who is humble and serious enough about his sin to recognize 
what is the proper reparation and penance for it may use the costly gift 
which another has made available for him to offer as his sacrifice.106  
 
Swinburne and the Moral Problems against Satisfaction  
 
 Like Anselm, Swinburne's account struggles to answer the moral problems 
against satisfaction.  Several critics of Swinburne's atonement theory challenge him using 
some version of (2) the problem of superfluous suffering and (3) the appeal to robust 
love.  For example, Steven L. Porter says, 
...since the goods obtained by Christ offering reparation and penance on 
behalf of sinners could be accomplished without his suffering and death, it 
is implausible to think that a good God would require such an event for 
forgiveness.  For a voluntary sacrifice of life is not a morally valuable act 
unless there is some good purpose that can only or best be achieved by 
means of it.107 
 
Porter thus claims that, 
 
It appears essential for Swinburne's case that he spell out some great 
goods which could only or best be achieved by the death of Christ, or else 
there will be no sufficient reason for Christ going to the cross nor God 
requiring it for forgiveness.108 
                                                 
 
104 Ibid., p. 153. 
 
105 Ibid., p. 161. 
 
106 Ibid., p. 153. 
 
107 Porter, "Swinburnian Atonement and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution," p. 232. 
 
108 Ibid., p. 233.  Eleonore Stump says, "If as Swinburne claims, God is not morally obligated to demand 
penance but decides to require it anyway, how are we to understand a good God's deciding to require 
torture and destruction when (on Swinburne's own account) God could get what he wants without 
it?...Moreover...although we find the victim who insists on penance morally acceptable, we admire her if 
she is willing to forego it" (Eleonore Stump, "Book Review: Responsibility and Atonement, by Richard 
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 Porter rightly leaves open the possibility that Swinburne can be rescued from this 
criticism if he can show that there is (at least plausibly) some benefit that is best achieved 
by the suffering and death of Christ.  Porter continues, 
Of course, there might be some other good purpose or purposes which the 
cross served which made it a valuable act, and thus, rendered it capable of 
being a part of the reparation and penance offered to God on behalf of 
sinners.  But Swinburne does not suggest what these other possible goods 
may be.109 
 
Let us see, however, whether there is a benefit to which Swinburne might appeal in order 
to escape these moral criticisms.   
Swinburne cannot escape the moral criticisms by appealing to the ability of 
Christ's reparation and penance to elicit any type of God's forgiveness.  Swinburne 
concedes that God could have accepted an act which involves far less suffering than the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Swinburne," Faith and Philosophy 11 (1994), pp. 326-327).  Similarly, David McNaughton argues, "It is 
unclear, indeed, that the genuine penitent could take his sins more seriously than he already has in 
apologising and dedicating his future life to God's service.  God does not need to give us the opportunity to 
make reparation as well in order for us to be able to take our sin seriously...If someone seeks to achieve an 
end by making a considerable sacrifice, when that end could have been achieved just as well without that 
sacrifice, then that sacrifice was unnecessary, even if it was not in vain because it did achieve the good end.  
Swinburne holds that God did not have to demand reparation, and so did not have to make it the case that 
someone would have to make a sacrifice if sinners were to be forgiven...Once it has been accepted that we 
have shown all the moral seriousness about atoning that we can in sincerely repenting, apologising and 
trying to reform, then the sacrifice is pointless" (David McNaughton, "Reparation and Atonement," 
Religious Studies 28.2 (June, 1992), pp.142-143).  Richard Cross similarly argues that "...I can deal with 
the Godward aspect of my sinfulness by apology and by dealing with the 'manward' aspect of it, and that I 
can deal with the manward aspect of it by apology and making sufficient additional reparation as outlined 
by Swinburne. So human beings can indeed make sufficient reparation for the Godward aspect [of] their 
sins.  They thus do not need to plead Christ's life and death as reparation for their sin" (Cross, pp.406-407).  
Since, "there is no need for additional reparation...the satisfaction theory of the atonement is otiose" (Cross, 
p. 397).  See also Philip L. Quinn, "Swinburne on Guilt, Atonement, and Christian Redemption," in Reason 
and the Christian Religion, edited by Alan G. Padgett (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 289-291. 
 
109 Porter, "Swinburnian Atonement and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution," p. 233.  See also Steven L. 
Porter  "Rethinking the Logic of Penal Substitution," in Philosophy of Religion: A Reader and Guide, 
edited by William Lane Craig (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2002), p. 601. 
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Cross as reparation for human wrongdoing.110  In fact, God didn't have to demand 
reparation and penance at all since forgiveness can come in response to repentance and 
apology.111  Thus, Swinburne must have another benefit other than God's forgiveness (in 
any form) to which he can appeal to justify the suffering involved in God's receiving 
reparation and penance through the Cross.   
There are at least three other benefits to which Swinburne appeals to defend the 
substantial reparation and penance that comes by Christ's life and death.  First, Swinburne 
appeals to something like "fittingness." 
The best reparation is that in which the reparation restores the damage 
done rather than gives something else in compensation.112 
 
Thus, the reparation offered through Christ is "far more perfect" than any other 
acceptable reparation.113  This is because "what needs atonement to God" is humans 
having lived "second-rate lives."  As a result, fitting reparation "would be made by a 
perfect human life, given away through being lived perfectly."114   
 There are problems with this defense of the reparation offered in Christ's life and 
death.115  First, if a perfect human life is enough to meet the standards of a fitting 
reparation, it is unclear why Christ's death is not superfluous.  Steven L. Porter says, 
                                                 
110 Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement, p. 160.  "...God could have chosen to accept one 
supererogatory act of an ordinary man as adequate for the sins of the world. Or he could have chosen to 
accept some angel's act for this purpose." 
 
111 Ibid., p. 86. 
 
112 Ibid., p. 156. 
 
113 Swinburne, "The Christian Scheme of Salvation," p. 28. 
 
114 Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement, p. 157. 
 
115 Some argue that it is impossible to give reparation to God if reparation is the removal of the "former 
harm" caused by the wrongdoer's actions (Swinburne, "The Christian Scheme of Salvation," p. 18).  This is 
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One might think that if Christ had avoided the cross, then Christ would 
be seen as having dodged the inevitable result of the kind of life he led.  
But dodging bullets—even inevitable ones—seems a virtue, unless there is 
some good purpose to taking the bullet.  Since Christ's life alone 
accomplishes the goods of substantive reparation and penance, 
Swinburne's view of the atonement provides no good reason for Christ to 
voluntarily go to the cross.116 
 
Further, even if Christ's death can be shown to be part of the "best" reparation, this 
defense will be vulnerable to (3) the appeal to self-sacrificial love.  For why would God 
demand best reparation when God could avoid significant suffering by accepting a lesser 
reparation? 
 Swinburne presents a second benefit when he claims that the opportunity to make 
reparation and penance gives us  
...the freedom subsequently to clear up...the mess we make...[which] 
allows us to affirm our identities as agents continuing over time.117 
 
This benefit does not help Swinburne avoid the problem of superfluous suffering.  Surely 
we could "affirm our identities as agents over time" simply by apologizing for our past 
wrongs. 
                                                                                                                                                 
because there is some question as to whether any harm can come to God from human wrongdoing.  
Eleonore Stump suggests "...it isn't clear that human wrongdoing harms God, or that an omnipotent, 
omniscient deity could be harmed at all." (Stump, "Book Review: Responsibility and Atonement, by 
Richard Swinburne," p. 326).  (Note: Stump couches this criticism as an attack on the need for penance, but 
it seems that she has failed to distinguish between penance as the removal of "...the purposive attitude of 
the guilty one toward the wronged one manifested in the causing of harm" and reparation as the removal of 
the former harm caused by the act (Swinburne, "The Christian Scheme of Salvation," p. 18)).  If this were 
the case, then any reparation would be unnecessary and so would involve superfluous suffering inasmuch 
as the reparation involved any suffering.  It seems, however, that sin can be said to harm God at least 
insofar as it denies God something that God desires; namely, human sinlessness.  If we agree to this, the 
idea of offering reparation to God is still coherent on these terms.  For a more detailed account of how God 
may be harmed by human wrongdoing see McNaughton, p. 135.  Also see Cross, p. 401.  Both argue that 
criticisms like Stump's here, do not hold against Swinburne.  Each argues for an intelligible way in which 
God can be said to be harmed by human wrongdoing such that reparation may be appropriate (though 
neither will defend Swinburne's application of reparation as an explanatory feature of Christ's work in the 
Cross). 
 
116 Porter, "Swinburnian Atonement and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution," pp. 232-233. 
 
117 Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement, p. 149. 
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 Swinburne presents a third benefit that comes of a victim's receiving 
substantial reparation when he claims that 
...the victim can insist on substantial reparation, and sometimes it is good 
that he should do so, that he should insist on the guilty one,118 for his own 
sake, making a serious atonement; for that allows him to take seriously the 
harm that he has done.119  
 
Here, Swinburne seems to offer an Aquinas-like defense, suggesting that God's accepting 
reparation through the Cross is to the benefit of the sinner in that it allows the sinner to 
take seriously the harm that has been done.  Of course, God is the One providing the 
reparation, but Swinburne acknowledges this, pointing out that even a parent's providing 
a child with the reparation for a child's wrongdoing "allows the child to take his action 
and its consequences seriously."120 
 What is the benefit of the child's taking his action and its consequences seriously?  
That is, what is the benefit of a human taking sin and its consequences seriously?  While 
Swinburne does not explicitly answer this question, it seems that such an attitude of 
seriousness contributes to genuine repentance.  Concerning repentance Swinburne says, 
Repentance involves, first, acknowledgment by the guilty one that he did 
the act and that it was a wrong act to do.  Thereby the guilty one distances 
the act from his present ideals.  Repentance also involves a resolve to 
amend—you cannot repent of a past act if you intend to do a similar act at 
the next available opportunity.121 
                                                 
 
118 In Responsibility and Atonement (p. 86) Swinburne's text says "victim" instead of "guilty one," which 
must be a typo since it is not victims but wrongdoers who make atonement.  Further, the corresponding 
quote in "The Christian Scheme of Salvation" reads "guilty one" as is quoted here.  
 
119 Swinburne, "The Christian Scheme of Salvation," pp. 21-22.  Also, Swinburne, Responsibility and 
Atonement, p. 86 (emphasis mine). 
 
120 Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement, p. 149.  For a detailed analysis of the analogy of the parent 
providing a child with reparation to God's providing our reparation through Christ's life and death, see 
McNaughton, pp. 131-137. 
 
121 Swinburne, "The Christian Scheme of Salvation," p. 18. 
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In providing reparation God could be making it known to the human that wrongdoing for 
which reparation is appropriate has been done.122  This helps the sinner to meet the first 
doxastic condition for appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration by developing an 
awareness of her sinful state.  Further, this reparation could be meant to encourage a 
"resolve to amend."  This helps the sinner to meet the volitional condition.  It is possible 
that God's providing a reparation which includes the Cross of Christ is the most effective 
way of encouraging free human wills to repent (acknowledge wrongdoing and resolve to 
amend).  If this is the case, then Swinburne may be able to defend himself against the 
problem of superfluous suffering and the appeal to self-sacrificial love.  But note that he 
does so by showing how satisfaction ultimately contributes to human appropriation of 
divine forgiveness-as-restoration. 
 Swinburne also seems to indicate that the penance provided through the life and 
death of Christ has the benefit of encouraging repentance.  One reason that Christ's life 
and death are a good penance is because    
...penance, to be good, must evince a concern that the particular harm was 
done which was done...Thereby it expresses the penitent's awareness of 
what he has done.123 
  
If expressing the penitent's awareness of wrongdoing is the only benefit of penance then 
it will fall to the problem of superfluous suffering.  For God, being omniscient would be 
able to know without expression whether someone was aware of what she had done.  But, 
Swinburne claims that penance is more than a mere expression. 
                                                 
 
122 The significance of the reparation provided could be an indication of the significance of the wrongdoing.   
 
123 Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement, p. 157. 
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The giving of the extra gift does not have the function of making clear 
something which was true whether or not the agent made it clear; that he 
meant the apology.  Rather it is a performative act whereby he disowns the 
wrong act (in a way which mere words do not do when the wrong is a 
serious one)...The penitent constitutes his apology as serious by making it 
costly.124  
 
Swinburne uses "performative" here to describe actions which "create or abolish states of 
people or relations between them."125  So, what new state is brought about through 
penance?  One might suggest that the giving of penance brings about personal 
reconciliation.  However, on Swinburne's view, such reconciliation cannot be complete 
until the final act of forgiveness. Therefore, he must be referring to another state.  He 
notes that in giving penance, the penitent's apology is constituted as serious.  That is to 
say, the penitent, in giving penance, takes his wrongdoing and its consequences seriously.  
This attitude, as I argued above, is part of genuine repentance.  Thus, penance seems to 
contribute to repentance.  And once again, Swinburne's view implies that satisfaction 
contributes to the appropriation of forgiveness-as restoration.  Thereby, Swinburne is 
again enabled to overcome the moral problems against satisfaction. 
 Someone might object to this reading of Swinburne, noting that on Swinburne's 
account repentance precedes reparation and penance.  For Swinburne claims that 
Any man who is humble and serious enough about his sin to recognize 
what is the proper reparation and penance for it may use the costly gift 
which another has made available for him to offer as his sacrifice.126 
 
                                                 
 
124 Swinburne, "The Christian Scheme of Salvation," p. 20. 
 
125 Ibid., p. 29, endnote 6.  Swinburne derives this terminology from J.L. Austin's use of "performative 
utterances" to describe claims which do not merely "report already existing states of affairs but themselves 
bring about states of affairs." 
 
126 Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement, p. 153. 
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Thus one might argue against my claim that reparation and penance contribute to 
human repentance according to Swinburne's theory of atonement. 
 It does seem to be the case that Swinburne holds that repentance precedes a 
human's offering of Christ's sacrifice as her own reparation and penance.  However, it is 
consistent with Swinburne's account to claim that God's provision of Christ's sacrifice 
(now available for human use) precedes human repentance and can function in such a 
way as to encourage the sort of repentance that will offer Christ's sacrifice as one's own 
reparation and penance.127  This is consistent with Swinburne where he says, 
God cannot literally atone for our sins, but he can help us to atone for our 
sins by making available to us an offering which we may offer as our 
reparation and penance, and by encouraging us to repent and apologize.  
He could give to us the opportunity to be serious enough about our sins to 
use his life and death as man to be our atoning offering.128 
 
If God's "making available" the offering can be seen as encouraging our repentance and 
apology, then Swinburne's account has hope for escaping the moral challenges posed by 
his critics.  For Swinburne could claim that God's encouraging repentance in this way is 
the most effective way to draw out such a response from free human wills.129  Thus, it 
                                                 
 
127 This view is also consistent with Swinburne's view that God's demanding reparation and penance helps 
to avoid the trivialization of personal relationship (See Swinburne, "The Christian Scheme of Salvation," p. 
21. And, Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement, pp. 86, 148-149.)   
 
128 Swinburne, "The Christian Scheme of Salvation," p. 27. 
 
129 This take on Swinburne also allows him to respond to the following objection by Eleonore Stump. 
"Human sin produces a breach in the relationship between human beings and God, a breach which the 
atonement somehow heals.  One way to see the problem here is to suppose that it lies with human beings 
and consists in finding a way of restoring to righteousness wills which are both free and (as Jeremiah says) 
"desperately wicked."  On Swinburne's view, however, the problem lies with God, who requires reparation 
and costly penance, which is out of the reach of human beings and which the atonement then provides" 
(Stump, "Book Review: Responsibility and Atonement, by Richard Swinburne," p. 326).  On my reading, 
Swinburne would be able to say that God requires reparation and costly penance as the most effective 
means of restoring free and wicked human wills. 
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appears that Swinburne can escape the moral criticisms of his account by adopting a 
divine-manifest offering approach to satisfaction. 
Swinburnian Satisfaction and the Divine-Manifest Offering View of Penal 
 
Substitution  
 
 Someone who holds to a divine-manifest offering account of penal substitution 
need not reject a divine-manifest offering account of Swinburnian satisfaction.130  One 
can coherently claim that, in the Cross, Christ both makes satisfaction through penal 
substitution and makes available satisfaction in the Swinburnian sense. 
 Someone might object to this claim in the following way.  First, someone might 
note that on the divine-manifest offering view of penal substitution God is said to be 
offering forgiveness-as-restoration in the Cross.  According to Swinburnian satisfaction, 
however, God does not offer forgiveness-as-restoration until humans associate 
themselves with Christ's satisfaction.  In the Cross, God only provides the means by 
which humans can elicit God's offer of forgiveness-as-restoration.  Thus, one who 
ascribes to both views simultaneously is forced into a contradiction inasmuch as he must 
claim that God both offers and does not offer forgiveness-as-restoration in the Cross. 
 This objection can be overcome in the following way.  On the divine-manifest 
offering view of Swinburnian satisfaction, God can be said extend a second-order 
offering in the Cross.  That is, God offers to offer forgiveness-as-restoration if the 
offender associates herself with Christ's satisfaction.  In this way, God can still be seen to 
manifest an offer of forgiveness-as-restoration in the Cross.  It is coherent to hold that 
                                                 
 
130 Though it should be noted that Swinburne rejects penal substitution on the basis of the moral objections 
and the impotence objection to satisfaction (Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement, p. 151-152). 
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God manifests both a first-order and second-order offer in the Cross.  On the divine-
manifest offering view of penal substitution, God is understood to be declaring "I am 
willing to enter into personal reconciliation with you."  On the divine-manifest offering 
view of Swinburnian satisfaction, God is understood to be declaring "If you associate 
yourself with the satisfaction that I have provided, then I am willing to enter into personal 
reconciliation with you."  These two claims can be held simultaneously with consistency 
for they simply amount to p ^ (q  p). 
  This compatibility can also help Swinburne insofar as he holds that his theory is a 
Thomist theory.  As we noted above, Swinburne tends to conflate the concepts of 
satisfaction and sacrifice.  As a result, Swinburne's view struggles to harmonize 
Aquinas's use of both concepts.131  It also leads Swinburne the bold claim that, 
"...Aquinas regards his theory as a sacrifice theory"132 which seems to ignore the fact that 
Aquinas also holds that his theory is a redemption theory,133 a satisfaction theory,134 and 
a merit theory,135 among other things.136   
Aquinas clearly distinguishes between satisfaction and sacrifice where he says, 
                                                 
131 See Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement, p. 156, footnotes 17 & 19. 
 
132 Ibid., p. 156 
 
133 ST III, q. 48, a. 4. 
 
134 ST III, q. 48, a. 6, ad. 3.  ST III, q. 46, a. 1 ad. 3.  ST III, q. 49, a. 3. 
 
135 ST III, q. 48, a. 1. 
 
136 See ST III, q. 48, a. 6, ad 3.  Philip L. Quinn also notes the pluralistic nature of the Thomist theory of 
Atonement, though he claims that the primary function of the Cross in Aquinas is satisfaction.  See Quinn, 
"Swinburne on Guilt, Atonement, and Christian Redemption," p. 295 and Philip L. Quinn, "Aquinas on 
Atonement," in Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement, edited by Ronald J. Feenstra and Cornelius Plantinga 
Jr. (University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame, 1989) pp. 153-177. 
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Christ's Passion...acts by way of satisfaction, inasmuch as we are 
liberated by it from the debt of punishment...but in so far as we are 
reconciled with God it acts by way of sacrifice...137 
 
From this we could develop a view according to which Christ's endures penal 
substitution138 on the Cross, thus making the satisfaction which abolishes the debt of 
punishment139 and achieves legal reconciliation (a divinely chosen condition for God's 
extension of forgiveness-as-restoration).  Also, on this view, Christ's work in the Cross is 
a pleasing sacrifice to God which elicits God's extension of forgiveness-as-restoration.140  
This view can avoid the ontological, moral, and conceptual problems above by adopting a 
divine-manifest offering approach according to which both the satisfaction and sacrifice 
achieved in the Cross work to elicit a sinner's appropriation of God's forgiveness-as-
restoration.  Were Swinburne to explicitly adopt something like this view, he could avoid 
the confusion between satisfaction and sacrifice that is in his account.141   
Eleonore Stump's Theory of Satisfaction 
 
In this section, I critically analyze the satisfaction theory of Eleonore Stump 
(which also is inspired by Thomas).  After explicating her theory, I argue that Stump's 
                                                 
 
137 ST III, q. 48, a. 6, ad. 3. 
 
138 ST III, q. 47, a. 3 ad. 1.  ST III, q. 49, a. 5.  ST III, q. 50, a. 1.  SCG IV, ch. 55.  CT, ch 227 & 228.  
 
139 ST III, q. 49, a. 3. 
 
140 Sacrifice might also be said to contribute to God's forgiveness-as-letting go inasmuch as it "appeases" 
God (ST III, q. 48, a. 3 & ST III, q. 49, a. 4).  Of course, on the divine-manifest offering view God would 
allow God's Self to "hold on" so that we can see God "let go" and be drawn to an appropriation of 
forgiveness-as-restoration. 
 
141 Philip L. Quinn also suggests that Swinburnian sacrifice and penal substitution may be compatible in a 
way that can "round out and strenghten that account" (Quinn, "Swinburne on Guilt, Atonement, and 
Christian Redemption," p. 297).  However, while describing this parity Quinn abandons the penal element 
of Christ's suffering and describes it only as a "substitution" for the extraction of the debt of punishment 
from sinners.  As a result, Quinn does not clearly add to Swinburne's view since Swinburnian sacrifice can 
also be described as a substitution in this way.  See Quinn, Philip L. "Swinburne on Guilt, Atonement, and 
Christian Redemption," pp. 293-297. 
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account fails to consistently distinguish between what she calls "the problem of past 
sin" and "the problem of future sin."  Further, her theory does not appear to be a theory of 
vicarious satisfaction as she claims.  I will then argue that a divine-manifest offering 
account of satisfaction (and even penal substitution) can help Stump overcome these 
problems in a way to which she might be amenable.  I also argue that the divine-manifest 
offering view of penal substitution can help Stump account for elements of Aquinas's 
theory which her theory struggles to harmonize.   
Stump's Account of Satisfaction 
 In her book, Aquinas, Stump outlines her take on a Thomist theory of atonement.  
Stump explicitly argues that satisfaction contributes to personal reconciliation by eliciting 
human appropriation of God's forgiveness-as-restoration.  Thus, Stump already appears 
to advocate a divine-manifest offering approach to satisfaction. 
Stump contrasts her theory with what she calls a problematic "popular account" of 
the atonement.142  On her reading of Aquinas, Christ's passion and death serve "two 
general functions" which "correspond to two different problems posed by moral evil."  In 
the atonement, Christ makes satisfaction to solve "the problem of past sin" and merits 
grace to solve "the problem of future sin."143 
While satisfaction is meant to overcome the problem of past sins, this problem is 
seen differently on the Thomist and popular views.  According to the popular view, the 
                                                 
 
142 The popular view according to Stump is outlined in detail in the introduction to this dissertation.  (See 
this diss., pp. 6-7.) An earlier version of Stump's writing on this topic can be found in Eleonore Stump, 
"Atonement According to Aquinas" in Philosophy and the Christian Faith, edited by Thomas V. Morris 
(Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), pp. 61-91. 
 
143 Stump, Aquinas, p. 430 
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problem is that such sins have resulted in God's alienation from humans, but on the 
Thomist view the problem is human alienation from God.  That is to say, 
For [the popular account], the main obstacle to human salvation lies, in 
effect, in God himself, whose justice constrains him to damn human 
beings unless atonement is made.  For Aquinas, the main obstacle lies in 
sinful human nature, which damns human beings unless it is repaired or 
restored by the atonement.144 
 
On her reading of Aquinas, satisfaction removes the debt of punishment, but satisfaction 
is not necessary for God's exercise of justice.  God could justly forgive without 
satisfaction but chooses it as the most "suitable way of healing our nature."145 
So the function of satisfaction for Aquinas is not to placate a wrathful God 
or in some other way remove the constraints which compel God to damn 
sinners.  Instead, the function of satisfaction is to restore a sinner to a state 
of harmony with God by repairing or restoring in the sinner what sin has 
damaged.146 
 
She proceeds to describe how Christ's satisfaction attains this goal.  In doing so, she 
offers a "homely example of minor evil."147  She imagines a mother who has asked her 
young son not to play near the flower beds to which she lovingly tends.  Ignoring his 
mother's instructions, the boy plays with his ball in the flower beds and destroys the 
flowers therein.  As a result, "some distance" is created between the boy and his mother.   
His will and hers are not in harmony, and he does not love her as he 
might.148 
 
                                                 
 
144 Ibid., p.432.  
 
145 Ibid., p. 431. 
 
146 Ibid., p. 432. 
 
147 Ibid., p. 433. 
 
148 Ibid. 
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If the boy became truly sorry for what he had done, he would try to fix what he had 
destroyed.  In doing this he would be making satisfaction, the "chief value" of which is 
not the restoration of the flowers but the restoration of "the harmonious and loving 
relationship" between the mother and son.149 
 Of course, this is not yet an example of vicarious satisfaction, so Stump 
continues, 
Because, on Aquinas's view, the point of making satisfaction is to return 
the wrongdoer's will to conformity with the will of the person wronged, 
rather than to inflict retributive punishment on the wrongdoer or to placate 
the person wronged, it is possible for the satisfaction to be made by a 
substitute, provided that the wrongdoer allies himself with the substitute in 
willing to undo as far as possible the damage he has done.150 
 
In light of this, Stump re-imagines the mother approaching her son who has yet any 
interest in reconciliation.  Disguised so that her son does not recognize her, she tries "to 
talk him into letting her make his restitution for him."151  In this way the mother seeks to 
turn "her son's will and love back to her, so that the harmony of their relationship is 
restored."152  And so,  
...if she provides vicarious satisfaction for her son...she eases his return to 
her.  She invites rather than forces his compliance.  She counts as 
sufficient for reconciliation his willingness to undo his mischief and does 
not require his actually restoring the garden. And finally, in the person of 
the substitute...she sets before him a living model of what he should be if 
he were up for it, so that he does not need to initiate the desired state of 
mind in himself, but needs just to watch and copy someone else's.153 
                                                 
 
149 Ibid. 
 
150 Ibid., p. 435. 
 
151 Ibid., p. 436. 
 
152 Ibid. 
 
153 Ibid., p. 437. 
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 Stump then asks, "If the aim of making satisfaction is just a sinner's repentance, 
why bother with restoration?"154 She claims that God could have ignored satisfaction but 
it is useful in two ways.  First, someone who is "truly sorry" will desire that the evil that 
was done be "undone."  Second, "participation in making compensation for the wrong 
done," that is, "the willing of restoration, voluntarily undertaken in contrition, helps 
strengthen the will in its resolution of repentance."155 
 Next, she asks "what the theological equivalent of restoring the flowers is."156  
She answers that what is ruined is "human intellect and will." 157  The thing marred is the 
sinner, himself.158  Thus, 
...Christ restores what sin has marred in human nature because he gives 
God a particularly precious instance of human nature...159 
 
This satisfaction reconciles the sinner to God if "the sinner allies himself with the 
substitute by willing the restitution the substitute makes."160  To ally oneself in such a 
way, one must have faith and charity.  To have faith means that one believes "that Christ 
                                                 
 
154 Ibid., p. 438. 
 
155 Ibid. 
 
156 Ibid. 
 
157 Ibid., p. 439.  In her earlier version she refers to this simply as "human character" (Stump,  
"Atonement According to Aquinas," p. 70). 
 
158 Ibid. 
 
159 Ibid. 
 
160 Ibid. 
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has made satisfaction for his past sin."  To have charity means to "have the love of 
God and goodness which makes him glad of the fact."161 
Objections to Stump's Account 
 
 There seem to be at least two problems with Stump's account of Thomist 
satisfaction.  First, Stump's account does not consistently distinguish between "the 
problem of past sin" and "the problem of future sin."162  On her reading of Aquinas, the 
problem of past sin "lies in sinful human nature, which damns human beings unless it is 
repaired or restored by the atonement."163   Or again, the problem of past sin is that it has 
ruined "human intellect and will" by leading to "a proud, selfish, disobedient mind and 
heart."164  Yet she defines the problem of future sin as  
...human proneness to evil, the disordered relationship among human 
reason, will and passions which, on Aquinas's view, is responsible for the 
tendency of human beings to sin.165 
 
It seems that there is no relevant difference between these two problems.  This false 
distinction leads Stump to make the contradictory claim that satisfaction both overcomes 
and fails to overcome the same problem.166  For, after claiming that satisfaction 
overcomes the problem of past sin167 Stump claims that "making satisfaction for past sin 
                                                 
 
161 Ibid., p. 440. 
 
162 Ibid., p. 430. 
 
163 Ibid., p.432.  
 
164 Ibid., p. 439. 
 
165 Ibid., p. 442. 
 
166 Of course, both satisfaction and meriting grace can contribute to overcoming the same problem together, 
but this is not Stump's claim. 
 
167 Stump, Aquinas, pp. 430ff. 
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still leaves a person with the same proclivities to do evil in the future."168  This 
contradiction can be seen again when Stump claims, 
...what will satisfy [God] is not repayment, but the goodness and love of 
his creature.169  
 
If "making satisfaction for past sin still leaves a person with the same proclivities to do 
evil in the future,"170 then making satisfaction for past sin still leaves a person without the 
requisite "goodness and love" to satisfy God.  Thus, Stump is forced to make the 
contradictory claim that making satisfaction is not enough to satisfy God.  
As a result, Stump falls into a second problem.  It is questionable whether Stump's 
theory of Christ's atonement is a satisfaction theory at all.  Stump claims that according to 
Aquinas, "satisfaction...removes the debt of punishment for sin."171  Yet, she later claims,  
For Aquinas, then, the aim of any satisfaction (including vicarious 
satisfaction) is not to make debts and payments balance but to restore a 
sinner to harmony with God.172 
 
Thus it is unclear whether Christ's satisfaction functions in such a way as to remove the 
debt of punishment.  If Christ's passion and death do not remove the debt of punishment, 
then Stump is wrong to explicate Christ's passion and death in terms of satisfaction.  For, 
satisfaction is that which God accepts in place of a sinner's punishment.  If God cannot be 
said to accept Christ's passion and death in place of a sinner's punishment, then Christ's 
                                                 
 
168 Ibid., p. 442. 
 
169 Ibid., p. 437. 
 
170 Ibid., p. 442. 
 
171 Ibid., p. 431.  
 
172 Ibid., p. 437.  The conflict is more apparent in Stump's earlier version where instead she says, "For 
Aquinas, then, the aim of any satisfaction (including vicarious satisfaction) is not to cancel a debt incurred 
by sin but to restore a sinner to harmony with God" (Stump, "Atonement According to Aquinas," p. 69 
(emphasis mine)). 
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passion and death are not satisfaction.  As a result, Stump cannot be said to offer a 
theory of vicarious satisfaction as she claims.173  Indeed, if the transformed mind and 
heart of each person is what satisfies God, then it is not clear that Jesus can offer 
satisfaction on behalf of another at all.  Perhaps, he can offer an example as to how each 
person can make her own satisfaction.174  Perhaps, Christ's passion and death can help 
each person to make, or persist in, her own satisfaction,175 but this is not vicarious 
satisfaction for on this view God accepts a sinner's own repentance as that which releases 
her from the debt of punishment.  It is not Christ's passion and death (or even a 
combination of human repentance and Christ's passion and death) which does so.    
Stump's Account and the Divine-Manifest Offering View of Penal Substitution 
 Stump can escape these problems with help from a divine-manifest offering 
approach to satisfaction (and even penal substitution).   Now, Stump rejects the popular 
view's concern "to make debts and payments balance."176  She argues, that God is instead  
...concerned with the sinner.  What he wants is for that person to love what 
God loves and to be in harmony with God.177 
 
                                                 
 
173 Ibid. 
 
174 And it seems that Stump relies on this where she says, "On this view, a person making vicarious 
satisfaction is not providing compensatory payment so much as acting the part of a template representing 
the desired character or action, in accordance with which the sinner can align his own will and inclinations 
to achieve a state of mind which it is at least unlikely he would have achieved on his own" (Stump, 
Aquinas, p. 437). 
 
175 This could be seen as the goal of "meriting grace" in Stump, Aquinas, pp. 441ff.  Also, note that Stump's 
two defenses of the usefulness of Christ's satisfaction involve help given to an already changed human will 
(Stump, Aquinas, p.438). 
 
176 Stump, Aquinas, p. 437. 
 
177 Ibid. 
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While it is true that what God wants is for sinners to be in harmony with God, Stump 
creates a false dichotomy by claiming that God wants that instead of wanting "to make 
debts and payments balance."  God's ultimate concern can be harmony with the sinner 
and balancing the accounts can be a means toward achieving that harmony.  In fact, we 
could even say that God is only concerned with balancing the accounts insofar as it helps 
restore the sinner's will to harmony with God.  If Stump were open to such a clarification, 
she could escape the problems presented above.  First, she would be able to clearly 
distinguish between the problems of past and future sin.  The problem of past sin could 
be the problem relating to the "accounts," while the problem of future sin could be the 
problem of human wills which are out of harmony with God.  Perhaps God's pursuing 
satisfaction through penal substitution to handle the first problem is part of God's most 
effective means of addressing the second problem.  Second, this theory would clearly be 
a theory of vicarious satisfaction for Stump would be able to show how Christ's 
atonement helps to "balance the accounts" and remove the debt of punishment.178  Stump, 
in fact, already seems open to a divine-manifest offering approach to satisfaction (even if 
she rejects penal substitution specifically) where she says, 
By affecting a person's heart and mind in the way that the Atonement is 
designed to do, God can bring about the act of will in which the sinner 
detests her sin and longs for God's goodness.179 
                                                 
 
178 Stump could distinguish between two uses of "satisfaction" in her account.  According to one use, 
"satisfaction" is that which Christ does which removes the debt of punishment.  According to the second 
use "satisfaction" refers to God's contentment or God's achieving God's ultimate goal.  In this way Christ 
could make satisfaction (in the first sense) in the Cross and God could still be unsatisfied (in the second 
sense) until the human will is turned to God in charity. 
 
179 Eleonore Stump, "Atonement and Justification," in Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement, edited by 
Ronald J. Feenstra and Cornelius Plantinga Jr. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1989), p. 205.  
Also she says, "Besides the role it has in making satisfaction to God for sin, liberating sinners from 
punishment, and the other benefits it is said to have, then the Atonement figures significantly in 
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 A divine-manifest offering approach to penal substitution can also help Stump 
insofar as she holds that her theory is a Thomist theory.  First, Stump's account seems to 
struggle to accommodate any Thomistic reference God's severity180 or penal 
substitution.181  Yet, using a divine-manifest offering approach to penal substitution she 
could harmonize this language with God's ultimate goal of "restor[ing] a sinner to 
harmony with God."182.  She could argue that God mercifully pursues "the goodness and 
love of his creature"183 inasmuch as God seeks to elicit a sinner's openness of will by 
exercising the option to pursue severity through penal substitution.184   
 Second, a divine-manifest offering approach to penal substitution is compatible 
with Thomist exemplarism, where Stump's view seems to struggle to harmonize 
satisfaction and example.  Stump claims that all of the roles of Christ's passion and death 
can be "subsumed under...making satisfaction and meriting grace."185  She cites 
Aquinas's Compendium Theologiae, chapter 227 when pointing out that these two 
functions correspond to the problems of past and future sin.186  Yet, the majority of 
                                                                                                                                                 
justification because of its role in eliciting the assent to moral rebirth requisite for justification" (Stump, 
"Atonement and Justification," p. 201.)  Also see Stump, "Atonement and Justification," pp. 200-201 and 
Stump, Aquinas, pp. 449-450. 
 
180 ST III, q. 47, a. 3, ad. 1. 
 
181 ST III, q. 47, a. 3, ad. 1.  ST III, q. 49, a.5.  ST III, q. 50, a. 1.  SCG IV, ch. 55.  CT, ch 227 & 228. 
 
182 Stump, Aquinas, p. 437.   
 
183 Ibid. 
 
184 We must also take care to avoid the mistake of overemphasizing the role of God's severity in Aquinas, to 
the neglect of Aquinas's view of God's mercy.  On my reading God's opting for severity is a manifestation 
of God's mercy because God's severity helps to draw sinners into a state of personal reconciliation with 
God.   
 
185 Stump, Aquinas, p. 430. 
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Aquinas's chapter is spent discussing Christ's death as "an example of perfect virtue 
for us."187  It is unclear how Christ's death as an example can be categorized as part of 
Christ's making satisfaction or meriting grace.188  On a divine-manifest offering account, 
however, Christ's making satisfaction, giving humans an example of virtue, and meriting 
grace can all be means by which God presents demonstrations meant to elicit in the 
sinner an openness to receiving that grace by which a sinner can be brought into personal 
reconciliation with God.   
                                                                                                                                                 
186 Ibid. 
 
187 CT, ch. 227. 
 
188 Stump appears to subsume it under satisfaction where she says, "...a person making vicarious 
satisfaction is not providing compensatory payment so much as acting the part of a template representing 
the desired character or action, in accordance with which the sinner can align his own will and inclinations 
to achieve a state of mind which it is at least unlikely he would have achieved on his own" (Stump, 
Aquinas, p. 437).  But, this seems to say that Christ is not making satisfaction for sinners in the Cross so 
much as he is demonstrating how sinners can make satisfaction for themselves.  This does not subsume 
exemplarism under vicarious satisfaction, but rather appears to replace vicarious satisfaction with 
exemplarism.  
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CHAPTER FOUR  
  
A DIVINE-MANIFEST OFFERING APPROACH TO PENAL SUBSTITUTION 
  
AND THE OBJECTIONS AGAINST PENAL SUBSTITUION 
 
Introduction 
 
 In this chapter I argue that a divine-manifest offering approach to penal 
substitution (DMP) can enable a theory of penal substitution to overcome the fourteen 
problems outlined in the introduction to this project.  I then argue that this view can be 
used to re-interpret Stump's "popular view" such that the popular view is logically and 
ethically defensible. 
 This chapter is divided into three sections.  In the first section I argue that DMP 
can overcome the problems for penal substitution that arise inasmuch as it is a theory of 
satisfaction.  In the second section I argue that DMP can overcome the problems for 
penal substitution that arise inasmuch as it is a theory of vicarious satisfaction.  In the 
third section I argue that DMP can overcome the problems for penal substitution that 
arise inasmuch as it is a penal theory involving the punishment of an innocent vicar.   
A Divine-Manifest Offering Approach to Penal Substitution and the Problems for  
 
Penal Substitution as a Theory of Satisfaction 
 
DMP can avoid all of the objections against satisfaction outlined in the 
introduction.  Having structured this account according to its ability to navigate the 
ontological and moral objections against satisfaction, I will briefly summarize how this 
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view can escape these problems.  I will then show how a theory of penal substitution 
can use DMP to escape the conceptual objections to satisfaction. 
A Response to (1) the Ontological Argument against Satisfaction 
On DMP God has the freedom to accept satisfaction, exact punishment on fallen 
humans, or give forgiveness-as-pardon without either satisfaction or punishment.  
Further, God can give forgiveness-as-letting-go and offer forgiveness-as-restoration 
simply by the free movement of God's Own will.  There is no authority or power outside 
of God which requires debt repayment before God can freely do any of these things. 
On this view, it is God God's Self who chooses to require debt repayment.  God 
creates this requirement1 in order to give God's Self the opportunity to meet this 
requirement by satisfaction through penal Self-substitution. This affords God an effective 
opportunity to draw humans into a state of personal reconciliation with God.  If God is to 
preserve the possibility of personal relationship, God cannot force a human being to be 
open to being personally reconciled (since human freedom is necessary for such a 
relationship).  Neither can God overcome the relational distance that separates humans 
and God by simply ignoring that distance.  As I have argued, if the problem here is that 
God loves humans but humans do not love God, God's ignoring the problem of the 
absence of human love toward God will do nothing toward overcoming this problem.  If 
God cannot force the needed love and cannot bring about divine-human reconciliation by 
simply overlooking the absence of human love towards God, then it seems that there is 
only one remaining alternative for overcoming human alienation from God.  God must 
                                                 
1 It is even possible to say that God creates a need in God's Self for satisfaction through penal substitution 
in the absence of punishment of fallen humans. 
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draw us into love of God. 2   On DMP, God's requiring and providing satisfaction 
through penal substitution (in the absence of direct divine punishment of fallen humans) 
is an essential part of this divine project.  
This is not a limit to God's omnipotence.  As Paul K. Moser says, 
Not even the true God, having supreme power and knowledge, can force 
genuine loving reconciliation.3 
 
And again, C.S. Lewis says, 
[God's] Omnipotence means power to do all that is intrinsically possible, 
not to do the intrinsically impossible. You may attribute miracles to him, 
but not nonsense. This is no limit to his power. If you choose to say 'God 
can give a creature free will and at the same time withhold free will from 
it,' you have not succeeded in saying anything about God: meaningless 
combinations of words do not suddenly acquire meaning simply because 
we prefix to them the two other words 'God can.'... It is no more possible 
for God than for the weakest of his creatures to carry out both of two 
mutually exclusive alternatives; not because his power meets an obstacle, 
but because nonsense remains nonsense even when we talk it about God.4 
Answering (2–3) the Moral Arguments against Satisfaction 
 DMP can also offer theories of penal substitution escape from the moral 
arguments against satisfaction. 
 
                                                 
 
2 This point recalls C.S. Lewis's claim that God “woos” us.  See C.S. Lewis, The Screwtape Letters (New 
York: Time Incorporated, 1961), pp. 24-25. 
 
3 Paul K. Moser, "Divine Hiding," Philosophia Christi, Series 2, 3.1 (2001), p. 99. 
 
4 C.S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain (New York: HarperCollins, 1996), p. 18.  Or again, this point recalls 
Hans Urs von Balthasar who says, "Man's refusal was possible because of the trinitarian 'recklessness' of 
divine love, which, in its self-giving, observed no limits and had no regard for itself.  In this, it showed both 
its power and its powerlessness and fundamental vulnerability (the two are inseparable). So we must say 
both things at once: within God's own self—for where else is the creature to be found?—and in the 
defenselessness of absolute love, God endures the refusal of this love; and, on the other hand, in the 
omnipotence of the same love, he cannot and will not suffer it" (Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama, Vol. 
4: The Action, translated by Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994), p. 329). 
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A Response to (2) the Problem of Superfluous Suffering 
For DMP to definitively avoid the problem of superfluous suffering, it would only 
need to be shown that through penal substitution God effectively encourages at least one 
more person toward personal reconciliation than the amount of people that would be so 
encouraged by any other means that excluded penal substitution.5  Now, it does not seem 
possible to empirically determine that God's receiving satisfaction through penal 
substitution in the Cross is an essential part of the most effective means of drawing 
humans into a state of personal reconciliation.  Yet, the popularity of penal substitution as 
noted in the introduction of this work is evidence which suggests the plausibility of such 
a claim.  Thus, while DMP does not give definitive escape from the problem of 
superfluous suffering, it at least gives plausible escape from this problem.   
Someone might object to this defense, pointing out that while there are many who 
may respond to penal substitution, there are also many who find it logically incoherent 
and morally repugnant.  As a result, if penal substitution is accepted as an explanatory 
feature of the atonement, it seems more likely that fewer people would respond to the 
divine offering in the Cross. 
                                                 
5 "Effective encouragement" is not causally determining in a way that overrides human freedom.  It is 
rather, causally influencing in a way that is compatible with human freedom.  The type of effective 
encouragement with which I am concerned is such that it achieves its goal when it elicits the desired free 
human response.  In a similar way a coach can "effectively" motivate (causally influence) her players to 
make free choices relevant to their participation in a game; or a lover could "effectively" woo (causally 
influence) his beloved; or a politician could effectively persuade (causally influence) voters to make a 
particular free choice on the ballot.  This does not mean that God is taking any particular risk when 
determining how to encourage/discourage humans (as the coach, lover, or politician does).  God, in God's 
omniscience, could know the manner of encouragement/discouragement that will most effectively 
encourage human wills to appropriate God's forgiveness-as-restoration.  With this foreknowledge God 
could pursue the means that will result in the most human appropriation of divine forgiveness-as-
restoration.  Again, this is not causally determining in a way that overrides human freedom, because God's 
foreknowing how a human will freely respond does not change the fact that the human's response was free.  
This fear could negatively affect human confidence in approaching God. 
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DMP, however, is compatible with subjective rejection of penal substitution. 
On DMP human assent to penal substitution is not necessary for the Cross to be effective 
as a divine-manifest offering that encourages humans to enter into personal reconciliation 
with God.  Recall that DMP is compatible with other theories of atonement that have 
historically been considered rivals to penal substitution.6  On DMP someone who 
accepts, say, a sort of exemplarism and rejects penal substitution could still find the Cross 
salvific inasmuch as he is encouraged by God to enter into a relationship of divine-human 
reconciliation.  On this view, God could objectively accomplish both perfect human 
example and penal substitution in the Cross.  Exemplarism could function as a language 
through which God communicates God's extension of forgiveness-as-reconciliation to 
some, while God speaks through penal substitution to others.  With this in mind, it seems 
plausible to say the following.  Christ's work in the Cross of defeating the devil, meriting 
grace, offering a sacrifice, providing a perfect example of human life, and so on, could 
effectively encourage x amount of fallen humans to be open to divine-human 
reconciliation, while Christ's work in the Cross of accomplishing all of this in addition to 
satisfaction through penal substitution could effectively encourage at least (x + 1) fallen 
humans to be open to divine-human reconciliation.7   
                                                 
 
6 See this diss., pp. 180-181. 
 
7 This can help us to make sense of how various atonement theories can have the same result (personal 
reconciliation with God) in human experience.  As L.W. Grensted's claims "...the personal experience of 
Atonement is in its essence one and the same in every place and age, and for every race of man.  The 
differences are differences of exposition rather than of life, and when we criticise the Ransom theory of the 
fourth century as crudely superstitious, the Penal theory of the sixteenth century as involving a conception 
of God's wrath impossible to us to-day, the Moral Theory of the nineteenth century as a mere emotional 
subjectivism, we have to remember that men holding these different theories have alike found in the Cross 
the key to the problem of life, have felt the bondage of sin and what it is to be free, and have known that 
this deliverance is not of themselves but of God" (L.W. Grensted, "The Atonement in Personal 
 214 
A Response to (3) the Appeal to Robust Love 
On DMP God demands penal substitution not exclusively for God's Own sake, 
but for the sake of the humans who would not otherwise appropriate forgiveness-as-
restoration without the demonstration provided by it.  Thus, DMP is consistent with a 
divine character of robust love. 
Answering (4–6) the Conceptual Arguments against Satisfaction 
 
 We can now ask whether DMP allows escape from the problems of inconsistency 
presented against satisfaction in the introduction.  I argue that a theory of penal 
substitution can use DMP to escape all three problems.   
Responses to (4) the Forgiveness Problem 
 Eleonore Stump poses the challenge of the forgiveness problem in the following 
way. 
  Suppose that Daniel owes Sarah $1000 and cannot pay it, but Sarah's  
  daughter Marion...does pay Sarah the whole $1000 on Daniel's behalf.  Is  
  there any sense in which Sarah can be said to forgive the debt?8 
 
I argue that this problem only threatens penal substitution inasmuch as it holds 
exclusively to a specific understanding of forgiveness-as-pardon (that is, forgiveness 
related to legal reconciliation).  I will argue that it is possible for penal substitution to 
escape this attack by distinguishing between two types of forgiveness related to legal 
reconciliation.  Further, I will show that even if a theory of penal substitution cannot 
escape this attack as it relates to legal reconciliation, DMP can offer escape from this 
attack by appealing to concepts of forgiveness which relate to personal reconciliation. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Experience," in The Atonement in History and in Life, edited by L.W. Grensted (New York: Macmillan, 
1929), p. 284). 
 
8 Eleonore Stump, Aquinas (New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 428. 
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The Forgiveness Problem and Legal Reconciliation 
 We have identified forgiveness-as-pardon as the type of forgiveness related to 
legal reconciliation.9  There are, however, two conceptions of forgiveness-as-pardon that 
we have yet to distinguish.  On one conception, to give forgiveness-as-pardon is (to use a 
definition of forgiveness offered by Stump) to "fail to exact all that is in justice due."10  
On another, to give forgiveness-as-pardon is "to fail to exact all that is in justice due from 
a specific debtor."  We can understand the difference between these two senses of 
forgiveness-as-pardon by distinguishing between forgiveness-as-pardon of a debt and 
forgiveness-as-pardon of a person.11  One can release a debtor from her obligation to 
repay the debt (and so forgive the person) while accepting satisfaction from a third party 
(and so not forgiving the debt).  
 It seems that no account of penal substitution can escape the forgiveness problem 
if it defines forgiveness exclusively as forgiveness-as-pardon of a debt.  Stump suggests a 
way in which one holding to this conception of forgiveness might attempt to escape this 
problem.  Stump claims that such a proponent could note that in order to relate more 
closely to the satisfaction provided by God in Christ, we should not interpret the above 
example such that Marion pays the $1000 to Sarah, but instead such that Sarah pays the 
$1000 to Sarah.  At least, we should consider the possibility that Sarah gives Marion 
$1000 to pay to Sarah on Daniel's behalf.  In both cases, Sarah is ultimately "paying" 
                                                 
 
9 See this diss., pp. 102-103. 
 
10 Stump, Aquinas, p. 428. 
 
11 John E. Hare also distinguishis between the notion of forgiving a debt and that of forgiving a person.  See 
John E. Hare, "Moral Faith and Atonement", a paper he presented as the Keynote Speaker, at Wheaton 
Philosophy Conference, 1996, http://www.calvin.edu/academic/philosophy/writings/moralato.htm.).  I 
analyze Hare's view in more detail below in this diss., p. 218, footnote 18.   
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herself.  Thus, while in one sense Sarah does "exact every bit of the debt owed to 
her," in another sense she does not exact a dime of the debt and can be said to have 
forgiven the debt.12   
 Against this, one might claim that even this modified metaphor is not apt.  The 
penalty under consideration is not one that calls for financial remuneration, but one that 
requires a form of suffering.13  As a result, there is no sense in which the "debt," once 
paid, can be said to be unexacted.  Thus, there is no sense in which it can be said to be 
forgiven-as-pardoned.  Someone could be given money to give back without 
experiencing any actual loss himself.  Yet one cannot be given suffering to suffer without 
experiencing the suffering himself.  Thus, while in the case of pecuniary debt there is a 
sense in which we can say that the fee was not exacted, in the case of suffering there is no 
such sense.14  Even if God, God's Self, undergoes the required suffering, the suffering is 
still exacted.  Even though it is not exacted from sinners, it is still exacted from someone 
                                                 
 
12 Stump does not ultimately combat this potential rejoinder as it relates to the forgiveness problem.  
Instead she pursues other problems that this rejoinder raises; particularly problems involved with punishing  
an innocent (Stump, Aquinas, p. 428). 
 
13 One might claim that financial loss is a form of suffering, however this is not entirely true.  The suffering 
involved with financial loss is a result of the loss (perhaps I grow anxious about the future, or I cannot 
afford a needed medicine, etc.), not the financial loss itself.  In fact, financial loss need not involve 
suffering at all.  A very wealthy person can afford to lose a dollar without experiencing any suffering.  The 
person might even give away money and as a result feel pleasure. 
 
14 David Lewis makes a similar distinction when he says, "As we mostly conceive of them, the condition of 
owing a debt and the condition of deserving to be punished are not alike.  In the case of debt, what is 
required is that the creditor shall not suffer a loss of the money he lent...whereas in the case of a 'debt of 
punishment,' what is required is that the debtor shall suffer a loss... (David Lewis, "Do We Believe in Penal 
Substitution?" Philosophical Papers 26.3 (1997), p .204).  While we have seen that in the case of financial 
debt there is a sense in which the debt can be both exacted and forgiven-as-pardoned, the relevant type of 
debt in the case of sinners is a debt of punishment.  If God requires that the sinner (or a substitute) suffer a 
loss through punishment, there is no way to both exact and not exact that loss.  In the case of sin, the debt 
sinners owe is a debt of punishment.  Thus, at this point, the proponent of penal substitution is still 
confronted with the forgiveness problem. 
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and there is no sense in which it is not exacted from anyone.  If a proponent of penal 
substitution claims that the full suffering is exacted, then the forgiveness problem holds 
with regard to this first conception of forgiveness-as-pardon.15 
 DMP could still escape the forgiveness problem as it relates to legal 
reconciliation, however, by appealing to forgiveness-as-pardon of a person.  In so doing 
we could claim that while God does not give forgiveness-as-pardon of a debt with regard 
to the debt of punishment, God does give forgiveness-as-pardon of a person inasmuch as 
sinners are released from the requirement to pay the debt of punishment themselves.  
Thus, even though God cannot be said to forgive the debt, there is still a sense in which 
divine forgiveness is possible as it relates to legal reconciliation.16    
The Forgiveness Problem and Personal Reconciliation 
 Even if DMP cannot escape the forgiveness problem as it relates to legal 
reconciliation, it can still claim that divine forgiveness is possible as it relates to personal 
reconciliation between God and fallen humans.  As I argued in chapter two, there are two 
more senses in which God can be said to forgive.17  God can also give forgiveness-as-
                                                 
15 It is worth noting that this problem holds even if a satisfaction theorist claims that the debt that sinners 
owe is not one of punishment.  On a non-penal theory of satisfaction, one could claim that punishment is 
what happens when sinners cannot pay their debt (or someone does not pay it for them).  In this case, what 
we owe to God is a certain amount of obedience, or honor, or virtue, etc.  It is something like this which 
Christ pays to God in full.  Far from rescuing the satisfaction theorist, however, this move brings him right 
back to square one.  Insofar as what is owed is paid to God in full, the challenge that there is no room for 
forgiveness-as-pardon of a debt will exist.  Further, it is not clear in this case that God can be said to both 
receive payment and forgive it as in the case of pecuniary debt.  For example, how can God give Christ 
obedience to return, without Christ Himself offering the obedience (and experiencing the suffering that is 
associated with it)?   
 
16 Stump allows for this when she claims that someone who wants to argue that God does forgive this debt 
might note that God's forgiveness is apparent in the fact that it is not we who are required to pay.  Since 
God (on account of God's justice) cannot overlook the debt, God is merciful in the only way possible.  This 
forgiveness, one might claim, is even more evident when we recognize that it is God, God's Self, in Christ, 
who pays the debt (Stump, Aquinas, p. 428). 
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letting go and extend forgiveness-as-restoration.18  When someone who has been 
wronged gives forgiveness-as-letting go or extends forgiveness-as-restoration, the 
forgiver is pursuing reconciliation with the wrongdoer in a way that is distinct from any 
sort of legal reconciliation.19   
 Forgiveness-as-letting go and forgiveness-as-restoration are not dependent upon 
forgiveness-as-pardon (in either sense).  We can see the distinction by noting the 
possibility that Sarah could even give forgiveness-as-pardon with regard to Daniel's debt 
while still not giving forgiving-as-letting go or forgiveness-as-restoration to Daniel.20  
Perhaps she forgives his financial debt in frustration, while personally vowing to have no 
further interaction with him.  In this we can see that "failing to exact all that is in justice 
due" is something distinct from giving forgiveness-as-letting go or extending 
forgiveness-as-restoration.   
                                                                                                                                                 
17 See this diss., pp. 103-108. 
 
18 John E. Hare employs a similar approach by distinguishing between the notion of forgiving a debt and 
that of forgiving a person.  (Hare, "Moral Faith and Atonement").  On my view forgiveness-as-pardon of a 
debt corresponds to forgiving a debt while forgiveness-as-pardon of a person, forgiveness-as-letting go, and 
forgiveness-as-restoration are three ways to forgive a person.  Hare does not distinguish between these 
three types of forgiveness of persons.  However, doing so is not necessary to escape the forgiveness 
problem since one can escape the problem using any of the three types.  This distinction also finds 
application within the Thomistic framework developed in chapter 2.  Insofar as the stain of sin is said to be 
overcome by a union of God and humans in mutual charity, it appears that the stain of sin is overcome by 
personal reconciliation between persons.  The reuniting of two persons in mutual charity requires a 
forgiveness of persons distinct from the notion of forgiving a debt.   
 
19 Giving forgiveness-as-letting go does not necessarily entail an offer of personal reconciliation, though it 
is necessary for personal reconciliation inasmuch as it is necessary for an extension of forgiveness-as-
restoration.  We could call the reconciliation directly corresponding to forgiveness-as-letting go, "emotional 
reconciliation," while the reconciliation directly corresponding to forgiveness-as-restoration is "personal 
reconciliation." 
 
20This extension of Stump's example requires us to add some background information for the relationship 
between Sarah and Daniel so that discussion of their personal relationship is clearer.  Suppose that Sarah 
and Daniel are friends and that Daniel has promised to repay the loan on time.  Suppose further that Daniel 
has failed to keep his promise and now the pecuniary debt owed to Sarah by Daniel includes an amount 
required as a punishment because Daniel did not repay the debt on time.  
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On account of this distinction, we can see that an offended party's refusal to 
give forgiveness-as-pardon of a debt does not nullify the role of forgiveness as it relates 
to personal reconciliation.  Sarah could insist that Daniel repay the $1000, while giving 
Daniel forgiveness-as-letting go and extending to Daniel forgiveness-as-restoration.  She 
could even make Daniel's debt repayment (by himself or another) a term for her 
willingness to extend either of these latter forms of forgiveness.  So, even if God cannot 
be said to give forgiveness with regard to legal reconciliation, divine forgiveness is still 
possible with regard to personal reconciliation.21   In fact, God could even demand that 
the debt of punishment be paid (by fallen humans or a vicar) before God will give 
forgiveness-as-letting go or extend forgiveness-as-restoration.22  It appears, then, that a 
theory of penal substitution developed using DMP can escape the forgiveness problem.23 
                                                 
 
21 Richard Swinburne appears to acknowledge this distinction when he notes that even after a wrongdoer 
has done everything that he can to atone for his wrongs (offered repentance, apology, reparation, and 
penance), the final act of atonement still belongs to the victim.  The final act, Swinburne claims, is to 
forgive (Richard Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1989), p. 84).  He 
even claims that forgiveness is a work of supererogation.  That is, a victim is under no obligation to 
forgive. (Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement, p. 87.  He notes, however, that Christians have a 
responsibility to do so, having undertaken forgiveness as an obligation.) Thus, according to Swinburne, 
even after a debt has been paid, the person to whom the debt had been due can give or withhold forgiveness 
as he sees fit.  Forgiveness does not become impossible by the repayment of a debt in full.  Even Stump 
would be forced to accept these distinctions with regard to forgiveness, for she notes that "Sometimes—
especially when we think about forgiveness from the point of view of the person wronged—we mean by 
'forgiveness' the wronged person's putting away all resentment or wrath with respect to the wrongdoer....on 
the other hand, sometimes—especially when we think about forgiveness from the point of view of the 
person committing the wrong—we mean by 'forgiveness' the restoration and healing of a broken 
relationship" (Eleonore Stump, "Book Review: Responsibility and Atonement, by Richard Swinburne," 
Faith and Philosophy 11 (1994), p. 325). 
 
22  Though he does not hold to penal substitution, Richard Purtill also notes that "forgiveness is quite 
consistent with punishing exactly as much as deserved" (Purtill, “Justice, Mercy, Supererogation, and 
Atonement,” in Christian Philosophy, edited by Thomas Flint (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 
1990), p.43).  Purtill is here referring to forgiveness-as-restoration for he says "genuine forgiveness is 'at-
one-ment' and it requires action on both sides" (Purtill, “Justice, Mercy, Supererogation, and Atonement,” 
p. 42).  Also, Steven L. Porter claims that in some cases one could even rightfully withhold forgiveness 
until the wrongdoer has not only repaid his debt but also endured appropriate punishment (Steven L. Porter, 
“Swinburnian Atonement and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution,” Faith and Philosophy 21.2. (April 2004), 
234-235).  Garrard and McNaughton allow for this where they say, "To forgive is not necessarily to waive 
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An Objection to this Argument and my Response 
 One might object by saying that sometimes justice calls for a breech in 
relationship between the wrongdoer and the wronged.  By offering personal 
reconciliation the victim does, in fact, "fail to exact all that is in justice due."  Thus, one 
could say, Stump's definition of forgiveness does not merely apply to forgiveness-as-
pardon.  It also sometimes applies to forgiveness-as-restoration.24   The objector could 
claim that this holds true in the divine-human situation because divine punishment in 
response to sin is relational.25  That is, the due divine punishment is something like 
eternal separation from God.  As a result, "failing to exact all that is in justice due" will 
not be distinct from the extension of forgiveness-as-restoration in the divine-human 
situation. 
                                                                                                                                                 
punishment...Holding that it is right to punish someone can be quite consistent with having an attitude of 
good will towards them" (Eve Garrard and David McNaughton, "In Defence of Unconditional 
Forgiveness," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103.1 (2003), p. 48).   
 
23 It is worth noting that DMP also overcomes Moule's challenge for theories of atonement with respect to 
their explication of divine forgiveness. "So there is our dilemma.  On the one hand there is this doctrine of 
free, unconditional forgiveness, matched by a penitence which is humble enough to acknowledge that it 
cannot earn or pay for forgiveness—seemingly a most un-quantitative process; but on the other hand is the 
need for an estimate of the character of sin, so realistic and objective and serious, that it has to resort to 
analogies of the quantitative type in order to safeguard quanti ponderis sit peccatum...And I suggest that it 
is the failure to bring these two considerations together into a single, realistic system that is partly 
responsible for the fact that different Christian theories of the atonement come into collision with one 
another" (C.F.D. Moule, "The Theology of Forgiveness," in Essays in New Testament Interpretation 
(London: Cambridge, 1982), p.253).  On DMP the first need is met in God's extension of forgiveness-as-
restoration, the second is met by God's refusal to give forgiveness-as-pardon of a debt. 
 
24 Some would argue that it even applies to forgiveness-as-letting go, saying that justice calls for negative 
feeling toward the wrongdoer. On this point see Jean Hampton in Jeffrie G. Murphy and Jean Hampton, 
Forgiveness and Mercy (New York: Cambridge, 1988). 
 
25 See, for example, Garry Williams, "Penal Substitution: A Response to Recent Criticisms" in The 
Atonement Debate, edited by Derek Tidball, David Hilborn, and Justin Thacker (Michigan: Zondervan, 
2008), pp. 177-178. 
 
 221 
Even if the punishment due to humans is God's refusal to be personally 
reconciled, the distinction between forgiveness-as-pardon of a debt and forgiveness-as-
restoration will hold.  This is because there will be two different grounds upon which 
God can refuse personal reconciliation.26  God can refuse personal reconciliation on the 
ground of punishment or God can refuse personal reconciliation on the ground of God's 
free personal prerogative.  Even if God eliminates the ground of punishment through 
satisfaction, God has the prerogative not to enter into personal reconciliation with 
humans.27  When God chooses not to exercise this prerogative, God extends the gift of 
forgiveness-as-restoration.28  Thus, the distinction between forgiveness-as-pardon of a 
debt and forgiveness-as-restoration still holds even where punishment is relational.29 
Responses to (5) the Damnation Problem 
 This objection notes that after receiving satisfaction, one no longer has any claim 
to the penalty previously owed.  Full divine satisfaction is inconsistent with just human 
damnation.  So, if God does damn some humans, either God damns them unjustly or 
Christ's penal substitution is not a full satisfaction. 
                                                 
26 I also discuss this in this diss., pp. 110-111. 
 
27 However, it would be inconsistent with God's character of robust love to accept satisfaction for the debt 
of punishment if God intends to refuse personal reconciliation based on God's free personal prerogative  
anyhow.  If God intended to refuse personal reconciliation to humans even if God received satisfaction, 
what benefit, consistent with robust love, could come of God's pursuing satisfaction? 
 
28 No human has a right to such divine forgiveness. It must come as a gift, even if punishment as a ground 
of refusal of personal reconciliation is removed.  So C.F.D. Moule says, "Forgiveness...is, by definition, 
free...The offender may make material reparation for any material damage he may have caused; but, if he is 
to be forgiven by the person he has offended against, he must be humble enough to accept the forgiveness 
gratis and not try to pretend he can earn it" (Moule, "The Theology of Forgiveness," p. 251). 
 
29 One might then ask "If the punishment for sin is God's refusal of relationship and yet God offers humans 
personal reconciliation, how can God be said to exact the full penalty for sin?"  For my response see this 
diss., pp. 252-254. 
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 There are at least two ways that a theory of penal substitution using DMP can 
escape the problem of damnation.  First, it can appeal to the distinction between legal 
reconciliation and personal reconciliation.  Even if Christ's satisfaction fully covers the 
debt of punishment and results in a legal reconciliation, there is still the issue of personal 
reconciliation with God.  As we noted above, a person whose debt of punishment has 
been paid might still not be personally reconciled to the one to whom that person was 
previously indebted.  This personal reconciliation could fail to be actualized for one of 
two reasons.  Either the person to whom the debt had been owed still refuses to extend 
forgiveness-as-restoration to the previous debtor, or the former debtor fails to appropriate 
the extended forgiveness-as-restoration.  A satisfaction theorist can escape the problem of 
damnation by appealing to either of these.  She can show how God can justly refuse to 
extend forgiveness-as-restoration to some even after their debt of punishment has been 
paid,30 or she can show how some fail to appropriate the offered forgiveness-as-
restoration even after their debt of punishment has been paid.  DMP takes the latter 
approach. 
 Against this, someone might offer the following analogy.  Suppose that Daniel 
owes Sarah $1000 and Marion pays it.  Now, Sarah might receive the $1000 and still 
refuse to extend forgiveness-as-restoration (be personally reconciled) to Daniel.  Even so, 
                                                 
 
30 Someone might claim that since divine punishment amounts to God's refusal of personal reconciliation, 
God could not refuse humans personal reconciliation if the debt of punishment has been satisfied.  
However, even if God's refusal to extend forgiveness-as-restoration is exhausted qua punishment (on the 
level of legal reconciliation) in Christ's penal substitution, God would still have logical and moral freedom 
to refuse to extend forgiveness-as-restoration qua personal reconciliation.  Humans have no right to 
reconciliation with God, even after the debt of punishment is removed.  Similarly, a wife might refuse 
personal reconciliation with her unfaithful husband for a period time, as a punishment for his 
unfaithfulness.  When the period of time is over, the wife could still refuse personal reconciliation with her 
husband.  The husband might protest, "Why are you still punishing me?"  To which the wife could reply, 
"You are no longer being punished.  I simply do not wish to be in a relationship with you."  
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if Sarah receives the $1000 from Marion, she can no longer rightfully demand the 
$1000 from Daniel.  She can refuse a personal relationship with him, but she cannot 
demand that he pay the debt that has already been paid.  In the same way, God cannot 
demand that some sinners pay the debt of punishment that Christ is said to have already 
paid, even if they are closed to personal reconciliation with God.  And it seems that God 
does make such a demand because at least some humans are still said to be damned. 
 To this, we may reply that there are two senses in which damnation can be used.  
There is a damnation corresponding to the debt of punishment and a damnation 
corresponding to divine-human alienation.  While Christ's satisfaction could be said to 
free all sinners from damnation corresponding to debt of punishment, the damnation 
corresponding to divine-human alienation is the result of a lack of personal reconciliation 
with God.  This damnation is simply separation from God through the absence of mutual 
charity.  Thus this damnation is a logically necessary consequence of not being 
personally reconciled to God.  As a result, even if Christ has paid the debt of punishment, 
if God refuses to be personally reconciled to a sinner or a sinner is closed to personal 
reconciliation with God, then that sinner will suffer damnation. 
 To clarify this idea, we can recall the distinction between God's active and passive 
wrath.31  God's active wrath is that quality of God that pursues satisfaction or punishment 
for sin.  God's passive wrath would be "the deliverance of humankind to themselves, their 
desires, their passions, and perverse thinking"32 through God’s respecting the freedom of 
                                                 
31 See this diss., pp. 167-168. 
 
32 Raymond Schwager, Must There Be Scapegoats? (New York: Crossroad Publishing, 2000), p. 215. 
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human activity.33  With this distinction in mind, a theory of penal substitution using 
DMP could claim that Christ's penal substitution provides a means of escape from God's 
active wrath.  Those who still suffer damnation do so under God's passive wrath.  This 
damnation is then, strictly speaking, not penal.  Rather it is a consequence of not being 
personally reconciled to God.  Thus while Christ's suffering and death may remove the 
debt of punishment, those who still suffer damnation do so either because God still does 
not extend forgiveness-as-restoration or because they do not appropriate the offered 
forgiveness-as-restoration.  On DMP the damnation corresponding to God's passive wrath 
is experienced only by those who do not appropriate God's manifest offering of 
forgiveness-as-restoration.34 
 There is a second way that DMP offers escape from this problem.  Someone using 
DMP could claim that Christ's satisfaction is a full satisfaction for sin, but it is only 
applied to those who are open to appropriating God's extension of forgiveness-as-
restoration.  This is possible because satisfaction offered from a third party does not 
automatically dissolve an offended party's claim to punishment.  The offended party must 
receive the offered satisfaction as sufficient payment on behalf of the wrongdoer.  As a 
result, an offended party could set a condition upon her willingness to receive offered 
                                                 
 
33 Ibid., p. 216. 
 
34 While a full account of the nature of Hell is beyond the purview of this project, my discussion of 
damnation could prompt someone to ask after the nature of damnation experienced under God's passive 
wrath.  So I will say a few words about it here.  If God is a unique person who is Goodness, Truth, Love, 
and so on, then to be separated from the person of God is to be separated from all of these things.  Such a 
separation could be called "Hell" and would (if humans somehow continue to exist so separated from God) 
would certainly be unpleasant even without active punishment.  Since, on DMP, Hell is experienced only 
by those who are not open to appropriating divine forgiveness-as-restoration, we can say with C.S. Lewis 
that, "...the doors of hell are locked on the inside" (C.S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain, p. 130).  DMP would 
also be compatible with the logical possibility that someone in Hell could become open to appropriating 
divine forgiveness-as-restoration and so be freed from her separation from God and personally reconciled 
to the one who is Goodness, Truth, Love, and so on.   
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satisfaction as sufficient payment on behalf of a wrongdoer.  The condition could 
even include the wrongdoer's openness to personal reconciliation with the offended 
party.35  In such a case, those who are not open to appropriating divine forgiveness-as-
restoration would still owe the debt of punishment.36 
A Response to (6) the Impotence Problem 
 The distinction between legal reconciliation and personal reconciliation can help 
us to understand how a theory of penal substitution using DMP escape the problem of 
impotence.  The criticism raised by the problem of impotence is that satisfaction relates 
only to legal reconciliation but not to personal reconciliation.  If, however, the 
satisfaction theorist can show that the way that God pursues legal reconciliation 
contributes to God's project of personal reconciliation, then the satisfaction theorist can 
clearly escape this problem.   
 As we noted above personal reconciliation involves to things.  First, the offended 
party must extend forgiveness-as-reconciliation to the offender. Second, the offender 
must appropriate the offended party's forgiveness-as-restoration.  On DMP, God chooses 
to allow legal reconciliation to be an obstacle to God's extension of forgiveness-as-
restoration.  God does this because the demonstrations that God provides to humans by 
overcoming this obstacle through penal Self-substitution effectively elicit human 
                                                 
 
35 For more on this point, see this diss., pp. 234-237.  
 
36 This latter approach could have an advantage when it comes to explaining justification by faith.  It can 
claim that those who are open to divine-human personal reconciliation are legally reconciled (or justified), 
while those who are not so open are not legally reconciled.  Someone who took the first approach would 
have to claim that all humans are legally reconciled while only some are personally reconciled with God.  
Thus, on the first approach justification will have to take on a non-legal meaning.  Being "justified" would 
be something like having received God's promise that one will be transformed into one who is without sin 
in any sense.  This is received by the believer through faith.   
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appropriation of God's forgiveness-as-restoration.  Thus, a theory of penal 
substitution using DMP can escape the impotence problem. 
A Divine-Manifest Offering Approach to Penal Substitution and the Problems  
 
for Penal Substitution as Vicarious Satisfaction 
 
 In this section I argue that a theory of penal substitution using DMP can avoid 
both the attack on the possibility of vicarious satisfaction as well as the attack on the 
morality of vicarious satisfaction. 
A Response to (7) the Attack on the Possibility of Vicarious Satisfaction 
As I noted above, the argument against the possibility of vicarious satisfaction 
relies upon the claim that moral credit and debt are non-transferable.37  In this section I 
will argue for the transferability of penal debt, thereby showing how a theory of penal 
substitution can escape this problem.38 
On Guilt and Moral Debt 
Now, it seems that the claim that moral debt is non-transferable is predicated upon 
the relationship of moral debt (of which a debt of punishment is a type) to guilt.  For 
example, Eleonore Stump claims that, 
When a person commits a sin, a debt of guilt is registered in one column 
which must be balanced on the same line in the other column by the 
                                                 
37 See this diss., p. 17-18.  
 
38 Though I will not deal with it here, another noteworthy response to this problem can be found in Hare, 
“Moral Faith and Atonement.”  Hare sketches a "partial-merger of identity" theory according to which 
Christians are incorporated into Christ in such a way that Christ can act as a representative on behalf of the 
entire group.  He likens this to filial identity, in accordance with which a mother might offer reparation on 
behalf of her misbehaving child.  Richard Purtill also suggests that an answer to this problem could involve 
"a theory of our incorporation into Christ which takes our unity with Christ as a genuine metaphysical fact" 
(Purtill, “Justice, Mercy, Supererogation, and Atonement,” p. 46).  He, like Hare, utilizes the notion of filial 
identity (Purtill, “Justice, Mercy, Supererogation, and Atonement,” p. 47).  Also see, H.R. Mackintosh, 
Some Aspects of Christian Belief (New York: George H Doran Company, 1923), pp.117-118.  Mackintosh 
addresses the present concern by appealing to a "mystic union" between Christ and Christians.  
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payment of a punishment which compensates for the guilt.  This view 
raises a problem about how the books could ever balance if the debt is to 
be paid by someone other than the sinner, because the debt stems from 
guilt, and guilt is not a transferable commodity.39 
 
There does seem to be a sense in which individual guilt is non-transferable.  Sometimes, 
to say that someone is "guilty" is to declare the fact that someone has performed a 
blameworthy action or has persisted in a blameworthy state.  Guilt, in this sense, is an 
expression for the fact that one has behaved in a blameworthy manner.  Such guilt cannot 
be transferred to another party.  If I perform a blameworthy action, it can never be made 
the case that someone else performed that very same blameworthy action.  My guilt, as 
an expression of the fact that I performed that particular blameworthy action, can never 
apply to anyone else.  Another person might perform a similar action and thus become 
guilty themselves, but this guilt will be distinct from my own as it is related to that other 
person's action and not my own.  Not only is it the case that this type of guilt can never be 
transferred; this type of guilt can never be removed.  The fact that an agent committed a 
blameworthy action makes that agent identifiable as "one who committed blameworthy 
action x" as long as that agent's identity persists.40   
 While moral debt (of which a debt of punishment is a type) is connected to this 
type of guilt (and may even be referred to as "guilt") it is still distinct from this type of 
guilt.  Suppose a man commits a crime and incurs a debt of punishment wherein the man 
                                                 
 
39 Stump, Aquinas, p. 436.  In an earlier version of the article Stump writes "the debt is one of guilt" instead 
of "the debt stems from guilt" (Stump, "Atonement According to Aquinas," p. 68). 
 
40 It seems that Kant identifies guilt in this sense where he says, "After his change of heart, however, the 
penalty cannot be considered appropriate to his new quality (of a man well-pleasing to God), for he is now 
leading a new life and is morally another person; and yet satisfaction must be rendered to Supreme Justice, 
in whose sight no one who is blameworthy can ever be guiltless" (Immanuel Kant, Religion Within the 
Limits of Reason Alone, translated by Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (New York: Harper One, 
1960) Book II, Section I, C., p. 67). 
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must pay a particular fine and endure a determined amount of time in prison.  Having 
paid the fine and endured the prison term, the man can be said to have paid his debt of 
punishment such that he no longer owes such a debt.  Still, the man remains "guilty" in 
the sense that he committed the crime for which he was punished.  While the debt 
incurred by his guilt is gone, his guilt (as an expression for the fact that he once 
committed a crime) remains.  Herein we can see a distinction between "guilt" and a debt 
of punishment.41   
While guilt, as an expression of the fact of past wrongdoing, may be non-
transferable, there is still some question as to whether a debt of punishment incurred 
through such wrongdoing is transferable.42   Note that in the case of pecuniary debt we 
can identify a relationship between having borrowed money and owing a debt.  While the 
debt is incurred through the borrowing of money, the two are distinct.  Further, while    
"being identifiable as the person who borrowed money x from creditor y" is a non-
                                                 
 
41 Charles Hodge makes a similar distinction in Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, Vol. II (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989), pp. 532 & 540.  Oliver D. Crisp acknowledges this distinction as well.  He cites 
Berkhof in distinguishing between "liability to punishment" and "liability to guilt."  He claims that the 
latter is "irremovable and non-transferable" (Oliver D. Crisp, "The Logic of Penal Substitution Revisited," 
in The Atonement Debate, edited by Derek Tidball, David Hilborn, and Justin Thacker (Michigan: 
Zondervan, 2008), p. 216).  So, "the actual property of having committed this sin does not transfer" yet 
"Christ can suffer as a substitute for this liability to punishment" (p. 217).  Crisp ultimately allows for the 
possibility of such a transfer and attacks it instead on moral grounds saying, "...it seems monumentally 
unjust to punish an innocent party in the place of a guilty one for a penal debt" (p. 219).  I address the 
moral concerns that Crisp expresses regarding the guilty going free and the innocent being punished in this 
diss., pp. 239-247, 258-263. 
 
42 Heinrich Vogel takes another approach.  He claims that humans do not have the power to transfer guilt 
but "God can do it, simply because he is omnipotent, so that with Him the impossible is possible" (Heinrich 
Vogel, The Iron Ration of a Christian (London: Student Christian Movement Press, 1941), p. 140).  This is 
also cited in Leon Morris, The Cross in the New Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1965), p. 42, 
footnote 70.  This understanding of omnipotence, while it may help one avoid problems like the current 
one, will ultimately lead to the problem of superfluous suffering. For why did God not simply, in God's 
omnipotence, coerce free wills and so be done with sin?  If one responds saying something like "God did 
not do so that God might receive glory in the Cross", we could just respond, "Why did not God, in God's 
omnipotence, choose to be glorified without such glorifying actions?" 
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transferable quality, the debt incurred through the borrowing is transferable.  
Similarly, a sinner may, by his wrongdoing, take on the non-transferable quality of being 
guilty while also incurring a potentially transferable moral debt. 
This distinction helps to answer Steven S. Aspenson where he says,  
The guilt of the guilty...is tied to something, namely, the agent of the 
wrongdoing.  And since the guilty can do nothing to disown that guilt 
(short of becoming someone else) and no one else can do anything to 
remove it from them, vicarious atonement has no mechanism to account 
for how Christ's efforts better the status of others before God rather than 
his own.43 
 
On DMP Christ's efforts do not necessarily remove human guilt as an expression that one 
has performed a particular blameworthy action or persisted in a blameworthy state.  
Instead, it removes the debt of punishment and thus changes a human's status from "one 
who owes a debt of punishment to God" to "one who does not owe a debt of punishment 
to God."   
This distinction also enables a theory using DMP to avoid problems that arise 
when one attempts to explain the transfer of moral credit and debt by appealing to a sort 
of "legal fiction."  Purtill characterizes the legal fiction response in the following way.   
God looks at us in our sinfulness, but pretends to see Christ in his perfect 
obedience.44 
   
He rightly criticizes this view, saying,  
...so far as I can see this interpretation...fails because the idea of God 
'pretending' or 'deeming' is unintelligible.  The way God sees things is the 
way they are; the way God acts toward things is and must be based on the 
reality of these things.45   
                                                 
 
43 Steven S. Aspenson, "Swinburne on Atonement," Religious Studies 28 (1996), p. 203. 
 
44 Purtill, “Justice, Mercy, Supererogation, and Atonement,” p. 46. 
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On DMP God does not pretend with regard to human guilt.  God sees a fallen human as 
one who is a wrongdoer in an alienated state.  Yet, God also sees that same person as one 
whose debt of punishment has been paid.  Further, as that person is transformed in 
relationship with God, God sees that person as one who was or is a wrongdoer in an 
alienated state who is becoming someone who exists in a personally reconciled state with 
God.  This involves no divine pretending.  Thus, DMP agrees with Hodge where he says,  
It is indeed true that God cannot but regard every person as he really is.  
His judgments are according to truth.  But this is not inconsistent with his 
regarding Christ, although personally innocent, as having voluntarily 
assumed our place and undertaken to satisfy the demands of justice in our 
place; nor with his regarding the believer, although personally 
undeserving, as righteous, in the sense of being free from just exposure to 
condemnation, on the ground of the vicarious satisfaction of Christ.46   
 
Let us now ask whether a debt of punishment is actually transferable.47 
                                                                                                                                                 
45 Ibid. 
 
46 Hodge, pp. 533-534.  
 
47 Richard Swinburne's analysis of guilt also accounts for this distinction.  He says that "the assertion that 
someone is guilty" makes a claim about the past: that the wrongdoer did something wrong. It also "makes 
two further claims about the present.  The first is that the guilty one owes something to...his victim."  The 
second is that "the guilty one has acquired a negative status, somewhat like being unclean..." (Richard 
Swinburne, "The Christian Scheme of Salvation," in Philosophy and the Christian Faith, edited by Thomas 
V. Morris (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), p. 16).  While "[a]n agent cannot alter the 
fact that he did the past act", the debt and the negative status are both removable (Swinburne, "The 
Christian Scheme of Salvation," pp. 18-19).  Though, he claims, neither is transferable. No one else can 
make apology for the guilty one (Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement, p. 149) which is necessary for 
the removal of the negative status (Swinburne, "The Christian Scheme of Salvation," p. 17).  Further, no 
one can pay another's debts. "If I steal £10 from Jones and you give him an equivalent sum, he has not lost 
money; but it remains the case that I still owe £10 to Jones" (Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement, p. 
149).  He claims, however, that while these are not transferable someone else can help the guilty one to 
remove the debt and negative status (Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement, p. 149).  I will argue that 
while guilt as an assertion about the past is neither removable nor transferable, a debt of punishment is both 
(at least in a way analogous to the way that we typically think of pecuniary debts as removable and 
transferable).  The transferability of the negative status remains an open question on DMP.  But, DMP's 
effectiveness does not depend on such transferability.  Christ, in paying a guilty one's debt of punishment, 
could encourage the guilty one to be open to removing the negative status by "distancing" himself from his 
past (Swinburne, "The Christian Scheme of Salvation," p. 18); that is, by making "the present 'he' in his 
attitude as different as possible from the past 'he'... (Swinburne, "The Christian Scheme of Salvation," p. 
17).  Thus, again, we can see how DMP can avoid appealing to any sort of "legal fiction."          
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On Pecuniary Debt and Penal Debt   
Some who argue that a moral debt is non-transferable, contrast moral debt with 
pecuniary debt, which is more clearly transferable.  For example, Philip L. Quinn argues 
that there is 
...a salient disanalogy between pecuniary and moral debts.  It seems that 
moral debts are not transferable or transmissible in the way that pecuniary 
debts are.  If one person owes another money, the debt can be transferred 
to and paid by a third party...But things are different for other kinds of 
debts.  If one person murders another, we sometimes say that the murderer 
owes a debt to society which is to be paid by suffering punishment.  But 
this is not a transferable debt that could be paid by the murderer's friends 
or relatives...48  
 
On Quinn's view, a debt of punishment related to sin is likewise non-transferable. 
 
Like debts of punishment for crime in our legal system, debts of 
punishment for sin seem to me to be too tightly tied to those who commit 
the sins for it to be plausible to suppose that one person may remove 
another's debt of punishment by paying it in full.  So I find the very idea of 
vicarious satisfaction for the debt of punishment of sin hard to swallow.49 
 
 David Lewis offers some insight into why a debt of punishment could be non-
transferable while a pecuniary debt is so.  He distinguishes between a debt of punishment 
and a pecuniary debt in the following way. 
As we mostly conceive of them, the condition of owing a debt and the 
condition of deserving to be punished are not alike.  In the case of debt, 
                                                 
 
48 Philip L. Quinn, "Christian Atonement and Kantian Justification," Faith and Philosophy 3.4 (1986), p. 
445.   
 
49 Philip L. Quinn, "Aquinas on Atonement," in Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement, edited by Ronald J. 
Feenstra and Cornelius Plantinga Jr. (University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame, 1989), p. 174.  Quinn, 
however, softens this claim in a later article where he says, "When I compare the moral intuition that debts 
of punishment can never be transferred from the wrongdoer to an innocent party with the theological claim 
that Christ's life and death were sufficient to pay the debt of punishment for all human sin, I do not find 
myself stuck with the conclusion that the moral intuition is more likely to be true than the theological 
claim.  So I, at least, am willing to reconsider the moral intuition and perhaps to revise or even to abandon 
it in the light of the theological claim" (Philip L. Quinn, "Swinburne on Guilt, Atonement, and Christian 
Redemption," In Reason and the Christian Religion, edited by Alan G. Padgett (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1994), p. 293). 
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what is required is that the creditor shall not suffer a loss of the money 
he lent...whereas in the case of a 'debt of punishment', what is required is 
that the debtor shall suffer a loss... 50 
 
This contrast appears to rely on two claims.  First, it claims that pecuniary debts are 
compensatory while penal debts are not.  Second, it claims that pecuniary debts are 
flexible with regard to the dissolution of the debt while penal debts are not equally 
flexible.  That is, there is only one way that a debt of punishment can be paid.  
Specifically, the wrongdoer herself must suffer a loss.  No one else can suffer the 
wrongdoer's loss on the wrongdoer's behalf for the debt of punishment involves that 
particular wrongdoer suffering a loss.  The debt can only be paid by the wrongdoer or no 
one at all.  This could be contrasted with a pecuniary debt which can be paid from several 
different sources.  If Daniel owes Sarah $1000, Sarah can receive payment of the debt 
(and so not suffer a loss) from Daniel or Marion or anyone else who is willing to pay 
Sarah back on Daniel's behalf.  Thus, one could argue, while it is possible for a third 
party to pay a pecuniary debt, it is not possible for a third party to pay a debt of 
punishment. 
I will argue that penal and pecuniary debts are similarly compensatory and 
similarly flexible with regard to the dissolution of the debt.51  Let us first examine the 
nature of the compensatory function served by a pecuniary debt.  Note that what is 
                                                 
 
50 David Lewis, p.204. 
 
51 Lewis also indicates that this could result in logically viable cases of vicarious satisfaction through penal 
substitution.  He says, "What function would we have to ascribe to punishment in order to make it make 
sense to punish an innocent substitute?—A compensatory function" (David Lewis, p. 204).  He explains 
that if a wrongdoer's punishment is viewed as a benefit to the victim then the source of the benefit would 
make no difference so long as the victim was "compensated" (David Lewis, 204-205). In this case, a debt 
of punishment would be much like a pecuniary debt. This similarity would make it possible for a penal debt 
to be transferable in the way that a pecuniary debt is.   
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required in the case of pecuniary debt is not simply that the creditor avoid a financial 
loss.  In fact we can imagine a situation in which a creditor's lending results in an overall 
financial gain, even though the relevant debt remains outstanding.  Suppose that Sarah 
meets Daniel at a coffee house to loan him $1000.  After leaving the coffee house 
suppose that Sarah finds $2000 that goes unclaimed.  Suppose further that Sarah would 
not have gone to the coffee house and found the $2000 had she not been meeting Daniel.  
Or suppose that Marion, pleased with Sarah's loan, decides to give Sarah $2000.  In both 
cases Sarah avoids financial loss, and even experiences financial gain, after and as a 
result (in part) of giving a loan to Daniel.  And yet, we would not say that Sarah has been 
compensated with regard to Daniel's pecuniary debt.  This is because, strictly speaking, 
the pecuniary debt in this example is not one in which Sarah is owed $1000 from anyone, 
but a debt according to which Daniel must pay Sarah $1000.  Sarah is under no 
obligation to count money received from any other source as payment of Daniel's debt.52   
The nature of debt compensation, even within the context of pecuniary debt, is not 
a general claim to payment.  Sarah has a particular financial claim over Daniel.  When 
that claim is met, then Sarah may be said to have been "compensated" with regard to 
Daniel's debt.  Now, it seems that any debt serves this sort of compensatory function 
inasmuch as the person to whom the debt is owed has a claim over the debtor; that is, 
                                                 
52 I make this claim in contrast to L. Berkhof's claim that "If some beneficent person offers to pay the 
pecuniary debt of another, the payment must be accepted, and the debtor is ipso facto freed from all 
obligation" (L. Berkhof, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1941), p. 376).  I claim, instead, 
that the only repayment that automatically dissolves the pecuniary claim of the creditor is repayment from 
the debtor.  Now, the creditor may have no say as to how the debtor acquires the money to repay the debt.  
As a result, anyone could give the debtor the money with which the debtor may repay the debt and 
automatically dissolve the pecuniary claim.  However, contrary to Berkhof, the creditor is under no 
obligation to receive money from any source apart from the debtor as payment of the debt.  In most cases of 
pecuniary debt a creditor would be willing to accept repayment from a third party, but this is because a 
creditor's usual concern is only the money and the third party is offering the money on the condition that it 
be received by the creditor as fulfillment of the debtor's debt. 
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inasmuch as the debt is owed to someone.  With regard to pecuniary debt the relevant 
claim involves financial payment.  With regard to penal debt the relevant claim involves 
punishment.  In each case, the person to whom the debt is owed has a claim over the 
debtor and can be said to have been "compensated" with regard to the debt when the 
claim has been met.  Thus, in this way, penal and pecuniary debts appear to have a 
similarly compensatory nature. 
Let us now examine the potential flexibility with regard to the dissolution of each 
type of debt.  Now, it seems that debt, by nature, can only be owed to a person.  One 
cannot owe a debt, for example, to a river or to the air.  One might suggest that if a 
person were to pollute a river or the air one would incur a debt according to which one 
must clean up the river or air.  But, inasmuch as this is the case, the debt owed is not to 
the river or to the air, but rather to the persons who depend upon and enjoy the use of it.  
Likewise a moral debt, inasmuch as it is a debt, can only be owed to a person.  And so 
when a person has served a full prison term, we say that he has paid his debt "to society".  
That is, he has met the claim of the persons that make up his community.   
Inasmuch as a debt is owed to a person, the person to whom the debt is owed has 
a claim over her debtor.  Such a claim can be dissolved in three ways.  First, if the debtor 
fulfills the claim by paying the debt, then claim dissolves.  However, since the claim is 
held by a person, that person also has the option to dissolve her claim willfully.  This 
leads us to the second and third means of claim dissolution.  Second, the person to whom 
the debt is owed has the logical freedom to dissolve her claim willfully and 
unconditionally.  This is to give forgiveness-as-pardon of a debt.  And third, if one has 
the logical freedom to dissolve a claim willfully, then one also has the logical freedom to 
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set conditions for the willful dissolution of one's claim.  Then, once those conditions 
are met, one releases one's claim.  This third means of dissolving a claim is what we have 
identified as "satisfaction."53  Where the conditions are met by a third party, satisfaction 
is vicarious.  
We can see how this is so in the case of a pecuniary debt.  A creditor has a claim 
over her debtor.  When the debtor has repaid the debt, the creditor's claim vanishes.  The 
creditor also has the freedom to release her claim and so not require repayment from the 
debtor.  Further, the creditor is free to accept a payment from a third party as a condition 
of her releasing her claim over her debtor.54  By accepting payment from a third party, 
she is accepting vicarious satisfaction with regard to the pecuniary debt.  She is not 
obligated to receive such satisfaction, but has the logical freedom to do so. 
It seems that the same logical possibilities hold inasmuch as a penal debt is owed 
to someone; that is, inasmuch as someone holds a penal claim over her offender.  To 
show how this is so, let us look at an example from Shakespeare's Merchant of Venice.  
Shylock loans Antonio 3,000 ducats on the condition that it be repaid in three months 
time.  If the loan is not repaid, Antonio will owe a penalty to Shylock.  Shylock says that 
if the loan is not repaid in three months,  
  ...let the forfeit 
                                                 
53 Steven L. Porter presents a similar argument.  Porter explains that punishment, in his view, is an optional 
right to be enforced by the offended one.  The victim is free to insist on the execution of punishment or to 
allow the offender to go unpunished.  Because of this freedom there is some logical "flexibility" with 
regard to the execution of the punishment.  And this flexibility could extend to allowing for "a voluntary 
penal substitute" (Porter, "Swinburnian Atonement and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution," pp. 236-237). 
See also Steven L. Porter, "Rethinking the Logic of Penal Substitution," in Philosophy of Religion: A 
Reader and Guide, edited by William Lane Craig (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2002), p. 
605. 
 
54 She is even free to accept the promise of payment from someone else as a condition of her releasing her 
claim over the original debtor.  
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  Be nominated for an equal pound 
  Of your fair flesh, to be cut off and taken 
  In what part of your body pleaseth me.55 
 
Antonio willingly agrees to the terms of the bond.  And after three months have passed 
they stand before the court.  The money which Antonio had anticipated using to repay the 
bond has been lost at sea.  Shylock demands the price of the forfeit: one pound of 
Antonio's flesh.  Bassanio, the friend on whose behalf Antonio borrowed the money, 
arrives and offers to repay the 3,000 ducat debt several times over.  Bassanio even offers 
his own flesh in exchange for Antonio's.  
 Shylock has both a pecuniary and a penal claim over Antonio.  Certainly it is 
possible for Shylock to accept vicarious satisfaction with regard to the pecuniary debt.  It 
seems that Kant and Quinn would concede that it is logically possible for Shylock to 
accept the ducats offered by Bassanio on Antonio's behalf as satisfaction for Antonio's 
financial debt.  Why would it not also be logically possible for Shylock to accept 
vicarious satisfaction of his penal claim through penal substitution?  Antonio owes a 
penalty to Shylock as a result of not having repaid his debt by the promised time.  That 
penalty involves the forfeit of Antonio's life.  Bassanio offers to give his life in Antonio's 
place.  That is, he offers to pay the penalty that is due to Antonio.  It is unclear why it 
would be logically56 problematic for Shylock to accept a pound of Bassanio's flesh as a 
condition for Shylock's releasing his penal claim over Antonio.   
                                                 
 
55 Merchant of Venice, I.iii. 149-152. 
 
56 The question as to the moral implications of such a substitution will be addressed in following sections.  
See this diss., pp. 239-247, 258-263. 
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Again, if we agree that it is neither logically problematic for Shylock to 
enforce his right to Antonio's punishment nor logically problematic for him to release his 
claim over Antonio, then how does it become logically problematic for Shylock to release 
his claim conditionally?  That is, if it is not logically problematic for Shylock to either 
take Antonio's life or release his claim to Antonio's punishment, how does it become 
logically problematic for Shylock to either take Antonio's life or unconditionally release 
his claim to Antonio's punishment or accept 9,000 ducats to release his claim over 
Antonio, or accept Bassanio's freely offered life to release his claim over Antonio, or 
accept anything at all to release his penal claim over Antonio?57   
 Similarly, fallen humans owe a penal debt to God.  Since God has the freedom to 
release God's claim on the divine external punishment of fallen humans, God also has the 
logical freedom to release God's claim on the divine external punishment of humans as a 
result of someone else having endured such punishment.  Thus, penal substitution, at least 
insofar as it is an example of vicarious satisfaction, is logically possible.58 
Two Objections to this Argument and My Responses 
 There are at least two objections that could be raised against this defense.  First, 
someone might argue that a debt of punishment is distinct from moral debt.  Moral debt, 
someone could claim, is an expression for the wrongdoer's responsibility for creating a 
                                                 
 
57 Swinburne makes a similar point in the following way, "Can someone else be punished instead of the 
wrongdoer? There are many cases in history of heroic men offering to take the punishment (corporal, 
capital, or whatever) instead of another.  What happens is that the wrongdoer by his wrong action loses 
certain rights...If some saint then offers the state a bargain—that the state return to the wrongdoer his right 
to life or whatever in return for the right to the saint's life, which the saint has the right to cede to the state, 
then if the state accepts that bargain, the saint loses his right to life and the wrongdoer regains his" 
(Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement, p. 108).  
 
58 We will later examine conceptual problems for penal substitution insofar as one innocent vicar is said to 
be "punished" on behalf of multiple people.  See this diss., pp. 248-251. 
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relational distance between the wrongdoer and her victim.  Overcoming such a debt 
requires something like repentance, and while a debt of punishment or reparation may be 
paid vicariously, no one can repent on another's behalf.  Thus, even though a debt of 
punishment may be transferable, moral debt, and the payment of such a debt are non-
transferable. 
 It does appear that vicarious satisfaction as it relates to moral debt defined in this 
way is impossible.  Likewise, such a debt cannot be waived, for if a wrongdoer is 
unwilling to repent, the relational distance between her and her victim cannot be 
overcome; even if the victim is willing to extend forgiveness-as-restoration to the 
wrongdoer.  DMP can escape this criticism by distinguishing between two types of moral 
debt: (1) moral debt as it relates to a debt of punishment and (2) moral debt as it relates to 
a debt of repentance/relational distance.  According to DMP, God accepts vicarious 
satisfaction for (1) as a means to encourage and help the human to be open to overcoming 
(2). 
 Second, one might argue that I have not defended the transferability of penal debt, 
but instead have argued merely for a type of conditional cancelability of penal debt.  That 
is, on the view I have defended, the same penal debt does not transfer from sinners to an 
innocent vicar.  Rather, the sinners' debt is simply cancelled in response to someone else's 
endurance of punishment.    
 The same could be said, however, with regard to pecuniary debts.  What we call a 
"transfer" of pecuniary debt can be understood as a creditor's cancellation of a debt in 
response to a third party's promise to take on a new debt of equal value.  Thus, the 
creditor's claim over the original debtor dissolves as a result of the creation of a new 
 239 
claim over the third party.  If we call this conditional cancellation a "transfer" in the 
case of pecuniary debt, we must also call a "transfer" in the case of penal debt.  And even 
if we do not call it a "transfer," conditional cancellation is what I have identified as 
satisfaction.  And where the relevant condition is met by a third party, the satisfaction is 
vicarious.  Thus, vicarious satisfaction will still be logically possible. 
A Response to (8) the Attack on the Morality of Vicarious Satisfaction 
It is true that our moral intuition does sometimes reject vicarious satisfaction.  I 
will argue, however, that there are cases of vicarious satisfaction that are not so rejected.  
My argument relies on the claim that there are at least two reasons that we reject 
vicarious satisfaction for serious crimes in common practice.  First, it seems that such a 
substitution would defeat at least part of the purpose of the punishment.  A second reason 
that we reject substitution in such cases is simply that we do not have the moral authority 
to release the offended party from punishment.  Thus, an instance of vicarious 
satisfaction in which the purposes of punishment are not defeated and the offended party 
has the moral authority to release the offender from punishment, may be an instance of 
vicarious satisfaction that is morally permissible. 
The Rejection of Vicarious Satisfaction by Moral Intuition 
 Undoubtedly our moral intuitions reject vicarious satisfaction in some cases.  For 
example we would not allow a rapist's mother to serve his prison term.  We would 
demand that the wrongdoer serve his punishment himself.59  Neither would we allow a 
murderer's innocent friend to replace the murderer on death row.60  We would demand 
                                                 
59 Steven L. Porter uses this example in Porter, "Swinburnian Atonement and the Doctrine of Penal 
Substitution," p. 237. 
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that the murderer suffer the penal consequences of his own actions.  And yet many 
Christians believe that something very like this happens on the Cross.  An innocent Christ 
suffers penal consequences on behalf of rapists, murderers, liars, and thieves.   
David Lewis sees this as evidence that the Christian who holds penal substitution 
has fallen into inconsistency.  That is, in promoting penal substitution in the case of the 
atonement "they disagree with what they themselves think the rest of the time,"61 and 
develop a sort of two-mindedness.  Lewis concludes, "Their principles alter from one 
case to another, for no apparent reason."62 
I will argue, however, that there is a relevant difference between the examples 
used above (in which vicarious satisfaction is morally problematic) and the vicarious 
satisfaction in DMP.  To determine the possible difference, let us first examine the 
reasons why we reject vicarious satisfaction in the examples used above.  There are at 
least two reasons that we reject this substitution.  First, it seems that such a substitution 
would defeat at least part of the purpose of the punishment.  For example, we would 
never let the mother of a rapist serve the rapist's prison term, Steven L. Porter claims, 
because a major part of the prison term is to achieve "potential utilitarian ends" like 
                                                                                                                                                 
60 David Lewis, p. 205. 
 
61 Ibid., p. 206. 
 
62 Ibid., p. 205.  Lewis notes, however, that this two-mindedness is not limited to those who hold to penal 
substitution to explain the doctrine of the atonement.  For while we all might reject penal substitution in the 
example of the rapist or murderer, there are some cases in which we allow it.  He points out that in every 
day practice we unflinchingly allow penal substitution in the case of fines. This fact, he claims, is enough to 
show that we are all inconsistent with regard to our intuitions about penal substitution. Lewis claims that if 
we were really against penal substitution in the case of fines, but simply thought that giving up the idea of 
fines was impractical, then our dissatisfaction in retaining fines (since they allow for penal substitution) 
ought to show.  However, this dissatisfaction does not show (p. 209). As a result the penal substitution 
theorist has at least a "tu quoque" against anyone who complains of his "two-mindedness".  This, Lewis 
claims, "...indicates that both sides agree that penal substitution sometimes makes sense after all, even if 
none can say how it makes sense" (p. 209). 
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deterrence, rehabilitation, and prevention.63  These ends cannot be achieved by a 
substitute.64  If we did allow such a substitution, then a murderer who happened to have a 
lot of very loyal and innocent friends, could freely go about committing as many crimes 
as he had friends willing to serve his sentence. 
 A second reason that we reject vicarious satisfaction in such cases is simply that 
we do not have the authority to release the offender from his debt of punishment.  In the 
case of such serious crimes, when the offender deserves to be punished, allowing the 
offender to go free is tantamount to a crime in itself.  But, why is this so?  Particularly, 
why is this so if we consider mercy a virtue?  I claim that in such cases we do not have 
the moral authority to give mercy.  Even if the judge who is sentencing is willing to 
relinquish her own claim to the murderer's punishment, the victims still have a claim to 
punishment.  And even if the direct victim(s) and the victim's family were willing to 
release their claims to punishment, the judge's hands could be tied by the fact that the 
crime threatens the security of the community and so was against the entire community.65  
As a result, the judge must sentence the criminal.  If the judge were to accept a penal 
substitute, she would be releasing the offender from punishment.  If the judge does not 
have the moral authority to release the offender from punishment, then the judge does not 
have the moral authority to accept a substitute. 
 
 
                                                 
 
63 Porter, "Swinburnian Atonement and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution," p. 234. 
 
64 Ibid., p. 237. 
 
65 Perhaps, if the entire community, victim, and victim's family were willing to release the offender's debt 
of punishment, we could then allow it.   
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The Resonance of the Vicarious Satisfaction in DMP with Moral Intuition 
 If I am correct in arguing that these are the reasons that we find vicarious 
satisfaction in the above examples morally problematic, then if we can show that DMP 
involves an instance of vicarious satisfaction in which (1) the purposes of punishment are 
not lost and (2) the punisher has the moral authority to release the offender from 
punishment, then we will have shown that DMP can offer escape from the present 
criticism. 
Let us begin by asking whether any of the purposes of punishment are lost on 
DMP.  We can find some help in this regard from Steven L. Porter.  In his essay, 
"Swinburnian Atonement and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution", Porter defends the use 
of retributive punishment which he defines as  
  ...the forcible withdrawal of certain rights and/or privileges from a   
  wrongdoer in response to the intentional misuse of those rights and/or  
  privileges by the wrongdoer.66  
 
Porter proceeds to outline many of the benefits of such retributive punishment.  He 
distinguishes between "potential utilitarian ends" and "intrinsic ends."  In the former 
category he includes deterrence, rehabilitation, and prevention.  The goods affiliated with 
the "intrinsic" category, he claims, are "secured in all cases of rightful, retributive 
punishment."67  In the case of God's punishment in response to sin, the "intrinsic ends" 
associated with such punishment include the facts that it 
  ...takes human sin seriously, it treats sinners as responsible moral agents,  
  and it vindicates or expresses the appropriate value of both the Godhead  
  and the divine/human relationship.  The result of this is that the sinner has  
                                                 
 
66 Porter, "Swinburnian Atonement and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution," p. 234. 
 
67 Ibid. 
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  the opportunity to be morally educated and formed, and the provision 
  of this opportunity is good even if sinners are unwilling to recognize the  
  correct moral values which are expressed in the punishment.68 
 
Again, he elaborates on the goods affiliated with divine punishment in response to sin. 
 
  Moreover, sinners are provided the opportunity in the cross to recognize  
  the gravity of their offense, to realize their responsibility before God, to  
  grasp the great value of the Godhead and the divine/human relationship,  
  and in all of this to become aware of the riches of God's mercy, grace, and  
  love.69  
 
The distinction between the potential utilitarian ends of punishment and the intrinsic ends 
of punishment (with their potential results) is important, Porter claims, because it helps to 
make sense of those situations in which we find vicarious satisfaction (specifically, penal 
substitution) morally counter-intuitive.  For example, we would never let the mother of a 
rapist serve the rapist's prison term.  Presumably this is so, Porter claims, because a major 
part of the prison term is to achieve ends like deterrence and prevention (as we noted 
above).  These ends cannot be achieved by a substitute.  However, the intrinsic ends that 
Porter outlines, along with their results, can be achieved through the punishment of a 
substitute.  And these are the ends that God is after in the divine/human situation.70   
 To this we can add, with John Hare, that penal substitution is able to express the 
value not only of God but of human victims of human sin as well.71  DMP can add 
                                                 
 
68 Ibid., p. 235. See also, Porter, "Rethinking the Logic of Penal Substitution," pp. 603-605. 
 
69 Ibid., p. 237. 
 
70 Ibid. 
 
71 Hare borrows Jean Hampton's term and calls this "the expressive theory of punishment."  On this view, 
"[punishment] is good because it expresses the right relative value of [the offender] and his victim." (Hare, 
"Moral Faith and Atonement").  Porter cites Hare in noting this expressive value of punishment, but only 
does so in respect to the expressed value of God and not also human victims (Porter,"Rethinking the Logic 
of Penal Substitution," p. 604). 
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further to Porter's argument inasmuch as it argues that vicarious satisfaction through 
Christ's penal substitution is plausibly the most effective way to achieve God's goal of 
divine-human personal reconciliation.  Specifically, it may be the most effective means to 
the elicitation of human appropriation of God's offer of forgiveness-as-reconciliation; 
which, on DMP, is the ultimate goal of divine punishment.  On DMP, vicarious 
satisfaction through penal substitution is plausibly more effective in the realization of this 
goal than divine punishment of fallen humans directly.  Porter appears to be amenable to 
such a point where he says,  
...if God punished sinners to some degree, there would likely be further 
alienation between God and humans...But if Christ is able to bear the 
punishment well, then persons will have cause to be exceedingly grateful 
for this substitution rather than bitter towards God.72  
  
What is more, this reconciliation can allow for a pneumatology according to which God 
transforms the fallen human such that the human avoids future sin.  Thus, DMP could 
plausibly be the most effective means of securing Porter's "potential utilitarian ends" of 
punishment (deterrence, rehabilitation, and prevention).73   
                                                 
 
72 (Porter, "Rethinking the Logic of Penal Substitution." pp. 605-606).  However, Porter later seems to 
downplay this point saying, "...whether the sinner subjectively appreciates the meaning of the cross or not, 
Christ's suffering the punishment due sinners objectively expresses the great moral truth of God's value 
relative to rebellious sinners" (Porter, "Rethinking the Logic of Penal Substitution," p. 606).  The problem 
with downplaying this point is that the mere "objective expression" of God's value as a justification for the 
Cross will be vulnerable to the appeal to robust love (Why would God pursue the mere "objective 
expression" of God's value at so great a cost?) and the damnation problem (Why is there further 
punishment if God's purpose of expressing God's value objectively is achieved in the Cross?).  The same 
objections apply to Porter's third good reason (listed first in his text) for Christ's vicarious punishment: that 
"the goods of substantive reparation and penance are more fully realized via the punishment of Christ" 
(Porter, "Rethinking the Logic of Penal Substitution," p. 605).  Appealing to the opportunity for moral 
education and formation that the Cross affords will not rescue Porter either.  First, this appeal is vulnerable 
to the problem of superfluous suffering (Couldn't God give humans this opportunity in a less painful way?)  
Second, this appeal on its own is vulnerable to the same shortcomings that we discussed with respect to the 
third conception of sin (see this diss., pp. 35-39). Specifically, it may be possible to be "morally educated 
and formed", that is to "recognize the gravity of offense," "realize responsibility before God," and so on, 
while hating (and so not being personally reconciled to) God.   
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Someone might object that this approach to divine punishment gives an 
undeterred sinner free reign to do as he pleases without facing penal consequences.  That 
is, this view allows for something like a murderer who happens to have a lot of very loyal 
and innocent friends, to freely go about committing as many crimes as he had friends 
willing to serve his sentence.   Because of the sacrifice of Christ, the sinner can enjoy a 
life of sin without concern about the consequences. 
We have seen however, that on DMP, this is not the case.  I argued above that an 
unrepentant and untransformed sinner will still be under divine wrath.74  This wrath may 
or may not be seen as penal (depending on which response to the damnation problem is 
chosen), but either way it will amount to separation from the person of God.  Thus, an 
unrepentant sinner is not free to enjoy a life of sin without concern about the 
consequences. 
 Now let us ask whether, on DMP, God has the moral authority to release fallen 
humans from punishment.75  As I claimed above, it seems that inasmuch as a punishment 
is owed to someone, the person to whom the punishment is owed has the freedom to 
release his claim to it.  Thus, inasmuch as fallen humans owe a debt of divine punishment 
for sin to God, God has the logical freedom to release God's claim on such punishment.  
                                                                                                                                                 
73 Porter, "Swinburnian Atonement and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution," p. 234.  Porter also seems 
amenable to this point inasmuch as he notes that Christ's vicarious punishment allows for "the possibility of 
the further subjective good of what might be called moral education and moral formation" (Porter, 
"Rethinking the Logic of Penal Substitution," p. 604).  DMP's emphasis, however, is not merely on the 
Cross's provision of such a possibility or opportunity (this opportunity could be given in other ways).  DMP 
argues that Christ's vicarious satisfaction is part of the most effective means to that end. 
 
74 See this diss., pp. 167-168, 221-225. 
 
75 Answering this question will serve to answer the concern about God's offering forgiveness for evils done 
to others. Simon Wiesenthal expresses such a concern with forgiving someone for acts committed against 
others in Simon Wiesenthal, The Sunflower: On the Possibilities and Limits of Forgiveness (New York: 
Schocken Books, 1997).  My answer here can be seen as a response to this concern where God is the 
forgiver. 
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Yet some might argue that it would be immoral for God to exercise such freedom 
because it unjustly impinges on other victims' claims to punishment.76  Those victims 
have a claim to punishment and in providing vicarious satisfaction without the consent of 
the victims, God is denying them the fulfillment of their legitimate claim (or the freedom 
to release it themselves). 
 However, the relevant punishment from which fallen humans are freed is divine 
punishment in response to sin inasmuch as it is before, or against, God.  God is the only 
One who has a claim to such a punishment.  If the divine punishment for sin is something 
like a spiritual death resulting from denial of fellowship with God, then it seems that God 
has complete logical and moral authority to release or enforce divine punishment.  For, it 
is unclear how anyone else can have a legitimate claim to God's refusal of fellowship 
with another person.  Thus, if God releases God's claim to this punishment, then the 
sinner is completely free with regard to that punishment.   
 Even if we hold that, despite their release from divine punishment, humans still 
have legitimate claims to punishment over one another, we can claim that God's 
forgiveness-as-pardon of a person is not unjust toward human victims.  We can do so in 
two ways.  First, God's releasing someone from divine punishment in response to sin 
inasmuch as it is before, or against, God is compatible with God's allowing and even 
enforcing punishment in response to human wrongdoing against other humans.  
Similarly, we can imagine a human judge who has been wronged by a criminal.  This 
judge may release her own claim to punishment of that criminal and even extend 
                                                 
 
76 This objection could face an ontological problem insofar as it seems to hold to a moral standard apart 
from God.  But, the objector could avoid this problem by modifying her claim to say that God's exercise of 
this freedom is not in keeping with God's character of robust love for victims. 
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forgiveness-as-restoration to that criminal.  Still the judge's own forgiveness-as-
pardon and forgiveness-as-restoration of the criminal is compatible with her enforcement 
of punishment on behalf of other victims.  Likewise, God's forgiveness-as-pardon of a 
person and forgiveness-as-restoration is compatible with God's allowing and encouraging 
systems of human punishment.  It is even compatible with something like purgatory 
which could involve other forms of divinely enforced punishment for wrongdoing against 
other persons.   
Second, we can claim that God's forgiveness-as-pardon is not unjust toward 
human victims because even if they did have a claim to divine punishment of their 
offenders, God has the moral authority to command human victims to release their own 
claims to such punishment.77 
Summary 
 Thus, it seems that DMP allows for a morally permissible account of vicarious 
satisfaction.78  This account seems morally permissible inasmuch as the divinely intended 
                                                 
77 Also exercising this authority could be in keeping with God's robust love.  For example, a divine 
command to give forgiveness-as-letting go can be in the interest of the victim.  When outrage is allowed to 
flourish, an outraged person can find himself oppressed by his own anger.  He can become consumed by 
thoughts of evil done to him; constantly reminded of and reliving the situation.  Forgiveness-as-letting go 
can be a means of liberating the victim by freeing him from his own outrage.  This is not to condone the 
perpetrator's crime.  To the contrary, to forgive in any sense involves the denunciation of the evil that is 
being responded to with forgiveness, because to forgive one must first acknowledge that evil has been done 
and the perpetrator is culpable for the relevant evil. Thus, Vincent Brümmer says, "...forgiveness should not 
be confused with condonation.  If you were to condone my action, you would thereby deny that it is an 
action which caused you injury and thus also deny that there is anything to forgive" (Vincent Brümmer, 
"Atonment and Reconciliation," Religious Studies 28 (1992), p. 440). 
 
78 L. Berkhof has listed four conditions that must be met for vicarious punishment to be "legal" (or free 
from injustice).  "(1) that the guilty party himself is not in a position to bear the penalty through to the end, 
so that a righteous relation results; (2) that the transfer does not encroach upon the rights and privileges of 
innocent third parties, nor cause them to suffer hardships and privations; (3) that the person enduring the 
penalty is not himself already indebted to justice, and does not owe all his services to the government; and 
(4) that the guilty party retains the consciousness of his guilt and of the fact that the substitute is suffering 
for him" (Berkhof, p. 376).  On the view I have defended (1) & (3) are not conditions for a moral transfer of 
punishment.  If the victim has the moral authority to pardon (and so to conditionally pardon) and the 
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ends of divine punishment in response to sin are most effectively achieved through 
the punishment of the willing substitute, Christ.79  Further, God has the moral authority to 
demand or waive divine punishment.80  Thus, God has the moral authority to offer to 
accept satisfaction through an alternative; in this case, divine penal Self-substitution 
through the innocent vicar, Jesus Christ.81  
A Divine-Manifest Offering Approach to Penal Substitution and the Problems  
 
for Penal Substitution as Penal 
 
 In this section I will address problems for penal substitution that arise insofar as 
an innocent vicar is said to endure a penalty. 
Responses to (9–10) Attacks on the Possibility of Christ's Enduring Sinners'  
 
Punishment 
 
A Response to (9) the Claim that an Innocent Person Cannot be Punished 
 
 As I noted in the introduction, A.M. Quinton presents a logical argument against 
the possibility of punishing an innocent person.82  Quinton argues that an innocent person 
can never be punished because punishment, by definition, can only correlate with guilt.  
                                                                                                                                                 
purposes of the punishment can be achieved through a transfer, then the victim can accept the punishment 
of a guilty third party, even where the offender could endure the punishment himself, as fulfillment of the 
victim's claim to punishment. 
 
79 Problems that arise insofar as the substitution involves the punishment of an innocent person (including 
whether such punishment is possible) will be addressed in the following section. 
 
80 Steven L. Porter says, "...while just punishment must always be directed towards a wrong that deserves 
such punishment, there is no injustice in someone else voluntarily serving that punishment if there are good 
reasons for such a transfer and the victim agrees to accept such a substitution as fulfillment of the offender's 
debt" (Porter, "Rethinking the Logic of Penal Substitution," p. 605).  
 
81 Accepting vicarious punishment as satisfaction is distinct from demanding the punishment of an 
innocent.  The former is morally permissible whereas the latter may not be so.  Also, one might object that 
the punishment of an innocent is always immoral.  I will address this criticism in more detail later in this 
chapter.  See this diss., pp. 258-261. 
 
82 See this diss., p. 20. 
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An innocent person may receive suffering that he does not deserve, but he cannot, 
strictly speaking, "be punished."83   
 Quinton is correct that by "punishment" we sometimes mean something like 
"deserved suffering inflicted in response to guilt."  In this sense, an innocent vicar can 
never be punished because there can be no sense in which an innocent person can be said 
to deserve suffering.  However, there is another, broader, sense in which we use the term 
"punishment."  Sometimes, by "punishment," we simply mean "suffering inflicted as a 
response to guilt."  This type of suffering can be inflicted on someone who does not 
deserve to suffer.84  For example, someone who was framed may claim to be enduring 
punishment (suffering inflicted as a response to someone else's guilt) that she does not 
deserve.  We could also say that "the punishment outweighed the crime" when someone 
endures more suffering than they can be said to deserve.  Or again, a coach might punish 
an entire team for the infraction of one player.  While the team is running laps, one player 
could rightly complain to the offending player, "I am being punished for your guilt."85  If 
we are using "punishment" in this broader sense, it becomes clear that an innocent person 
can be punished.86 
                                                 
 
83 A.M. Quinton, "On Punishment," Analysis 14 (1954). pp. 133-142. 
 
84 James Denney claims that Christ's sufferings "...were not penal in the sense of coming to Him through a 
bad conscience, or in the sense that God was angry with Him personally, as if He had really been a guilty 
man" (James Denney, The Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation (London: J. Clarke, 1959), p. 272).  Rather, 
they "...were penal in the sense that in that dark hour He had to realize to the full the divine reaction against 
sin in the race in which He was incorporated..." (Denney, p. 273).  This is also cited in Vincent Taylor, 
Forgiveness and Reconciliation (London: Macmillan and Co, 1960), p. 212.   
 
85 Steven L. Porter uses a similar analogy to demonstrate the transferability of punishment in some cases 
(Porter, "Swinburnian Atonement and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution," pp. 236-237). 
 
86 Steven L. Porter also addresses this objection in Porter, "Swinburnian Atonement and the Doctrine of 
Penal Substitution," p. 236.  R.M. Hare addresses this objection in R.M. Hare, "Punishment and Retributive 
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A Response to (10) the Claim that One Person Cannot Endure the Punishment of  
 
Many 
 
Even if we successfully show that an innocent person can be punished on behalf 
of a guilty person, any theory of penal substitution that claims that Christ's suffering 
removes the entire debt of divine punishment87 must offer an explanation for the claim 
that Christ suffered and died on behalf of many guilty persons.  John Stott claims that a 
traditional understanding of the power of Christ's death is that 
...in and through Christ crucified God substituted himself for us and bore 
our sins, dying in our place the death we deserved to die...88 
 
It seems that it is not possible for one person to endure the punishment of many people 
when that punishment is something like death or a life sentence.  According to this 
criticism, while it may be possible for Christ to endure the same quality of punishment 
that sinners deserve, Christ as one person cannot endure the same quantity of punishment 
that multiple sinners deserve.  How is it possible for one undeserved death to be 
substituted for many deserved deaths? 
 Unless we can show that Christ suffered as many deaths as there are sinners, then 
this argument will succeed in showing that Christ did not serve the same quantity of 
punishment that sinners deserve.  This does not mean, however, that Christ's penal 
substitution is not a full satisfaction for the debt of punishment that sinners owe to God. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Justice" in R.M. Hare, Essays on Political Morality (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), p. 203 (also cited in Porter, 
"Swinburnian Atonement and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution," p. 236).  David Lewis responds to it in 
David Lewis, p. 209. Hans Urs von Balthasar addersses it in Balthasar, pp. 337-338. 
 
87 This is distinct from what we could call "partial penal substitution" which holds that Christ only endured 
part of the penalty that sinners deserve and that sinners must still endure, or make satisfaction for, a portion 
of the penalty themselves. 
 
88 John R.W. Stott, The Cross of Christ (Leicester, England: Inter-Varsity Press, 1986), p. 7. 
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Outside of the repayment of the debt by the offender, the offended party has the 
option of determining what will satisfy her.  Thus, God is free to determine that the value 
to God of Christ's substitution is equivalent to the value to God of sinners enduring the 
suffering that they deserve. 89   
For example, suppose that both Antonio and Bassanio owe a debt of punishment 
to Shylock.  Each of them must give Shylock one pound of his own flesh.  Suppose then 
that Portia steps forward and offers to willingly give one pound of her own flesh as 
satisfaction of the debt owed by Antonio and Bassanio.  Shylock, as the offended party, 
has the option to accept such a satisfaction thereby dissolving his claim to the debt of 
punishment owed by Antonio and Bassanio.  Even though Portia gives only one pound of 
flesh (whereas, between Antonio and Bassanio, Shylock is owed two) Shylock is free to 
accept this smaller quantity as full satisfaction.90 
 Thus, while it may not be possible for one innocent person to suffer all of the 
punishment due to several guilty people, it is possible for one innocent person to suffer 
punishment on behalf of several guilty people inasmuch as the offended party has the 
freedom to accept the innocent's punishment as satisfaction for the debt of punishment 
due by the many. 
 
                                                 
89 This response is reminiscent of Duns Scotus' acceptation theory of satisfaction according to which God 
determines the value of Christ's suffering to be sufficient to cover the debt of punishment for sinners.  For 
more on Duns Scotus' theory see Adolph Harnack, History of Dogma, Vol. VI, translated by Neil Buchanan 
(New York: Dover, 1961), pp.196-198.  Also see L.W. Grensted, A Short History of the Doctrine of the 
Atonement (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1920), pp. 157-162.  Also see Andrew S. Yang, 
"Scotus' Voluntarist Approach to the Atonement Reconsidered," Scottish Journal of Philosophy 62.4 
(2009), pp. 421-440.  Charles Hodge argues against the Scotist view in Hodge, pp.487-489.   
 
90 Of course, in the Shylock case there are moral concerns with regard to a potential vicarious satisfaction.  
I will address such concerns as they relate to the divine-human situation in the pages that follow. 
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Responses to (11) the Attack on the Claim that Christ Actually Endured Such  
 
Punishment  
 
Some argue that Christ did not actually endure the divine punishment due to even 
one sinner.  Christ's doing so, they claim, would be at odds with the claim that Christ is 
resurrected.  This objection then points to the claim that the penalty that sinners deserve 
is everlasting damnation.91  Yet, Christ is said to be risen and exalted.  Thus, it appears 
that Christ is not everlastingly damned and as a result, does not actually endure the 
punishment that a sinner deserves.92  Eleonore Stump claims, 
 ...no matter what sort of agony Christ experienced in his crucifixion, it  
  certainly was not (and was not equivalent to) everlasting punishment, if  
  for no other reason than that Christ's suffering came to an end.93 
 
There are at least four ways that a theory of penal substitution using DMP can 
address this criticism.  First, it can simply claim that the divine punishment due to sinners 
is not everlasting punishment.  Thus, Christ could endure divine punishment which is 
equivalent to that which a sinner deserves and the punishment would come to an end. 
Second, it could claim that the type of punishment that a sinner deserves is not 
necessarily everlasting punishment, but the spiritual death which is the punishment for 
sin is everlasting for typical humans.  That is, perhaps Christ, in enduring the punishment 
                                                 
91 See this diss., p. 21. This objection loses strength if everlasting damnation is not held to be the due 
punishment for sin.  And while such a claim is controversial I will still address this objection here since 
many theories of penal substitution (including the "popular view") hold that something like everlasting 
damnation is a consequence of sin. 
 
92 See Eleonore Stump, "Atonement According to Aquinas," In Philosophy and the Christian Faith, edited 
by Thomas V. Morris (University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame, 1988), p. 63.  See also, Edwin 
Rabbie, Introduction to Defensio Fidei Catholicae de Satisfactione Christi, Adversus Faustum Socinum 
Senensem, edited by Edwin Rabbie, translated by Hotze Mulder (Assen/Maastricht, The Netherlands: Van 
Gorcum, 1990), p. 6.  Rabbie is there summarizing a criticism put forth by Faustus Socinus. 
 
93 Stump, "Atonement According to Aquinas," p. 63. 
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for sin, died a particular kind of spiritual death from which Christ was able to rise; a 
spiritual death from which other humans would not have been able to rise.  Simply 
because a different person will respond to a similar penalty in a different way, does not 
mean that the penalty itself is any less similar.  For example, suppose that a 7 year old has 
somehow incurred a penalty of 10 lashes with a whip.  The chances that the penalty will 
result in the 7 year old's death are likely.  Suppose then, that the child's father offers to 
endure the lashes on behalf of his child.  Though the lashes will still bring great 
discomfort to the father, they will not affect him as fatally as they would his child.  If the 
offended party accepts the father's offer of satisfaction, then both the father and the child 
could live.  And in receiving the lashes, the father could be said to actually receive the 
child's penalty.  In this case, the penalty due to sinners is something like separation from 
God.  Now, if humans are ontologically dependent upon God, if God were to completely 
withdraw from humans, then those humans would cease to exist.  However, since Christ 
was also God, one could argue that it would be possible for Christ to experience 
separation from the Father without ceasing to exist.  Thus, by being ontologically 
independent, Christ could endure this painful penalty and survive, whereas other humans 
could not.  Thus, it could have been the case that Christ actually suffered the punishment 
that fallen humans deserved. 
 Yet, even if the divine punishment due to sinners is held to be everlasting, there 
are still two more responses available to a theory of penal substitution using DMP.  The 
third response is similar to the response I offered to the claim that one person cannot 
endure the punishment of many.  One could say that while Christ does not suffer the 
same quantity of punishment, Christ suffers a limited amount of the same quality of 
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punishment that sinners' deserve.  This limited amount of the same quality of 
punishment endured by Christ could be accepted by God as full satisfaction for the debt 
of punishment owed by fallen humans to God.  Thus, one could say that Christ actually 
endured the type of punishment that fallen humans deserve, though there was no need for 
Christ to endure the full quantity of such punishment.94 
 Fourth, DMP could claim that Christ endures only part of the punishment that 
humans deserve and it is of partial value to God relative to the value to God of the 
punishment that we deserve.  The rest of the punishment could be waived by God,95 
endured by humans,96 or covered by direct satisfaction from fallen humans (or addressed 
through some combination of these three).97  This response, however, would involve a 
deviation from the popular view which claims that Christ's penal substitution is a 
sufficient satisfaction for the debt of punishment related to human sin.98 
                                                 
94 Again, this response is reminiscent of Duns Scotus' acceptation theory of satisfaction.  For further 
reference on this topic see this diss., p. 251, footnote 89.  
 
95 This could allow for divine forgiveness-as-pardon of a debt with regard to the remaining debt of 
punishment, thus giving DMP another means of escape from the forgiveness problem. 
 
96 However, if the deserved punishment is eternal, it is unclear that a portion of such punishment endured 
vicariously by Christ will result in less than eternal punishment as a remainder.  At some point, it seems 
that God will have to count partial punishment as satisfaction for the part of the punishment that is 
unendured or waive any remaining punishment. 
 
97 David Lewis takes note of a similar potential response to this problem (See Lewis, p. 206). "[Christians] 
may say...that what happened to Christ on the cross was something very much worse than 
crucifixion...Perhaps these evils, if not the crucifixion itself, were an equal substitute for the deserved 
damnation that the sinners escaped in return" (Lewis, p. 206).  If I understand this response correctly, it 
claims that Christ's limited suffering was somehow of a quality more acute than the suffering deserved by 
sinners, such that the limited suffering He endured was equivalent to the infinite punishment deserved by 
sinners.  However, it is not clear what sort of calculation can be done to show such a thing.  Further, if there 
were a way to perform such a calculation, the current problem would still hold.  For eventually, the infinite 
punishment that sinners owe would catch up to and surpass Christ's limited suffering.   
 
98 There is a fifth, approach that a theory of penal substitution could utilize to escape this problem.  It could 
take inspiration from Hans Urs von Balthasar and claim that "...[Christ's] experience of being abandoned on 
the Cross is timeless" (Balthasar, p. 336).  With this in mind, one might argue that Christ's suffering 
somehow takes place outside of time and so is eternal.  While this fifth response can help penal substitution 
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Responses to (12–14) the Moral Attacks on Vicarious Punishment 
 Here I will address the three moral attacks against vicarious punishment, arguing 
that DMP can answer all three. 
A Response to (12) the Objection against Retributive Punishment 
 We should begin by distinguishing between retributive punishment and revenge.  
Retributive punishment simply refers to punishment that is exacted in response to an 
offender's deserving punishment.99  Revenge, on the other hand, is often thought of as a 
retaliation that is delivered with malicious pleasure.  DMP claims that God pursues 
retributive punishment in the Cross, but not revenge in the sense just described.100   
                                                                                                                                                 
to escape the current problem, a claim that the vicar endures eternal conscious suffering as the punishment 
for sin will not fall within the parameters for moral penal substitution that I have set up under DMP. I argue 
that Christ's penal suffering on our behalf is morally permissible (and consistent with God's character of 
robust love) because it meets three necessary conditions: 1) Christ's punishment is received with His 
autonomous consent (see this diss., p. 259-260). 2) The suffering endured by Christ is redemptive (it elicits 
human openness to personal reconciliation with God) (see this diss., pp. 214, 259, 261-263).  3) The 
redemption brought about through Christ's suffering could not be brought about in any less painful way 
(see this diss., pp. 212-213).  On this three-part standard, Christ's punishment will never actually be eternal; 
even if an eternal punishment is what humans owe.  Since there is a finite amount of human beings Christ's 
suffering will eventually complete its redemptive purpose by eliciting openness from all of those who 
would be so influenced by Christ's suffering.  Those who are not presently open, will either open up 
eventually or entrench themselves in a closed state permanently (God would know the condition of each 
person's heart in this regard).  Once everyone who would be encouraged toward divine-human personal 
reconciliation by Christ's penal suffering has become open to this, Christ's penal suffering ceases to be 
redemptive and it would stop. Parameters 2 and 3 rescue DMP from the claim that God is a sadist and 
Christ is a masochist. On account of these parameters, DMP can claim that neither pursues suffering for its 
own sake.  The moment Christ's suffering ceases to be redemptive it stops.  The moment there is a less 
painful way to the same goal of human appropriation of divine forgiveness-as-restoration, Christ's suffering 
will stop and the less painful way will be pursued.  It can also be argued that DMP relies on the claim that 
Christ's satisfaction is finished and complete.  If God is "being satisfied" by an eternal penal substitution 
that is being endured by Christ, there could be some fear that the substitution will cease and the remainder 
of the eternal punishment (itself eternal) will be demanded of us.  This could make the sinner hesitant to 
open to personal reconciliation with God. 
 
99 For an interesting defense of retribution as an essential component of any moral punishment, see 
Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement, pp. 93-109. 
 
100 Charles Hodge also distinguishes between "vindicatory" and "vindictive", saying, "It is a common 
mistake or misrepresentation to confound these two words, and to represent those who ascribe to God the 
attribute of vindicatory justice as regarding Him as a vindictive being, thirsting for revenge" (Hodge, p. 
489). 
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Still, some argue that there is no role for retributive punishment in a moral 
theory of atonement.  John Hare states that those who reject penal substitution on account 
of a moral rejection of retributive punishment claim that, 
To return harm for harm done is...merely to increase the amount of 
suffering in the world, not to set anything right.101 
 
Now, it may be the case that the pursuit of retributive punishment for its own sake 
"merely increases suffering" and is incompatible with robust love.  Further, it is the case 
that DMP claims that God pursues retributive punishment through God's active wrath in 
the Cross.102  If this were the end of the story, then perhaps (if retributive punishment 
really is incompatible with robust love) penal substitution would fail on account of this 
objection.  However, according to DMP, God does not pursue retributive punishment for 
its own sake.  Rather, God's pursuit of retributive punishment through active wrath is 
educative and demonstrative in such a way that it effectively elicits human appropriation 
of divine forgiveness-as-restoration (and thus moral transformation or rehabilitation 
through relationship with God).103  God can then be said to pursue retributive punishment 
through active wrath as a means to draw humans away from God's passive wrath.  This 
goal of divine retributive punishment is entirely compatible with robust love. 
 This answer enables DMP to respond to Steve Chalke where he says, 
Rather than a symbol of vengeance or retribution, the cross of Christ is the 
greatest symbol of love and a demonstration of just how far God the 
                                                 
 
101 Hare, "Moral Faith and Atonement." 
 
102 For a take on penal subtitution that does not claim that there is a retributive function of the Cross, see 
Boersma, Hans. "Eschatological Justice and the Cross: Violence and Penal Substitution," Theology Today 
60 (2003), pp. 186-199. 
 
103See this diss., pp. 163-179.  
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Father and Jesus his Son are prepared to go to prove that love and to 
bring redemption to their creation.104  
 
Chalke creates a false dichotomy.  On DMP God's pursuit of retribution in the Cross is a 
manifestation of God's deep love for humans and it serves to demonstrate God's love in a 
way that is conducive to human appropriation of God's offer of personal reconciliation.105  
On DMP God's opting for severity106 is a manifestation of God's mercy107 because God's 
severity helps to draw sinners into a state of personal reconciliation with God.  This in 
turn is a demonstration of God's love because it displays the lengths to which God will go 
to be personally reconciled with humans.108 
 We can see a similar error in C.F.D. Moule who says, 
...I want to argue that, on a fully personal level of procedure, and most of 
all in a Christian understanding of the way in which offence and 
estrangement are dealt with, there is no place at all for 
retribution...Ultimately, the controlling factor cannot be anything so 
abstract and impersonal as justice or retribution: the controlling factor is 
the worth of human personality, and the creation or restoration of mature 
persons must be the paramount concern in whatever is done when an 
estrangement has occurred between persons - or between a human person 
and a God who is personal.109   
                                                 
 
104 Steve Chalke, "The Redemption of the Cross" in The Atonement Debate, edited by Derek Tidball, David 
Hilborn, and Justin Thacker (Michigan: Zondervan, 2008), p. 44. 
 
105 For more on this point, see this diss., pp. 174-176. 
 
106 See Aquinas, Summa Theologica (ST) III, q. 47, a. 3, ad. 1. 
 
107 See ST III, q. 46, a. 1, ad. 3.  Also see this diss., pp. 133-138. 
 
108 Garry Williams gives an interesting answer to a theological variation of this argument which claims that 
"retributive punishment is ruled out by Jesus' own teaching on how we should relate to one another" 
(Williams, p. 173).  Williams cites Romans 12:19, in answering that Paul "explains that individuals must 
not take revenge precisely because God is going to do so" (Williams, p.174).  Williams claims that this 
seeming inconsistency between God's Own actions and God's commands is not really inconsistent "since he 
is God and we are not" (Williams, p. 174). 
 
109 C.F.D. Moule, "The Christian Understanding of Forgiveness," Theology 71 (1968), p.437.  Moule later 
argues, "...retributive justice must, on a Christian showing at least, be regarded rather as part of the 
educative or corrective process - part of the attempt to retrieve or to generate full personhood and to 'do 
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On DMP, God's pursuit of retribution through divine penal Self-substitution is an 
essential part of God's project of overcoming divine-human estrangement and making 
humans into mature persons.  Divine retribution is not opposed to this end.  Instead, it is 
conducive to it. 
A Response to (13) the Objection against Punishing an Innocent 
Someone could concede that we have shown that vicarious satisfaction is neither 
logically nor morally problematic, while complaining that the penal suffering of an 
innocent remains morally problematic. This objector could claim that it is always morally 
wrong to inflict punishment upon an innocent person.  Thus, while accepting vicarious 
satisfaction is not morally problematic,110 the content of the satisfaction can be.  In this 
vein the objector could say, "It might be morally allowable for an offended party to 
accept the torture of a baby as satisfaction (since he may set the terms of his own 
satisfaction) but it would never be morally allowable to actually torture a baby.  
Similarly, it might be morally allowable for an offended party to accept the punishment 
of an innocent, but it would never be morally allowable to actually punish the innocent." 
Now, if we are going to hold to penal substitution in the case of the atonement, we 
must show that there are times when it is morally allowable to punish the innocent, or at 
least to allow an innocent person to receive punishment.  Recall that we have defined 
                                                                                                                                                 
justice' (if you like) to responsible freedom of choice.  And the amount of suffering required will be 
measured (however instinctively and intuitively) by the person's need, not by his supposed deserts" (Moule, 
"The Christian Understanding of Forgiveness," p. 438).  On DMP retributive justice is instructive and 
corrective and it addresses a human's need by responding to that human's deserts.  In this quote Moule 
appears to be amenable to such a role for retributive justice, but then this contradicts his earlier claim that 
"there is no place at all for retribution" (Moule, "The Christian Understanding of Forgiveness," p. 437). 
 
110 Accepting vicarious satisfaction is distinct from demanding it.  An offended party has no claim to 
vicarious satisfaction and so cannot categorically demand it.  She can accept it, however, in place of the 
penal claim which is hers to demand. 
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Christ's punishment as "undeserved suffering in response to another's guilt."111  As a 
result, we might rephrase the question, "Is it ever morally permissible to allow an 
innocent person to be punished?" to, "Is it ever morally permissible to allow an innocent 
person to receive suffering that he does not deserve?"  The answer to this last question 
seems to be, "yes."  We, in fact, often allow this.  A good example is in the case of a 
kidney transplant.  The donor experiences undeserved suffering to benefit the recipient.  
Now to what benefit can we appeal to justify the suffering of the innocent Christ on the 
Cross?  According to DMP, God, in the Cross, inflicts undeserved suffering upon God's 
Self in Jesus in order to overcome obstacles to sinners' appropriation of God's extension 
of forgiveness-as-restoration.  Someone might object that a kidney transplant is not 
morally permissible if the kidney is stolen from the donor, even if the donor will survive 
without the removed kidney.  As a result, we would need to add the caveat that for the 
punishment of an innocent to be morally permissible it must be done with the full 
autonomous consent of the sufferer.112   
We can now see how the penal suffering of an innocent could be morally 
justified.  It could be morally justified if it is done with the autonomous consent113 of the 
sufferer and if the benefit to be attained through the suffering is most effectively attained 
by no other, less painful means.  Further, that we might avoid the appeal to robust love, 
                                                 
 
111 See this diss., p. 249. 
 
112 Steven L. Porter says, "It would seem that the only possible way such a transfer of punishment could be 
just is if the substitute voluntarily and with sound mind accepts the penalty.  But given that the substitute 
meets these conditions, I fail to see what is unjust about such a transfer" (Porter, “Swinburnian Atonement 
and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution,” p. 236).  
 
113"Autonomous consent" will mean that the one who consents is not coerced and is mentally competent 
with regard to the decision being made.  
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the benefit to be achieved through the suffering of the innocent must be consistent 
with robust love.  The penal suffering endured by Christ in the Cross is thus, on DMP, an 
instance of morally permissible punishment of an innocent.  Christ autonomously 
consents to endure the penal suffering.  And this is done because it is part of the most 
effective means to elicit human appropriation of God's forgiveness-as-restoration; a 
benefit which is consistent with a divine character of robust love. 
 DMP is now in a position to reply to the concern that penal substitution is an 
instance of divine "child abuse."  With Garry Williams, DMP can note, 
There is an immediate problem here with the criticism; namely that when 
the Lord Jesus Christ died, he was a child in the sense that he was a son, 
but not in the sense that he was a minor.  As an adult, Jesus had a mature 
will and could choose whether to cooperate with his Father.  So we are in 
fact looking at a father and an adult son who will together for the father to 
inflict suffering on the son...114   
 
 DMP can also respond to the feminist concern that in penal substitution "God 
plays the role of a sadist who willfully inflicts punishment..."115  Let us rephrase our 
question from "Is it ever morally permissible to allow an innocent person to receive 
suffering that he does not deserve?" to "Is it ever morally permissible to inflict 
undeserved suffering upon an innocent person?"  To answer this, we need only point to 
the doctor who cuts into the patient donating the kidney.  In fact, she is inflicting 
suffering on an innocent (and even morally praiseworthy) patient.  But, the doctor and the 
                                                 
 
114 Williams, p. 185. Hans Boersma also claims, "Coercion on the part of the perpetrator and involuntary 
suffering on the part of the victim characterize abusive relationships.  Neither coercion nor involuntary 
suffering can be attributed to Christ's atoning death on the cross.  Any attempt to maintain abusive power 
structures by appealing to the cross is theologically incoherent and morally insidious" (Boersma, 
"Eschatological Justice and the Cross: Violence and Penal Substitution," p. 196). 
 
115 John T. Carroll & Joel B. Green, The Death of Jesus in Early Christianity (Massachusetts: Hendrickson 
Publishers, 1995), p. 260. 
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donating patient are working together to save another.  The doctor does not perform 
the operation from delight in the suffering.  Indeed, she may even suffer herself if she is 
removing the kidney of her own daughter.  Yet, she and her daughter work together to 
save the life of another.  Likewise, God is not a sadist who pursues the suffering of the 
Cross for God's own delight.116  Rather, God inflicts redemptive suffering on God's Self 
in Christ for the purpose drawing humans into divine-human reconciliation.  That is, 
according to DMP, Christ and the Father conspire together in the Cross to create 
obstacles to human persistence in alienation, remove obstacles to sinners' appropriation 
of divine forgiveness-as-restoration, and in all of this to elicit human openness to divine-
human reconciliation. 
A Response to (14) the Claim that Penal Substitution Valorizes Victimization 
 
Hans Boersma explains how Christ's participation in penal substitution is not a 
valorization of victimization.  He cites Richard Mouw who says that there is an 
"important distinction between redemptive and masochistic suffering."117  Christ's penal 
substitution is an example of redemptive suffering and as such is a morally praiseworthy 
example of robust love and not a valorization of victimization.  He notes, 
We can all imagine situations in which we would give up something of 
ourselves in the interest of others.  As a parent, I gladly do certain things 
for my children, even if there is a personal cost attached.  I like to think 
that I would even be willing to die, if that were necessary to save my 
children's lives.  We all view self-sacrifice—the giving of oneself for the 
sake of others—as appropriate in certain circumstances...Though not all 
                                                 
 
116 We might even say that the Father also suffers in the infliction of the suffering. On this theme see Jürgen 
Moltmann, The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology, 
translated by R.A. Wilson and John Bowden (New York: Harper & Row, 1974). 
 
117 Richard J. Mouw, "Violence and the Atonement," Books & Culture (Jan./Feb., 2001), 15.  Cited in 
Boersma, Hans. "Eschatological Justice and the Cross: Violence and Penal Substitution," p. 196. 
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self-sacrifice is appropriate (and it is important not to lose sight of this 
fact), in certain circumstances it may be a perfectly right thing to do.118 
 
Similarly, the kidney donor is active in accepting the suffering inflicted by the doctor.  
Here we have an instance of active acceptance of suffering that is worthy of moral praise 
rather than an accusation of unhealthy passivity or masochism.119   
 This principle of robust love does not valorize suffering for the sake of suffering, 
rather it seeks the good of others even if suffering must be endured in order to procure 
that good.120  As a result, this principle is consistent with advocating for victims in a way 
that seeks to rid the world of the sort of victimization that feminists rightly want to avoid.   
For example, the same principle of robust love that motivates Christ's suffering in the 
Cross could also motivate a battered wife to move out of her home.  The wife's withdrawl 
from her husband can be an act of love whereby she seeks to awaken her husband to his 
culpability in abuse121  and remove from him this opportunity to perpetuate his violence 
and deepen his culpability.122  In this accountability she calls him to repentance and 
                                                 
 
118 Boersma, Hans. "Eschatological Justice and the Cross: Violence and Penal Substitution," p. 196. 
 
119 Williams uses a different example.  "Imagine...the father who directs teams of Medecins Sans 
Frontieres, sending his son into an area where he and the son know that the son will suffer greatly...There is 
no injustice here, because the purpose is good and both parties are willing" (Williams, p. 187). 
 
120 Luke Timothy Johnson also distinguishing between the acceptance of suffering as masochism and the 
acceptance of suffering as an act of robust love. "The imitation of Christ in his life of service and suffering- 
not as an act of masochism for the sake of suppressing one's own life but as an act of love for the 
enhancement of others' life- is not an optional version of Christian identity. It is the very essence of 
Christian identity" (Luke Timothy Johnson, Living Jesus: Learning the Heart of the Gospel (New York: 
HarperCollins, 1999), p. 201). This is also cited in Michael J. Gorman, Cruciformity: Paul's Narrative 
Spirituality of the Cross (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), pp. 379-380. 
 
121 See Darby Kathleen Ray, (Deceiving the Devil. Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 1998), p. 68. 
 
122 Michael J. Gorman says, "When an abused wife endures violence at the hand of her husband as an 'act 
of love,' she is unwittingly allowing her husband to betray his own commitment to love and thus to live out 
the evil desires of the old age and old self.  Accepting this violence is not an act of suffering love but—
again, unwittingly—complicity with the powers of the old age...The God revealed on the cross does not 
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rehabilitation.123  In doing this the wife promotes healthy relationships and the 
absence of oppression and abuse.124  In doing this, she pursues her husband's own good.   
This principle is also consistent with the active choice to endure suffering in order 
to publicly expose violent and oppressive power structures, as in many of the non-violent 
protests of the Civil Rights movement.125  Again, here suffering is not exalted as a virtue.  
Rather suffering is endured in the pursuit of the good of others.  Of course, much more 
can be said on this topic, but for our purposes it is enough to say that on DMP, Christ 
willingly endures suffering out of love and in pursuit of the good of fallen humans.  
Christ's penal substitution is not a glorification of the patient endurance of suffering as a 
virtue for its own sake.        
Conclusion 
 Using a divine-manifest offering approach, a theory of penal substitution can be 
developed which is both logically and morally coherent; able to avoid all fourteen 
problems presented above.  This view can be used consistently to shed light on the deep 
truths that sin is a serious problem and that God intensely loves fallen humans and 
pursues personal reconciliation with them. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
endorse the husband's violence but desires his liberation from it and, of course, the woman's protection 
from it" (Gorman, p. 378).  
 
123 See Ray, p. 35. 
 
124 See Ray, p. 53. 
 
125 On this point see Walter Wink, The Powers That Be: Theology for a New Millennium (New York: 
Doubleday, 1999). 
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 ii. Second objection and response. 
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α. Objection: This reading misinterprets sin as a 
moral concept rather than a religious concept. 
    
β. Response: There is a sense in which the moral 
and the religious are united in the God-
consciousness. 
 
3. The problematic consequences of such a state. 
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a. External consequences for sin in Schleiermacher. 
     
b. Internal consequences for sin in Schleiermacher. 
 
c. Analytic internal consequences for sin in Schleiermacher. 
 
4. The role of the human will. 
   
   a. Defect becomes sin as a result of willfulness. 
   
b. Original vs. actual sin. 
 
C. The Nature of the Solution to the Problem of Sin: Moral Perfection...........p. 60 
 
1. The solution to sin is a state of moral perfection. 
 
2. The pursuit of this solution will be confined by three parameters. 
 
a. Parameter 1: The sinner cannot transform on her own strength. 
 
b. Parameter 2: The sinner’s will is the gateway to transformation. 
 
c. Parameter 3: God respects human freedom. 
 
3. One problem for this reading and my response. 
 
a. Problem: This reading implies that the problem of sin is that we 
are not willing to receive the God-consciousness which must be 
present in order for sin to exist. 
 
b. Response: A part of the God-consciousness will be present in us 
despite our attitude; another part can be imparted to us only with 
the consent of our will.   
 
 D. The Role of the Cross in the Solution...........................................................p. 67 
 
1. Christ, in the Cross, attracts us to God’s project of transformation. 
     
a. By revealing Christ’s blessedness. 
    
   b. By inviting us to join in Christ’s blessedness. 
 
2. Once we are opened to God, God can begin God’s project of 
transformation in us. 
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E. Final Evaluation of Schleiermacher’s Conception of Sin and Its Solution...p. 69 
 
1. A Schleiermachian satisfaction theory could escape Pproblem (2), the 
problem of superfluous suffering. 
 
2. A Schleiermachian satisfaction theory is vulnerable to problem (3), the 
appeal to robust love. 
 
3. A Schleiermachian satisfaction theory is vulnerable to problem (6), the 
impotence problem. 
 
IV. Kierkegaard’s Conception of the Problem of Sin and Its Solution.........................p. 73 
 
 A. Introduction...................................................................................................p. 73 
 
  1. Section overview. 
 
2. Thesis: A Kierkegaardian understanding of the problem of sin, can 
justify the necessity of the Cross in a way that preserves the benefits of the 
third conception while avoiding the problems to which such a conception 
is susceptible. 
 
 B. The Problem of Sin.......................................................................................p. 74 
  
  1. Sin as a state of alienation from God. 
 
   a. Sin is not defined merely as a type of action. 
 
b. The conditions under which the state of sin is possible. 
  
 i. Human dependence. 
 
 ii. Human freedom. 
 
   c. The manner in which the state of sin is realized. 
   
2. The problematic consequences of such a state. 
 
 a. External and internal consequences. 
 
 b. Analytic internal consequences. 
 
  3. The role of the human will. 
 
 272 
 
C. The Nature of the Solution to the Problem of Sin: Faith..............................p. 82 
 
1. The solution to sin is a state of faith. 
 
 a. An explication of De Silentio's view. 
 
i. On Fear and Trembling as a meditation on the question 
of trust. 
 
  ii. On trust and infinite resignation. 
 
  iii. On trust and the teleological suspension of the ethical. 
 
  iv. On trust and the absolute relation to the Absolute. 
   
   b. One problem for this reading and my response. 
 
i. Problem: This reading puts De Silentio in the unpalatable 
position of being a divine-command theorist, allowing the 
possibility of evil divine commands. 
 
ii. Response: This reading separates God's goodness and 
God's person only by abstraction. 
 
3. The pursuit of this solution will be confined by three  
parameters. 
 
a. Parameter 1: The sinner cannot transform on her own strength. 
 
b. Parameter 2: The sinner’s will is the gateway to transformation. 
 
c. Parameter 3: God respects human freedom. 
   
D. The Role of the Cross in the Solution...........................................................p. 95 
 
 1. Christ, in the Cross, invites and draws us to relationship with God. 
   
  a. By revealing our state of alienation. 
 
  b. By revealing God's Love. 
 
2. This reading is compatible with Murray Rae's interpretation of 
Kierkegaard's theory of atonement. 
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E. Final Evaluation of Kierkegaard’s Conception of Sin and Salvation..........p. 98 
 
1. A Kierkegaardian satisfaction theory could escape problem (2), the 
problem of superfluous suffering. 
 
2. A Kierkegaardian satisfaction theory could escape problem (3), the 
appeal to robust love. 
 
3. A Kierkegaardian satisfaction theory could escape problem (6), the 
impotence problem. 
 
CHAPTER TWO:  SATISFACTION AND GOD'S EXTENSION OF 
FORGIVENESS.........................................................................................................p. 100 
 
I. Introduction..............................................................................................................p. 100 
 
 A. Chapter Overview.......................................................................................p. 100 
 
B. Thesis: By arguing that God's demanding satisfaction contributes to human 
appropriation of divine forgiveness-as-restoration. Aquinas, unlike Anselm, 
develops a satisfaction theory that might escape the six problems for 
satisfaction.......................................................................................................p. 101 
 
II. Personal Reconciliation, Forgiveness, and Satisfaction.........................................p. 101 
 
 A. Personal Reconciliation and Forgiveness...................................................p. 102 
 
  1. Three conceptions of forgiveness. 
    
a. Forgiveness-as-pardon. 
 
i. This is not necessary for personal reconciliation. 
 
ii. This can be given without regard to the offender's 
response. 
    
b. Forgiveness-as-letting go.  
 
i. This is necessary for personal reconciliation. 
 
ii. This can be given without regard to the offender's 
response. 
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ii. This neither requires nor is necessary for 
forgiveness-as-pardon. 
 
c. Forgiveness-as-restoration. 
 
i. This is the offended party's entrance into personal 
reconciliation. 
 
ii. This cannot be given without regard to the offender's 
response, only offered. 
 
iii. This neither requires nor is necessary for forgiveness-
as-pardon. 
 
iii. This is not necessary for forgiveness-as-letting go, but 
forgiveness-as-letting go is necessary for forgiveness-as-
restoration. 
 
   d. Summary. 
 
2. Three objections to this analysis and my responses. 
 
a. First objection and response. 
 
i. Objection: This analysis neglects forgiveness as a 
bracketing off of wrongdoing. 
 
ii. Response: This is not a separate type of forgiveness, but 
a common element in all three types of forgiveness. 
 
b. Second objection. 
 
i. Objection: This analysis neglects forgiveness as a 
modification of a previous moral judgment. 
 
ii. Response: Such a modification is not forgiveness since 
forgiveness must relate to wrongdoing and the modification 
declares that there was none. 
 
c. Third objection. 
 
i. Objection: This analysis neglects cases in which 
forgiveness-as-pardon and forgiveness-as-restoration are 
not distinct.  
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ii. Response: Where punishment is relational, there will 
be two different grounds upon which the offended party 
can refuse personal reconciliation.   
 
 B. God's Extension of Forgiveness-as-Restoration and Satisfaction...............p. 111 
 
1. Satisfaction is not logically necessary for God's extension of 
forgiveness-as-restoration. 
 
2. Satisfaction is not the most efficient means to God's extension of 
forgiveness-as-restoration. 
 
3. Satisfaction may allow for a benefit not attained by any other means and 
so God may require it as a condition of God's extension of forgiveness-as-
restoration. 
 
III. Anselm's Theory of Satisfaction............................................................................p. 115 
 
A. Introduction.................................................................................................p. 115 
 
 1. Section overview. 
 
2. Thesis: While Anselm's soteriology can escape (1), the ontological 
problem, it cannot escape the moral problems against satisfaction. 
 
B. Some Contemporary Readings of Anselm's Soteriology............................p. 116 
 
1. That satisfaction frees God to forgive sinners. 
 
2. That Christ's death is essential to divine satisfaction. 
 
C.  Anselm on the Divine Requirement of Satisfaction...................................p. 118 
 
1. That God pursues satisfaction to maintain God's honor. 
 
2. That God pursues satisfaction to maintain justice. 
 
3. That God pursues satisfaction to maintain "fitness." 
 
4. That God pursues satisfaction to maintain orderly beauty. 
 
D. Anselm and the Ontological Argument against Satisfaction......................p. 121 
 
1. That some accuse Anselm of vulnerability to the ontological     
argument. 
 276 
 
2. That this view is in conflict with Anselm. 
 
a. It is in conflict with Anselm’s claim that God is "that, than 
which nothing greater can be conceived." 
 
b. It is in conflict with Anselm’s claim that God does not possess 
God's nature by participation in something apart from God's Self.   
 
c. It is in conflict with Anselm’s explanation of God’s relationship 
to necessity. 
  
E. Anselm on the Object of Divine Satisfaction..............................................p. 125 
 
1. An explication of Anselm's view. 
 
a. That it seems that Anselm holds to the centrality of Christ's 
obedience and not Christ's death. 
 
b. That Anselm does hold to the salvific centrality of Christ's 
death. 
 
2. Two potential problems for this reading and my responses. 
 
a. First problem. 
 
i. Problem: How do we reconcile Anselm's claims that man 
was restored by Christ's obedience and that Christ's death 
was necessary for salvation? 
 
    ii. Response: Anselm employs "obedience" in two senses. 
 
b. Second problem. 
 
i. Problem: How can we reconcile the necessity of Christ’s 
death with the claim that God did not demand Christ’s 
death? 
 
ii. Response: Human salvation is necessary because Christ 
freely chose it, not because God demanded it. 
 
F. Anselm and the Moral Arguments against Satisfaction..............................p. 132 
 
1. That Anselm's claim that Christ's death Preserves God's honor can 
overcome problem (2), but not problem (3). 
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a. That this appeal overcomes (2) the problem of superfluous 
suffering. 
 
b. That this appeal fails to overcome (3) the appeal to robust love. 
 
2. That Anselm's claim that Christ's death preserves Divine Justice fails to 
overcome (2) the problem of superfluous suffering. 
 
3. That Anselm's claim that Christ's death preserves "fitness" and "orderly 
beauty" fails to overcome (2) the problem of superfluous suffering. 
 
IV. Aquinas's Theory of Satisfaction...........................................................................p. 137 
 
 A. Introduction.................................................................................................p. 137 
 
  1. Section overview. 
  
2. Thesis: Aquinas's satisfaction theory can overcome the moral problems 
inasmuch as he claims that God's requiring satisfaction in the absence of 
punishment of fallen humans contributes to God's project of drawing 
sinners into a union of mutual love with God. 
 
B. Aquinas on the Centrality of Christ's Passion for Divine Satisfaction........p. 138 
 
C. Aquinas on the Divine Requirement of Satisfaction...................................p. 139 
 
1. That Thomas's view is similar to Anselm's in that it links satisfaction 
with Divine Justice. 
 
2. That Thomas's view differs from Anselm's. 
 
a. According to Thomas, God could justly forgive without 
punishment or satisfaction. 
 
b. According to Thomas, God chooses to pursue satisfaction 
through Christ's Passion because it is the most merciful alternative. 
 
D. Aquinas and the Moral Arguments against Satisfaction.............................p. 144 
 
1. That Thomas can escape (2) the problem of superfluous suffering if he 
can show that there is some merciful benefit obtained by satisfaction that 
is not obtained by the alternatives to satisfaction. 
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a. That an appeal to sinners' deliverance from the debt of 
punishment does not suffice. 
 
b. That an appeal to sinners' deliverance from bondage to the devil 
does not suffice. 
 
c. That an appeal to the restoration of the good of human nature 
and the removal of the stain on the soul could suffice. 
 
i. Because if God were to force a solution, God would 
sacrifice human freedom upon which the solution depends. 
 
ii. Because God cannot simply overlook the problem as 
with the debt of punishment. 
 
iii. Because satisfaction may contribute to God's project of 
drawing humans into a relationship of mutual love. 
 
2. That Thomas can escape (3) the appeal to robust love. 
 
CHAPTER 3: SATISFACTION AND HUMAN APPROPRIATION OF 
FORGIVENESS.........................................................................................................p. 154 
 
I. Introduction..............................................................................................................p. 154    
  
A.  Thesis: Penal Substitution can be a divine tool used to elicit human 
appropriation of God's forgiveness-as-restoration.  This "divine-manifest offering 
approach" can help the accounts of satisfaction developed by Richard Swinburne 
and Eleonore Stump.........................................................................................p. 154 
  
B.  Chapter Overview......................................................................................p. 154 
 
II. Personal Reconciliation, Human Appropriation of Forgiveness, and 
Satisfaction...................................................................................................................p. 155 
  
A. Personal Reconciliation and Human Appropriation of Forgiveness...........p. 155 
 
1. Three conditions for appropriation of forgiveness. 
 
a. Belief that one is in an alienated state for which one is culpable. 
 
b. Belief that the offer of forgiveness is genuine. 
 
c. Willingness to turn from alienation and embrace personal 
reconciliation. 
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  2. An objection to this analysis and my response. 
 
a. Objection: Personal reconciliation cannot be had until an 
offender has also communicated her willingness to be reconciled to 
the offended party. 
 
b. Response: Since God, as an omniscient being, is a reader of 
human hearts, genuine repentance (in the form of the second 
doxastic condition and the volitional conditional) can function as 
the successful attainment of any communication condition for the 
appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration.   
 
 B. Human Appropriation of Forgiveness and Satisfaction..............................p. 158 
 
1. Satisfaction is not logically necessary for human appropriation of 
forgiveness-as-restoration. 
 
2. Satisfaction may be the most efficient means to human appropriation of 
forgiveness-as-restoration. 
 
a. On satisfaction as a means to the fulfillment of the volitional 
condition. 
 
i. God cannot coerce fulfillment of the volitional condition 
without destroying personal relationship. 
 
ii. Encouragement and discouragement are non-coercive 
attempts to elicit a movement of another's will. 
 
iii. Satisfaction may be part of God's encouraging an 
offender to embrace personal reconciliation and 
discouraging an offender from persisting in alienation. 
 
b. On satisfaction as a means to the fulfillment of the doxastic 
conditions. 
 
i. The manner in which evidence is made available for 
belief can affect the potential believer's movement of will. 
 
ii. Satisfaction may present evidence for the relevant beliefs 
in a manner which most successfully helps humans to meet 
the volitional condition. 
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3. Satisfaction is not necessary for some other human benefit aside 
from the appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration. 
 
III. A Divine-Manifest Offering Account of Penal Substitution.................................p. 161 
 
 A. Paul K. Moser's Divine-Manifest Offering Approach to Atonement.........p. 162 
1. The type of forgiveness relevant for personal reconciliation is 
forgiveness-as-restoration, or conciliatory forgiveness. 
 
2. An offer of conciliatory forgiveness typically aims to lead a person to 
the reception of such forgiveness. 
 
3. God offers conciliatory forgiveness to humans in the Cross. 
 
 B. Penal Substitution and Divine-Manifest Offering.......................................p. 163 
 
  1. Penal substitution and the doxastic conditions for appropriation of  
  forgiveness-as-restoration. 
 
a. On the first condition (awareness of sinful state). 
 
i. God's pursuit of atonement in any form is evidence that 
humans are in a state for which atonement is appropriate. 
 
ii. This is compatible with God's pursuing the first 
condition through other means as well. 
 
 α. Through the teaching of Jesus. 
 
 β. Through feelings of guilt. 
 
b. On the second condition (awareness of God's willingness to be 
reconciled). 
 
i. God's pursuit of atonement in any form is evidence that 
God is willing to be reconciled with humans. 
 
ii. This is compatible with God's pursuing the second 
condition through other means as well. 
     
     α. Through the teaching of Jesus. 
     
     β. Through an existential feeling of peace. 
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c. On the Cross as part of the most effective means to human 
fulfillment of these conditions. 
 
i. The Cross is attention-getting in a way that combats 
human ability to ignore evidence for the first condition. 
 
ii. The Cross is assuring in a way that combats human 
ability to doubt evidence for the second condition. 
 
2. Penal substitution and the volitional condition for appropriation of 
forgiveness-as-restoration. 
  
 a. Discouragement against alienation. 
 
  i. Penal substitution as a demonstration of danger. 
 
ii. Penal substitution as a demonstration of the value of 
divine forgiveness. 
 
 b. Encouragement towards personal reconciliation. 
 
i. Penal substitution as a demonstration of God's dealing 
with human guilt. 
 
ii. Penal substitution as a demonstration of divine justice. 
 
iii. Penal substitution as a demonstration of divine love. 
 
C.  Further Explication of this Account...........................................................p. 176 
 
1. This view can address the concern that the human will is too weak to 
meet the volitional condition on its own. 
 
2. This view can address the moral problem of sin. 
 
3. This view does not claim to be a complete account of God's work in the 
Cross.  
 
4. This view does not claim that a human's fulfillment of the volitional 
condition is dependent upon antecedent beliefs. 
 
IV. Richard Swinburne's Theory of Satisfaction.........................................................p. 182 
  
 A.  Swinburne's Account of Satisfaction.........................................................p. 183 
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B.  Swinburne and the Moral Problems against Satisfaction...........................p. 188 
 
1. Swinburne is confronted with (2) and (3), the moral problems against 
satisfaction, by his critics. 
 
2. Swinburne could escape these problems by appealing to a unique 
benefit of Christ's reparation and penance. 
 
a. Swinburne cannot escape these problems by appealing to the 
ability of Christ's reparation and penance to elicit God's 
forgiveness.  
  
b. Swinburne cannot escape these problems through his appeal to 
the "fittingness" of reparation. 
 
c.Swinburne cannot escape these problems by appealing to the 
opportunity for us to "affirm our identities as agents." 
 
d. Swinburne can escape these problems insofar as Christ's 
reparation and penance contribute to a wrongdoer's repentance. 
  
  3. An objection to this reading of Swinburne and my response. 
 
a. Objection:  On Swinburne's account repentance precedes 
reparation and penance. 
 
b. Response: It is consistent with Swinburne's account to claim that 
God's provision of Christ's sacrifice (now available for human use) 
precedes human repentance and can function in such a way as to 
encourage the sort of repentance that will offer Christ's sacrifice as 
one's own reparation and penance. 
 
C. Swinburnian Satisfaction and the Divine-Manifest Offering View of Penal 
Substitution......................................................................................................p. 196 
 
1. That these views are compatible. 
 
a. That a divine-manifest offering view of Swinburnian satisfaction 
is compatible with a divine-manifest offering view of penal 
substitution. 
 
b. An objection to this claim and my response. 
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i. Objection: Holding both views forces one to claim 
that God both offers and does not offer forgiveness-as-
restoration in the Cross. 
 
ii. Response: It is coherent to hold that God manifests both 
a first-order and second-order offer in the Cross. 
 
2. That this compatibility can assist with Swinburne's Aquinas 
interpretation.  
 
a. That Swinburne's account struggles to distinguish between 
satisfaction and sacrifice in Aquinas. 
 
b. That Aquinas distinguishes between satisfaction and sacrifice. 
 
c. That a divine-manifest offering view of satisfaction can 
harmonize simultaneous roles for satisfaction and sacrifice. 
 
V. Eleonore Stump's Theory of Satisfaction................................................................p. 198 
  
 A. Stump's Account of Satisfaction.................................................................p. 199 
   
B. Objections to Stump's Account...................................................................p. 203 
   
1. Stump's account does not consistently distinguish between the problem 
of past sin and the problem of future sin.  
   
2. Stump's account does not appear to be a theory of vicarious satisfaction 
as she claims. 
 
C. Stump's Account and the Divine-Manifest Offering View of Penal 
Substitution......................................................................................................p. 205 
 
1. The divine-manifest offering view of penal substitution can help Stump 
to avoid the two problems presented. 
 
2. The divine-manifest offering view of penal Substitution can assist with 
Stump's Aquinas interpretation.  
 
a. With it Stump could account for Aquinas's references to penal 
substitution and God's severity. 
 
b. With it Stump could maintain a clearer role for Thomist 
exemplarism. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: A DIVINE-MANIFEST OFFERING APPROACH TO 
PENAL SUBSTITUTION AND THE OBJECTIONS AGAINST PENAL 
SUBSTITUTION.......................................................................................................p. 209 
 
I. Introduction..............................................................................................................p. 209 
 
A. Thesis: A divine-manifest offering approach to penal substitution can 
overcome the fourteen objections against penal substitution..........................p. 209 
 
 B. Chapter Overview.......................................................................................p. 209 
 
II. A Divine-Manifest Offering Approach to Penal Substitution (DMP) and the Problems 
for Penal Substitution as a Theory of Satisfaction.......................................................p. 209 
 
A. A Response to (1) the Ontological Argument against Satisfaction............p. 210 
 
1. That there is no authority outside of God that restricts God's choice to 
give forgiveness-as-pardon, forgiveness-as-letting go, or offer forgiveness-
as-restoration. 
 
2. That God chooses to require satisfaction through penal substitution 
because of its effectiveness in drawing free humans into personal 
reconciliation. 
  
3. That God's inability to force or overlook the necessary human 
movement is not a limit to God's omnipotence.  
  
B. Responses to (2–3) the Moral Arguments against Satisfaction...................p. 211 
  
  1. A response to (2) the problem of superfluous suffering. 
 
a. DMP offers plausible, though not definitive, escape.  
 
i. That it only needs to be shown that penal substitution 
effectively encourages one more person to be open to 
appropriation than would be encouraged without penal 
substitution. 
 
ii. That the popularity of penal substitution indicates that 
this is plausible. 
 
b. An objection to this argument and my response. 
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i. Objection: That someone might object saying that the 
seeming logical and moral problems of penal substitution 
could lead to fewer people responding to God's offering in 
the Cross. 
 
ii. Response: That the compatibility of DMP with other 
theories of atonement allows for plausible escape from this 
objection.  
  
  2. A response to (3) the appeal to robust love. 
  
a. That God chooses to require penal substitution in the absence of 
direct divine punishment of fallen humans for the sake of humans 
who would not otherwise appropriate forgiveness-as-restoration. 
 
  b. That this other-focused approach is consistent with robust love. 
   
C. Responses to (4–6) the Conceptual Arguments against Satisfaction..........p. 214 
 
1. Responses to (4) the forgiveness problem. 
 
a. An overview of the responses given. 
 
b. The forgiveness problem and legal reconciliation. 
 
i. That there is a distinction between forgiveness-as-pardon 
of a debt and forgiveness-as-pardon of a person. 
 
ii. That penal substitution cannot escape the forgiveness 
problem as it relates to forgiveness-as-pardon of a debt. 
 
iii. That penal substitution can escape the forgiveness 
problem as it relates to forgiveness-as-pardon of a person. 
 
c. The forgiveness problem and personal reconciliation. 
 
i. That forgiveness-as-pardon is distinct from forgiveness-
as-letting-go and forgiveness-as-restoration. 
 
ii. That DMP can escape the forgiveness problem as it 
relates to forgiveness-as-letting-go and forgiveness-as-
restoration. 
 
 d. An objection to this argument and my response. 
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i. Objection: Forgiveness-as-pardon of a debt and 
forgiveness-as-restoration are not distinct in the divine-
human situation because the due punishment is God's 
refusal of personal reconciliation. 
 
ii. Response: The distinction holds because God can refuse 
personal reconciliation on the ground of punishment or on 
the ground of God's free personal prerogative.    
 
2. Responses to (5) the damnation problem. 
 
a. First response: Damnation is possible even after legal 
reconciliation has taken place. 
 
i. That the damnation resulting from a lack of legal 
reconciliation (to which satisfaction directly pertains) is 
distinct from the damnation resulting from a lack of 
personal reconciliation. 
 
ii. That the damnation corresponding to a lack of legal 
reconciliation corresponds to God's active wrath while the 
damnation corresponding to a lack of personal 
reconciliation with God corresponds to God's passive 
wrath. 
 
b. Second response: Christ's Satisfaction is only applied to those 
who are open to appropriating God's extension of forgiveness-as-
restoration.   
 
3. A response to (6) the impotence problem. 
 
a. That satisfaction can escape this problem if it can relate legal 
reconciliation to personal reconciliation. 
 
b. That personal reconciliation involves two things. 
 
i. An offer of forgiveness-as-restoration on the part of the 
offended party. 
 
ii. Appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration on the part 
of the offender. 
  
c. That DMP claims that God's pursuing legal reconciliation 
through penal substitution elicits human appropriation of God's 
forgiveness-as-restoration. 
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III. A Divine-Manifest Offering Approach to Penal Substitution and the Problems for 
Penal Substitution as Vicarious Satisfaction................................................................p. 226 
 
A. A Response to (7) the Attack on the Possibility of Vicarious 
Satisfaction.......................................................................................................p. 226 
 
  1.  An overview of the response given. 
  2.  On guilt and moral debt. 
a. That some derive the non-transferability of moral debt from the 
relationship of moral debt and guilt. 
 
b. That guilt, as an expression of an agent's performance of a 
blameworthy action, is non-transferable. 
 
   c. That guilt and moral debt are distinct. 
d. That the non-transferability of guilt does not entail the non-
transferability moral debt (including a debt of punishment). 
 
e. That this distinction enables DMP to avoid an appeal to "legal 
fiction. 
 
  3.  On pecuniary debt and penal debt. 
 
a. That some claim that moral debt is not transferable in a way 
analogous to pecuniary debt. 
 
i. Because pecuniary debt and penal debt are not both 
compensatory. 
 
ii. Because pecuniary debt and penal debt are not similarly 
flexible with regard to dissolution of debt. 
 
b. That penal debt is transferable in a way analogous to pecuniary 
debt. 
  
i. Because pecuniary debt and penal debt are similarly 
compensatory. 
 
α. That what is required in the case of pecuniary 
debt is not simply that the creditor avoid a financial 
loss.   
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β. That what is required in the case of pecuniary 
debt is that the debtor meet the claim of the creditor. 
 
γ.  That what is required in the case of penal debt is 
that the debtor meet the claim of the creditor. 
  
ii. Because pecuniary debt and penal debt are similarly 
flexible with regard to dissolution of debt. 
 
 α. That a debt can only be owed to a person. 
 
β. That a person to whom any debt is owed has a 
claim over the debtor which can be dissolved by 
payment from the debtor, forgiveness-as-pardon, or 
satisfaction. 
  
4.  Two objections to this argument and my responses. 
 a. First objection and response. 
i. Objection: There is a non-transferable type of moral debt 
apart from a debt of punishment. 
 
ii. Response: DMP can escape this criticism by 
distinguishing moral debt as it relates to a debt of 
punishment and moral debt as it relates to a debt of 
repentance/relational distance. 
 
 b. Second objection and response. 
i. Objection: This does not show the transferability of penal 
debt, but only a type of conditional cancellability of penal 
debt.  
    
ii. Response: Conditional cancellation is called a "transfer" 
with respect to debts and analogously can be called a 
"transfer" with respect to penal debts. 
 
 B. A Response to (8) the Attack on the Morality of Vicarious Satisfaction....p. 239 
  1. An overview of the response given. 
  2. On the rejection of vicarious satisfaction by moral intuition. 
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a. That our moral intuitions reject vicarious satisfaction in 
some cases. 
 
b. That our moral intuitions reject vicarious satisfaction in such 
cases for two reasons. 
 
i. Such a substitution defeats at least part of the purpose of 
the punishment. 
 
ii. Such a substitution is not within our moral authority. 
 
3. On the resonance of the vicarious satisfaction in DMP with moral 
intuition. 
    
a. That the purposes of punishment are still achieved on DMP. 
 
 i. The "intrinsic ends" of punishment are achieved. 
 
ii. The goal of divine-human personal reconciliation is 
plausibly most effectively achieved. 
 
iii. The "potential utilitarian ends" of punishment are 
plausibly most effectively achieved. 
 
b. That God has the moral authority to release fallen humans from 
divine punishment.  
 
i. Because God is the only one with a claim to the relevant 
divine punishment. 
 
ii. Because God's forgiveness-as-pardon does not unjustly 
impinge on human victims' claims to punishment.  
 
α. For God's forgiveness-as-pardon is compatible 
with punishment on behalf of human victims. 
 
β. For God has the moral authority to command 
humans to release their claim to punishment. 
  
 C. Summary.....................................................................................................p. 247 
 
IV. A Divine-Manifest Offering Approach to Penal Substitution and the Problems for 
Penal Substitution as Penal..........................................................................................p. 248 
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A. Responses to (9–10) Attacks on the Possibility of Christ's Enduring 
Sinners' Punishment.........................................................................................p. 248 
 
1. A response to (9) the claim that an innocent person cannot be punished. 
 
   a. That we use "punishment" in a narrow and a broad sense. 
 
   b. That Christ could not be punished in the narrow sense, but could 
   be punished in the broad sense. 
  
2. A response to (10) the claim that one person cannot endure the 
punishment of many. 
 
a. That it is unlikely that Christ served a quantity of punishment 
that matches the quantity of punishment owed by multiple sinners. 
 
b. That God is free to determine that the value to God of Christ's 
substitution is equivalent to the value to God of sinners enduring 
the punishment that they owe. 
 
B. Responses to (11) the Attack on the Claim that Christ Actually Endured Such 
Punishment.......................................................................................................p. 252 
 
1. First response: The divine punishment due to sinners is not everlasting 
punishment. 
 
2. Second response: The spiritual death which is the punishment for sin 
has everlasting results for typical humans but Christ can endure such a 
death without everlasting results. 
 
3. Third response: Christ endures a limited amount of the same quality of 
punishment due to humans which is accepted by God as full satisfaction 
for the debt of punishment. 
 
4. Fourth response: Christ endures a limited amount of the same quality  of 
punishment due to humans which is accepted by God as partial 
satisfaction for the debt of punishment. 
 
 C. Responses to (12–14) the Moral Attacks on Vicarious Punishment...........p. 255 
  1. A Response to (12) the objection against retributive punishment. 
a. That God's pursuit of retributive punishment is distinct from 
revenge. 
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b. That retributive punishment for its own sake may be 
incompatible with robust love. 
 
c. That God does not pursue retributive punishment for its own 
sake but for its usefulness in eliciting openness to appropriation of 
God's forgiveness-as-restoration from humans. 
 
  2. A Response to (13) the objection against punishing an innocent. 
a. That it is sometimes morally permissible to allow an innocent 
person to receive suffering that he does not deserve. 
 
 i. When the suffering is endured for the benefit of another. 
 
ii. When the suffering is endured with the autonomous 
consent of the sufferer. 
 
b. That this enables DMP to respond to the accusation that penal 
substitution involves "divine child abuse." 
 
c. That this enables DMP to respond to the accusation that penal 
substitution involves divine sadism. 
 
3. A response to (14) the claim that penal substitution valorizes 
victimization. 
 
a. That Christ does not endure suffering for its own sake, but 
pursues the good of humans even if suffering must be endured to 
obtain it. 
 
b. This principle is consistent with denouncing victimization. 
 
c. This principle is consistent with other active choices to endure 
suffering to procure some other good or expose evil. 
 
V. Conclusion..............................................................................................................p. 263 
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